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"Implementation is worth studying 
precisely because it is a struggle 
over the realisation of ideas. It is 
the analytical equivalent of original 
sin; there is no escape from 
implementation and its attendant 
responsibilities. What has policy 
wrought? Having tasted of the fruit 
of the tree of knowledge, the 
implementer can only answer, and with 
conviction, it depends. ... 
" 
Pressman, J. and Wildavsky, A. (1979) 
Implementation, 2nd edition, Uni- 
versity of California Press, 
Berkeley, p. 194. 
SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
This dissertation examines the-'implementation gap' and 
reports evidence on progress in implementing closure of 
health services at micro-implementation level. 
Specifically, the research develops an historically 
bound, processual and contextual account of the 
development and fate of permanent closures of General 
Practitioner Maternity Units (GPMU) in four 
neighbouring Oxford DHAs. 
The major objectives of this study are to illustrate 
and analyse the process by which the 'implementation 
gap' is closed and to identify. some of the potentially 
important factors which help to explain the pace and 
rate of change differential across health districts. 
The key questions, guiding the research include: What 
affects the pace of implementation? Why do districts 
fail or succeed in implementing change? What affects 
the 'implementability' of the GPMU closure proposals? 
To make further progress towards an understanding of 
implementation, this research adopts a new, eclectic, 
and integrative approach: the Contextualist Approach. 
One major theme underlying most of the results and 
ideas presented here, is that the outcome of 
implementation can be explained by the interplay 
between the content, the context and the process of 
implementation itself. 
The research is essentially qualitative. The data 
collection process comprises three main activities: 
documentary search, in-depth interviews, and 
ethnographic material. The strategy of data 
presentation and analysis was to develop a descriptive 
framework for organising the data (Yin, 1989). 
A set of three interacting groups of factors is found 
to affect implementability and rate and pace of change 
at micro-implementation level - the nature of the 
locale, leadership, and the quality of the proposal 
itself. 
Although other authors 
policy, this research 
extensive treatment of 
under investigation. 
investigate partial, as 
hospitals within the 
particular emphasis on t 
have studied health service 
is unique in offering an 
the changing policy context 
It is also the first to 
opposed to total, closure of 
context of the NHS, with 
he GPMU. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
This empirical research aims to study the gap 
which often exists in public hospitals between 
statements of intentions and their operational 
implementation. The question of closing the 
"implementation gap" (Dunshire, 1978) is one of the 
fundamental issues facing any large-scale organisation 
whether public or - commercial. - Closing-- the 
implementation gap is required not only because of the 
pressing need,, to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public organisations, but also because 
of the necessity to re-build credibility in public 
sector management and confidence in the public manager. 
This dissertation examines the implementation of 
permanent closure of General Practitioner Maternity 
Units (GPMUs) by four District Health Authorities (DHA) 
which form part of the-Oxford Regional Health Authority 
(ORHA). The GPMUs studied in this research are: 
(1) the Amersham GPMU in the Wycombe health district; 
(2) the Abingdon GPMU in the Oxfordshire health 
district; (3) the Bletchley GPMU-and Westbury Maternity 
Home in the new Milton Keynes health district; and (4) 
the Isebrook GPMU in the Kettering health district. 
It is important to distinguish between GPMUs and 
consultant obstetric wards. The latter provide 
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specialist obstetric medical care for all women but 
particularly for those at higher risk. GPMUs provide 
General Practitioner's (GP) obstetric and midwifery 
care to women- who have- been selected during the 
antenatal period as being at low risk. These units 
have access to emergency cover from the local 
consultant obstetric ward. 
Where GP units are either located within a 
hospital with a consultant obstetric department or 
adjacent to consultant maternity hospitals, they are 
designated as "integrated" GP units. Where they are 
not within a hospital with a consultant department, 
they are usually referred to, particularly by the 
proponents of their closure, as "isolated" GPMUs 
because they have no resident medical officers and 
limited anaesthetic facilities. In the Oxford health 
region, and for the purpose of this research, these 
units are generally called "peripheral" GPMUs because 
of their location in small hospitals at some distance 
from the central DGHs (District General Hospital). 
The process of implementation in the public sector 
can be studied at two different levels: (1) the macro- 
implementation level, and (2) the micro-implementation 
level (Berman, 1978; Scheirer; 1981). 
"The central government must execute its 
policy so as to influence local delivery 
organisations to behave in desired ways; we 
call this the macro-implementation problem. 
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In response to central actions, the local 
organisations have to -devise and carry out 
their own internal policies; we call this the 
micro-implementation problem. " (Berman, 1978, 
p. 164) 
In the UK, Dunshire (1978), Barrett & Fudge 
(1981), Levis & Wallace (1984), and Hogwood & Gunn 
(1986) have led the theoretical, conceptual, and 
empirical development in the field of macro- 
implementation. Others such as Klein (1980), Ham 
(1981), Haywood and Hunter (1982), Hunter (1983,1986), 
and Hunter and Wistow (1987) have considered the issues 
in the NHS and stressed the gap between national policy 
and local strategy. 
"There is mounting evidence that 
governmental, and DHSS, preferences on 
priorities are not always accorded precedence 
locally" (Haywood and Hunter, 1982, p. 159). 
This research highlights some of the 
implementation problems at the micro-implementation 
level. The focus on micro-implementation problems is, 
however, not meant to be at the cost of ignoring 
completely the macro-implementation level. The latter 
will be treated as an important element of the wider 
context in which the districts operate. 
The study investigates the relationship between 
intended and realised change within local DHAs. A 
recent contribution by Pettigrew (1985) has been to 
suggest, and then to illustrate empirically, using the 
example, of a large and complex British firm that 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION Page 3 
realised change results from the relationship and the 
interplay between three sets of factors: (1) the 
content of change; (2) the context of change, which 
includes both the external conditions and the internal 
organisational characteristics; and (3) the process of 
managing change. The context, content, and process 
framework is guiding this investigation into the 
closure of GPMUs. 
The methodology used to gather data for this 
research was a form of longitudinal field research 
developed at the Centre for Corporate Strategy and 
Change (CCSC), University of Warwick for use in the 
study of change in both private and public sector 
organisations (Pettigrew; 1985,1990). In terms of 
fieldwork, this approach entailed the analysis of a 
broad range of documentary and archive material, 
secondary quantitative indicators, semi-structured 
interviews with key participants, and observational 
material. 
The Closure of Health Facilities in England 
In England, the closure and conversion of health 
facilities has become an increasingly common 
phenomenon. As Hardy (1985) pointed out, 
"In the public sector, government policies 
involving massive expenditure cuts have led 
to redundancies and the reduction of 
services. In the health services, for 
example, hospital closures have become 
relatively commonplace. " (p. xi) 
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The closure of hospitals, however, remains a 
sensitive political issue. Data on closure in the NHS 
is not readily available and is disclosed with caution. 
"It is important to bear in mind, however, 
that closures are very often balanced by 
openings or other reprovision and are not, in 
themselves, much of an index to anything at 
all. Again, information of this nature is 
only available locally". 
DHSS Senior Officer 
In the nine years from 1979-1987, over five 
hundred hospitals or health facilities were affected by 
permanent closure proposals. In the last two years 
alone (1988 & 1989), an additional two hundred and 
thirty three facilities were closed. (Figure 1-0). 
K 
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Figure 1-0 
Cumulative Number of Total Closures of NHS Hospitals 
and Health Facilities, 1979 - 1989. 
Total 
number of 
closures 
700. 
600. 
500. 
400. 
300. 
200. 
100. 
000 
Years 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
n: 35 42 54 22 76 86 43 76 67 132 101 
GRAND TOTAL: 734 
min: 22 
max: 132 
average: 66 
Source: Data provided by the DHSS. 
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Partial closure of hospitals is also becoming more 
frequent in the NHS (see Table 1-0). 
Table 1-0 
Number of Partial Closure of NHS Hospitals 
and Health Facilities 
1979 - 1989 
64 17 4 18 27 19 29 34 72 46 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Source: Data provided by the DHSS. 
Yet, despite their prevalence and significance, 
research into closure phenomena in the NHS has been 
limited. Anecdotal case reports on some of these 
closures of health facilities exist and journalistic 
accounts are plentiful. With a few exceptions, namely 
those of Korman & Simons (1978), Korman & Glennerster 
(1985,1990), Hardy (1985), Tomlinson (1988), and the 
CCSC's series (Pettigrew et al, 1989,1990, forthcoming 
1991), there is a paucity of British empirical study of 
the implementation of closure in hospitals. 
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The Closure of GPMUs 
The closure of peripheral GPMUs has been a 
consistent feature of Government policy since the Peel 
Report in 1970 which stated that they should be 
replaced by large integrated consultant and GP units 
(see Chapter five). By the time of the 1974 
reorganisation there were 221 peripheral GPMUs which 
were accounting for over 10% of all births occurring in 
the NHS hospitals. In 1986, about 2% of all births in 
England took place in the remaining-'94 peripheral GPMUs 
still in use and the total number of obstetric and 
maternity units in England represented only 66% of the 
number of units available in 1973 (Figure 1-1). 
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Figure 1-1 
Proportion of Obstetric and Maternity Units 
1973,1978, and 1985 
England 
100% 
90% . INTEGRATED GPMUs . 
80% 
70ý . 
60% . PERIPHERAL GPMUs 
50% . 
40% 
30% . 
20% . . 
10% . OBSTETRIC WARDS 6% 
Year 1973 1978 1985 
Integrated 
Peripheral 
obstetrics 
TOTAL: 
n% 
87 (16%) 
221 (42%) 
219 (42%) 
527 (100%) 
n% 
106 (25%) 
148 (359) 
169 (40%) 
423 (100%) 
n 
111 (32%) 
103 (29%) 
137 (39%) 
351 (100%) 
Source: Drawn using data provided by the National 
Perinatal Epidemiology Unit (NPMU), Oxford. 
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The proportion of peripheral GPMU has decreased 
from 42% in 1973 to 29% in 1985 whereas the proportion 
of integrated GPMUs has increased from'16% to 32%. In 
that respect the policy is being implemented 
successfully. 
The closure of GPMUs is a relatively old and, 
somehow, less exciting issue as compared to other more 
recent strategic concerns such as AIDS, the increase of 
day-care services, and the development of -, community 
based psychiatric services. In contrast with these 
strategic concerns, the closure of a GPMU is a 
relatively short saga which, if unsuccessful, can be 
repeated within a short period of time. Closure 
generally involves, however, more strategic levels of 
choice than is the case with simple routine decision- 
making. It falls within the category of "middle-range 
decisions" (Hunter, 1980). 
"The outcomes of middle-range decision at- 
health board level can have an impact on 
broader, more strategic - policy-making 
activity. Indeed, middle-range decision 
making is often a substitute for macro-policy 
making, which aims at a more synoptic 
approach and one that decision-makers find 
difficulty in adopting" (p. 6). 
The closure of a maternity unit is also a H, more 
bureaucratic issue as compared to current strategic 
concerns as listed above. The circumstances and 
process of closure are governed by a number of 
procedures which allow, however, for a fairly wide 
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variation in the timing, scope, and content of 
implementation. 
The closure of a GPMU is a relatively complex 
change phenomenon. The closure not only affects the 
patients, the staff, and the resources directly 
involved in the provision of the services, but it also 
has implications for the whole range of supporting 
services. It has consequences for the practice of some 
local GPs and midwives. It has to be considered 
concurrently within the National norms and priorities, 
the Regional strategies, and the local circumstances 
and particular past history and tradition. It could 
hardly be isolated either from other capital and 
revenue expenditure or from alternative rationalisation 
and improvements to be achieved in the pattern of 
services. Besides, clear and indisputable "performance 
indicators" (PI) to assess and compare local obstetric 
and maternity services do not exist (Malek & Spencer, 
1984; Pollitt, 1985; Campbell & Macfarlane, 1987) and 
the short and medium range planning of maternity 
services has proved extremely difficult in the last two 
decades because of the unpredictable fluctuation of 
pregnancies from year to year (Mugford & Stilwell, 
1986). 
The planning procedure leading towards the closure 
of health facilities has a high level of visibility and 
involves a large number of parties with various and 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION Page 11 
often conflicting interests. As Korman & Simon (1978) 
pointed out: 
"Hospital closures entail a decision making 
process which brings into play judgements on 
clinical practice, assessment of potential 
economic gains or losses, compliance with 
national standards of provision and community 
needs. These judgements are likely to be 
made by different groups -who may arrive at 
quite different conclusions about the same 
situation"(p. 147) 
The procedure has a high local political and media 
profile. In order for one District Health Authority 
(DHA) to close a local health facility, it is necessary 
that the Authority draws the attention and seeks the 
reaction of a wide-range of advisory and bureaucratic 
bodies as well as external interest groups representing 
employees, consumers, professionals, staff, local 
authorities, voluntary bodies etc. In some cases the 
Secretary of State's approval might also be needed to 
proceed. 
The permanent closure of a maternity unit is a 
collective enterprise involving local interdependent 
social actors. According to the DHSS's circular which 
set out the procedures in relation to closure and 
change of use of health facilities, 
"In general, responsibility for determining 
the closure or change of use of health 
buildings rests with the Area Health 
Authority (District Health Authority since- 
the 1982 reorganisation) subject to the 
formal agreement of the Community Health 
Council. Where sufficient local agreement 
exists, it should be possible to move the 
proposal to close (or change of use) to 
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actual closure or change of use within a 
period of six months" (DHSS Circular HSC (IS) 
127, p. 1) 
The outcome of the process of closure is often 
uncertain. The previous research on closure 
particularly in the public sector has shown that few 
proposals are carried out free from opposition and 
without any significant modification to the original 
intent (Bardach, 1976; Behn, 1978; Brewer, 1978; Ellis, 
1983) . 
Inasmuch as maternity service closures are 
relatively complex and uncertain, decided by 
interdependent agencies involving many parties with 
conflicting interests, it may be difficult to implement 
them successfully. 
The Research Contribution 
The unique contribution of this research will be 
to develop an historically bounded, processual and 
contextual account of the development and fate of four 
permanent closures of GPMUs in England from 1982 to 
1989. The study focuses on the context in which these 
closure proposals were implemented as well as on the 
actions undertaken by the proponents of the closure and 
by their opponents. It highlights the key features and 
factors which could be associated with the response to, 
and fate of, the proposals. This-will- help in 
answering two basic substantive questions: What affects 
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the pace of implementation? Why do districts fail or 
succeed in implementing change desirable by the DHSS in 
the provision of local health care services? 
It is hoped that this research will contribute to 
knowledge in the area of implementation in°a number of 
ways. First, this research explores and-probes the 
notion of implementation in an empirical sense. There 
can be no doubt that the debate over what constitutes 
implementation has not yet been resolved (see Chapter 
two). In addition, this research deals" with the 
management of change at DHA level, and with the closure 
of hospital services, both areas where the usefulness 
of the implementation concept has not been 
investigated. 
More precisely, this research examines those 
contextual factors and features which 'constrained the 
response of four DHAs facing the same longstanding 
policy: the replacement of small peripheral GPMUs by 
larger combined consultant and GP units. This area is 
one where little empirical research of a longitudinal 
nature has been undertaken. It is hoped that the 
findings will-be of use to future researchers' in this 
area. 
Finally, it is hoped that this research will 
contribute to knowledge because it - empirically 
describes and analyses how some Districts were, or were 
not, able to implement the proposals. This may permit 
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other DHAs to avoid some of the difficulties in 
implementing similar proposals. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
This chapter has introduced the subject of what 
this research is about: the gap between statement of 
intentions and their operational implementation. 
Chapter two reviews the conceptual foundations and the 
theoretical perspectives of. implementation, together 
with their advantages and limitations. Chapter three 
presents the research framework, reviews the existing 
literature on closure in the NHS and enumerates the 
main questions that will be dealt with in this study. 
Chapter four presents the design and methodology used 
in the research. Chapter five-outlines the changing 
context of maternity services and the general 
environment in which the closure of the GPMUs took 
place. Chapters six to nine consist of the empirical 
description and individual discussion of the four case- 
studies. Chapter ten takes a broad look at the 
district's responses to the national policy, outlines 
the pattern emerging from the case studies, reviews the 
theoretical approaches to implementation in the light 
of the empirical evidence of the research, and offers a 
concluding'summary of the key research findings. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Conceptual Foundations and the Theoretical 
Perspectives of Implementation 
This chapter has three sections. The first 
section specifies which literature the study draws upon 
sY 
in addressing the broad problem of implementation. The 
second section summarises and critically evaluates the 
various theoretical perspectives on implementation to 
be found in the literature. A summary of the key 
points emerging from the literature and a discussion of 
the motives for the diversity of perspectives conclude 
the chapter. 
As Van Meter & Van Horn (1975) indicated, there is 
a rich heritage from the social sciences that is often 
overlooked by those attempting to discuss 
implementation process. The problem is that what is 
known about implementation is fragmented among several 
fields of knowledge that cut across a number of 
academic social science disciplines, including 
organisational theory and political science (Hrebiniak 
& Joyce, 1984; Hyder, 1984). 
The need to build a bridge between organisational 
theory and public policy has recently been stressed by 
a number of organisational theorists (Hall & Quinn, 
1983; Pennings, 1985). It has also been emphasised in a 
number of recent contributions to- the health care 
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management literature (Marmor & Dunham, 1983; Shortell, 
1984; Ham & Towell, 1985; Champagne et al, 1987) . This 
research has been guided by the diverse bodies of 
literature from public policy and organisation theory. 
The Concept of Implementation 
Implementation has been referred to as an "elusive 
phenomenon" (Bourgeois & Brodwin, - 1984; Lewis & 
Wallace, 1984). Most scholars view implementation as a 
stage between a-decision and operations and describe it 
in quite positive terms, such as "making strategy 
happen" (Stonich, 1982) or "putting ideas into 
practice" (Hyder, 1984). Ironically, most influential 
research has mainly used descriptions of failures, 
mistakes, and breakdowns of implementation (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973; Bardach, 1977; Berman & McLaughlin, 
1978). 
There are numerous difficulties in adopting a 
precise definition of implementation. As Scheirer 
(1981) indicated, - 
"A more precise definition -is probably 
impossible without including within the 
definition some of the analyst's theoretical 
orientation toward the problem" (p. 16). 
For instance, Nutt (1986), concurrently adopting a 
decision making and an organisational development 
perspective, described implementation as: 
"a series of steps taken by responsible 
organizational agents in planned change 
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processes to elicit compliance needed to 
install changes" (p. 230) 
Other scholars such as Ansoff (1984), Hrebiniak & Joyce 
(1984), Galbraith & Kazanjian (1986) have written 
influential books about strategy implementation without 
feeling concerned about the necessity for conceptual 
clarification. Their books contain no explicit 
definition of the notion of implementation itself. 
These authors use the traditional textbook approach to 
strategy implementation which treats implementation as 
a question of organisational design where structures 
and management processes are manipulated in concert 
with strategic goals to create a "fit" (Venkatraman & 
Camillus, 1984) between them. 
Of the many definitions, both narrow and wide, the 
most often quoted in recent British implementation 
analysis literature is the proposal offered by Barrett 
and Fudge (1981) and Barrett and Hill (1984). 
Advocating a Bargaining/Negotiation perspective, they 
defined implementation-as a: 
"political process characterized by 
negotiation, bargaining and compromise 
between those groups seeking to influence (or 
change) the action of others, and those upon 
whom influence is being brought to 
bear" (p. 238) . 
As some of the fiercest opponents of Barrett and 
her colleagues' proposals indicated, the main strength 
of this definition is that it often mirrors the 
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reality, particularly in the public and human service 
sectors, by presenting an accurate "description of what 
happens in real life" ("Hogwood & Gunn, 1986, p. 207). 
The main criticism which could be made about this 
definition is provided by Barrett & Hill (1984) 
themselves: The proposal retreats from- considering the 
context within which the process takes place. As they 
indicated: 
"We urge that individual empirical studies of 
implementation must raise questions about 
their context, we are less clear about 
exactly how that should be done without 
enlarging such research activities to such a 
degree that it may take projects beyond the 
point of manageability" (Barrett & Hill, 
1984, p. 238) 
For the purposes of this research, implementation 
refers to the stream of events, decisions of 
participants, and actions whereby intents are realised, 
frustrated, and modified over time within a particular 
context. 
Theoretical Perspectives on Implementation 
The following section offers a classification of 
the various theoretical orientations to be found in the 
implementation literature. 
Elmore (1978) has provided an early discussion of 
the various implementation approaches available in the 
literature. Using the idea of alternative 
organisational models suggested by Allison (1971) he 
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suggested four distinct models of implementation 
processes: (1) the system management model; (2) the 
bureaucratic process model; (3) the organisational 
development model; (4) the conflict. and bargaining 
model. 
The main contribution 'of Elmore's paper has been 
to point out that the literature does not support a 
single analytic model of implementation but a range of 
complementary models. However, it appears that Elmore 
(1978) was much more anxious to ascertain whether or 
not the decision making models provided by Allison were 
suitable for studying policy implementation than to 
develop an original and genuine classification of 
implementation perspectives. 
Our review of the literature identifies seventeen 
differing perspectives for studying implementation 
(Table 2-0). 
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Table 2-0 
Classification of the Various Implementation 
Perspectives Into Four Categories 
Perspectives Leading Scholars* 
THE CLASSICAL APPROACH 
- The Rational Planning Perspective (Kootz & Weighwick, 1990) 
- The Decision Making Perspective (Nutt, 1986)- 
- The Rational Tools Perspective (Bohret, 1987) 
- The Ideal Conditions of Implementation (Hogwood & Gunn, 1986)' 
- The Operational Research Perspective (Naylor & Thomas 1984) 
THE CONTINGENCY APPROACH 
- The Contingency Perspective (Ginsberg & Venkatraman, 1985) 
- The "Fit" Perspective (Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986) 
THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH 
- The Individual Characteristics (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1983) 
- The Strategy-Manager Perspective' (Szilagyi &-Schweiger, 1984) 
- The Diffusion of Innovation Perspective (Rogers, 1983) 
- The Cultural Perspective (torch, 1986) 
- The Organisational Development Perspective (McLean et al, 1982) 
THE POLITICAL APPROACH 
- The Bureaucratic Process Perspective (Lipsky, 1984) 
- The Inter-organisational Perspective (O'Toole & Montjoy, 1984) 
- The Bargaining/Negotiation Perspective (Barrett & Hill, 1984) 
- The Resource Dependency Perspective (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
- The Symbolic Implementation Perspective (Pettigrew, 1985) 
--------------- 
(*) Example of current leading scholars who have contributed in 
developing the perspective. 
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Trying to simplify the question as far as 
possible, analysis of the alternative perspectives 
reveals that they cluster into four distinct 
categories: (1) the classical approach; (2) the 
contingency approach; (3) the behavioural approach; and 
(4) the political approach. 
In outlining the theoretical perspectives which 
have been adopted by previous researchers for 
addressing the question of implementation, it must be 
stressed that these perspectives are neither mutually 
exclusive nor independent. They overlap with one 
another and could be used in a number of combinations 
to study implementation. However, for the. present 
purpose, they- will be treated according to their 
independent descriptions in the. literature. 
The Classical Approach to Implementation 
The Organisational and the Policy analysis 
"classical" models (Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; Korman 
& Glennerster, 1985) of implementation share the same 
basic assumptions. As Nakamura & Smallwood (1980) 
pointed out, during the 1920s and 1930s the policy 
literature integrated, under the heading of public 
administration, the principles of scientific management 
as a comprehensive set of rational precepts to guide 
the administrative process which was responsible for 
policy implementation. 
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The classical approach to implementation rests 
firmly on the assumptions that the whole process can be 
controlled from one centre of authority, that 
formulation and implementation are two sequential and 
discrete entities with implementation the means of 
putting intentions into effect, and that efficiency is 
the basic criterion on which to evaluate administrative 
performance (Elmore, 1978; Nakamura & Smallwood, 1980; 
Ansoff, 1984). The assumptions are that once formulated 
intentions will be implemented as, or nearly as, 
expected through a, highly rationalised structure 
controlled at the top by a small group of people who 
have the legitimate right to exercise authority. In 
other words, the- classical model is grounded in the 
assumption that implementation is a technical, non- 
political activity which proceeds in response to 
directives arising from the top. 
The classical approach encompasses the following 
five perspectives: (1) the Rational Planning 
Perspective; (2) the Decision Making Perspective; 
(3) the Rational Tools Perspective; (4) the Ideal 
Conditions of Implementation Perspective; and (5) the 
Operation Research Perspective. 
The first, the Rational Planning Perspective, 
deals only implicitly with implementation. In this 
perspective the key element= to successful 
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implementation is the methodical and sequential action 
involved in planning. The emphasis is placed on 
recognising the variety and the hierarchy of plans as 
well as on developing ways of improving the soundness 
of the planning premises which portray the environment 
in which the plan is to be carried out. The 
organisation is assumed to be relatively well-insulated 
from the rather predictable environment. It also looks 
for ways of improving the quality of the whole analysis 
which has to be undertaken before taking any action 
(Koontz and Weighwick, 1990). 
From this perspective, effective implementation 
requires clearly specified tasks and objectives as well 
as a management plan that allocates tasks and 
performance standards (Elmore, 1978): The managers have 
considerable capacity to change the organisation. The 
success or failure of implementation is judged by 
observing the discrepancy between stated intentions and 
outcomes. As Korman & Glennerster (1985) pointed out, 
it is assumed that "if outcomes differ from-intentions 
something has gone wrong. "(p. 5) 
As Champagne et al (1985,1987) pointed out, this 
perspective represents the traditional textbook 
approach to management and planning. - The adherents of 
this perspective such as Lorange & Vancil (1976), 
Steiner (1979), among many others, advocate a number of 
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strategic planning processes based on principles of 
rational decision making. They also prescribe ways of 
coupling strategies to operating plans (Hobbs & Heany, 
1983). The prototypical process includes the following 
steps: (1) assessing the opportunity; (2) setting 
objectives and goals; (3) identifying alternatives to 
achieve them; (4) deciding which one to implement; and 
(5) formulating supporting plans and making budgets. It 
is assumed that purpose and integrated decisions, 
actions, and plans are essential for a firm's long term 
success. 
The Decision Making Perspective, proposes finding 
out the possible determinants of implementation 
outcomes in the various stages of the decision making 
process. The key element in-successful implementation 
is to make the right decision using a highly rational 
process. Therefore, the emphasis is placed on 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
sequence of decision-making stages in which the people 
or the organisational unit involved should go through. 
Furthermore, the advocates of this perspective such as 
Horvath & McMillan (1979), Mazzolini (1980,1981), 
Fahey (1981), Nutt (1986), among others, highlight the 
appropriate activities in each strategic decision 
making step. 
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The number, the significance, and the boundaries 
of the steps varies significantly according to. the 
various authors. These steps typically include: 
(1) problem formulation; (2) development of alternative 
solutions; (3) selection; and (4) authorisation and 
installation. 
The focus is on the processes surrounding the 
decision with much less. emphasis on the implementation 
phase itself. As Nutt (1986) indicated, because steps 
taken to ease implementation can be found in any stage 
of the process, each stage provides "a window through 
which implementation tactics can be viewed" (p. 234). 
The third perspective, - the Rational Tools 
Perspective, considers that the key element to 
successful implementation is the appropriate process 
and procedures incorporated into the relevant 
managerial techniques. As Hogwood & Gun (1986) 
indicated, the procedures involved are those of 
scheduling, planning, and control. Therefore, failure 
of implementation would' be lapses of ' planning, 
specification and control. . 
Integrated planning and budgeting systems 'of the 
Planning Programming Budgeting System type (PPBS) ', 
Local Authority Corporate Planning, 'Joint Strategic 
Planning, and Zero Base Budgeting (ZBB) are among the 
many managerial techniques advocated but adopted more 
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or less successfully by government agencies to secure 
rationality in both decision making and implementation. 
Other managerial techniques such as managing by 
objectives and performance appraisal, payment schemes, 
incentives and rewards systems, have also been 
advocated as means to improve implementation. Most 
techniques for strategic analysis or approaches to 
corporate strategic management such as the BCG porfolio 
model, the GE McKinsey Matrix and PIMS analysis could 
roughly be classified in this category. It is- assumed 
that the management techniques increase 
comprehensiveness of planning and, therefore, -reduce 
incrementalism in implementation. Implementation 
consists of using management control via 
procedural/managerial techniques- to hold agency 
accountable for the achievement of well-defined 
standards of performance (Elmore, 1978). 
The fourth perspective, the Ideal Conditions of 
Implementation Perspective assumes that implementation 
failure could best be avoided or- compensated by 
identifying the deviations from the perfect conditions 
of implementation. The-assumption is that once one has 
become aware of the constraints which tend to impede 
implementation, one can undertake action to avoid them. 
As Hogwood & Gunn (1986) pointed out, the perspective 
deals with entities which nowhere exist in real life 
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but in contrasting the real world with an ideal type it 
is intended to improve the understanding of "the 
practical difficulties of implementation. 
The promoters of this perspective such as Hood 
(1976), Dunshire (1978)f Gunn (1978), Chase (1979) , and 
Hogwood & Gunn (1986) have tried to form an ideal 
picture of implementation derived from the classical 
theory of bureaucracy as a rational form of human 
organisation. The list of preconditions necessary to 
achieve perfect implementation includes adequate time, 
sufficient and available resources,, absence of external 
circumstances imposing crippling constraints, minimal 
dependency relationship, valid theory and direct 
relationship between cause and effect, understanding of 
the problem to be solved and agreement on objectives, 
perfect communication and co-ordination, perfect 
compliance and the like (Alexander, 1985; Howood & 
Gunn, 1986). 
The fifth perspective, the Operational Research 
Perspective, represents an abstract and logico- 
deductive construction of implementation. It uses 
simulation of implementation through mathematical 
models which focus on prescribing the best decision 
concerning the course of action to reach a specific 
intended outcome. 
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Ceteris Paribus, the Operational Research 
Perspective provides the opportunity to investigate in 
advance the consequences of- a set of assumptions 
regarding the implementation process. Therefore, it 
allows an analysis of a wide range of possible 
contingencies of choice - and strategies of 
implementation. It is assumed that the outcome of the 
implementation process can be known in advance by 
reducing or controlling the, significant variables 
associated with the implementation process. In such a 
perspective, all significant factors are known, and the 
problem for the top decision-makers is one of 
optimising in the light of the myriad facts. 
Recent policy implementation research and 
theoretical development such as the studies of Elmore 
(1980), Barrett & Hill (1984), and Whitmore (1984) 
pointed out that the classical hierarchical approach to 
implementation fails to capture the interactive 
relationship between formulation and implementation as 
well as the political dimension of 
formulation/implementation processes. They also 
stressed that the distinction between means and ends is 
blurred, fuzzy, and often broken since "at various 
points throughout the policy process, what is given as 
means for one set of actors may be considered as ends 
by others" (Whitemore, 1984, p. 241). NHS analysts such 
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as Ham (1981), Haywood & Hunter (1982), Hunter (1983, 
1986) also stressed the failure of conventional 
hierarchical top-down models to account for the 
implementation gap. 
According to Elmore (1978) one of the main 
weaknesses in the classical approach is that it fails 
to account for the lack of management control across 
jurisdictional boundaries. Its most important weakness 
is, however, its lack of descriptive validity. 
"all propositions on which the model is based 
are normative; they describe how 
organizations ought to function, not 
necessarily how they do ... 
it is dangerous, 
however, to focus on the normative utility of 
the model to the exclusion of its descriptive 
validity. To say that the model simplifies in 
useful ways is not the same thing as saying 
that the implementation process should be 
structured around the model. This is a 
mistake that policy analysts are particularly 
prone to make ... (Elmore, 1978, p. 
199) 
Attacks against the classical approach have also 
been made by Organisational Theory critiques. One of 
the major criticisms issued has been that the classical 
approach uses relatively mechanical closed-system 
assumptions which fail to consider the environmental 
influences as well as many important internal aspects 
of organisation (Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). 
Miles et al (1974) indicated that for the first 
half of this century organisation theorists tended to 
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ignore the environment or at least to hold it constant. 
Throughout those years, the research on organisation 
has been inclined to explain organisational outcomes 
mainly in terms of factors within the organisation 
itself. According to Hardy (1985): 
"A perspective such as this is incomplete 
because it ignores the fact that the 
internal workings of an organisation are 
affected by external forces as well as by 
factors inside the organisation" (p. 2). 
However, the most obvious criticism of the 
classical approach of implementation concerns the 
ubiquitous presumption of rationality in decision 
making behaviour. As Bourgeois & Brodwin (1984) 
indicated, in this approach the role of the decision- 
maker is that of a rational actor issuing directives 
from the seat of power. To succeed the organisation 
needs to be tightly coupled so that the decision made 
at the top can be implemented throughout the 
organisation enabling intentions to become actions. 
However, empirical research into management decision 
making has provided clear indications of psychological 
and organisational limits to rationality in real-life 
decision-making (Pettigrew, 1973; March & Olson, 1976; 
Quinn, 1980). Rational decision making affords a bad 
basis for action rationality. Furthermore, many parts 
of large and complex organisations such as educational 
facilities, hospitals and other public institutions 
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have proved loosely coupled and, as a result, 
intractable to analysis and action through rational 
assumptions (Weick, 1976; Gaertner et al, 1984). 
In summary, recent literature in both- fields, 
Policy Analysis and Organisation Theory, has severely 
questioned the conventional linear assumptions 
regarding the implementation process. As the strategic 
problem came to be seen as much more' complex, the 
emphasis is moving away from the classical approach to 
implementation (Chaffee, 1985). A plea for considering 
environmental and contextual forces which constrained 
the internal workings of organisation has recently been 
made. In order to understand and explain the gap 
between stated intentions and the realised outcomes 
additional variables must be incorporated- into the 
stream of research on implementation process. 
The Contingency Approach to Implementation 
The contingency approach is the prevalent approach 
to implementation in the strategic- management 
literature. The basic premise of this approach is that 
an organisation has a variety of unequal effective 
structural forms and organisational processes from 
which to choose when implementing a particular strategy 
(Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986). In this approach, the 
role of the decision-maker is that of an architect, 
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designing administrative systems to implement strategic 
change (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984). 
The model of the organisation as an open system is 
at the foundation of this approach to implementation. 
According to the open system theory, the organisation 
acquires its input from the environment and after 
having engaged in through-put processing, dispenses its 
output to the environment (Katz & Kahn, 1966). The, open 
system model of organisation has expanded the classical 
research concerns to include the exchange relationships 
between organisation and its environment as-well as the 
effect of organisation-environment interface. 
The contingency approach to implementation assumes 
that a mismatch between the organisation and its 
environment may prove detrimental to the organisation 
in either the short or long run. On the other hand, 
success in aligning the organisation with its 
environment may prove profitable. According to 
Christensen et al (1978), who have been among the 
leading scholars in the field, the main implementation 
task is to design and to make effective "an 
organisational structure appropriate for the efficient 
performance of the required tasks"(p. 130). 
The contingency approach rests mainly on the same 
set of assumptions as the classical approach. In fact, 
the contingency approach offers an extension to the 
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classical approach. As Bourgeois & Brodwin (1984) 
indicated, this approach starts where the previous one 
ends: with implementation. Like the classical 
approach, the contingency, approach considers 
implementation as a series of technical, non-political, 
administrative activities. 
The contingency approach of ., 
implementation 
encompasses the following two main perspectives: 
(1) the contingency perspective; and (2) the "fit" 
perspective. 
The contingency perspective of implementation is 
essentially determinist. In , 
this perspective 
situational or contextual variables such as 
environmental uncertainty, technology or size 
automatically determine structure. , 
As Astley and Van 
de Ven (1983) pointed out: 
'Contingency theory assumes that contextual 
constraints have binding effects on 
organisational operations. In other words, 
context has causal primacy; management merely 
responds in the the technically appropriate 
manner. ' (p 253) 
The key to successful implementation is to design 
an organisational structure which is best adapted to 
the characteristic of both its external and internal 
contexts. Therefore, the emphasis is placed on 
assessing the organisational attributes, tasks and 
environment and on adopting the appropriate structural 
CHAPTER TWO - CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS Page 34 
form. The organisation must change with the 
environment. 
It is further suggested that organisations which 
succeed more speedily and effectively in implementing 
change can be distinguished from the others by a number 
of characteristics referring to managerial and 
organisational attributes (Daft, 1982; Gaertner et al, 
1984). These have been broadly described by Burns & 
Stalker (1961) and later writers under the label of 
"organic" as opposed to "mechanistic" structures the 
former being appropriate in an uncertain or fast- 
changing environment while the latter is suitable in a 
time of stability. As Hogwood & Gunn (1986) suggested, 
the organic structure seems relevant to those 
implementation situations in which the decision-makers 
are concerned to design structures capable of 
implementing a sequence of change over time, but 
considerations such as the scale of many governmental 
agencies and the demands of accountability make it 
difficult to use within the public sector. 
The second perspective, namely the "fit" 
perspective, pushes the contingency perspective 
further. In this perspective key internal 
administrative and organisational mechanisms are put in 
line with an intended strategy. The framework that 
best illustrates the theoretical basis of that 
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perspective is the McKinsey Seven "S" Framework (Peters 
and Waterman, 1982). 
The implementation elements are derived on the 
backcloth of a given strategy. An important assumption 
underlying this perspective is that these elements can 
be consciously designed to constitute an internally 
consistent organisational form (Miles & Snow, 1984) 
which, in turn, could have a crucial impact, especially 
under competitive conditions. Criticisms relate mostly 
to the relative neglect of the external influences to 
the organisation on the implementation and to the one 
way alignment between strategy and the internal 
structures and management processes (Venkatraman and 
Camillus, 1984). 
Above all, the contingency approach does not 
diverge from the rational actor model. The firm is 
composed of omnipotent managers who speak with a single 
voice. The general manager is the rational processor 
of the various demands on the organisation. Strategy, 
structure and processes are assumed to be neutral 
features of organisations, and the environment itself 
is presumed objective. As Bourgeois & Browin (1984) 
suggested, the approach fails to deal with problems of 
obtaining accurate information, nor does it resolve 
either the motivational problems or the lack of 
political considerations of the classical approach. The 
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political dimension of the formulation/ implementation 
processes is ignored with little recognition that an 
issue is influenced by the others at any point across 
the formulation/implementation continuum. 
Furthermore, evidence from empirical research is 
neither conclusive nor adequate to support a simple 
deterministic relationship between the strategy, the 
structure and the environment. Depending on which body 
of empirical evidence is used and on which part of the 
strategic process is observed, both "structure follows 
strategy" and "strategy follows structure" can be valid 
propositions (Pettigrew, 1985). - 
The Behavioural Approach to implementation 
As Hogwood & Gunn (1986) pointed out, there are 
some limits to what can be achieved in implementation 
by manipulating structures and procedures: human 
behaviour must also be influenced. 
The behavioural approach is grounded in the belief 
that there are some significant individual and 
organisational sources of resistance that must be 
overcome in implementing changes. The features that 
matter most are those that affect individual 
motivation, commitment, and interpersonal cooperation 
in implementation. 
The behavioural approach encompasses the following 
perspectives: (1) the Individual Characteristics 
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perspective; (2) the Strategy-Manager matching 
perspective; (3) the Diffusion of Innovation 
perspective; (4) the Corporate Culture perspective; 
(5) the Organisational Development (OD) perspective and 
the Organisational Change and Development (OCD) 
perspective. 
The individual characteristics perspective assumes 
that implementation outcomes are determined by one main 
set of factors: the personal variables which 
characterise the people who are involved in the 
process. This perspective stems from the psychological 
literature on attitudes, attitude change and behaviour. 
As Champagne et al (1987) indicated, the 
proponents of this perspective postulate the existence 
of a sequential relationship between individual 
characteristics and behaviour. Personality traits, 
attitudes and values, are presumed to influence the 
implementing staff members' willingness to foster and 
to implement changes. For instance, using a survey 
design, Gupta & Govindarajan (1983) studied how 
managers' attitude toward risk would'affect the success 
of strategic implementation and found a significant 
relationship between' risk-taking and success in 
implementation. This view of implementation is }rather 
inadequate. 
"It is not dynamic, it does not examine the 
process of implementation, and comes 
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dangerously close to a trait theory of 
strategic leadership. It is far removed from 
organisational reality, and it takes a 
monodimensional view" (Voyer, 1986, p. 18) 
Interest in the individual characteristics 
perspective reached its peak early in the 1960s and 
significantly waned in the early 1970s. The direction 
of influence between changes in individual variables 
and change in behaviour remained debatable (Schuman- 
Johnson, 1976). Some scholars such as Calder & Schurr 
(1981) and Pfeffer (1982) have emphasised the need for 
understanding attitudes in context. 
"Attention to the context in which 
dispositions (such as attitudes) and 
perceptions of the environment are formed is 
a critical deficiency in the various 
perspectives of individual rational 
choice"(Pfeffer, 1982, p. 75) 
In recent business policy literature, the 
assumption that senior staff's personal values and 
aspirations do play an influential role in the 
formulation and the implementation of strategies has 
led to increasing attention to the managers' 
characteristics and to the matching of managers to 
strategies. 
According to the proponents of this perspective of 
implementation (Wissema et al, 1980; Szilagyi & 
Schweiger, 1984) emphasis should be placed on selecting 
managers for implementing strategies whose personality 
traits, cognitive style, behavioural characteristics, 
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and personal values are congruent w 
of particular chosen strategies. 
managers lack the flexibility to 
managerial behaviour and style 
effectively in implementing various 
(Wissema et al, 1980). 
ith the requirements 
It is assumed that 
adopt a range of 
and to function 
types of strategies 
The various Strategy-Manager Matching models could 
be criticised on various major points. First, in most 
matching models the meaning of the concept of strategy 
is taken for granted while it may well be considerably 
different from one manager to the other. 
Second, managers could be matched to strategies 
only if managerial personality traits and other 
important managerial characteristics can be accurately 
identified and measured. Furthermore, it would be 
beneficial to match managers to strategies only if 
specific personality traits associated with successful 
strategy implementation are known. The notion of value 
offered by the Harvard Business Policy scholars such as 
Christensen et al (1978) was intended to reassert the 
influence of managers as different individuals in the 
strategic management process. However, the conceptual 
clarity and the supporting research evidence concerning 
the validity of the contentions and prescriptions 
offered by the various matching models is still largely 
missing. 
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Third, other relevant factors or "matching 
contingencies" (Tichy, 1983) such as organisational 
culture and power, structural boundaries, and various 
systems, must also be considered in selecting senior 
managers. As Galbraith & Kazanjian (1986) indicated, 
the matching manager to strategy perspective assumes 
that there are no major social or political 
dysfunctions associated with changing top managers and 
general managers in particular as the strategy changes. 
Although empirical research does not exist, this latter 
assumption could be challenged on a commonsense basis 
as well as on real life evidence particularly in public 
services. 
The third behavioural perspective, the diffusion 
of innovation perspective, also stresses the role of 
the individual in implementing change. However, it 
shifts its main focus from the personality traits to 
the role and skills of the leaders and the 
implementation techniques (Nord and Tucker, 1987). It 
is generally assumed that the way changes are 
communicated to the people who are affected by them, 
and the role of the opinion leaders and "product 
champions" (Coleman et al, 1966; Stocking, 1985) are 
critical in facilitating or impeding change and use of 
innovation. 
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Unfortunately, the main focus of the research on 
innovation has clearly been on predictors of innovation 
adoption as an outcome and the empirical research did 
not directly illuminate the problems of implementation 
process as a critical factor (Forrest, 1977; Scheirer, 
1981; Gaertner et al, 1984). Furthermore, the majority 
of the studies have focused on technological innovation 
in contrast to organisational and managerial 
innovation. Because of significant differences between 
technological and organisational innovations (Draft, 
1982), the empirical research findings cannot simply be 
transcribed from one type of innovation to the other. 
The literature on innovations in health care 
organisations has also traditionally focused on the 
diffusion of technological and medical innovations. 
The central interest has been in the adoption or 
rejection of specific therapies and procedures (Coleman 
et al, 1966) by individual practitioners and the unit 
of analysis has. been the innovation itself rather than 
the organisational context. 
The diffusion of innovation perspective, has been 
essentially anthropocentric at the expense of the 
organisational and environmental determinants of the 
adoption of innovation and change (Elkin, 1983). As 
Pettigrew et al (1988) indicated, the diffusion of 
innovation -perspective's lack of an organisational 
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focus and its low sensitivity to the structural and 
environmental variables have made it less able to 
handle strategic issues where changing resource flows 
and dominant organisational coalitions assume 
importance. 
The fourth behavioural perspective, namely the 
corporate culture perspective, is the latest wave of 
explanation for the success or failure of 
implementation (Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984). A 
corporate culture is a set of beliefs shared by 
managers about how they should manage people and 
conduct their business (Schein, 1985; Lorch, 1986). The 
assumption is that distinctive corporate cultures are 
responsible for the ability of devising and 
implementing change successfully (Tichy, 1983; Peter & 
Tseng, 1983; Bice, 1984). 
In this perspective, the corporate culture is seen 
as a potentially powerful source of resistance to 
change in shifting strategic direction (Allaire & 
Firsirotu, 1985) as well as a critical lever which 
could be used to mobilize and channel the energies of 
organisational members (Smircich, 1983). The 
implementation of significant and discontinuous changes 
would require some sort of rethinking of the system of 
beliefs. Otherwise, the corporate culture could become 
an "invisible barrier" (Lorsch, 1986, p. 95) which 
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would inhibit the needed change. The main challenge 
becomes to know how either to mould and shape internal 
culture in particular ways or to change culture, 
consistent with managerial purposes. As Bourgeois & 
Brodwin (1984) indicated, 
"it would appear that with an organisational 
culture in place, the implementation task is 
90 per cent done" (p. 251). 
The basic assumption that distinctive corporate 
culture is responsible for success is based upon the 
study of institutionalised managerial practice used 
either in successful Japanese firms or in successful 
American companies. There has been considerable debate 
over the validity of these studies (Shortell, 1985). 
The assumption that the management has the 
capacity both to adjust and alter the organisational 
culture in a planned way has also been questionned 
(Pettigrew, 1986). The corporate culture perspective 
uses a too mechanistic notion of organisational 
culture. 
"The talk about corporate culture tends to be 
optimistic, even messianic, about top 
managers molding cultures to suit their 
strategic ends. The notion of corporate 
culture runs the risk of being as 
disappointing a managerial tool as the more 
technical and quantitative tools that were 
faddish in the 1970s" (Smircich, 1983, 
p. 346). 
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The fifth behavioural perspective, the 
Organisational Development perspective (OD), is the 
best known attempt to apply the conceptual groundings 
of behavioural science to the management of 
organisations. OD has been practiced in industrial 
corporations since the 1950s but is relatively new in 
public organisations as well as in hospital settings 
(Marguilies & Adams, 1982; McClure, 1985). 
OD has changed considerably since its emergence in 
the 1950s (Greiner, 1977; Pettigrew, 1985). It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to review in detail 
the stages of the OD evolution. Besides, Pettigrew 
(1985) has recently synthesised the extensive 
literature on OD practice and theory. 
For the purpose of this research two broad OD 
patterns of -thought can be distinguished: (1) the 
classical OD perspective of implementation; and (2) the 
contemporary Organisational - Change and Development 
(OCD) perspective of implementation. 
The classical OD approach (Bennis, 1969) arose 
from humanistic psychology. Relying on educational 
strategies emphasising experiential behaviour, the 
classical OD perspective seeks organisational change 
through changes in people variables such as attitudes, 
interpersonal relations, and organisational climate. 
As a process for bringing about organisational change, 
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the classical OD approach assumes that change induced 
by individual staff members who are key to successful 
implementation is more likely to be achieved than 
change arising from external sources. 
Implementation failure and success can be gauged 
by looking at the extent to which implementers were 
involved in the formulation, the extent to which they 
are encouraged to exercise independent judgement, and 
the extent to which they use face-to-face work groups 
for mutual support and problem solving. Implementation 
failures are the result of lack of consensus and 
commitment among implementers (Elmore, 1978). 
The classical OD perspective has been widely 
criticised. For instance, its objectives and methods 
have been described as conservative, manipulative, 
intrusive, and primitive (Strauss, 1976). It has been 
criticised for its lack-of empirical foundations (Kahn, 
1974) as well as for failing to consider the divergence 
in interests and conflict (Blackler & Brown, 1980). It 
has also been criticised for its reductionistic scope: 
the classical OD approach has been obsessed with the 
people variables (Stephenson, 1975) to the exclusion of 
temporal, procedural, and contextual factors and 
features (Pettigrew, 1985). 
The parameters of the emerging contemporary OCD 
perspective are not well established yet they already 
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appear much more complex than the 'parameters of the 
classical OD perspective. A recurring theme in the 
recent literature suggests that it starts where the 
classical OD perspective ends: with the contextual 
variables. Intraorganisational -context and the 
conditioning and enabling influence of the social and 
economic environment are promoted as facilitating and 
constraining the processes of organisational change. 
In fact, in recent years, the concern of the 
scholars has moved on from the rational analytical 
schemes of internal intended planned changes to the 
understanding of the variety of process modes of 
strategic change. 
The main interest of the scholars is still on 
"policy centred" or "top-down" implementation and on 
overcoming the resistance in managing strategic change 
in structure, - systems and process (Kotter & 
Schlesinger, 1979; Ansoff, 1984; Lippitt et al, 1985). 
But the focus of the fundamental research has moved 
beyond the study of change episodes to the analysis of 
various organisational change processes such as the 
organisational learning processes (Argyris & Schon, 
1978), the corporate transition processes (Kimberly and 
Quinn, 1984), the processual dynamics of changing and 
continuity (Pettigrew, 1985), the institutional change 
processes (Hyman, 1984; Zucker, 1987), and the context 
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and process of organisational transformation (Child & 
Smith, 1987). 
The empirical process researchers such as 
Pettigrew (1977), Mintzberg (1978), Quinn (1980), and 
Kanter (1983), among others, have shown that strategic 
change processes are best described as multi-level 
activities. The research also indicated that the 
outcomes of these processes are shaped by a wide range 
of variables as opposed to a product of rational 
debates involving afew or even a single general 
manager. However, as Pettigrew '(1987) recently 
indicated, there has been a tendency among the pioneers 
of this perspective to focus on the link between the 
process of change and the internal structure, corporate 
culture, and political context at the expense of the 
explanatory role of the outer larger context and 
content of strategic change. 
Recent research such as the studies of Pettigrew 
(1985), Hardy (1985), Johnson (1987), and Child & Smith 
(1987). have included these variables in their research 
framework. They have already been criticised for 
defining their- context too narrowly (Whittington, 
1989) . 
"Though these authors may sometimes refer to 
national cultural characteristics - as for 
instance, in Pettigrew's (1985) linking of 
OD's success within ICI in the 1960s to a 
general cultural atmosphere of liberalism and 
tolerance - they fail to connect such factors 
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to any systematic account of wider social 
structure. The tendency is to adopt an 
economistic atomism. Thus the ways in which 
social structures of class or gender may be 
mobilised by managers in obtaining important 
outcomes are systematically ignored" (p. 70). 
The body of contextual empirical studies is still 
limited and of an exploratory nature. These studies 
have provided some outstanding monographs of strategic 
change. Thus far the contribution has remained 
essentially descriptive. 
"However, useful as this process research has 
been in descriptively analysing how 
significant changes are made, with the 
exception of Quinn (1980,1982), Kanter 
(1983), and Pettigrew (1985) few of these 
process researchers have tried to build on 
their descriptive analyses and pinpoint some 
of the key prescriptive features of 
managerial strategy required to create 
substantial changes in manpower, structure, 
or strategy" (Hardy & Pettigrew, 1985, p. 13). 
Pettigrew (1985,1987) has recently pointed out 
that the principal shortcoming of the literature on 
organisational change and development is its 
ahistorical, acontextual, and aprocessual treatment of 
change. 
"As with so many other areas in the social 
sciences the empirical findings-- and 
theoretical developments in the field of 
organisational change are method-bound. For 
as long as we continue to conduct research on 
change which is ahistorical, acontextual, and 
aprocessual, ' which continues to treat the 
change programme as the unit of analysis and 
regard change as an episode divorced from the 
immediate and more distant context in which 
it is embedded, then we will continue to 
develop inadequate descriptive theories of 
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change which are ill-composed guides for 
action. " (p. 15) 
This major criticism directed at the 
organisational change and development literature is 
very much the same for all the perspectives associated 
with the behavioural science approach, with the 
exception of the fundamental OCD perspective which is 
only just beginning to gather momentum. 
Furthermore the applied behaviour science theory 
has been basically apolitical. Most of the behavioural 
perspectives, with the exception of the contemporary 
OCD perspective, systematically avoid the problem of 
power, or do not consider the influence that 
conflicting interests within and outside the 
organisation may have on the efficiency of the 
implementation strategy. 
The behavioural approach would seem most 
appropriate under conditions that favour collaboration. 
However, it clearly overlooks the role of conflict 
under differing conditions, such as when the pattern of 
resource sharing is threatened, when opportunities to 
seize new resources are opened up, or when resources 
decrease. 
Political Approach to Implementation 
The political approach to implementation is 
primarily concerned with the impact of patterns of 
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power and influence on the implementation processes and 
outcomes. As opposed to the other approaches 
introduced thus far, in the political- approach, 
conflict and bargaining are considered as -endemic 
rather than exceptional or pathological features of 
organisations. The focus is not on the resolution of 
conflict but on the strategy- and tactics used by 
individuals and groups to make the best of it. 
The political approach assumes that, as a result 
of the division of labour, a plurality of at least 
partly conflicting interests exist within and among 
organisations. These interests would become manifested 
through the quest for control over the real or symbolic 
organisational scarce resources (Pettigrew, 1973). 
The implementation outcomes reflect the relative 
strengths of the interest groups at a particular moment 
of time. In the last resort, successful implementation 
would depend on the ability of a particular group or -a 
coalition of various groups promoting specific 
interests to generate enough power and thereby to 
impose its will on- the others. However, because 
implementation outcomes are the result of bargaining 
and compromise between the various interest groups 
involved, they rarely represent perfectly the interests 
and original preferences of any single actor in 
particular. 
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As Hogwood & Gun (1986) indicate, the basic 
argument is that implementation may have been 
carefully planned in terms of structure, systems and 
influence on behaviour, but if it takes insufficient 
account of the powerful internal and external interests 
then the implementation is unlikely to succeed. 
The political approach encompasses the following 
perspectives: (1) the bureaucratic process perspective; 
(2) the inter-organisational perspective; (3) the 
bargaining and negotiation perspective; (4) the 
resource dependency perspective; and (5) the symbolic 
implementation perspective. 
The first political perspective of implementation, 
namely the bureaucratic process perspective, traces the 
effect of lower-level discretion and routinised 
behaviour on the implementation of change (Lipsky, 
1974). According to Scheirer (1981) this perspective 
might be more accurately termed the "bureaucratic- 
political explanations for non-implementation" (p. 29) 
since it has mainly been used by the scholars to 
explain the failure rather than the success of policy 
implementation. 
Because of the frequency and immediacy of the 
contact- between the client and the "street-level 
bureaucrat" (Lipsky, 1984) - one who is in direct 
contact with clients and who takes, decisions over 
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client treatment - it is difficult for higher level 
administrators to monitor or control their actions and 
performance. Clients' control is also relatively 
limited because of their dependence on the bureaucrats 
to mediate their needs to the organisation. 
In this perspective, , autonomy and discretion 
increase as one moves down the hierarchy, the strategy 
comes upward from the rank and file rather than 
downward from the top, and therefore the "participation 
managed planning is the preferred implementation 
approach" (Nutt, 1983, p. 605). The problem revolves 
around the top managers' ability either to devise more 
sophisticated ways of bounding and controling 
discretion (Weatherly & Lipsky, 1977) or to define 
organisational -purposes broadly enough to encourage 
innovation and to establish an incentive scheme to 
encourage operating managers to make decisions that 
will further the long-range interests of the 
organisation (Bourgeois & Browing, 1984). 
The success or failure of any top-down 
implementation attempt would depend on whether the 
force of existing routine, at the point of delivery 
operates with or against the proposal, to be 
implemented. 
The main strength of the bureaucratic process 
perspective has been to identify and explore the 
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existence and 'source of power through functional, 
professional, and organisational autonomy. However, 
the perspective tends to heed the technical skill and 
knowledge at delivery level and to overlook the other 
sources of -power, such as control over long term 
allocation of resources and the legal prerogatives held 
by other influencers such as the central government and 
local. authorities in, implementing change. 
"Central government clearly has access to 
legislative resources not available to local 
authorities and can use these not only in 
relation to the implementation of a 
particular policy but to change the rules of 
the game in which relationships are normally 
conducted (such as the right to be consulted, 
the basic grant structure) or even to change 
or abolish other political actors, as with 
the re-elected 1983 Conservative Government's 
plans to abolish the Greater London Council 
and the metropolitan counties. The fact that 
one organisation in an implementation 
relationship has a preponderance of resources 
does not exclude the likehood that it will be 
dependent on other organisations for key 
aspects of implementation" (Hogwood & Gunn, 
1986, p. 217). 
Furthermore, the study of implementation has been 
confined to the behaviour of actors in their 
organisation roles and setting, neglecting the wider 
context which determines both the power base wielded by 
the street level bureaucrats and the way that 
individuals and groups interact with each other in the 
process of operating routine. 
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The second perspective of the political approach, 
the inter-organisational perspective, suggests that 
implementation results not from the actions undertaken 
by a single organisation but rather from the joint 
actions undertaken 'by a set of organisations. These 
structures are comprised of individual implementers 
from different organisations who must coordinate their 
decisions and actions or must co-operate one with 
another in order to carry out a particular proposal. 
"The number of organisations and the need for 
coordination across organisations make the 
situation much more complex, ceteris paribus, 
than in the single agency case" (O'Toole & 
Montjoy, 1984, p. 492) 
In the literature on inter-organisational 
implementation, the emphasis has been initially placed 
on the number of necessary linkages which have to be 
made in securing implementation. That kind of analysis 
has been well summed up by Elmore (1980): 
"With a sharp pencil, a good eye for detail, 
and a pocket calculator, one can demonstrate 
without much trouble that any policy will 
fail, simply in counting the number of 
discrete clearances and decisions, assigning 
a probability to each, and multiplying them 
seriatum" (p. 608). 
The empirical basis for such calculation has been 
provided by Pressman & Wildavsky's (1973) study. Their 
research suggested that the effects of factors inherent 
in the nature of bureaucratic organisations would tend 
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to be compounded by the number of veto points, and-the 
ability to induce actions would decline as the number 
of agencies increases. 
The main contribution of this first step in the 
development of the inter-organisational-perspective has 
been to stress the effect of the agreement among a 
large number of participants over the outcome of the 
implementation processes. However, the process of 
simple arithmetical calculation is a little misleading., 
"Pressman & Wildavsky's calculation was based 
on an "all-or-nothing" concept of a 
favourable outcome at each decision point, 
whereas the chances of partial success might 
well be higher. That being said, it still 
seems likely that the greater the number of 
clearances required among other bodies 
involved in implementation, the lower will be 
the chances of full implementation" (Hogwood 
& Gunn, 1986, p. 203). 
Additional development and research such as the 
studies conducted by Bardach (1977), Radin (1977), and 
Hardy (1985) indicates that the chances of successful 
implementation can be either greatly improved or 
impeded by a variety of manoeuvres and counter- 
manoeuvres performed by the various parties involved in 
the processes. This is grossly overlooked in the 
simple process of arithmetical calculation. 
The inter-organisational perspective has been 
further developed within two other political 
perspectives of implementation: (1) the conflict and 
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bargaining perspective; and (2) the resource dependence 
perspective. 
The model of implementation as conflict and 
bargaining focuses on the nature of interactions taking 
place among multiple participating actors and agencies 
as well as on their interests, relative autonomy and 
tactical use of power to retain or obtain control over 
resources. 
The proponents of this perspective such as Bardach 
(1977), Barrett & Fudge (1981), Barrett & Hill (1984) 
stress the complexity and ambiguity of both the 
proposals to be implemented and the negotiative 
processes involved in implementation. The proposals 
themselves are simply a point of departure for 
bargaining among implementing agencies. 
Implementation often takes place in absence of 
clearly defined goals and without clear focus of power 
to resolve the issues. The various parties involved 
have only an imperfect understanding and knowledge of 
the other motives and resources. 
Success or failure of implementation is a relative 
notion determined by the actor's position in the 
process itself. The outcome is simply a convenient 
temporary agreement which reflects no overall agreement 
on purpose but which brings expectations into momentary 
convergence and takes negotiation to closure. 
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"Bargained decisions proceed by convergence, 
adjustment, and closure among individuals 
pursuing essentially independent ends ... The 
mechanism of convergence depends on the 
interdependence of expectations. Parties to 
the bargaining process must predicate their 
actions not only on predictions on how other 
will repond but also on the understanding 
that others are doing likewise. So bargaining 
depends as much on shared expectations as it 
does on concrete actions" (Elmore, 1978, 
p. 220). 
The major contribution of this perspective has 
been to highlight the complexity and ambiguity of 
implementation. However, the perspective has come 
under fire from two directions. On the one hand it has 
been criticised for being long in description and short 
in prescription (Elmore, 1980; Hogwood & Gunn, 1986). 
On the other hand, it is attacked for relying on "soft" 
methodologies leaving open the questions of causal 
inference and generalisability (Hood, 1982). 
"The explanatory power of the blurred-sector, 
bargaining-exchange, multiple-actors vision 
of policy, as it stands, is at best trite. It 
is a picture, not a theory ... Stressing 
complexity is a cop-out" (Hood, 1982, p. 
369). 
A view of implementation that emphasises complexity 
such as the bargaining perspective requires further 
work towards the specification of its elements (Barrett 
& Hill, 1984). 
The resource dependence perspective argues that 
the organisational behaviour becomes externally 
constrained because the organisation must attend to the 
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demands of those in its environment that provide 
essential resources to attain its self-interest 
objectives (Pfeffer &- Salancik, 1978). It is assumed 
that dependence of organisations increases with the 
degree to which resources are scarce or irreplaceable, 
and with the extent to which transactions are 
institutionalised or controlled by only a few groups. 
The foremost premise of this perspective is that 
implementation, like all other organisational 
activities and outcomes, is accounted for by the 
specific context in which the focal organisation is 
embedded. This context is made up of the set of 
various organisations with which the focal organisation 
interacts in order to secure its access to necessary 
and important resources. 
Thus far, the empirical research has either tested 
the fundamental assumption regarding the link, -between 
control over resource and the development of inter- 
organisational power and influence or investigated the 
various specific means and strategies undertaken by an 
organisation to- cope with external constraints 
resulting from resource dependence and for managing 
dependencies. The compelling empirical evidence has 
been consistent with the theory presumption concerning 
compliance to external constraints. It has also 
supported the prediction regarding the management of 
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external dependence. Most of this empirical research 
has been reviewed and summarised by Pfeffer (1982). 
While the resource dependence perspective does 
locate the cause and effect of organisational inter- 
dependence, it overlooks the process which links them 
together. The perspective contributes to the 
understanding of the ties between organisations and 
accounts for why organisational networks have formed 
and developed but disregards almost completely how this 
has been done. In other words, it neglects the dynamic 
aspect of the interface between the organisations 
involved. 
Furthermore, despite the-fact that the perspective 
suggests that the organisational activities and 
outcomes are accounted for by the context in which the 
organisation is embedded, it does not include a concern 
with the larger societal context and its institutional 
arrangments (Benson, 1982; Pettigrew, 1985). 
"There is a tendency to develop a general 
theory of resource dependencies applicable to 
educational, religious, political, and 
economical organisations, that is a search 
for context-free generalisations (Benson, 
1982, p. 146) 
The fifth political perspective, the symbolic 
implementation perspective, is the least developed and 
least mapped organisational perspective (Bolman & Deal, 
1984) and could be subdivided into (1) the symbolic 
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decision perspective; and (2) the symbolic, action 
perspective. 
The symbolic decision perspective suggests that 
decision-makers and policy-makers in particular do not 
intend that all decisions be implemented (Hill, 1982; 
Beyer et al, 1983; Hunter, 1983; Barrett &. Hill, 1984; 
Korman & Glennerster, 1985) Some decisions would be 
enacted only as a ceremonial (Trice et al, 1969) 
reflecting the electorate's mood of the day regarding 
the particular issues. Others would be empty promises 
designed to cool down strong opposition from various 
interest groups (Beyer et al, 1983). According to 
Barrett & Hill (1984), the persistence in attempting to 
implement a policy at what transpires as the wrong 
level could also be interpreted as essentially 
symbolic. It may be attributed to a reluctance to 
attack the real interests which would be more 
appropriate targets. As Korman & Glennerster (1985) 
indicated: 
"the reason why some policies are not 
implemented is that no one ever expected them 
to be. Acts are passed or ministerial 
speeches made to satisfy some party pressure 
or awkward interest group but civil servants 
know that they need not strain themselves too 
hard to achieve results. The policy is 
symbolic. " (p. 7) 
When the results are 
external pressure increases 
not forthcoming while 
or if crisis occurs, 
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unavoidable bureaucratic dysfunctions will usually be 
diagnosed and the management blamed. Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) have labelled that scapegoating process the 
"symbolic role of management": 
"The manager is a symbol of the organization 
and its success or failure, a scapegoat, and 
a symbol of personal or individual- control 
over social actions and outcomes. The 
symbolic role of management derives in part 
from a belief in personal causation as 
opposed to environmental determinism ... As a 
symbol of control and personal causation, 
managers and organizational leaders can be 
used as scapegoats, rewarded when things go 
well and fired when they go poorly ... When 
problems emerge, the solution is simple 
and easy - replace the manager"(p. 263) 
The symbolic decision perspective offers a 
somewhat Machiavellian account of the policy 
formulation/implementation processes which, 
nevertheless, could sharply strike the policy 
observer's imagination. As Barrett & Hill (1984) 
indicated from an essentially symbolic standpoint, the 
study of implementation would-not be of much interest, 
except to demonstrate how people are duped. Besides, 
it draws a picture of decision-making which gives total 
control to the central decision-makers at the expense 
of the peripheral implementers. The research has shown 
that the peripheral implementers are not powerless in 
fixing the outcomes of the decision process (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973; Hunter, 1980,1983; Hardy, 1985). 
Aside from limited anecdotal accounts, there are very 
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few extensive empirical studies widely supportive of 
this symbolic view of implementation. 
The Symbolic Action Perspective extends the 
Symbolic Decision Perspective and thereby provides a 
perspective which is of much , use for studying 
implementation processes. This perspective emphasises 
the role of political language and symbols in 
implementing decisions. As Pfeffer (1981) pointed out, 
"Political language and symbolic action can 
have consequences for mobilization and 
motivation of support, for cooling off or 
placating opposition either inside or outside 
the organisation, and for organizing activity 
within the organization around the issue of 
implementation" (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 211) 
This perspective combines ideas about sources, 
uses, and outcomes of power together with ideas 
concerning the role of symbolism, language, beliefs, 
and myths. The argument is that considerations of 
power and influence are relevant for predicting 
resource allocations and strategic choices, while 
consideration of language and symbolism are critical to 
understanding the process designed to create legitimacy 
for these outcomes of power. Pettigrew (1977,1979, 
1985) has championed such a unified view of political 
and cultural analysis of organisational activity, which 
he refers to as the Political and Cultural Perspective 
on Organisational Process. 
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"The political-cultural view of 
organisational functioning gives emphasis to 
the propensity of actors and groups in 
organisations to create and maintain systems 
of meaning and to articulate broad 
interpretative schemes, values, and 
interests" (Pettigrew, 1985, p. 136) 
In short, it is suggested that organisations are 
systems of patterned activity in which the various 
actors attempt to develop and convince others of the 
dominating legitimacy of- their actions, ideas, and 
demands. These actions and decisions become legitimate 
when the various actors accept them because they 
believe that they are sufficiently just and right for 
willing compliance. 
"If. outcomes can be legitimised to the point 
where they are not questioned, even by 
potential opponents, actors have succeeded in 
obtaining their desired outcomes by using 
their power to prevent conflict from arising 
. This aspect of power 
has been termed 
unobtrusive (Hardy, ` 1985), not so much 
because power is used unobstrusively but 
because of the circumstances in which it is 
used and the objective of its use. Overt 
power is employed in situation of overt 
confrontation, with the aim of defeating 
opposition. Unobstrusive power is used 
before overt confrontation occurs, with the 
explicit aim of preventing it " (Pettigrew, 
1986, p. 135) 
The key element to successful implementation is 
the use of language, symbols, beliefs, myths, "rituals, 
ceremonies and settings in presenting the decisions so 
that a social consensus around them emerge. Yet, 
political language and symbolic activity take place in 
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a competitive environment. Both sides of the political 
contest seek to manage the process by which actions and 
events are given meaning. 
"The management of meaning refers to a 
process of symbol construction and value%use 
designed both to create legitimacy for one's 
actions, ideas and demands, and to 
delegitimise the demands of one's opponents" 
(Pettigrew, 1985, p. 44). 
The task of those who resist implementation is to 
discredit the symbols and language used by those who 
promote the implementation, to make people aware of 
grievances, to politicise issues, and to delegitimise 
the actions, ideas and demands of their opponents. 
This would be achieved most often in an incremental 
rather than a rational-linear fashion. 
The proponents of this perspective such as 
Pettigrew (1979,1985), Pfeffer (1981,1982), Hardy 
(1985) have distinguished between the substantive 
outcome and the sentiment outcome of political 
activity. The former depends largely on scarce 
resource control and dependency considerations while 
the latter is mainly influenced by the use of political 
language and symbols. 
Success of implementation could be expressed, not 
solely in terms of achievement of objective or in terms 
of variation from original intentions, but also in 
terms of feeling of appropriateness, justice and 
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legitimacy of four main elements: (1) the proposal 
itself; (2) the mechanisms and the procedures used to 
meet general assent - or to avoid provoking public 
dissent; (3) the speed of implementation; and (4) the 
anticipated side-effects of implementation. According 
to Hardy and Pettigrew (1985) and Pettigrew (1986), 
political actors may also define success as the ability 
to establish areas of influence where dominating 
legitimacy is established and thus unchallenged. 
The main contribution of this perspective has been 
to highlight the critical role played by political 
language and symbols in arousing support, quieting 
opposition and justifying the aims and power position 
of the various participants. Another significant 
contribution of this perspective has been to treat the 
implementation of strategic changes as a long term 
process, incorporating the antecedent conditions, 
political and cultural forces within the organisation, 
and the wider social, economic, and competitive forces 
with which the organisation must operate. An 
additional major contribution has been to empirically 
demonstrate that power could. not only be used to 
produce preferred outcomes in the face of conflict but 
also to ensure that conflict does not occur in the 
first place. 
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As Pettigrew (1987) recently indicated, there is 
still much to be done to develop a perspective which 
combines political and cultural elements to analyse 
change processes and which focuses on the 
interconnections between the context, the content, and 
the process of change. Research at this level is not 
yet common. 
The main strength of the political approach is its 
powerful descriptive validity. It points to the 
central importance of conflict and political processes 
in organisation and decision. Furthermore, it presents 
a useful realistic portrayal of implementation which 
captures a number of significant organisational 
dynamics such as legitimation and coalition building 
processes which are overlooked in other approaches. As 
Bolman & Deal (1984) recently indicated, 
"The political perspective is an important 
antidote to the antiseptic rationality that 
sometimes characterizes rational perspective 
and the naive optimism that is sometimes 
present in human resource theories" (p. 216). 
However, the political approach has been subject 
to challenge on a number of points. 
"Critics describe two major limitation in the 
(political) frame: (1) The political 
perspective is so thoroughly focused on 
politics that it underestimates the 
significance of both rational and 
collaborative processes. (2) The frame is 
normatively cynical and pessimistic. It 
overstates the inevitability of conflict and 
understates the potential for effectiveness 
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and collaboration" (Bolman & Deal, 1984, p. 
144). 
The research which substantiates the political 
approach has been criticised for relying primarily on 
"soft" methodologies such as historical analysis and 
case studies. As Pettigrew (1985) indicated, as with 
so many other areas in the social sciences the 
empirical findings and theoretical developments in the 
field of organisational change are method-bound. It 
has been argued that the research findings lack 
generalisability and that the research provided little 
advices to managers on how to predict implementation 
problems- as well as on how to improve implementation 
processes (Elmore, 1980; Starkey; 1987). 
These criticisms are common arguments in the 
debate between hard and soft research methodologies. 
The political approach to implementation is not unlike 
other-areas of social sciences which are also relying 
primarily on case studies and historical analysis- in 
developing knowledge. By delving more deeply into 
organisational life, the methodology has provided the 
investigators with meaningful insights concerning the 
intangible aspect of political processes (Pettigrew 
1973,1985; Mintzberg, 1979; VanMaanen, 1979). 
The obvious point to make here is that political 
perspectives are no panacea. Not all decisions are 
equally political or are equally likely to be affected 
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by the power of the organisational participants 
involved: Some decisions would be more political than 
others (Hickson et al, 1985). Therefore, the political 
approach may be more analytically valuable in some 
kinds of organisation and decision than others. 
"Political theorists have made a strong case 
for the proposition that power and politics 
cannot be ignored in organisation theory, but 
they have not yet investigated in detail the 
complex interplay among rationality, human 
needs, and politics ... To say that 
organisations, are political is true but too 
easy. What is needed is more differentiated 
propositions about variables influencing 
political processes in organisations" (Bolman 
& Deal, 1984, p. 217). 
Review of the Literature: Summary and Discussion 
There are a number of important points derived 
from the preceding literature. The first is that the 
conventional claims that too little attention has been 
paid to the question of implementation (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973) or that little is known about it (Van 
Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Williams, 1976; Voger, 1986) 
are no longer grounded. The volume of literature 
dealing with implementation issues is now enormous. 
The second point is a related although 
significantly distinct issue emerging from the review. 
It concerns the pluralism of the literature on 
implementation. This chapter features the 
interdisciplinary diversity of the literature and 
provides a comprehensive review of the recent 
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theoretical work on implementation in organisation 
theory , public policies and in political science. 
Seventeen differing perspectives grouped into four 
distinct categories have been briefly outlined together 
with their main advantages and limitations. 
Why has such a diversity of theoretical 
perspectives occurred? Nakamara & Smallwood (1980) and 
Bourgeois & Brodwin (1984), ' among others, have 
suggested that the different models of implementation 
represent a trend towards increasing sophistication in 
thinking about implementation, revealing a progressive 
shift away from the classical approach. The diversity 
of perspectives would result from the perceived failure 
and limitations of the already existing perspectives 
leading gradually towards the development of more 
refined alternative perspectives. 
There are a number of problems with this attempt 
to explain the diversity of perspectives. First, the 
building up process of increasing sophistication should 
logically direct- towards one single best and, 
therefore, generally accepted model of implementation. 
An essential conclusion of this review of the 
literature is that, as yet, there is no such analytical 
consensus; neither on the most meaningful approach for 
examining implementation nor on what factors are the 
most important to consider. 
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Second, such an explanation for the diversity of 
perspective implies that there is a rough chronological 
trend in the development of the perspectives available, 
beginning with the classical approach followed by the 
contingency approach ensued by the behavioural approach 
and ending with the political approach. The roots of 
these differing approaches can be found in the 
development of the theory of public and business 
administration which is often portrayed in such a 
acontextual sequential linear fashion. It was, 
however, only during the 1970s that the "implementation 
gap" was finally recognised as an important issue, 
initially in the USA (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980), 
and then in the UK (Hunter, 1983). As Nakamura & 
Smallwood (1980) indicated, 
"During the 1970s a growing number of 
publications appeared in an attempt to pin 
down what Erwin C. Hangrove has called the 
Missing Link in social policy - the 
implementation process. Although earlier 
papers, articles, and books had commented on 
selective aspects of what we now label 
Implementation Studies, it was not until 1973 
that such studies assumed major visibility 
with the Pressman and Wildavsky's book 
Implementation" (p. 12) 
Our literature review portrays a concurrent as opposed 
to a sequential linear development of the perspectives 
on implementation. Table 2-0 enumerates some of the 
leading scholars who, during the 1980s, have been 
contributing concurrently to the literature. 
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Third, this evolutionary explanation for the 
diversity of perspectives implies that there should be 
a diminishing support for the classical approach. Our 
review of the literature does not indicate a decline in 
the popularity of the classical perspectives. To the 
contrary, the classical approach is still prevailing in 
both sets of literature, public policy and strategic 
implementation (Gray and Hunter, 1983; Hardy, 1986). 
The literature review undertaken in this chapter 
suggests a more satisfactory explanation for the 
diversity of the perspectives on implementation. There 
are three main reasons for the variety of perspectives. 
First, there is enough evidence in the literature 
review to support the view that there are multiple 
processes concurrently at work in implementation. 
These processes involve, at the same time, a number of 
analytical, structural, behavioural, and political 
dimensions. Each perspective emphasises a limited 
aspect of implementation. The number of perspectives 
is partly accounted for by the diversity of processes 
at work and by the complexity of the issue 
investigated. 
Second, being a relatively new area of inquiry, 
implementation borrows concepts and research methods 
from already established, related disciplines. For 
example, the "unfreezing-moving-refreezing" change 
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sequence proposed by the the psychologist Lewin has had 
an influential impact on some of the behavioural 
perspectives, whereas the concept of "fit" (Venkatraman 
and Camillus, 1984, p. 513) has served as a central 
thrust to the development of the contingency approach. 
The diversity of perspectives reflects the skill and 
the variety of the conceptual frames of reference of 
the social scientists who, in the 1970s and in the 
1980s, have entered the field attempting to explain the 
implementation process and outcome. As Allison (1971), 
Elmore (1978), Barrett and Fudge (1981), and Pettigrew 
(1987), among others, have suggested, what we see 
depends on where we are and which way we are looking. 
"Where we sit not only influences where we 
stand, but also what we see. Few social 
scientists would claim to enter the field 
with empty minds waiting to be gradually 
filled by evidence" (Pettigrew, 1987, p. 649). 
In the twenty years in which the field has truly been 
in existence the issue has attracted people from 
several disciplines, including sociology, social 
psychology, political science, and organisation theory. 
This suggests that implementation is a highly complex 
field involving many substantive issues. As Scheirer 
(1981) pointed out, 
"Each social science discipline seems to have 
one or more strands of theory addressing 
problems of social change, but thus far no 
synthesis has emerged which weaves together 
these diverse threads of discourse" (p. 24) 
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Each of the theoretical approaches and their 
perspectives to implementation has focused on one set 
of variables as the key to successful implementation. 
Third, the diversity of perspectives occurred also 
as a result of the variety of contexts as well as the 
wide span of disparate contents areas which have been 
considered by the various scholars. The literature on 
implementation contains works ranging from the study of 
the failure to produce jobs for the hard-core 
unemployed in Oakland (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) to 
the successful implementation of a diversification 
strategy in a medium-size computer company (Voyer, 
1986). As Lowi (1964), Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), 
and Grindle (1980), among others, have already pointed 
out, the implementation process and outcome vary 
depending on the content of public policy and the 
context of administrative action. 
"Clearly, then, the content of public 
programs and policies is an important factor 
in determining the outcome of implementation 
initiatives ... policy or program content is 
often a critical factor because of the real 
or potential impact it may have on a given 
social, political, and economic setting. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider the 
context or environment in which 
administrative action is pursued" (Grindle, 
1980, p. 10) 
There is one further essential point deriving from 
the literature review undertaken in this chapter. There 
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is no single or correct general theory of 
implementation. Instead, there are a large number of 
competing perspectives favouring a limited number of 
factors in explaining implementation phenomenon. The 
focus on one group of factors alone, the tendency to 
overlook the contexts, and the neglect of the processes 
surrounding implementation, have caused the literature 
to become diffuse and inconclusive. Because of these 
shortcomings the research has not been able yet to 
dismiss the conventional top-down chain model in which 
directives from above are expected to be fully 
implemented at once by front-line operators. 
To make further progress towards an understanding 
of implementation it is now necessary to incorporate 
these factors into a more unified and holistic 
framework, to bring in an appreciation of the contexts, 
and to study the dynamic of implementation processes 
over time. This would allow the research to address 
the variety and complexity of implementation in detail, 
increasing the explanatory power and the value of the 
approach as a guide to action. 
Such an eclectic and integrative approach is now 
possible by building on the contextualist theory of 
method developed by Pettigrew (1985,1987,1988,1990) 
and used by the various members of the Centre for 
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Corporate Strategy and Change (CCSC), University of 
Warwick. 
"The analytical cornerstone of the CCSC 
research is the view that theoretically sound 
and practically useful research on change 
should explore the contexts, content, and 
process of change, together with their inter- 
connections through time. The focus is on 
changing, catching reality, in flight; and in 
studying long-term processes in their 
contexts, a return to embeddedness as a- 
principal of method" (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 3) 
Contextualism offers at least two major 
theoretical and methodological= advances important to 
the study of implementation. First, it allows 
simultaneous consideration of the many key internal and 
external factors likely to influence the implementation 
process and outcome. - A contextualist analysis of 
implementation draws on phenomena at horizontal-, and 
vertical levels of analysis and the inter-connections 
between those levels through time. For example, the 
lack of resistance of the GPs to the closure of their 
GPMU should not be solely associated horizontally with 
the decreasing opportunities to maintain their skills 
resulting from the diminishing number of maternity beds 
over the years. It must also be linked vertically to 
national medical, technological, clinical, and socio- 
economical change over that same period of time. Such 
an holistic explanation for the GPs behaviour trades 
simplicity for realism. Causation is neither linear 
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nor singular. Implementation phenomemon have multiple 
causes and are to be explained more by the convergent 
interactions and interconnected loops among factors and 
features over time. The result is a holistic account 
of implementation in which content and context are 
repeatedly reviewed alongside process variables. 
Second, contextualism provides an approach capable 
of drawing on concepts from a variety of disciplines. 
This literature review has featured the 
interdisciplinarity of implementation. It has been 
suggested that there are multiple processes 
concurrently at work involving rational, structural, 
behavioural, and political dimensions. Implementation 
is a complex phenomenon which could benefit from a 
holistic treatment allowing distinct paradigmatic 
approaches to co-exist and contribute to the analysis 
of what is happening. Chapter three presents the 
contextualist framework. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Studying The Implementation of Closure 
Using a Contextual st Framework 
This chapter outlines the contextualist research 
framework and specifies its components for studying the 
implementation of closure of GPMUs. It reviews the 
research literature on the implementation of closure in 
the NHS and enumerates the main questions that will be 
dealt with in this study. 
The Contextualist Framework 
The contextualist framework emphasises the inter- 
play between three different groups of factors: (1) the 
contexts of change, (2) the process of change, and 
(3) the content of change, together with skills 
regulating the relations between the three. According 
to Pettigrew et al (1988), 
"The what of change is encapsulated under the 
label content, much of the w of change is 
derived from an analysis of inner and outer 
context, and the how of change can be 
understood from an analysis of the process" 
(p. 301). 
An outline of the CCSC analytical framework is 
presented in Figure 3-0 and the major components of 
each group of factors are listed below. 
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Figure 3-0 
Outline of the CCSC Framework for 
Studying Strategic Change 
CONTEXT 
Outer Inner 
CONTENT PROCESS 
CONTEXTS OUTER 
Political economy 
National Policy and finance 
Changing patterns of 
mortality and morbidity 
Social movements 
Population shifts 
INNER 
Formal Organisation 
History 
Local policy and finance 
Culture 
Power Relations 
CONTENT Acute vs priority group 
Growth vs retrenchment 
Radical vs Incremental 
Top down vs bottom up 
Technological vs social 
Predictable vs risky 
PROCESS Action and interaction 
Product champions } 
Dominant coalitions 
Perceptions 
Assumptions and roles 
Legitimisation 
Source: Pettigrew et al (1990). 
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Although the analytical separation of these three 
clusters of factors may make -them appear to be 
structural entities, the contextualist model is 
designed to be understood as composed of dynamic 
processes with mutually contingent inter-relationships 
over time. No single component of the model is 
expected to account for the success or failure of 
implementation. Focusing on one or the other of these 
three categories of factors as the key to understanding 
implementation is bound to promote neglect of the other 
levels that are equally vital influences on 
implementation outcome: 
The content refers to the particular area of 
transformation under. study. Various aspects of the 
content might have an impact on the kind of activity 
stimulated by the implementation process. For 
instance, van Meter and Van Horn (1975) argued that the 
implementation process varies depending on two key 
characteristics: (1) the amount of change involved and 
(2) the extent to which there is goal consensus among 
the participants. Grindle (1980) also indicated some 
features of content affecting the implementation of a 
proposal. He suggested that an implementation gap is 
more likely to be found when the benefits provided by 
the proposal are divisible than when collective 
benefits are realised. Change that is designed to 
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achieve long-range objectives, which requires 
considerable behavioural adaptation, and that depends 
upon a network of widely dispersed decision units would 
be far more difficult and onerous to implement than 
change whose advantages are immediately apparent, 
change depending on a small number of key powerful 
decision units, and change requiring little in the way 
of changed behaviour patterns. In addition, the form 
in which goals are stated may also have a decided 
impact on implementation. Whether they are stated 
clearly or ambiguously and whether -the key actors are 
in agreement about them can beý decisive for the 
implementation, especially at the local level. 
Pettigrew et al (1988) suggested that the speed, the 
quantity, the quality, and the consequence of the 
proposal being implemented on the receptivity of the 
context to future change are also'important features of 
content. Some changes will be radical, others 
incremental. Some changes will--involve contraction, 
others development. The degree of uncertainty, of risk 
and the availability of models from which cues can be 
taken can also be important. 
Clearly, then, various features of the content can 
have a significant impact on the process and outcome of 
implementation initiatives. This research is primarily 
concerned with a single change issue: the permanent 
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closure of GPMUs. Therefore, the content level offers 
several important similarities between the cases; major 
differences relate to the contexts and process levels. 
As Wildavsky (1979) pointed out, "the context 
controls (or at least heavily conditions) the 
implementation" (p. 164). One of the major contentions 
of this research is that proposals similar in- content 
may still be implemented differently if the context in 
which they are pursued differs substantially. 
Analytically the context of implementation is 
divided into outer and inner context. The outer 
context refers to the global-environmental dimensions 
which influence concurrently on all, the DHAs at a given 
time. Usually, these dimensions are not within-the 
direct control of the districts albeit part of the 
managerial action could be to amplify some of them in 
order to develop concern and to legitimate the content 
of change. 
Building on the CCSC conceptual framework, the 
outer context might include a number of dimensions such 
as the DHSS policy and the RHA strategy for maternity 
services, the DHSS formal procedures and guidelines for 
closure, the National trends in the birthrate and in 
the perinatal mortality ratios, the changing role of 
the professional and the technological development in 
obstetrics, the social and ideological movements 
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regarding the medicalisation of childbirth and the 
place of birth, the major structural and ideological 
changes in the management of the NHS, such as the 1982 
reorganisation and the implementation of general 
management. 
The outer context could also include a, set of 
local features which could impinge on the process and 
outcome of implementation. These encompass various 
dimensions such as the history and state of formal and 
informal relationships between the local CHC and the 
DHA, the political tradition of the locality and the 
status of the health services in the local, political 
agenda, the geography of the district and the competing 
centres of population, the social fabric of the local 
community and the network of powerful local groups. 
By contrast, the inner context refers to the 
characteristics of-, the district itself. It comprises 
various features such as the size of the district, the 
district strategy for maternity services and its place 
in the strategic and operational change agenda, the 
history of the issue in the district and the skill of 
the key district managers, the district leadership and 
the championing of the closure proposal, the profile of 
the unit involved, the professional support for the 
GPMU. These factors and features of the district set 
the scene for implementation, but part of the action 
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could aim at securing change to the -inner context 
itself in order to set more receptive conditions for 
implementation. A major contention of the research 
developed in this dissertation is, that both the local 
outer context and the inner context have a critical 
impact on the genesis, - development, and conclusion of 
GPMU closure decisions. 
One of the main pillars of the CCSC framework is 
its processual approach. It avoids the trap of 
concentrating either on decision-making, structure, 
people, or power at the expense of- how the, process 
itself is managed through time. In the present 
research the process refers to the path of actions,; 
reactions, and interactions of the various -interested 
parties involved in promoting or resisting the closure 
of a particular GPMU. 
Critical at that level of analysis are the 
attempts by the proponents and by their opponents to 
redefine the issue, the types of action that are 
regarded as legitimate by each side in contest, and the 
process used by the protagonists to create legitimacy 
for their demands and to de-legitimise the demands of 
others, which Pettigrew (1977,1979,1985) refers to as 
the "management of meaning" 
"The management of meaning refers to -a 
process of symbol construction and value use 
designed both to create legitimacy for one's 
actions, ideas and demands, and to 
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delegitimise the demands of one's opponents. 
Key concepts for analysing these processes of 
legitimisation and de-legitimisation are 
symbolism, language, belief, and 
myth"(Pettigrew, 1985, p. 44) 
Several analysts have stressed the benefit of 
examining processes in a number of stages or sub- 
processes (Quinn, 1980; Berman, 1980; Scheirer, 1981; 
Kanter 1983). This segmentation of the implementation 
processes can-be useful particularly for translating 
descriptive processes of change- into prescriptive 
analytical statements about the various managerial 
tasks, constraints and challenges at each of the stages 
in creating strategic change (Pettigrew, 1985). 
Analytically, the process is here conceptualised 
as three interdependent and overlapping sub-processes: 
(1) the genesis of the closure proposal, (2) the 
development of the action, and (3) its conclusion. 
These three major stages form the skeleton of our 
analytical chronologies of the proposal to close the 
maternity units contained in chapters six to nine. 
The three groups of factors for studying 
implementation have now been presented. A central 
thesis of the contextualist longitudinal research 
design is that implementation ultimately involves a 
whole set of factors, features, and processes in 
interaction over time. The overall challenge of this 
type of research is to connect up the context, content, 
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and process levels of analysis in developing a holistic 
explanation for the success and failure of 
implementation. 
While the study performed in. this dissertation and 
the CCSC study share the same basic framework, there 
are a number of differences between them including the 
literatures which they are based upon and the research 
sites. The critical difference lies, however, in the 
type of service change investigated. The CCSC study 
addresses the implementation of a number of current 
major strategic service changes. " Their study is 
designed so as to analyse how management tackles a 
large interrelated change agenda, juggling time, energy 
and political capital between strategic issues. The 
research reported in this dissertation is less 
extensive and ambitious than the`CCSC's study. It has 
a single change issue: the closure of the peripheral 
GPMUs. The issue offers an attractive opportunity for 
studying the dynamics of implementing at DHA level. 
The Implementation of Closure in the NHS 
What has the existing research literature on 
closure in the NHS to say about either the content, the 
context, or the process of implementation? There is 
only a handful of academic research on the 
implementation of closure in the NHS. These include: 
the study of the closure of two small hospitals 
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focusing on the impact of the process of consultation 
by Korman and Simons (1978); the study"-of the delay and 
change of pace in implementing the - closure of a large 
institution for mentally handicapped people by Korman 
and Glennerster (1985, -1990) ; the. research on the 
managerial strategies and different " responses to 
closure of two small hospitals and two factories by 
Hardy (1985); and the study of the differences between 
authorities closing two psychiatric hospitals by 
Tomlinson (1988). Other research has investigated the 
effects of run-down and closure, together with the 
build-up of alternative services, particularly, for 
mentally ill people (Bennett, 1989; Wing 1990,1991; 
Leff, 1991). 
The CCSC series on the management of change in the 
NHS also includes two groups of closures: two acute 
hospitals and two psychiatric hospitals (Pettigrew et 
al, 1990). Because in many respects the present 
research is similar, indeed indebted to this pioneering 
work, it may be useful at this point to review these 
researches in turn and to point out the key findings 
that are particularly relevant to this dissertation. 
Korman and Simons (1978) 
Korman and Simons (1978) studied two decision- 
making processes of hospital closures during the period 
1972 to 1976. The research was one of four similar 
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studies on various issues commanded by the Royal 
Commission on the NHS. The aims of their research were 
to describe the process of closure and to illustrate 
how consultation was perceived and practiced by those 
involved. The study took place within one single 
region and the two cases were selected because they 
illustrate, respectively, high and low opposition to 
closure. Much of the data were taken from written 
sources complemented by informal discussions with some 
of the key participants. 
Korman and Simon (1978) found"-that although the 
proposals to close both hospitals were, clearly 
decisions by management, the officers did-not always 
have control over events concerning closure. A number 
of external factors such as the 1974 reorganisation, 
the Labour government return to power in Febuary 1974, 
as well as the autonomous actions of the clinicians and 
their Councils, impinged on the implementation of the 
closure proposals. They also pointed out that the 
community access to alternative facilities, the ways 
the proposed closures were announced, particularly to 
the staff, and the managerial policies of consultation 
were important factors in explaining the different pace 
of implementation and the strength of the opposition to 
the closure proposals investigated. 
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Korman and Simons (1978) finally indicated that, 
in addition to seeking advice from others, consultation 
can serve different purposes such as protection of 
group interests, information, negotiation, maintaining 
working relations, and reviewing the reasoning process 
of the decision. The variety of purposes reflects both 
the ambiguity of the concept of consultation and the 
varied expectations brought to the process by the 
various interest groups being consulted. They 
concluded that consultation may at time cause delay in 
implementation but it can also increase the legitimacy 
of a decision and , therefore, ease its implementation. 
Korman and Simons' research is interesting in 
comparison with the research reported in the present 
dissertation, particularly because it lists some of the 
contextual features which, although beyond managerial 
control, added pressure and influenced the timing and 
the pace of implementation. There is, however, little 
analysis in their study beyond that point. The 
processes and mechanisms through which these features 
worked are neither specified, illustrated, nor 
explained. Furthermore, the researchers do not place 
their empirical material in a broader frame of 
reference. The processes and events involved in both 
hospital closures are presented solely in the form of a 
diary and there is no attempt to focus on analytic 
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abstractions for purposes of presenting theory at some 
level or another., The study does not take into account 
the evolution of the idea and, action for closure as 
well as the constraints within which the decision 
makers operate. Little attention is paid to the 
immediate and, more distant antecedent conditions of the 
implementation episode considered. , An undoubted 
weakness of the research is that it neglects almost 
entirely the inner context of the health authorities 
responsible for the closures. +r 
Korman and Glennerster (1985,1990) 
Korman and Glennerster (1985,1990) present a 
detailed case-study of the long and complex process of 
the first closure of a large institution for the 
mentally handicapped in Britain: the Darenth Park 
Hospital in London. The research was commissioned by 
the DHSS at the request of the hospital Steering Group. 
The resettlement of residents outside the hospital was 
also evaluated (Wing, 1990; Wing 1991). An interim 
report was produced in 1985 (Korman and Glennerster, 
1985) but their book published in 1990 covers the 
entire closure programme. The study relied on a 
variety of sources of information such as files, 
informal conversations, interviews, attendance at 
meetings, and feed-back reports. 
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Korman and Glennerster (1990)-found two phases in 
the process of closure of the hospital. The first 
phase began in 1970 and ended in 1983. It is described 
as "a long-and frustrating period of planning, much of 
which proved abortive" (Korman and Glennerster, 1990, 
p. 1). During the second phase,,, events moved rapidly 
and the hospital finally closed in August 1988. 
Korman and Glennerster (1990) set the closure in 
the context of the theoretical debates about de- 
institutionalisation and normalisation. " They argue 
that the precipitating factors which made the closure a 
feasible option were numerous but that the ideological 
pressure behind normalisation proved an important 
factor. They also put the closure in the national 
policy and financial context. In particular, they 
illustrated how the critical change in the financial 
ground rules resulting from the DHSS green paper on 
financing priority group services (DHSS, 1981) had a 
significant impact on both the change of pace of 
implementation and on the outcome of the closure 
proposal. According to the authors this shows clearly 
that public bureaucracies need an appropriate incentive 
structure to respond to -national policy. The 
introduction of general management and the inception of 
the accountability review system are pointed out as 
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important contributory factors in speeding. upý the 
process of closure. 
Before 1983, the philosophy and actions of the 
regional officers conformed to the classical, rational, 
central planning approach. On the basis of the 
evidence provided in the case-study, Korman and 
Glennerster (1990) argue that the assumptions of this 
approach are naive. The divergent interests within and 
between the various interest groups involved, the 
divergent models of care between the Region and the 
local authorities, the cut back of financial support 
given by the central government to the local 
authorities after the 1976 economic crisis, and in 
general the lack of incentives for cooperation or 
effective sanctions to obtain compliance, all are shown 
to have contributed to slowing down the centrally 
planned process of closure during its first phase of 
implementation. 
Continuing pressure to succeed from the regional 
officers and important changes in their approach to 
implementation were critical to the success of 
implementation. This stressed the key role of higher 
tiers, in this case the RHA, in driving through change. 
The new approach combined central pressure with the 
freedom of the district to produce its own solutions 
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and generated a more rapid pace of change during the 
second phase of the closure. 
"What emerged after 1983 was a new pattern of 
strong regional leadership with professional 
and technical support for those undertaking 
the reprovision locally, but with a maximum 
amount of financial devolution and minimal 
detailed capital control. That approach 
conforms well to the pattern of management 
exercised in some of the most successful 
large corporations, if we are to believe 
Peter and Waterman (1982), a- tight-loose 
relationship between the centre and the 
district and unit level managers" (Korman and 
Glennerster, 1990, p. 158). 
According to Korman and Glennerster (1990) the changing 
approach to closure illustrates that public servants 
can be innovative and that public bureaucracies can 
adapt and can learn from their mistakes. 
Korman and Glennerster's research is clearly 
"contextualist in character" (Pettigrew, 1990, p. 5); it 
offers both a multi-level and a processual analysis of 
the pace and success of the implementation process of 
the closure at local level. The contribution of the 
research is, however, limited not so much because it 
has a single change issue focus but because it is based 
on a single case-study. The research does not allow 
the analysts to demonstrate how variability in context 
influenced variability in process and outcome. 
., a 
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Hardy (1985) 
Hardy (1985) provided a thorough comparative case- 
study research of organisational closure using a 
contextualist framework. Her study is similar to that 
presented in this dissertation in terms of 
investigating the management of closure at DHA level. 
The study focused on the response to the closure 
proposals using the concept of unobstrusive power: 
"The essence of the unobstrusive aspect of 
power is the ability to give meaning to 
events and actions, and to influence the 
perceptions of others so they either remain 
unaware of the implications of political 
outcomes or view them in a favourable -way. 
Unobstrusive power is thus founded in the 
ability to define reality, not -only- for 
oneself, but for others" (p. 47) 
Hardy's book contains four case-studies: the successful 
closure of two factories and one hospital as well as 
the - failure to close a maternity hospital during the 
period 1975 to 1979. Unfortunately, she did not 
undertake to discuss either the reasons behind the 
selection of her cases or the justification for 
combining together factories and hospitals closures in 
her research. She did not look particularly at 
commonalities and differences across public and private 
organisational contexts. It is left to the reader to 
assume that this selection of cases was justified. The 
cornerstone of her methodology was the use of informal 
interviews. This was supplemented-with evidence from 
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written and documentary sources and the use of various 
unobstrusive measures. 
Hardy's study aimed at explaining why different 
responses to announcements should-arise, and why some 
closure decisions are implemented without opposition, 
whereas others are confronted with resistance. The 
research focused primarily on the employees and the 
Trade Unions' responses to closure. 
Hardy found that the economic difficulties which 
prevailed in Britain from- 1974 to 1980 led to 
increasing numbers of closures but that the employees' 
resistance to closure died away over time. She argued 
that the social legitimacy of closure has changed 
during that period. The accumulation and continual 
justification of closure on economic, technical and 
commercial criteria has rendered closure- more 
acceptable and, therefore, less resisted. The general 
decline in the power of Trade Unions also accounts for 
the diminishing trend in the action against closure. - 
The specific organisational context of the 
closures also was significant, particularly- in 
contributing to the power resources of the different 
interest groups involved. -' The important factors and 
features specified by Hardy -(1985) at that level of 
analysis include the rate of unionised workforce, the 
support from other unions, the wider support from the 
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media and the public, the strategic leverage, the 
organisational culture, and the characteristics -of the 
workforce such as the age of the-staff. 
Hardy's analysis of the case-studies indicates 
that, apart from any contextual influences, the 
specific reaction to the closure proposals investigated 
depended on the managerial strategies for closure. She 
was able to identify four key strategies used by 
managers to -reduce the possibility of resistance: 
(1) the creation of managerial credibility via climate- 
setting-or tactical opportunism; (2) the consultation 
with employees, unions, and- other groups; (3) the 
provision of redundancy payments. for lost jobs- and 
redeployment arrangements; and (4) the justification of 
the closure on the basis of acceptable criteria. 
Hardy concluded that no explanation for. the 
resistance to closure is complete without reference to 
each of the three elements of her framework: the wider 
environment, the organisational context and the 
managerial process. She also stressed that managers do 
try to define proposals in such a way as to secure 
favourable sentiments towards the closure among 
potential opposition groups. 
Hardy's study of the different responses to 
closure provides a good example of a contextualist 
research. It illustrates how the employees' response 
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to closure has changed over time as a result of the 
accumulation of the continual justification of closure 
particularly on economic -grounds by companies 
struggling against a declining. -economy. An 
interesting 
contribution of Hardy's { (1985)'"- study is that it 
illustrates the critical impact. of managerial action on 
the outcome'of the individual closure proposal. 
Although the focus of the research on the Trade 
Unions and employees' reaction to closure permits'the 
combination of commercial -firms and public-agencies in 
the research sample, it- does not -present a realistic 
picture of the complexity of the response to closure, in 
the NHS. To Hardy's credit her case-studies deal to a 
limited extent with the medical staff as well as with 
the Community Health Council" (CHC) response to the 
closure of the hospitals investigated. - She clearly 
overlooks, however, the historical, cultural,, and 
institutional form of the hospitals concerned, the 
history of previous attempts to close the facilities, 
as well as the policy context and the administrative 
politics of closure of services in aalarge and complex 
public bureaucracy as the NHS. 
Tomlinson (1988) 
Tomlinson (1988) examined the North East Thames 
RHA's (NETRHA) decision, made in 1983, to close and re- 
provide two hospitals, Friern and Claybury, out of the 
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six psychiatric hospitals in the region. The research 
was conducted by the RHA mental health research 
committee seeking for lessons that could be learned for 
other closures. A cost' effectiveness analysis of the 
closures was also undertaken (Leff, 1991). 
Tomlinson (1988) noticed wide differences between 
both 'health and local authorities in the overt 
influence of members over decision-making as well as in 
the role of the chairmen. He argued that these 
differences indicate the possibility of identifying a 
number-of types of authority. Drawing on public policy 
making literature, he constructed a set of archetypes 
of implementing authority ranging along a continuum of 
discretion in developing and implementing independent 
strategies from central government. Those at one end 
of the continuum, the "Athenian Authorities" (p. 188), 
can develop discrete policies, change their 
organisational structure to implement them, and regard 
legislative limits as open to interpretation. Those at 
the other end of the continuum, the "Controlled 
Authorities" (p. 185), have little ability to pursue 
courses of action autonomously from the direction and 
very limited choices for change to administrative 
structure. In the middle of the continuum, the 
"Autharchic Authority" (p. 186), can develop 
discretionary policy as market demands arise and change 
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structure to fulfil such policy within -, legislative 
limits. According to Tomlinson (1988) the two DHAs 
responsible for implementing the closure of the 
hospitals belong to the "Autharchic" type. 
He pointed out that a number of features of the 
change content such as the relatively low status of 
Mentally Infirm services in the local change agenda, 
the complexity to achieve staff redeployment and 
retraining, and the problem of re-providing the 
services, call in RHA's intervention. He concluded 
that the feasibility and the likely outcomes of these 
interventions, closing down or opening up opportunities 
for discretionary decision-making, can be considered in 
the light of the-archetype of authorities having 
responsibility for-the implementation. 
Tomlinson's (1988) main contribution has been to 
suggest that public authorities with differentiated 
degrees of autonomy in formulating and implementating 
strategies can respond differently to ' the same 
centrally prounonced policy and to list some of the 
features of content- that influence' the process of 
implementation. The research presents, however, some 
major logical inconsistencies as well as, a number of 
critical methodological and analytical shortcomings. 
First, there is a definite°disjunction between the 
empirical evidence reported and the 'findings of the 
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research. The case-study narrates in some length the 
history of the NETRHA decision to go ahead with the 
closure of the hospitals but it does not provide 
evidence on the response of the various health and 
local authorities with responsibility for its 
implementation. The archetypes of "implementing 
authority" are, therefore, entirely theoretical and not 
empirically determined. There Is no evidence of a 
logical connection between his archetypes of 
implementing authorities and their response to the 
central policy. 
Second, Tomlinson (1988) claims that wide 
differences were apparent from observation of Health 
Authority meetings and that these differences, indicate 
the possibility of identifying" a number of types of 
authority. He: concluded, however, that the two DHAs 
responsible for managing the hospitals belong to the 
same achetype. Were the similarities more important 
than the differences then? He also claims that because 
the re-provision of the - `hospitals involves 
collaboration between health and local authorities "an 
essential part of the research has. --thus- been to 
consider the response of local decision makers in- both 
types of authority to the NETRHA initiative" 
(Tomlinson, 1988, p. 184) . The analysis fails, however, 
to connect back to the research material, which in any 
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case is not provided, and to mention which archetype 
the local authorities investigated-belong to. 
Third, and more importantly, the research is a 
typical example of ahistorical, aprocessual, and 
acontextual study of change. As Pettigrew (1985) 
pointed out: 
"For as long as we continue to conduct 
research on change which is ahistorical, 
acontextual, and aprocessual, which continues 
to treat the change programme as the unit of 
analysis and regard change as an episode 
divorced from the immediate and more distant 
context in which it is embedded, then we will 
continue to develop inadequate descriptive 
theories of change , which are illcomposed 
guides for action" (p. 15). 
Pettigrew et al, 1990 
Probably the most extensive work carried out to 
date on the management of change in the NHS is the 
CCSC's research at the- Warwick Business School, 
University of Warwick. The CCSC's series includes 
8 cases-studies cutting across various strategic areas. 
The research was funded by the NHS Training Agency 
(NHSTA) and by a consortium of eight RHAs. The aims 
of the research were to identify the motors of, and the 
barriers to, change in a number of districts tackling 
concurrently many of the major strategic issues and to 
explore the skills associated with change management in 
the NHS. The study relies on three main sources: in- 
depth interviews, documentary and archive data, - and 
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observational material. It includes four examples of 
closure: two acute hospitals, St Mary's Paddington-and 
the Central Middlesex Hospital in Bloomsbury, and two 
psychiatric hospitals, the Rainhill' and the 
Whittingham. _ 
Pettigrew et al (1990) set their analysis of acute 
service rationalisation in the literature on 
organisational decline, -death and the management , of 
retrenchment. - 'They illustrated that, in Paddington, 
the creation of the District in 1974 and the 
substantial change in thinking, from capital to service 
planning, speeded up the pace of change. They found 
that the combining of retrenchment and redevelopment 
was crucial to the whole process. The delibarate 
selection by the Chairman of a team-of people offering 
complementary rational-analytic and political skills 
was also an important factor., The case illustrates the 
key role of the rational process, particularly in 
convincing sceptics, as well as the importance of the 
political skills of the leaders in securing sound 
central, commitment, anticipating- objections, making 
concessions, "and'building a dominant coalition with the 
clinicians (McKee, 1988). The ability of the team of 
people promoting the closure to learn from previous 
errors and to modify their approach also stands out as 
a critical factor. The reduction of complexity through 
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the use of flexible and locally based ad hoc groups and 
the development, at the start of- the process, of a 
broad vision rather than detailed technical planning 
were further critical contributory factors to the 
success of the proposal. 
The evidence shows that the pace of change has 
been slower in Bloombury than that in Paddington. One 
contextual explanation provided for this'is the greater 
complexity in Bloombury: the 'district had twice the 
budget ofý Paddington, three post-graduate groups, a 
higher proportion of regional specialities. and of cross 
boundary referrals. Above all, -it included two 
teaching hospitals with independent- traditions, a long 
history of rivalry, and pronounced cultural differences 
as well as a much wider range of conflicting and 
hostile interest groups than Paddington whilst no 
dominant coalition. Other contributory factors 
include: high dependency on developments in the 
academic sphere for success in service planning, -a 
rapid management turnover at' both senior and middle 
management levels and the loss of organisational 
memory, poor relation with clinicians, substandard 
manpower and information systems, a long history of 
poor performance and a series of financial crisis which 
diverted senior managerial time and attention. They 
suggest that the prospect of massive new capital 
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investment and the style and political skills of the 
new DGM have contributed to accelerate the pace- of 
change in the late 1980s. 
The CCSC series also includes an analysis of the 
ongoing process to close two large mental illness 
hospitals: the Rainhill Hospital expected to close-by 
1992 and the Whittingham Hospital planned to close by 
1997. The analysis is set in the historical evolution 
of the asylums and the context of the present day 
national policy for psychiatric services based on 
community care and non-institutional therapies. The 
history and institutional characteristics of the 
institution are shown to have a persuasive influence on 
the management of change task. 
Pettigrew et al (1990) indicated that although the 
context and content of each closure present many 
similarities in terms of the top-down pressures for 
change, key differences exist between the two projects 
in the clarity of the time scale and the scope of the 
regional strategy. Services for the mentally ill were 
a regional priority in the case of Rainhill but not in 
Whittingham. The latter had a longer term approach 
driven by incrementalist change as opposed to the more 
radica_ and expedient change featuring in Rainhill. 
They indicated that the appointment of a UGM in 
Rainhill speeded up further and sharpened up the 
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implementation process. The -introduction of short 
general management contract and, of performance review 
was also influential. The important differences in the 
process of change relate particularly to the language 
and style of efforts, with more emphasis at, Rainhill on 
the language of opportunity and for action to dominate 
over legitimation, whereas at Wittingham there was more 
emphasis on obstacles and on building a climate for 
change. 
To date, March 1991, the CCSC -book on- managing 
stategic service change in the NHS has not yet been 
published. The Project Report (Pettigrew et 'all 1990) 
which discusses the majority of 'the case-studies 
concludes that the management of change in the NHS is 
likely to be contextually very sensitive and that there 
is neither a quick fix, simple recipe--nor universal way 
of implementing change in ` such a° pluralist 
organisation. It suggests, however, looking at context 
in terms of its dynamic receptivity for change. ': - 
"We mean by the term receptive context that 
there are features of context (and also 
management action) that seem to be favourably 
associated with forward movement. On the 
other hand, there is in non receptive 
contexts a configuration of features which 
may be associated with blocks on change" 
(Pettigrew et al, 1990, p. 118) 
The list of key features associated with "receptive" 
context for change includes: the quality and coherence 
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of policies, the availability of key people; the 
intensity -and scale of pressure; a supportive 
organisational culture; the relationship between 
managers, clinicians, and other professionals; a 
cooperative inter-organisational network; the 
simplicity and clarity of goals and priorities; and the 
fit between the district's change agenda and its 
locale. 
The contribution of the CCSC's series on managing 
service change in the NHS is three-fold. First the 
study demonstrated the strength. of the analytical 
approach lying in the combination of' a contextual and 
processual view of implementation allied-to a multi- 
level analysis. Second, it illustrated that the 
process of implementation demands longitudinal research 
which covers decades rather than, years. Third, it 
provided comprehensive evidence from a number of major 
case-studies including four on closure. - 
Criticisms have already been made about the 
contextualist approach adopted by the CCSC researchers 
for studying the implementation of service changes in 
the NHS. Critics such as Starkey (1987), Clark and 
Starkey (1988), and Whittington (1989,1990) have 
acknowledged the solid empiricism of the contextualist 
research but have expressed concern about its validity. 
They typically state that contextual research permits 
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the reconstruction of processes after the occurences 
but does not allow for prediction of the future course 
of events; - it brings forth lengthy descriptive 
histories which do not tell us very much about how to 
improve future performance in implementing 
organisational change. 
This criticism can be questioned because it 
appears to be based on a limited view of organisational 
research on change- which suggests that studies on 
implementation should only be concerned with issues 
which can directly improve the performance of 
organisations. In reply, it could be argued that 
detailed, comparative longitudinal research will' lead 
to more complete understanding of the implementation of 
change. It could further be stressed that the research 
well suits the present state of knowledge in the 
implementation of change. Pettigrew (1987) has 
answered this criticism by stressing that: 
, "In unchartered areas of inquiry, 
description, analysis, and interpretation are 
laudable enough research objectives whilst 
amongst other things ought to allow us to 
contradict myths about rational problem 
solving processes of formulating and 
implementing change carried out by all-seeing 
and presumably omnipotent chief executives or 
general managers"(p. 425) 
It does not seem justified to reject the contextualist 
research approach because it is primarily concerned 
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with descriptive" as opposed to normative theory of 
change. I 
The second major criticism of the contextualist 
approach also relates to its validity. Critics argued 
that this type of research is limited because the case- 
studies developed by contextualist researchers are 
unique, based on too deep, detailed, idiosyncratic and 
emphatic understandings of - the organisations 
investigated. The findings are, therefore, not 
generalisable beyond the immediate case or set of case- 
studies. 
This criticism is also misdirected. The problem 
lies in the very notion of generalisation- of findings. 
The critics are implicitly contrasting the findings of 
the longitudinal comparative contextualist research 
with those of survey research relying on statistical 
generalisation. The contextualist research relies, 
however, not on statistical but on analytical 
generalisation of organisational phenomenon based on 'a 
logic of replication in comparative settings. In 
analytical generalisation, "the = investigator is 
striving to generalise a particular set of results to 
some broader theory"- (p. 44). ' To reject the 
contextualist approach because it is generating 
analytical as opposed to statistical generalisation, 
seems also unjustified. 
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Summary and The Key Research Questions 
In summary, the proposed research framework 
directs attention to three clusters of factors: the 
content, the process, and the contexts - inner and 
outer. Each of these analytical dimensions can be a 
vital influence on the pace and fate of implementation. 
The research literature reviewed in this chapter 
shows that important progress has'been made since the 
first study on closure in the NHS was carried on twelve 
years ago. In particular, the field is slowly 
gathering momentum accumulating evidence from an 
increasing number of major case-studies. A promising 
framework to further our understanding of the 
implementation of closure within, as well as across, 
service area is now available. The existing work on 
closure in, the NHS can be summarised in relation with 
the three analytical dimensions of the framework. 
In terms of the content, there is as yet only a 
small amount of research ' available on 'the 
implementation of closure in the NHS. "'There has been, 
however, an emphasis on the closure and redevelopment 
of psychiatric services (Korman and Glennerster, 1985, 
1990; Tomlinson, 1988; Pettigrew et al, 1990; Hall and 
Brockington, 1991) and a tendency to examine the issue 
at RHA level. Where there have-been studies of Acute 
and Maternity facilities at district level, they 
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examine closure implemented before the 1982 
reorganisation (Korman and Simons, 1978; Hardy, 1985) 
and, therefore, when the district authorities were not 
yet responsible for the closure of health services (see 
Chapter five). The CCSC series (Pettigrew et al, 1990) 
include two highly informative case-studies of recent 
closure of Acute facilities at DHA level but none of 
Maternity services. It is this forgotten area of 
services which is investigated in the present 
dissertation. 
In terms of the process dimension of the 
framework, the researchers have put a critical focus on 
structure (Korman and Simons, 1978; Korman and 
Glennerster, 1985,1990; Tomlinson, 1988) rather than 
action. Hardy (1985) and Pettigrew et al (1990) have, 
however, - provided evidence that the way closure 
proposals are generated and the process. of creating 
legitimacy for the proposal are most influential. They 
also argued that the research needs to take into 
account the historical evolution of ideas and actions 
for change as well as the constraints within which 
decision makers operate. - .r 
Finally, in terms of the context, the research 
literature reviewed in. the previous section shows that, 
although some research has been acontextual (Korman and 
Simons, 1978; Tomlinson, 1988), there has been a 
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tendency in recent years to investigate the national as 
well as the local barriers to implementation (Hardy, 
1985; Korman and Glennerster, 1990; Pettigrew et al, 
1990) 
The Research Questions 
The present research provides a detailed empirical 
longitudinal analysis of four closure proposals at DHA 
level within the maternity services policy area. It 
focuses on the dynamic process of implementation 
through time using a multiple process perspective. 
This should help in answering some of the fundamental 
questions such as: was there evidence of variability 
in the depth, rate and pace of implementation? what 
affects the pace and rate of implementation? why is it 
that centrally-formulated policy does not get 
implemented ipso facto as prescribed? what affects the 
'implementability' (Quick, 1980) of such a proposal? 
Building on the conceptual framework above, the 
specific research questions can be summarised as 
follows: 
- What role does central policy play in 
the genesis of the proposals? How do 
the districts respond to policies 
emanating from higher tiers? How does 
the apparatus and process of 
implementation get started? 
- What are the main impediments and 
facilitators in the implementation 
process? What are the varying effects 
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of culture, leadership, and political 
skill on the implementation and change? 
How can the success and failure of 
implementation be explained? 
This chapter has outlined the research framework, 
reviewed the literature on implementation of closure in 
the NHS, and enumerated the main questions that will be 
dealt with in this study. The next chapter will' 
describe the research methodology. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Research Process 
Studying implementation poses a number of 
practical methodological problems for field 
researchers. These problems arise from the complexity 
of the concept of implementation (see Chapter one) and 
from the difficulty of studying organisational 
processes. In the following section the general 
research approach is presented. Next, the process 
leading to the decision to investigate the closure-of 
GPMUs in the Oxford health region is described. The 
data collection process is introduced, followed by the 
general approach guiding the presentation of results 
and the data analysis. Finally, a summary concludes 
this chapter. 
General Research Approach 
One of the fundamental methodological issues 
relates to whether implementation should be studied 
using quantitative or qualitative methods. Basically, 
the traditional textbook approach in social science 
methods suggests that qualitative research should be 
conducted where quantitative study is not feasible. 
For instance, Dooley (1984) indicated that, 
"Qualitative research may be the preferred 
method when hypotheses cannot be 
operationalised in quantitative terms. One 
instance of this is when theory is 
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insufficiently developed to provide well- 
defined hypotheses. Another is when the 
natural social situation provides the only or 
best laboratory but cannot be entered with 
the usual standardised measurement 
techniques" (p. 274) 
Implicit in this approach is the assumption that 
quantitative research is generally preferable to 
qualitative research which is often portrayed as less 
scientific and inferior. This reasoning accounts for 
the fact that social scientists using qualitative 
methods never seem to tire in telling their readers 
that their methodology and, therefore, their general 
approach is also a scientific one (Zetterberg, 1965). 
In recent years a number of writers such as Glaser 
and Strauss (1967), Van Maanen (1979,1983), Mintzberg 
(1979), Strauss (1987), 
_ 
Pettigrew (1973,1990), among 
others, have . sought to establish 
the qualitative 
methodology in its own right. Setting apart the 
training and the philosophy of knowledge of the 
investigators, it has been argued that the primacy of 
emphasis between qualitative and quantitative methods 
depends on the circumstances of the research and on the 
kind of data needed by the researcher (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). 
The present research is essentially qualitative. 
My association with the precepts of the 
phenomenological perspective of social science 
(Deutscher, 1973; Schwartz and Jacobs, 1979) and my 
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personal interest in understanding daily life and 
activities of health care organisations from the 
manager's point of view condition both my choice of the 
broad research question and my strategy of research. 
As Taylor and Bogdan (1984) pointed out, 
"Since positivists and phenomenologists take 
on different kinds of problems and seek 
different kinds of answers, their research 
demands different methodologies. Adopting a 
natural science model of research, the 
positivist searches for causes through 
methods such as questionnaires, inventories, 
and demography that produce data amenable to 
statistical analysis. The phenomenologist 
seeks understanding through qualitative 
methods such as participant observation, in 
depth interviewing, and others that yield 
descriptive data. In contrast to a natural 
science approach, the phenomenologist strives 
for understanding on a personal level the 
motives and beliefs behind people's actions" 
(p. 2) 
The circumstances of the research also played in 
favour of using qualitative research. There has been 
little empirical research on -implementation 
particularly in the NHS (see Chapter three) from which 
to draw a list of the important factors which could be 
measured. Implementation phenomena are still poorly 
understood and, therefore, a quantitative approach 
would have suffered from not knowing exactly what to 
measure. The research activity cannot be constrained 
by the boundaries of existing hypotheses. Under such 
circumstances there is an obvious need to gain a better 
understanding of the issue and to discover what , is 
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important before valid and reliable quantitative 
measures can be made. It should be stressed that the 
broad objective of this research, given the present 
knowledge of the implementation phenomenon, is to 
develop concepts, insights, and understanding from 
patterns in the data rather than to test hypotheses. 
Qualitative methods have been found particularly 
appropriate for fulfilling such objectives (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984; Walter, 1988; Yin, 1989). 
Finally a further major influence on the research 
method adopted'in this 'dissertation was the kind of 
data needed to fulfill the requirements of the 
processual (Van de Ven, 1986) contextualist research 
(Pettigrew, 1985,1987,1990) . As Pettigrew (1990) 
pointed out, 
"The key points to emphasize in analysing 
change in a contextualist mode, are firstly 
the importance of embeddedness, studying 
change in the context of inter-connected 
levels of analysis. Secondly, the importance 
of temporal inter-connectedness, locating 
change in past, present, and future time. 
Thirdly, the need to explore context and 
action, how context is a product of action 
and vice versa; and finally the central 
assumption about causation -in. this kind of 
holistic analysis, causation of change is 
neither linear nor singular - the search for 
a simple and singular grand theory of change 
is unlikely to bear fruit. Explanations of 
change are bound to be holistic and 
multifaced" (p. 5) 
Such an analysis places emphasis on the richness of the 
data base. According to Pettigrew (1990), the 
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comparative case study method satisfies the conditions 
of contextualist analysis. 
"Given all the variants of longitudinal 
research sketched by Kimberly (1976) Miller 
and Friesen (1982) and others, why have we 
adopted the comparative case study method? 
The simple answer is because the longitudinal 
comparative case method best suits the 
research topic we are pursuing, the 
contextualist mode of analysis we adopt, and 
the broad research objectives we have in 
mind" (p . 8) . 
Pragmatism dictates, however, that only a relatively 
small number of organisations can be investigated. One 
of the limitations of this study relates to the small 
sample size: caution is therefore required in 
generalising the results. 
In summary, the richness and complexity of the 
implementation phenomenon demands a methodology which 
is capable of capturing in-depth the intangible aspects 
of process and the rich and intricate logic of 
implementation. The quantitative methodology has been 
criticised for its failure to deal with the complex 
issues of process (Pettigrew, 1973; Van Maanen, 1979), 
and for over-emphasising rigour at the expense of 
richness (Mintzberg, 1979; Hardy, 1985). 
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Focusing the Dissertation: From the "Implementation 
Gap" to the Closure of GPMUs in the Oxford Region 
An important feature of the present research is 
that it did not start with the specific and clear 
intention of studying the closure of GPMUs. As 
Sternberg (1981) pointed out, 
"Contrary to dissertation mythology, the 
choice of a dissertation topic is not an - 
inspirational point in time but a rather 
extended process. " (p. 73) 
I began looking intensely for a viable dissertation 
topic with my doctoral studies in October 1985. By 
Summer 1986, after having produced a review of the 
British and American literature on strategic planning 
in health care organisations, a dissertation proposal 
highlighting the core problematic of my research, the 
implementation gap, was submitted and accepted. There 
was then no mention of the specific issue of GPMUs. I 
had still then to decide upon a clear focus of 
analysis. Because of the critical requirement that 
data for the dissertation must be available and 
accessible, it was felt that such an issue ought to 
come out of a feasibility study and preliminary field 
work. 
A summary of the proposal was then prepared and 
submitted to the General Manager/Medical Officer of the 
Oxford Regional Health Authority via the Regional 
Planning Administrator. The decision to conduct the 
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feasibility study in Oxford was based on two main 
reasons. First, the Oxford RHA was the only Region to 
have moved from above to below its RAWP target (see 
Chapter five). At that time, this was-interpreted as a 
general indicator of its capability in managing change 
and in closing the "implementation gap". Second, it 
was also motivated by logistics. As indicated above, 
the present research is essentially qualitative. As 
Dooley (1984) pointed out, 
"While quantitative research may or may not, 
take place in the field, qualitative research 
necessarily takes place in the natural 
setting" (p. 281). 
This means that the setting which is investigated must 
be accessible to the researcher. Oxford is located 
within one hour by car from the University of Warwick 
and fulfils this essential condition. 
Gaining access to organisations is one of the 
critical but often difficult and lengthy, steps in the 
research process (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984) especially 
for a foreign Ph. D. student. Some of the people 
interviewed, particularly during the early days of the 
research, insisted on the complexity of the NHS and 
expressed-scepticism on my ability to understand, it. A 
comment from an interviewee iý. sustrates this point: 
"I have been working in the NHS almost all my 
life and I still don't understand very well 
how it works. It is a large and complex 
British institution. It is unique in the 
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whole world you know. Any way, good luck! 
If you ever find out how it works, please let 
me know". 
Three broad: conditionsýwere raised by the Regional 
officers in order to support the project: (1) privacy 
would not be invaded, names of individuals would not be 
used, and sensitive-information which is not in the 
public domain would remain confidential; (2) the design 
of the research would ensure that the data'collection 
process did not take too much time-with individual 
managers either at the Regional or at the District 
levels; and (3) 'there would be no requirement for 
financial commitment on behalf of the RHA, DHAs, and 
Units-involved. These three conditions were accepted. 
The first condition is reflected in the data presented 
in chapters six to nine whereas the second condition 
affected the data collection process. Because the 
research entailed the co-operation of most DHAs, the 
Regional General Manager sought the support of the DGMs 
and permission to carry out the research in the region 
was finally obtained in December 1986.. 
Meanwhile a review of the five strategic plans as 
well as the planning guidelines and reports produced by 
the ORHA since its inception in 1974 was made. It soon 
appeared that the key to the successful implementation 
of the 1984-1994 regional strategic plan was the 
transfer of resources from acute and maternity services 
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towards the priority groups (see Chapter -five) and I 
decided to carry on the search for a specific research 
issue in that general direction. This was made with 
three broad criteria in mind. First, the potential 
issues should cover a change which can be defined. As 
Stocking (1985)ýpointed out, 
"This may sound obvious but it is not quite 
as easy as it first appears. With some 
innovations it -,, may. be very difficult to 
decide whether the innovation is going on or 
not. Even if those involved say they are now 
carrying out a new procedure, it is sometimes 
questionable whether the originators- would 
even recognize it" (p. 5). 
Second, the issues should provide cases of successful 
implementation as well as examples of failure. As 
Korman and Glennerster (1985) indicated: 
"If we are to understand policy making (and 
its implementation) we must study the process 
by which original intentions are modified or 
frustrated" (p. 5) 
Thirdly, the issues should be original in that they 
should not be studied in the major CCSC research on the 
management of strategic service change in the NHS. 
This was motivated by the desire to add to the Centre 
data base without prejudice to its activities. 
Two specific issues emerged from this search: 
(1) the provision of day care services in surgical 
disciplines; and (2) the association of GPMUs and 
consultant obstetrician wards. The second issue was 
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ultimately preferred for a number of reasons. There 
was a major ongoing inquiry on the implementation of 
day care services in surgery conducted by the RHA 
planning officers and they were concerned that my 
research might interfere with their work. More 
importantly, although the region's notable RAWP pace of 
change, Oxford was lagging behind most of the other 
regions in implementing the central government's 
intention to close the peripheral GPMUs (see Chapter 
five). This represented an intriguing paradox and an 
obvious example of "implementation gap" at the macro- 
implementation level. 
There was also clear evidence of the 
implementation gap at the micro-implementation level. 
The DHAs have been responsible for the closure of the 
local health care facilities since the 1982 
reorganisation (see Chapter five). By 1986, four out of 
the five DHAs with peripheral GPMUs in Oxford had 
produced a formal closure proposal for consultation. 
The outcome of these consultation processes can be 
divided into two groups: (1) two DHAs had reached a 
local agreement; and (2) two had been referred for 
Ministerial decision. In each of these two groups one 
proposal was successfully implemented whilst the other 
one failed. Table 4-0 summarises this natural research 
design for studying implementation and specifies the 
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sites involved. The table includes the whole 
population of proposals submitted for consultation by 
the Oxford DHAs from their inception to the beginning 
of the research field work. Altogether, they present a 
full picture of the possible outcomes of such a 
process. 
Table 4-0 
Consultation/Closure Matrix 
Oxford RHA 
From 1982 to 1986 
Outcome of the Proposal 
Outcome of the Success Failure 
Consultation 
Local Isebrook GPMU Abingdon GPMU 
Agreement (Kettering DHA) . (Oxfordshire DHA) 
Bletchley GPMU 
Ministerial -Westbury Amersham GPMU 
Decision Maternity Home (Wycombe DHA) 
(Milton Keynes DHA). 
A further reason for the choice of this issue 
relates to the quality of the documentary material 
available at both RHA and DHA levels on the proposals 
as well as on the facilities involved. A final reason 
relates to the quality of access to the settings. The 
closure of GPMUs represents a symptomatic yet non- 
threatening issue for the various organisations and 
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most of their members as few resouces were at stake. 
That increased the probabilities of negotiating access. 
As Child and Smith (1987) pointed out, 
"The high quality access provided by an 
organisation is an indispensable, but rarely 
granted, requirement for qualitative, 
contextual, research into process of 
organisational change" (p. 203). 
To summarise, in this research, the three 
traditional field research processes of: (1) focusing 
from a broad research problematic to a specific 
research issue; (2) gaining entree to the 
organisations; and (3) selecting interesting sites for 
research, were not linear-sequential as generally 
pictured in most prescriptive textbooks on social 
research methods. These processes ran concurrently and 
were muddled. They were incrementally, driven by a 
combined search for scientific rigour, richness of the 
data-base, and pragmatism. Such a way of conducting 
research is, however, not uncommon in qualitative 
research. As Taylor and Bogdan (1984) indicated, 
"Qualitative researchers are flexible in how 
they go about conducting their studies. The 
researcher is a craftperson. The qualitative 
social scientist is encouraged to be his or 
her own methodologist (Mills, 1959). There 
are guidelines to be followed, but never 
rules. The methods serve the researcher; 
never is the researcher a slave to procedure 
and technique" (p. 8). 
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However, the Oxford health region represents an 
extreme case as opposed to a typical example of how the 
regions dealt with the issue; it has been a "late 
adopter" (see Chapter five) of the policy. One should, 
therefore, be cautious in extrapolating the findings to 
other health regions. 
The Data Collection Process 
The data collection process comprised three main 
activities: (1) documentary search; (2) in-depth 
interviews; (3) observational and ethnographic 
material. This section describes the purpose of each 
activity, elaborates on the methods used, and stresses 
some of the problems and limitations. 
The data collection was carried out in two phases 
- an approach particularly recommended by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). In the first phase an analysis of a 
wide range of documentary and archive material was 
made. Broadly, this phase began in March 1987 in 
Wycombe, June in Milton Keynes, September in Kettering, 
and in October in Oxfordshire. In the second, phase, 
the key participants were interviewed. The last 
interview was held in Oxfordshire in April 1989. 
The aims of the first phase were; (1) to obtain a 
detailed history of how the case developed over time; 
(2) to identify the key participants in the 
implementation process; and (3) to reduce the time 
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spent with individual managers as requested by the 
Regional General Manager. Interviewees were not 
requested to recall the precise chronology of events 
but encouraged to describe their experiences and to 
clarify their -. motivation and action. I found it 
important to obtain as much documentary evidence as 
possible prior to the interview stage particularly 
since, as a French Canadian, I was not totally fluent 
in English. The factual information obtained was of 
great assistance in structuring interviews as well as 
in probing for -details and sometimes to jar the 
interviewees'. memory. - 
At the regional level, the researcher was given 
unrestricted access to the headquarters archive 
department and to the library. Specifically, the 
following sources were used to develop the 
implementation chronologies: minutes and relevant 
papers of meetings from the Regional Health Authority, 
the Regional Team of Officers, the Regional Planning 
Group and other bodies and project planning teams, 
files relating to closure of hospitals and services, 
and files concerning the GPMUs and the maternity 
hospitals. 
At the district level, strategic and operational 
plans, minutes and papers of District Planning Teams as 
well as District Health Authority minutes, Planning 
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Teams and Consultative Committee minutes were also 
perused. In all cases the researcher was given access 
to complete DGM's files which included correspondence, 
memos, and notes on meetings. 
At unit level, the files were consulted only in 
Amersham and did not yield genuinely new insights. The 
CHCs' files which included correspondence, responses to 
consultative documents, newspaper articles and press 
releases were also consulted. 
Overall access to the documents was best in 
Wycombe, almost as good in Kettering and Oxfordshire, 
and rather less complete in Milton Keynes. Greater 
difficulty was experienced in the latter case partly 
because all the files had not been transferred from the 
previous districts to the new DHA and partly because of 
selective survival of the files since the proposal was 
put forward in 1982, particularly'at the CHC. 
The second phase was based on in-depth 
interviewing. 
"By in-depth qualitative interviewing we mean 
repeated face-to-face encounters between the 
researcher and informants directed toward 
understanding informants' perspectives on 
their lives, experiences, or situation as 
expressed in their own words" (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984, p. 77). 
The main aim of Phase 2 was to identify the motivations 
and actions of the people involved in the process and 
to record the factors which, according to them have 
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influenced implementation. The interviews were semi- 
structured and, on average, lasted for one and a half 
hours. The pro-forma of questions and issues which was 
used as a checklist for the design of the individual 
interviews is given in Appendix A. These questions 
were based on the- analytical framework and on the 
original research questions presented in Chapter three. 
They were supplemented by the outcome of the Phase 1 of 
the data collection process. 
The majority of interviews were conducted on a one 
to one basis and all were tape-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. No respondents objected to being recorded 
but some requested that the machine be switched off at 
certain times in order to comment on sensitive issues. 
These issues can be classified into three broad 
categories: (1) features of the personality of the key 
people involved; (2) conflicting relationships among 
them; and (3) hidden motivation for action. 
As part of the first phase of the data collection, 
potential informants were identified. At the end of 
each interview, the informant was invited to introduce 
other key individuals who played an active part in the 
process. A particular effort was made to interview'the 
"product champions" (Stocking, 1985) in each case, the 
leaders of the public campaign, and representatives of 
the various professionals concerned. 
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Representatives of relevant interest groups 
directly involved were interviewed. These groups 
included: DHSS and Regional officers, District 
officers, Unit officers, CHCs, GPs, Obstetricians, 
Midwives, employees and public action' committees. For 
instance, at Wycombe, I interviewed the current and the 
previous chairmen, the DGM, the various members of the 
DMT including the Nursing Officer, the Medical 
Officers, the Treasurer, the District-Administrator and 
the Consultant and the GP representatives, the UGMs, 
the Director of 'Planning and the Planning Officer, the 
Chief Nursing Advisor, the Patient Services Managers, 
the Administrator of the Family Practitioner Committee, 
the Secretary to the CHC, the Joint Trade Union 
Committee Secretary, two midwives, two members of the 
public action group, the representative of the local 
branch of the NCT. Twenty different individuals were 
interviewed, several of them more than once since two 
different proposals were investigated. 
The lists of people interviewed in Kettering and 
in Milton Keynes roughly compare with the 'list above. 
Fewer interviews were, however, held in Oxfordshire. 
In this case I interviewed: the DGM, the Medical 
Officer, the Assistant DGM/Planning and Performance, - 
the UGMs, the AHA Planning Officer, the Secretary to 
the CHC and his assistant, the GP representative, the 
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District Planning Nurse, the Chairman of the Maternity 
Support Group, and a midwife. Many of them were 
interviewed on two different occasions since, as in the 
case of Wycombe, two ý different proposals were 
investigated. The perspectives of -the various 
participants roughly coincide and it was felt that 
interviews with additional people would, -not yield new 
insights. 
Finally, interviews were also conducted with DHSS 
and Regional officers as well as with various 
individuals outside the NHS with knowledge of GPMU's 
operation. These included representatives-of the Royal 
Colleges of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, General 
Practitioners, Midwives, the National Birthday Trust 
Fund, the National Childbirth Trust, the Association of 
GP Hospitals, and the National Perinatal Epidemiology 
Unit in Oxford. In total, more than 100 interviews 
were held between January 1987 and April 1989. 
Information obtained from interviews is subject to 
a variety of well-known problems such as bias, poor 
recall, and inaccurate articulation (Yin, 1989; Walker, 
1988). Some interviewees, particularly in Milton 
Keynes, had difficulty recalling the chronology of 
events without some 'prompting. This was not the case 
in the other districts because the development of the 
proposals was partially ' followed in real time with 
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interviews taking place during or relatively shortly 
after the events had occurred. Certain actions were 
undertaken to increase the reliability and validity of 
this study: (1) the quality of the overall data base 
has been improved by multiple interviewing; (2) 
interview material has been checked against documents 
and records; (3) key informants have reviewed draft 
case-study reports; (4) multiple case-studies were 
investigated using a common pro-forma of questions and 
issues providing regularity and patterning. 
Finally, unobstructive measures such as government 
statistics, district performance reports, and financial 
reports were all used to supplement interview material. 
Observational and ethnographic activities such as site 
visits and attendance at formal meetings also took 
place. From March to September 1987, I attended the 
meetings of the working party on the re-opening of the 
Amersham GPMU in order to get first hand experience of 
the management of the issue and to observe the group 
dynamics. Informal chance meetings over lunch and 
telephone conversations also proved valuable sources of 
data. 
In summary, the data collection involved three 
main activities: documentary search, interviewing with 
key informants, and observational as well as 
ethnographic material. In terms of the sequencing of 
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the data collection, the chronologies were established 
first using archival data and a few interviews, 
followed by the interviewing, secondary data collection 
and informal questioning. The triangulation of these 
sources of evidence and the relatively large numbers of 
interviews provide some assurance that the data 
collected is reasonably valid and complete; albeit, the 
data collection in Milton Keynes was a little more 
difficult than in the other three districts. 
Data Presentation and Analysis 
The data gathering process generated a mass of 
information. By far, the most difficult part of this 
research was the presentation and the analysis of the 
empirical material. A limitation of the present 
research is that the analysis relies on the perception 
of one researcher. The challenge was to find ways of 
identifying the patterns through an immersion in the 
data without drowning in the details. 
As for the other activities of the qualitative 
research, there is no absolute rule on either 
presentation or in the analysis of qualitative data. 
As Jones (1988) pointed out, 
"The analysis of qualitative data is a highly 
personal activity. It involves processes of 
interpretation and creativity that are 
difficult and perhaps somewhat threatening to 
make explicit. As with depth interviewing 
there are no definitive rules to be followed 
by rote and by which, for example, two 
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researchers can ensure that they reach 
identical conclusions about the set of 
data" (p. 56) . 
According. to Yin (1989), there are, however, two broad 
categories of analytic strategies in case study 
research: (1) relying on theoretical. propositions; and 
(2) developing a case description. Basically, the 
first approach is a close- analogue to the positivist 
model of research and aims to test a priori 
propositions. It should be stressed once more that the 
objective of the current research is to evoke possible 
hypotheses rather than to test theoretical 
propositions. The purpose of this research must 
clearly be classified as exploratory. In contrast, in 
the second approach, the general analytical strategy is 
to develop a descriptive framework for organising the 
data. This has been the analytical strategy favoured 
by, for instance, Korman and Glennerster (1985,1990), 
Hardy (1985), Pettigrew et al (1990), and the one 
adopted in this research. 
Three broad sections form the basic descriptive 
framework: (1) the genesis of the proposal; (2) its 
development; and (3) its conclusion. This structure 
was adopted as a substitute to the initial 
chronological presentation of the data because it 
grants the opportunity to highlight the key factors and 
features of the case and to establish early analytical 
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themes inductively derived from the case whilst keeping 
a broad temporal presentation needed to lay out the 
narrative. I 
The analytical challenge of contextualist research 
is to link up the content, contexts, and processes of 
change over time - to explain the differential 
achievement of change objectives (Pettigrew, 1990). 
The approach used here relies on a combination of 
elements of systematic analysis such as chronology, 
tables, figures, and the researcher's own hunches 
developed through immersion in, the data and repeated 
readings of documents and interview transcripts. 
Summary 
This chapter has outlined the problem of 
researching a complex phenomenon such as 
implementation. It has been argued that a qualitative 
approach was most appropriate because of the richness 
and complexity of implementation, the circumstances of 
the research, the kind of data needed in analysing 
change in a contextualist mode, the philosophy of 
knowledge and the skills of the researcher. 
The study focuses on the implementation of 
peripheral GPMU closure proposals in the Oxford health 
region. The issue represents a clear example of an 
implementation gap at both the macro and micro- 
implementation levels. The data collection process 
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comprised three main activities: documentary search; 
in-depth interviews and observational , as well as 
ethnographic material. A very rich data base was 
developed. The use of multiple data sources provides 
some assurance that a relatively complete and accurate 
picture of implementation was obtained. The study does 
suffer, however, from the limitations traditionally 
associated with the qualitative research: (1) small 
sample size; and (2) data analysis relying on the 
perception of one researcher. A number of measures 
have been taken in an attempt to alleviate these 
problems but caution is still required in generalising 
the findings. 
The general- strategy of data presentation and 
analysis was to develop a descriptive framework for 
organising the case-studies (Yin, 1989). The 
analytical approach relied on a "combination of 
systematic analysis and intuition developed through 
immersion in the data. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Maternity Services Policy and 
Its Changing Context 
The next four, chapters deal. with the permanent 
closure of GP maternity services in Oxford DHAs. The 
structure of the NHS and. its bureaucratic process for 
dealing with closure are relatively complex. This 
chapter presents the structure of the NHS as well as 
the closure procedures and guidelines. Of all the 
major British institutions, the NHS has, since its 
inception had one of the highest levels of public 
opinion support. This chapter begins by highlighting 
the unique place held by the NHS in recent British 
political history. 
In line with the theoretical imperative of the 
research, it is necessary to investigate the 
implementation of the policy in its historical context. 
The next part of the chapter outlines the changes which 
took place in maternity policy and in the role of GPs 
in obstetric care since the beginning of the century. 
It is not the intention of this chapter to analyse and 
explain the root causes of these changes. Rather, the 
objective is to describe certain trends and 
characteristics which are important in understanding 
the implementation of the GPMU closure proposals 
described in the next chapters. 
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Finally, this chapter examines the pattern of 
local response to the current central government 
in-patient maternity facilities policy. The Oxford RHA 
Strategic Plan and its strategy for in-patient 
maternity services are outlined; this chapter ends 
with a concluding summary. 
The Political Context 
Next to the monarchy, the NHS appears to be 
Britain's most popular institution. Historically all 
post-war politicians in the UK have been duty-bound not 
to be seen as attacking the NHS. 
The NHS was established in 1948 and its creation 
has been described by one of its architects, Mr Michael 
Foot, who in November 1980 became leader of the British 
Labour Party, as the Labour Government's most 
intrinsically Socialist proposition. As Klein (1985) 
pointed out: 
"To this day the NHS symbolises the Labour 
Party's vision of a Socialist society. It is 
a service which offers free access to health 
care to the entire population as a right of 
citizenship, regardless of the ability to 
pay. It is a service which recognizes only 
one criterion for allocating resources to 
individual patients, that of need as defined 
by the professional providers of health care. 
It is a service, furthermore, which is 
overwhelmingly financed out of general 
taxation, and which is thus a powerful 
instrument for redistributing money from the 
working population to the sick and the old. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the NHS 
symbolizes in British eyes social equity and 
collectivist compassion. " (p. 42) 
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Until 1979, successive governments, both Conservative 
and Labour, had almost unconditionally committed 
themselves to developing the 'NHS. As Wilding (1989) 
indicated: 
"The consensus about the Welfare State which 
existed from 1945-1975 can easily, be over- 
emphasised. There were differences between 
the main political parties about what should 
be done and how quickly, but there was near 
universal acceptance of the major role of the 
state in welfare which had emerged in the 
years between 1945 and 1950. There was little 
question about that principal. " (p. 185) 
The 1980s have been an important and somehow 
unusual decade in British political life. A new word, 
"Thatcherism", entered the political lexicon (Jessop et 
al, 1988; Hall and Jacques, 1990; Gramble, 1990). 
First elected in 1979, the Conservatives subsequently 
won both the 1983 and 1987 general elections. Thus, Mrs 
Thatcher became the only Prime Minister ever to be re- 
elected after two consecutive full terms since Lord 
Liverpool in the 1820s. 
The Thatcher governments have been implementing a 
new "radical" Conservatism which has rejected most of 
the post-war legacy of the Conservative party itself. 
The approach became known as "political monetarism". 
Besides her exercise of Prime Ministerial power and the 
encouragement of "Victorian values", one of Mrs 
Thatcher's key features (Kavanagh, 1990 a, b) has been 
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her fundamental opposition to Labour party privilege 
based on the public sector: 
"Much of Thatcher's legacy from previous 
leaderships was philosophical in terms of the 
social obligations of Conservative govern- 
ments ... When Mrs Thatcher came to office 
in 
1979 the emphasis had switched away from 
accepting welfarism as a policy objective and 
towards individual self-reliance and thrift. 
The private sector was stressed and the 
public sector subject to scrutiny as to the 
desirability of its component parts ... 
Similarly, although the Thatcher approach to 
the Health Service and the social welfare 
system was to maintain state provision, this 
was - in theory at least - regarded as less 
significant than before as a hallmark of 
Conservative rule" (Holmes, 1985, p. 12). 
The decade witnessed a clear, move towards 
transferring the ownership of major British public 
service institutions - telephone, gas, -; electricity,, and 
water - into private hands. Amidst these changes the 
NHS could clearly not remain unaffected. 
In the 1979 Conservative election campaign, four 
main themes featured alongside the party's motto 
"reinvigorating the private, wealth-creating sector of 
the economy": (1) the reduction of public spending; 
(2) reducing trade union power; (3) tax cuts; and (4) 
inflation. During the first two years of the 1980s, 
government popularity plummeted. The' Labour party 
dominated the opinion polls and there were several by- 
election defeats for the Conservative Government. As a 
result, the Prime Minister was vulnerable. A-proposal 
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for dismantling the NHS had been tentatively floated in 
the party's 1979 election manifesto. However, the 
repeated attacks of the Labour party, pressure from the 
Cabinet left-wingers, and the outcry of the welfare 
state lobby in the. Conservative party in particular, 
led to the idea being effectively abandoned and forced 
the Prime Minister to repudiate the proposal at the 
1982 annual party conference. 
There is little doubt that Mrs Thatcher's handling 
of the Falklands campaign - which began with the 
Argentine invasion in April 1982 - greatly assisted her 
re-election chances, but the Conservative's new key 
campaigning theme "the NHS is safe with us" clearly 
contributed significantly to winning re-election in 
1983. The new enthusiasm of the Conservatives for the 
NHS was symptomatic. As Klein (1985) pointed out: 
"the best evidence of the continuing strength 
of the consensus supporting Britain's 
existing health care system comes precisely 
from the Thatcher government's born-again 
enthusiasm for the NHS: an enthusiasm all the 
more significant because it represents the 
tribute paid by ideological bias to political 
necessity" (p. 56). 
Once again the NHS became a central issue during 
the 1987 general election. It was brought back onto 
the electoral agenda by the new Labour party leader, Mr 
Neil Kinnock. The government spending record on the 
NHS and the expansion of the private health care sector 
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were the key watchwords of Labour's campaign. The aim 
was to wrongfoot the Conservative government on its 
renewed commitment to the NHS. The complexity of the 
argument meant, however, that this proved very 
difficult to achieve. 
"From the government perspective, the growth 
of spending of health care is presented as 
evidence of its commitment to the NHS. The 
drop in the growth rate is less important and 
significant, it is argued, than the fact that 
there has been any increase at all in 
spending in the NHS in the period when the 
overall performance of the -British economy 
has been truly dreadful. Consequently, any 
increase in expenditure could not be financed 
out of the dividends of growth but meant 
transfer of resources from private 
consumption to public spending. From the 
perspective of the government's critics, in 
contrast, the spending record is evidence of 
the Conservative's niggardliness which, it is 
argued, is undermining the NHS. The price of 
financial stringency,, the critics maintain, 
is cutting the NHS and reducing its ability 
to respond to need" (Klein, 1985,. p. 43). 
The Labour party's leadership difficulties, its 
"failure to translate its ideas into clear policy 
commitments" (Small, 1989, p. 117) and the unpopularity 
of the Labour's defence policy in particular 
contributed to the Conservative party's own strengths 
in the 1987 Conservative re-election. 
In summary, the British NHS is a highly sensitive 
political issue. Throughout the 1980s, the NHS has 
been at the core of the political confrontation between 
Thatcher's Conservative party, which has gained the 
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overall parliamentary majority on three consecutive 
occasions, and "Her, Majesty's Opposition", the Labour 
party. Such a critical issue at national level is 
bound to reflect on local politics. when health, care 
issues, such as the closure of health facilities, are 
raised by the local Health Authorities. 
The Structural Context 
The NHS was first reorganised in 1974 by the Heath 
Conservative government in a measure to unify its 
original tripartite structure. This was achieved by 
bringing together the hospital, community and 
preventive services under 14 Regional Health 
Authorities (RHAs) - responsible for populations 
varying from nearly 2 to over 5 million. Below these 
were 90 Area Health Authorities (AHAs) which were 
further sub-divided into a number of geographical 
districts and units of management. 
Gradually it became apparent that the structure 
was over-elaborated, and the NHS was further 
reorganised in 1982 by the first Thatcher government. 
The AHAs were abolished and replaced by 192 District 
Health Authorities (DHAs) directly responsible for the 
planning, development, and management of a total of 
about 900 units. In each RHA, there were between 8 and 
22 DHAs, each of which had 2 to 10 units. The Chairmen 
of these Authorities are appointed by the Secretary of 
CHAPTER FIVE - THE CHANGING POLICY CONTEXT 
_ 
Page 142 
State and receive a small, part-time salary. This 
structure largely remained in force thoughout the 
period of the research. 
In parallel with this process of reorganisation, 
the government introduced a strategic planning system 
as well as a procedure of accountability reviews. As 
Korman and Glennerster (1990) pointed out: 
"Under this system, regions and districts had 
to respond to questions from the central 
department about their progress towards key 
policy goals" (p. 27). 
In 1985, however, there were further management 
changes resulting from the implementation of the 
recommendations of the NHS Management Inquiry Report 
(the -Griffiths report), commissioned by the second 
Thatcher Conservative government's Secretary of State, 
Mr Norman Fowler. Prior to this inquiry, each RHA 
appointed a Regional Team of Officers (RTO). In the 
same way each DHA appointed a District Management Team 
(DMT) comprising of functional managers as well as 
elected medical representatives. The DMT reported 
directly to the DHA, and the District Administrator 
worked directly to the Chairman. The DMT had no 
permanently designated head but members took it in turn 
to preside over meetings. These key decision-making 
groups were operating by consensus. 
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Although the Management Inquiry Team did not 
reject systematically the consensus management, one of 
its major recommendations was to identify clearly a 
General Manager at regional, district, and unit levels. 
The recommendation was approved by the Ministers and 
implemented in 1985. The General Managers took 
personal responsibility for planning, implementing 
plans, and controlling the performance of their 
organisations. The resulting management arrangements 
differed among the various regions and districts, from 
the retention of the RTO and DMT in their previous form 
to major changes and reorganisation of functions at all 
organisational levels. A schematic structure of the 
NHS is presented in Figure 5-0. 
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Figure 5-0 
Schematic Structure of the NHS 
(excluding Family Practitioner Committees 
and relationships with other bodies) 
England, 1985 
Secretary of. State 
DHSS 
RHA RHA RHA 
CHC --- DIA CHC --- DHA CHC -- D 
Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit Unit 
Source: Adapted from Mullen, P. (1985). 
For each DHA, there is also one Community Health 
Council (CHC). The CHCs were not included in the 
original design for the 1974 reorganisation, but they 
were championed by the Labour party and appeared during 
the parliamentary debate. The CHCs were established to 
be the voice of the consumer but their responsibilities 
extend far beyond a concern simply for the interests of 
patients. They are responsible for promoting and 
protecting the interests of the local population and 
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are commonly referred to as the "Watch Dogs" of the 
health services (Farrell and Levitt, 1980). 
Normally, the CHCs have 18-24 members. One half 
of the members are appointed by local authorities, one 
third by voluntary organisations,, and the remaining one 
sixth by the RHA. The RHAs are responsible for funding 
the CHCs in their territories but the CHCs are separate 
and autonomous consumer-representative, bodies. 
Further reforms in the organisation of the NHS 
have been proposed in the White Paper Working for 
Patients, published on 31st January 1989 by the third 
Conservative government. These reforms were not 
implemented during the period of the present research. 
For more details on the key changes advocated by the 
White Paper see Willetts (1989). 
With the structural context now broadly set, the 
next section considers the DHSS guidance on 
consultation. 
The Bureaucratic Context 
Consultation is a key aspect of the NHS system for 
implementing a permanent closure. The duty to consult 
the CHCs is laid down by the NHS Regulations, 
SI 1973 No 2217. General guidance on the circumstances 
and processes of consultation is available in a DHSS 
circular, HCS(IS)207, issued in October 1975. 
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There are a number of difficulties with these 
documents. One is that they adopt different approaches 
to consultation, and use different terminology. A 
further difficulty is that they allow for considerable 
variation in the timing, scope, and content of the 
consultation. As Liddell (1981) pointed out: 
"The rules and procedures of consultation, as 
currently framed, present a minefield of 
complexity and delay, even to the initiated. 
Established when the scale and pace of change 
were more modest (or the public less aware), 
they have been interpreted and developed by 
custom and practice, and by precedent of 
ministerial and legal decision. Perhaps most 
bewildering is the combination of variables 
introduced but hardly explained by the 
official guidance, changes which may-apply-to 
health buildings or to services, which may be 
permanent or temporary, partial or -total, 
urgent, substantial or merely part of routine 
management" (p . 32) . 
Because of these difficulties the DHAs rely generally 
on their Administrators and, since 1985, on their 
General Managers to advise on the way to approach each 
situation. The complexity of the process also has its 
effect on the CHC members who often feel powerless in 
fighting the closure proposals (see Health Service 
Journal, 16 November 1989, p. 1384). As Korman & 
Simons (1978) indicated: 
"When an Authority consults other bodies, it 
has in effect made up its mind, at least. 
tentatively, on an issue. Because closure 
procedure is complex, based on a detailed 
review of provision and needs, there is 
already a commitment to closure at the time 
an Authority recommends closure procedures be 
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initiated. The Authority is still open to 
influence to the extent that it can be shown 
that the decision is unacceptable, based on 
inadequate information or misunderstanding. 
CHC members, however, see this as a decision 
already made, and the potential for 
influencing the decision as minimal"(p. 178) 
The general rule is that consultation should be as 
full as circumstances permit. The usual procedure is 
for the DMT to hold informal pre-consultation with the 
CHC and the other advisory committees. A consultative 
document is produced specifying the reasons for the 
closure, the alternative use of the site and 
alternative employment of staff, the relationship 
between the closure and other developments, and the 
implications for the patients. This is then circulated 
to a wide range of advisory bodies, staff, and powerful 
external interest groups. Most of these groups are 
expected to comment on the closure proposal, which the 
DHA has to take into account when making its decision. 
The local CHC has a particularly critical role to 
play in the process. It has a statutory right to be 
formally consulted on any substantial variation in the 
local provision of health care services. The NHS 
Strategic Planning System implemented in 1982 also 
makes provision for the local CHC to be consulted on 
the District strategic plan and forward programmes. 
If, on the one hand, the CHC agrees to the 
closure, then the DHA can go ahead. If, on the other 
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hand, the CHC objects to the closure it must put 
forward a detailed and constructive counter-proposal 
which must be taken into account by the DHA. If the 
DHA still wishes to go ahead with the initial closure 
proposal, it must refer the decision to the RHA which, 
if it supports the DHA, must forward the proposal to 
the Secretary of State who may or may not confirm the 
decision to close the service. A summary of- the 
administrative process of closure and the steps 
followed by each of the case-studies-As presented in 
Figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1 
Algorithm of the Sequence of Decisions 
in the Technical Process of Closure 
Amersham 
GPMU 
NO NOT 
Step 1 Step 2 Stop Step 4 
DHA Local RHA Secretary 
Closure . Agreement .. ji, NO-e,. Approval -a. YES-a" of State 
Proposal DHA/CHC Approval 
YES YES 
Abfing' don Ise rook Bletchley/ 
GPMU GPMU Westbury 
YES 
GPMUs 
With the exception of the first proposal to close the 
Amersham GPMU, a consultation paper was issued for all 
cases (Step 1). Two out of the four cases, Abingdon 
GPMU and Isebrook GPMU, ended with a local agreement 
between the DHAs and the CHCs on the closure proposals 
(Step 2). The remaining two proposals, Amersham GPMU 
and Bletchley GPMU, were referred to the RHA (Step 3) 
and forwarded to the Secretary of State for arbitration 
(Step 4). The proposal to close the Amersham GPMU was 
rejected whereas the proposal to close the Bletchley 
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GPMU and the Westbury Maternity Home was approved by 
the Secretary of State. 
Full local consultation rarely takes less than six 
months, and more usually nine or ten months. The 
timetable may extend to years if a difficult 
Ministerial decision is involved. This delay is the 
single most important factor identified by the 
respondents for negotiating and compromising in order 
to reach a local agreement on the closure proposal. 
The savings from closures -are calculated at a 
particular point in time and the longer decisions take 
to be made, the greater the likelihood that the savings 
will diminish. 
The data on the numbers and outcomes of cases 
referred for Ministerial decision in the last two 
decades are not available. In recent years the trend 
has been, however, for the Secretary of State to be 
increasingly involved in settling the proposals (Table 
5-0). 
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Table 5-0 
Percentage of Closure Proposals Referred 
for Ministerial Decision 
England 
1986 - 1989 
Ministerial Numbers of 
Decisions Closures 
Years 
--------------------------------------- 
1986 9.11.8 . 76 
1987 13 . 19.4 . 67 
--------------------------------------- 
1988 5, 
--- 
3.0 . 
------------- 
132 
----- --- 
1989 
--- 
------ 
23 
--------- 
. 22.7 . 
------------- 
101 
----- 
Source: Data provided by the DHSS. 
This section has briefly described the formal 
procedure for the closure and change of use of health 
facilities. For more details on the administrative 
processes involved see, for example.. Dennis et al. 
(1980), Liddell (1981), and Finch (1985). The next 
section presents the formation of maternity policy in 
England, the changing place of the general 
practitioners in obstetric care, and the context in 
which it occurred. This analytical chronology of the 
policy formation has greatly benefited from the work of 
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Rona Campbell, Department of Social Administration and 
Policy, University of Ulster, Alison Macfarlane and 
Miranda Mugford of the National Perinatal Epidemiology 
Unit (NPEU) in Oxford. 
The Historical, Social and Economical Contexts 
The main objective of the maternity service policy 
has always been to minimise mortality in mothers and 
babies. The following five- headings summarise the 
development of the policy since` the beginning of the 
century: 
1. Universal Home Confinement; 
2. The Provision of Small GPMUs and Maternity 
Centres; 
3. Confinement at Home, in Consultant Ward, and 
in GPMUs according to Medical and Socio-- 
economic Risk Factors; 
4. Universal Hospitalisation; 
5. Rationalisation of all Existing Maternity 
Facilities. 
Universal Home Confinement 
During the nineteenth century most women in 
England and Wales had their deliveries at home. A 
small number of births were also taking place in 
charitable lying-in hospitals, , founded, -in the preceding 
century, as well as in military hospitals and in union 
workhouse infirmaries, managed by a number of joined 
local parishes (Abel-Smith, 1964; Crowther, 1981; 
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Salmon, 1988). A significant proportion of women 
having deliveries in these institutions were dying 
following normal labour from various septic conditions 
known as puerperal fever. The hospital was considered, 
by those with responsibility for the services, as a 
potentially dangerous place for childbirth. 
Towards the end of the century, the, -maternal death 
rates in hospitals were much lower than they were 
before because of the adoption of aseptic and 
anticeptic procedures. Nevertheless they were still 
significantly higher in hospital than in women's own 
homes. 
At the turn of this century, the rising public 
concern about infant mortality put political pressure 
on the Local Government Board, the forerunner of the 
Ministry of Health, to set up schemes for maternity and 
child welfare. Local authorities', were empowered to 
provide staff for home visiting, help for expectant 
mothers, clinics, and in-patient -beds. A number of 
maternity centres in buildings separate from hospitals 
were provided by local authorities, nursing 
associations, and other voluntary agencies. 
The Policy of Small GP Units and Maternity Homes 
During the first World War the over-crowding of 
towns and particularly the poor housing conditions 
emphasised the need for more maternity homes. At the 
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end of the war, the Ministry of Health was set up. It 
had a Maternity and Child Welfare Department, staffed 
entirely by women, whose task was to co-ordinate and 
monitor the implementation of maternity policy. The 
Ministry encouraged the development of. maternity homes 
throughout the country. A distinction was clearly made 
between maternity homes of up to 20 beds providing for 
normal cases, miscarriages or cases of minor 
difficulty, and larger maternity hospitals fully 
equipped for the treatment of all, complications and 
disorders of pregnancy and labour. 
The number of beds increased considerably both in 
hospitals and in small maternity homes such as in 
Westbury (see Chapter eight). Under the Local 
Government Act of 1929, local authorities took over the 
charitable hospitals and were given block grants by 
central government to secure the implementation of the 
services. Many local governments, such as in Amersham 
(see Chapter six) and in Wellingborough (see Chapter 
nine), expanded their workhouse infirmaries. The local 
cottage hospitals (see Chapter seven) also provided a 
number of maternity beds. 
The institutional delivery was already becoming 
popular with expectant mothers. The percentage of 
births in institutions rose to 15% in 1927 and 35% in 
1937 as a result of both the increase in the 
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institutional facilities available and a dramatic fall 
in the numbers of births. The maternal mortality rate 
in institutions did not, however, fall further. Quite 
the opposite, it rose slightly during that period to 
nearly five maternal deaths per thousand births. 
Both the British Medical Association (BMA) and the 
British College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
(RCOG), founded in 1929, supported the Government's 
policy. It was, however, criticised by some 
obstetricians who were calling for fewer well-equipped 
hospitals, with full facilities for teaching as well as 
treatment. 
The 1930s saw competition between obstetricians 
and GPs about who should be responsible for maternity 
care. As Stacey (1988) pointed out: 
"GPs were anxious to practice midwifery 
because this was one of the routes whereby 
they could influence the woman of the house 
and thus gain access to the health care of 
the whole family and increase their 
clientele. " (p. 87) 
The move towards institutional delivery was accompanied 
by changes in obstetric practices. The intervention 
during labour and the number of operative deliveries 
such as anaesthesia, forceps, caesarean section and 
other obstetric operations became increasingly common. 
Some GPs were, however, inadequately trained to perform 
these interventions. A proportion of the maternal and 
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perinatal mortality was attributed to the lack of skill 
of the GPs and to inadequate care, particularly in 
units located in small cottage hospitals. 
A few years before the second World War, an 
effective drug for the treatment of puerperal sepsis, 
the Prontosil developed by a German company, was 
introduced in England. The maternal mortality rate as 
a whole and the mortalities attributable to puerperal 
fever in particular fell sharply (Figure 5-2). The 
hospital was no longer considered by those with 
responsibility for the services as a dangerous place 
for childbirth. 
CHAPTER FIVE - THE CHANGING POLICY CONTEXT 
_ 
Page 157 
Figure 5-2 
Maternal Deaths per 1000 Births 
England and Wales 
1920 - 1980 
Numbers 
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Source: OPCS Mortality Statistics 
The provision of more in-patient maternity beds 
was certainly impeded, however, by the second World 
War. Nevertheless more than half of the deliveries 
were already taking place in-hospital in the immediate 
post-war years of the "baby. boom"ý Meanwhile the 
maternal mortality rate fell further to just over two 
per thousand births. 
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The Policy of Confinement According to Medical and 
Socio-Economic Risk Factors 
The proportion of mothers seeking admission to 
hospitals for their confinements increased further 
following the inception of the NHS in 1948. ' As Doyal 
(1987) stated: 
"The creation of the NHS was extremely 
important for British women, giving them for 
the first time both primary and hospital care 
free at source. It was particularly valuable 
in ensuring that all women were able to 
obtain ante-natal care and help during child- 
birth. " (p. 215) 
In its reply on the White Paper setting out the 
principle underlying the NHS, the RCOG recommended that 
NHS maternity accommodation should be provided to allow 
for 70% of all births to take place in hospital. 
This suggestion was not immediately adopted by the 
Ministers. The demand for acute hospital beds was out- 
stripping the supply. The provision of hospital 
accommodation, particularly for normal maternity cases, 
was not seen as legitimate by the authorities. The 
hospital care was reserved for the more difficult 
cases. The tendency was still to see pregnancy as a 
natural physiological event with departures from the 
normal occuring solely in some cases. 
The changes which took place after the war in the 
pattern of care available to women and babies, the 
improvements in general medical care, and the general 
increase in living standards made a substantial 
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contribution to improving all mortality rates and the 
maternal mortality rate in particular. In the first 
half of the 1950s, the mortality of mothers fell to 
less than one per thousand births and it became 
possible for every maternal death to be the subject of 
a detailed medical inquiry. The first report on these 
inquiries pointed to the booking of high risk women for 
delivery at home or in small GPMUs. In this period 
came the belief that the GPMUs were unsafe. 
The selection of women to deliver in hospital was 
a recurring theme in the 1950s and in the first half of 
the 1960s. Up to 1962, the percentage of births taking 
place in hospital remained relatively static at about 
60 to 65 per cent. This was made possible in spite of 
a sharp increase in the total number of births by the 
opening of new facilities such as in Bletchley (see 
Chapter eight). The number of maternity beds both in 
consultant obstetric units and in GPMUs increased 
steadily to peak only in the first half of the 1970s 
(Figure 5-3). 
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Figure 5-3 
Numbers of Beds in Obstetric Wards and in GPMUs 
England and Wales 
1955 - 1985 
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Source: Adapted from Campell & Macfarlane (1987). 
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At the same time there was a substantial increase 
in the productivity of all these beds and a sharp 
decrease in the average length of stay in particular 
(Table 5-1) 
Table 5-1 
Average Length of Combined Antenatal 
and Postnatal Stay 
England 
1955 - 1985 
1955 1965 1975 1985 
GPMUs 11.1 days 7.6 5.2 3.6 
Consultant 
beds 12.1 days 8.6 7.2 4.7 
Source: Data from Ministry of Health, DHSS Office 
Publications. 
In the 1950s, the maternity homes and the 
maternity units located in small cottage hospitals 
became known as GP units, whilst midwives maintained 
responsibility for nearly all the maternity care 
including supervising the deliveries. By the late 
1950s, they were already referred to as "isolated" 
GPMUs in some official reports. The new name 
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emphasised the lack of proximity to specialist 
obstetric services. It contrasted these GPMUs with the 
new "integrated" GP units which began to appear in the 
mid 1950s. In 1958, the National Survey on Perinatal 
Mortality suggested shortcomings in the standard of 
care available in "isolated" GPMUs, and poor results 
where transfer in labour was required. 
In 1959, the Ministry of Health Maternity Services 
Committee finally adopted the RCOG's recommendation 
that a national average of 70% of all confinements 
should take place in hospital. The committee also 
recommended that all GP obstetricians should have 
access to maternity beds within "integrated" units. 
The idea of getting all mothers and babies close to 
consultant care was progressively finding its way. 
The confinement in specialist units did not find 
favour universally. It met some resistance particularly 
from the mothers themselves. According to Graham and 
Oakley (1981) and Stacey (1988), the frames of 
reference of obstetricians and women differ as to both 
the nature of childbearing and its context. 
"Obstetricians see pregnancy and birth as 
medical matters, mothers as a natural 
biological process. The obstetrician has a 
limited view of the woman as a patient 
through her pregnancy and until after the 
birth; for the woman it is not an isolated 
episode but an event integral with the rest 
of her life. Her notions of a successful 
outcome are far more complex than his. These 
differences lead to conflicts, but the 
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differential, social positions between them 
leave the consultant in command. (Stacey, 
1988, p. 238). 
The protest was expressed through pressure groups, such 
as the Natural (later to become National) Childbirth 
Trust (NCT). The NCT was founded to provide education 
and support for women who wanted to take an active part 
in the birth of their child. Together with other 
pressure groups, such as the 'Association for the 
Improvement of Maternity Services (AIMS), the NCT 
campaign against the dehumanising of birth and the 
"unnecessary" technological intervention 'in-3-the 
management of pregnancy advanced. As Summey and Hurts 
(1986) indicated: 
"In recent years, the profession has come 
under attack by the very women it serves: the 
medical model of disease and intervention is 
said to have subsumed and perverted the 
midwifery model of support and assistance. 
The last vestiges of social childbirth 
described by Leavitt (1983) as a women being 
brought to the bed in her own home by the 
women she had called together gave way to 
scientific childbirth characterised by giving 
birth drugged and alone among strangers in an 
impersonal hospital. Women, who in the 19th 
and 20th centuries hastened the medical 
takeover of childbirth hoping it would save 
them from "death's door" (Leavitt and Walton, 
1984), now resist the medicalisation of their 
childbirth experiences"(p. 134). 
The growing critcism of the obstetric profession by 
women can be associated with the emergence of a wide 
variety of "new social movements" (Scott, 1990) and, in 
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particular, to the womens liberation movement. As 
Stacey (1988)"indicated: 
"It was a characteristic of the feminist 
movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s 
that some women began for'the first time to 
criticise the way in which they were treated 
by the medical profession; they began to 
develop the hypothesis that medicine was an 
active agent of their continued oppression. 
Reactions of women, -not themselves 
feminists, 
to their increasingly passive and 
subordinated role which the new obstetrics 
forced upon them fuelled these arguments. 
(p. 242). 
Recent History, Culture, and Context of Maternity 
Services 
The numbers of consultants in obstetrics and 
gynaecology started rising much more steeply from 1963 
onwards than it ever had since the inception of the NHS 
in 1948 (Figure 5-4). 
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Figure 5-4 
Number of NHS Consultants in 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
England and Wales 
1950 - 1985 
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Source: Campbell & Macfarlane (1987), p. 16. 
From 1965 to 1975, the fertility rate and the 
number of births fell sharply from over 850,000 to 
below 600,000. Occupancy levels, particularly in 
GPMUs, inevitably fell. 'In the twenty years from 1960 
to 1980 the roles of both the GPs and the midwives 
changed totally from attending deliveries to providing 
antenatal and post natal care only (Figure 5-5). 
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Figure 5-5 
The Changing Role of GPs and Midwives 
England and Wales 
1960 - 1985 
Numbers 
900 000 
Total births 
" ""' 800 000 ýý -' - 
700 000 
600 000 "Mº""' 
GPs' claims for care . ""r"" 500 000 including delivery "~'"+" 
l i f ' NZ Ps ms c a or ". " 400 000 antenatal and 
",,.. -ý" 
postnatal care 
300 000 only 
w 
ý; 
200 000 1 
Deliveries 
100 000 attended by e midwives '-"--- - -- _. _, - _ 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Years 
Source: Adapted from Campbell & Macfarlane (1987), p. 21 
Both the GPs and the midwives progressively 
withdrew from intrapartum obstetric care without much 
resistance. This suggests a tacit agreement, amongst 
the professions involved, that the change was 
necessary. It also coincided with an increasing 
tendency to see pregnancy and childbirth as hazardous 
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events in which specialist medical assistance and 
intervention are very often required. As Stacey (1988) 
indicated: 
"This history can be seen as an inter- 
professional struggle between obstetricians, 
GPs and midwives in which the first won at 
the expense of the other two .... They, GPs, 
became convinced by the obstetrician's 
arguments that no delivery can be regarded as 
safe until it is over, that is that one could 
not tell in advance what might be a normal 
delivery and that therefore all deliveries 
must be regarded as potentially abnormal. " 
(p. 240) 
In the 1980s pressures to "reinvolve the GPs in 
obstetrics came from various directions. As March et 
al (1985) pointed out, 
"GPs are now reasserting the advantages of 
continuity of care in pregnancy and labour 
and the suitability of GPMUs for patients at 
low risk. In 1981 the RCOGs and the RCGPs 
jointly recommended that the number of GPs-- 
who provide full obstetric care should be 
increased. This was restated by the working- 
party of the RCGOs on antenatal and 
intrapartum care. Patients have begun to 
react more openly against the dehumanising of 
birth and the inappropriate use of obstetric 
technology. Some consultants now recognise 
the particular skills contributed by GPs in 
low risk confinement"(p. 901) 
The midwives also began protesting about their status 
and various aspects of childbirth: 
"The midwifery leadership had not protested 
the new developments as they took place. The 
Association of Radical Midwives, which was 
formed in 1976, has a programme which would 
change the division of labour radically. The 
Association argues that midwives should be 
responsible for the 80% of normal births; 
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that midwives should be independent 
practitioners contracting with the NHS as GPs 
do; that 60% of deliveries should take place 
at home attended by midwives; that women 
should have choice of place and manner of 
delivery (Stacey, 1988, -p. 241), 
The decline in interest by GPs in intrapartum care 
was commonly attributed to the diminished opportunities 
to maintain their skills and confidence (Black, 1982; 
Jewell 1985; March et al, 1985). The fact that the 
fall in the GPs' claims for care, including delivery, 
preceded the closures, and that it occurred mainly at a 
time when the numbers of GP maternity beds were still 
increasing, suggests that other factors might also be 
responsible. For instance, many techniques to assist 
delivery such as the use of oxytocics and 
prostaglandins for induction and acceleration of 
labour, the electronic fetal heart rate monitoring and 
epidural analgesia were introduced during that period. 
This added to the trend towards greater technological 
intervention in labour in both normal and complicated 
cases (Figure 5-6). 
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Figure 5-6 
Trends in Obstetric Intervention 
England and Wales 
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Source: Macfarlane & Mugford (1984), p. 161. 
At the same time, the development of antenatal 
technology, such as ultrasound imaging and amniotic 
fluid analysis, led to a greater awareness of the 
factors which might call for specialist care at the 
delivery. This, however, was accomplished without 
increasing the ability to predict a problem free 
delivery which would call for GP obstetric and 
midwifery care. 
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In the 1960s, the maternal mortality rates reached 
the theoretical minimum that might be achieved and the 
emphasis in obstetrics shifted from maternal to 
perinatal mortality. As Summey & Hurst (1986) pointed 
out: 
"During that period, we saw a shift from a 
focus on management and childbirth procedures 
to one of monitoring and surveillance. In 
obstetrics an integral part of this shift was 
the change from the obstetrician's focus on 
the woman patient, or even the reproductive 
system, to the primacy of the fetus. The 
fetus has supplanted the woman as the 
obstetrician's patient. The technological 
advances of the period, extensively reviewed 
by Arney (1984) were harnessed to the use of 
the obstetrician for his in utero 
patient" (p. 112) 
By the beginning of the 1970s concern was 
broadening to include minimising impairments 
particularly among pre-term and low birthweight 
surviving babies. The developments in paediatrics, in 
neonatal care and the advent in the mid 1970s of an 
effective respiratory support for immature newborn 
babies, in particular, improved the survival chances 
for even the most pre-term and low birthweight babies. 
Policy reports pointed at modern pediatric neonatal 
intensive care in order to reduce some of the non-fatal 
but adverse outcomes of pregnancy. This called for the 
pediatric wards such as in Milton Keynes (Chapter 
eight) and in Wellingborough (Chapter nine) to be 
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relocated with the maternity units alongside the main 
district obstetric ward. 
Current Policy: Universal Hospitalisation 
In 1970, when maternity policy was reviewed by the 
DHSS Standing Maternity and Midwifery Advisory 
Committee, 73% of all births were already taking place 
in hospitals with consultant obstetric beds and less 
than 13 per cent of women were delivered at home. Even 
without specific policy 'direction the institutional 
confinement rate was rising sharply from 1963 onwards. 
The 'Committee recommended that maternity 
accomodation should be provided to allow for 100% 
hospital delivery and it went on to suggest that small 
isolated GPMUs should be replaced by larger combined 
consultant and GP units. It was argued that the 
greater safety of hospital confinement for mother and 
child justified such proposals. This allegation has 
been echoed by a number of committees of inquiry that 
have since looked at the maternity services, such as 
the 1978 Parliamentary Select Committee on Social 
Services. It was hoped that getting mother and baby 
closer to specialist care and life-saving equipment 
would reduce further the perinatal mortality as well as 
the number of babies born with an impairment because of 
harm at the delivery. In particular, the hazard 
associated with transferring women during labour to 
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specialist care in the event of an obstetric emergency 
was seen as an "unnecessary" risk. According to Stacey 
(1988) r 
"Around the time of the Peel Report, the 
obstetric profession decided that women were 
not to be permitted to take the risk of 
having a child at home. They further decided 
that they should intervene to reduce risks; 
that women had placed themselves in their 
hands, and therefore the decisions should be 
professional ones" (p. 242) 
It is not our intention to get into the debate 
about whether the obstetric wards are safer (Klein, 
1985) or are not safer (Tew, 1985) than GPMUs. Table 
5-2 presents the crude Perinatal Mortality Rates in 
both peripheral GPMUs and in NHS hospitals. 
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Table 5-2 - 
Perinatal Mortality Rate for Babies Born 
in Isolated GPMUs and in 
other NHS Hospitals 
Year Births Births in Nos. of Perinatal 
in Isolated Perinatal Mortality 
Isolated GPMU as a Deaths in Rates per 
GPMU % of all Isolated Thousand 
Births GPMU Births 
GPMU NHS 
Hospitals 
1975 43 862 7.2 218 5.0 20.4 
1976 45 458 7.7 191" 4.2 18.8 
1977 39 019 6.8 202 5.2 17.7 
1978 35 645 5.9 176 4.9 16.1 
1979 32 700 5.1 122 3.7 15.0 
1980 27 225 4.1 101 3.7 13.6 
1981 22 210 3.5 63 2.8 12.0 
1982 21 056 3.3 42 2.0 11.4 
1983 16, 694 3.1 41 2.1 10.5 
1984 18 435 2.9 37 2.0 10.2 
1985 16 346 2.5 27 1.6 9.9 
Source: OPCS Birth statistics. 
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The problem starts when it comes to interpreting the 
significance of these statistics. Both sides in the 
controversy are arguing that the figures support their 
own view on the issue. Little evidence on the safety 
of the GPMUs was, however, put forward by the Select 
Committee to support its proposals. 
"The evidence it adduced included as a main 
plank a table which showed that as the 
proportion of hospital births had increased, 
so the incidence of maternal and infant 
mortality had decreased. In a withering 
attack on the lack of sound research data on 
which to base this major and expensive change 
of policy, Archie Cochrane (1972) pointed out 
that because two factors co-vary (ie move 
together) it does not follow that one is the 
cause of the other.... In the years from 
1955-1968 which the Peel Committee surveyed, 
there had been many other changes: improved 
housing standards and improved nutrition for 
example. Although class differences 
remained, the all round longevity of health 
of the population had improved. It is likely 
that some of these factors were also 
associated with improvements in perinatal and 
maternal mortality" (Stacey, 1988, p. 239) 
Further research failed to provide the evidence 
requested. As Black (1982) pointed out: 
"most studies on the place of delivery and 
perinatal outcome have been unable to show 
the clear association between GP deliveries 
and adverse outcome that has been implicitly 
accepted by successive governments ... the 
notion that GP deliveries constitute a risk 
continues to gain support from national 
guidelines, expert reports, and opinions of 
most obstetricians, based largely on belief" 
(p. 490). 
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Notwithstanding, the recommendations were adopted by 
the Ministers and implemented almost immediately. In 
1978, the delivery at home represented only 1.6% of all 
maternities and over 92% of all births were taking 
place in hospitals with a consultant ward, and a large 
number of small "isolated" GPMUs were already closed 
(Table 5-3). According to Gray and Hunter (1983) this 
suggests that a consensus exists throughout the policy 
chain from national to local levels. 
"This can happen occasionally as in the case 
of the virtual achievement of a policy goal 
of 100% institutional confinement rate for 
childbirth. More usually, the periphery is 
able to thwart, distort or delay if it 
dislikes particular policy initiatives 
emanating from the centre" (p. 429) 
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Table 5-3 
Number of Peripheral GPMUs per Region 
1973-1986 
Health Regions 
(by decreasing size 
of population) 1973 1978 1983 1986 
------------------------------------------------------- 
West Midlands ........ 
Trent ............... 
North Western ........ 
Yorkshire ............ 
South East Thames .... 
North West Thames .... 
North East Thames .... 
South Western ........ 
Northern ............ 
South West Thames .... 
Wessex ............... 
Mersey ............... 
OXFORD ............... 
East Anglia .......... 
19 
20 
30 
14 
12 
2 
6 
43 
17 
7 
18 
5 
18 
10 
..... 
..... 
.... 
. ... 
.... 
..... 
14 ..... 10 ..... 9 .. 
18 ..... 13 ..... 16 .. 
9 ..... 5 ..... 4 
8 ..... 6 ..... 5 
6 ..... 4 ..... 3 
2 ..... 2 ..... 0 
4 ..... 6 ..... 4 
25 ..... 25 ..... 17 
9 ..... 7 ..... 7 
2 ..... 0 ..... 0 
22 ..... 17 ..... 16 
4 ..... 2 ..... 0 
17 ..... 13 ..... 9 
8 ..... 6 ..... 4 :. 
TOTAL 221 148 115 94 
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Rationalisation of All Existing Maternity Services 
The trend towards closing the GPMUs was given a 
new impetus by the acute energy crisis of 1973-74 which 
precipitated the economic recession in England, 
generated high rates of inflation, and resulted in a 
series of substantial cuts in public expenditure 
imposed by the Labour administration during the period 
1976-1979 (see Table 5-4). 
Table 5-4 
Summary of Expenditure Cuts 
1976 - 1979 
Announcement (date) 
1975 budget (4-75) 
1976 White Paper (1-76) 
July measures (7-76) 
IMF cuts (12-76) 
Total 
1976-7 1977-8 1978-9 
(£m at 1977 survey price) 
1347 ---- ---- 
340 2459 3891 
27 899 128 
--- 1617 1557 
1714 4975 5576 
Source: Bramley, G. and Stewart, M. (1981), p. 41 
From 1976 onwards, the pressure to rationalise acute 
and maternity services has increased most in those 
regions, such as Oxford, moving down towards lower RAWP 
(Resource Allocation Working Party) targets. 
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The problem was well summed up by Klein (1985): 
"The NHS inherited a geographical 
distribution of resources heavily biased 
towards the metropolitan area around London 
which persisted into the 1970s, when a 
determined effort was launched to redress the 
balance. A formula for rationing resources 
(RAWP targets) was then devised on the basis 
of demographic factors and mortality 
statistics. This provides a benchmark for 
judging whether any given region or district 
of the NHS is below or above its "equity" 
target. Thus in 1979 the North East Thames 
region, which takes in large chunks of London 
with its heavy concentration of expensive 
teaching hospitals, was reckoned to be 13 
percent above target while North West Region, 
which takes in tracts of Britain's declining 
industrial heartland, was estimared to be 9 
percent below target. Conceived in the days 
of optimism about economic growth, the 
formula has proven something of a political 
landmine in the era of pessimism about 
economic growth" (p. 44) 
The various Regions' distances from the RAWP targets is 
presented in Figure 5-7. 
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Figure 5-7 
Region's Distances from RAWP Revenue Targets 
1977-78,1987-88 
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There has been a long-term move for fewer but 
better equipped hospitals going back to the concept of 
the DGH contained in the 1962 Hospital Plan. The 
belief that the centralisation of the maternity 
services would be cheaper spead among those with 
responsibility for their development and management. 
Changes in attitude to closure have also taken place 
within the 1970s. 
"This decade is particularly fascinating 
because it is during this time that economic 
difficulties in Britain have made closure a 
familiar occurrence ... It appears that the 
continual justification of closure and 
redundancy on economic, technical and 
commercial criteria can make them --more 
acceptable because they are considered 
necessary or even desirable ... -The increasing acceptability of closure and the 
declining power of the unions has meant that 
opposition has become more difficult to 
create and sustain. It also means that if 
opposition does occur, it will be more likely 
to adopt an economic' stance, rather than a 
moral one" (Hardy, 1983, p. 211). 
The cutbacks intensified in the 1980s under the 
Conservative Government which looks upon controls on 
public spending as a central ingredient in its economic 
strategy. The maternity departments are the most 
expensive of the general departments and present an 
attractive opportunity for rationalisation. The 
hospital in-patient costs in different units are shown 
in Figure 5-8. 
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Figure 5-8 
Hospital In-patient Cost per Day 
of Various Units 
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Source: Fry et al (1984), p. 244 
In the last fifteen years, the substantial increase in 
the use of capital in neonatal units also adds to the 
pressures for rationalisation (Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 
Changing Value of Neonatal Equipment 
West Midlands 
1978-1984 
1978 1984 % change 
Unit 1 £ 1 304 £ 6 749 +418 
Unit 2 £ 2 028 £ 3 988 + 97 
Unit 3 £ 2 527 £ 6 898 +173 
Source: Mugford & Stilwell (1986), p. 58. 
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As Mugford & Stilwell (1986) pointed out: 
"One of the reasons why rationalisation has 
meant concentration is the fact that some key 
items of capital equipment, such as operating 
theatres and a few (but not many) items of 
neonatal care, come in large indivisible 
units ... In terms of annuitised costs, 
medical staffing indivisibilities are more 
important than those relating to equipment 
... A further argument that may be used in favour of large hospitals is that they should 
cope better with variable demand - that is 
they should need a smaller reserve of 
capacity in proportional terms- than small 
units" (p. 59) 
Since the mid-1970s, the gradual concentration of 
maternity services within specialised hospital wards 
has been proceeding under the guidance of the RCOG, 
aided by a series of committees and reports. In 1976, 
the Labour Government's consultative document, 
"Priority for Health and Personal Social Services in 
England", suggested making the resources of the 
peripheral maternity units available to other services 
with more pressing needs. In 1977, the second Labour 
Government's policy document, "The Way Forward", 
advocated the closure of small maternity units in 
favourýof large consultant obstetric units based in the 
DGHs. In 1980, the House of Commons Social Services 
Committee took on trust the belief that the 
centralisation of the maternity services would be 
cheaper and recommended the closure of the small 
maternity units. 
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"Although we were not provided with the 
relative cost of large and small units- it 
seems certain that a policy of closing small 
units and increasing the number of large 
units will continue to prove a saving, and 
even more important, will make more efficient 
use of the time and trained staff, and 
expensive equipment"(p. 26) 
In the 1980s, a number of reports repeated -the Social 
Services Committee analysis. Little evidence, however, 
was, put forward by the various committees to support 
their recommendations. As Mugford (1989) indicated: 
"In the light of the evidence, the case is 
not proven that GP maternity care is 
uneconomic. Indeed, the evidence points to 
the opposite conclusion. Even so, economic 
pressures are claimed among the reasons for 
recommending closure ... The continuing 
programme of centralisation of maternity 
units is not based on good evidence about the 
cost-effectiveness of the policy. There are 
few studies of costs in GP maternity units, 
and these all date from a decade ago. The 
cost effectiveness of GP maternity care is, 
in any case, a relative concept, and requires 
evidence of the cost-effectiveness of 
consultant obstetric care for comparison. 
This has yet to be studied in any 
detail" (p. 9) 
The current debate is obscured by the ambiguous meaning 
of the concept of savings which is often used to mean 
cost-shunting. As Korman & Simons (1978) indicated: 
"The savings from closure are both real and 
notional ... The concept of savings as a 
reason for closure is an attractively simple 
one; if less is spent on one service, then 
more ought to be available for others. But it 
may not always work out this way. If a 
district is under pressure to reduce costs, 
then savings on a closure may go towards 
preventing other services from being reduced; 
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savings are negative in that the financial 
situation is prevented from becoming as bad 
as it might have without the closure, rather 
than positive, actually having more resources 
to spend on services" (p. 182) 
Patterns of Responses to National Policy 
The response to Central government policy has not 
been uniform throughout the Country. An analysis of 
the standardised number of closure in GPMUs per million 
of population reveals four differing strategies used by 
the various authorities in implementing the central 
policy (Table 5-6). 
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Table 5-6 
Standardised Number of Closure of Peripheral 
GPMUs per Million of Population in 
the British health regions 
1973 - 1986 
Region 1973-1978 1978-1983 1983-1986 
First Group: The Early Adopters 
North Western . 5.2 
1.0 0.2 
South Western . 5.8 . 
0.0 . . 2.5 
Northern . . 2.5 . 
0.6 . . 0.0 
Yorkshire . 1.6 . 
0.5' . . 0.2 
South East Thames . 1.6 
0.5 0.2 
South West Thames . 1.7 
0.6 
Second Group: The Continuous Adopters 
East Anglia . 1.0 .. 1.0 
1.0 . 
West Midlands . 0.9 .. 0.7 
0.2 . 
Mersey . 0.4 .. 
0.4 0.4 . 
Third Group: The Non-Adopters 
North East Thames . 0.6 .. 
(0.6) .. 0.6 . 
Wessex . (1.4) . 1.7 . 
0.3 . 
Trent . 0.4 
1.8 .. (0.6) . 
Fourth Group: The Late Adopters 
North West Thames . 0.0 . . 0.0 . 0.8 OXFORD . 0.4 . . 1.6 . 1.2 
* In this Region, all peripheral GPMUs were already 
closed in 1983. 
(): Opening of GPMUs per million of population. 
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In the first group of regions, labelled the "early 
adopters" (Rogers, 1983, p. 248), the Authorities 
initially reduced the number of GPMUs sharply and 
continued to phase them out progressively afterwards. 
In the second group of regions, named the 
continuous adopters, the Authorities have constantly 
reduced the number of GPMUs thoughout the period. The 
third group, the non-adopters, combines the regions 
which have increased the net number of peripheral GPMUs 
during the period. Finally, the fourth group of 
regions, called the "late adopters", gathers the 
Authorities which have maintained their peripheral 
GPMUs for some time before ultimately starting to close 
some of them. The latter group encompasses the Oxford 
health region and, therefore, the closure described in 
the following four chapters. 
The discrepancy in the pace of implementation of 
the policy could result from a large number of factors 
including different interpretations of the national 
policy. The closures, however, were often justified by 
the difficulties in recruiting qualified midwives and 
nurses. The analysis of the numbers of qualified 
midwives and nurses employed in maternity departments 
(Table 5-7) does not support the view that the strategy 
for closure was primarily determined by staffing 
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problems; all groups comprise regions with lower or 
higher staffing levels than the national average. 
Table 5-7 
Strategies for Closure and Numbers of 
Qualified Midwives and Nurses per 1000 Maternities 
Strategy Midwives Nurses 
1975 1980 1975 1980 
NATIONAL AVERAGE ENGLAND 25.2 25.4 15.9 14.6 
The Early Adopters 
North Western 29.1 31.3 15.9, - 17.2 
South Western 24.3 22.5 14.0 14.2 
Northern _.. 
26.0 24.4 18.1 14.8 
Yorkshire 22.9 24.9 18.0 7.0 
South East Thames 27.1 27.8 16.3 14.8 
South West Thames 24.4 24.7 12.2 12.6 
The Continuous Adopters 
East Anglia 25.4 25.0 14.9 15.2 
West Midlands 23.0 23.4 '14.2 16.3 
Mersey 22.4 28.6 17.2 18.0 
The Non Adopters 
North East Thames 25.1 24.1 17.5 13.9 
Wessex 26.5 23.7 13.7 14.6 
Trent 25.7 25.2 17.0 17.7 
The Late Adopters 
North West Thames 24.2 23.2 12.8 8.3 
OXFORD 24.1 24.9 18.6 16.7 
Source: MacFarlane and Mugford (1984), p. 207,215 
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Implementation of the Policy in the Oxford Health 
Region 
The current Oxford Regional Strategic Plan is the 
latest in a series of five such plans produced in the 
region. In the main, the first four plans reflected 
the National trend for gradual advance in health care 
on all fronts including maternity services. The fifth 
Strategic Plan breaks with this tradition. The new 
strategy echoes the central government policies 
emphasising prevention and community oriented services, 
promoting district self- sufficiency in all care 
groups, and giving greater priority to the services for 
the elderly, - the mentally ill and the` mentally 
handicapped. The shift in emphasis towards the priority 
groups means a substantial redeployment of resources. 
In the Oxford health region a reduction of 11% in 
maternity service expenditure, combined with a 
reduction of 4% in acute service expenditure, should 
allow for a substantial increase in the level of 
resources of most of the other health services provided 
in the Region (Table 5-8). 
The substantial reduction in maternity services 
expenditure put further pressure on increasing the 
efficiency of all services provided and on closing 
peripheral GPMUs in particular. The overall regional 
strategy with regard to the in-patient maternity 
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facilities is clearly driving - towards the 
implementation of the National policy. 
"There are three main elements of maternity 
bed provision: consultant obstetric units, GP 
beds in association with these units, and 
more scattered elements of GP maternity 
provision in a number of peripheral 
hospitals. Regional policy favours the 
association of GP and consultant units with 
facility for easy and rapid transfer to the 
consultant unit should complications arise" 
(ORHA - Regional Strategic Plan 1984-1994, 
p. 384) 
Table 5-8 
Financial Implications by Care Group of the 
Oxford RHA Strategic Plan 1984 - 1994 
(increased expenditure in % of 1983) 
Care Group Status Quo 
---------- 
New Strategy 
------------ 
Change 
------ 
Maternity +18% +07% -11% 
Acute +14% A +10% I -04% 
Elderly +12% I +12% I 00% 
M. H. +11% ý +22% 1 +11% 
M. I. /E. M. I. +10% I +31% I +21% 
Community Serv. +10% ( +31% v +21% 
Disabled 00% +50% +50% 
Source: Elaborated using data from the ORHA (1984), 
"The Region's Health -A New Way Forward". 
Table 5-9 details the number of peripheral GPMUs 
in each of the oxford DHAs. Between the formulation of 
the policy in 1970 and the 1974 Reorganisation 
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virtually no change was made in the provision of 
peripheral GPMUs by the Oxford Regional Hospital Board. 
The net number of peripheral GPMUs began decreasing 
significantly in 1978. The closures have been, 
however, partly balanced by the opening of a number of 
new integrated GPMUs. 
Table 5-9 
Number of Peripheral GPMUs per 
AHA and per DRA 
Oxford RHA 
1973-1988 
Areas/Districts 1973 ° -1978 - 1983 1988 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Oxford AHA 
Oxfordshire DHA .. .6.. .6. .. 5.. .4 
Northampton AHA 
Northampton DHA .. .0.. .0. .. 0.. .0 
Kettering DHA ... .2.. .2. .1.. .0 
Buckinghamshire AHA, 
Wycombe DHA .... .1.. .2. .. 2.. .1 Aylesbury Vale DHA .1.. .1. .. 0.. .0 Milton Keynes DHA . .2.. .2. .. 2.. .0 
Berkshire AHA 
West Berkshire DMA .6.. . -A .'. 3. .3 East Berkshire DMA 
------ -- 
.0.. 
---- 
.0. 
-- - 
.. 0.. .0 
------------- 
Total 
- ---- ---- 
Peripheral GPMUs 18 17 13 8 
Integrated GPMUs 2 3 '-4 7 
TOTAL GPMUs 20 20 17 15 
*: Temporarily closed since March 1987 
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This concludes the third section of the chapter on 
the maternity services policy and its changing context. 
The following section summarises the issues that have 
been discussed. 
Concluding Summary 
This chapter has provided the necessary-data for a 
consideration of the implementation of GPMU closure 
proposals at DHA's level in the 1980s. The first 
section of the chapter outlined-the national political 
context, the structural context and the bureaucratic 
process for- dealing with closure of health facilities 
in England. The NHS is a highly sensitive political 
issue which has been at the core of the national 
political confrontation throughout the decade. The 
issue has been seen by the Labour party leaders as the 
Achilles' heel of the Thatcher's Conservative 
governments. Local , issues such as the closures and 
change of use of health facilities are, therefore, 
bound to echo the national controversy over the NHS and 
to question the government record on its development 
and management. 
A local agreement on closure can be reached by 
discussion with local authorities, interested parties, 
and above all with the CHC concerned. The inter- 
dependency between the DHAs and CHCs is, at the local 
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level, the key feature of the management arrangement 
for closure. Negotiation, bargaining, and compromise 
are, on this basis alone, likely to feature as central 
elements of the micro-implementation process. 
The proposal can be referred for arbitration up 
the line to the Secretary of State. Because of the 
delay created by referring the closure proposal and the 
uncertainty of the Ministerial approval, the DHAs 
generally favour working out a local agreement with 
their CHCs before ultimately directing the proposal to 
the Secretary of State if no compromise can be found. 
The bureaucratic procedures for consultation are 
relatively complex and ambiguous. The failure to 
comply with the procedures could provide, however, a 
basis for a challenge in Courts. - The successful 
management of closure requires, therefore, a fair 
degree of managerial skill in handling and servicing 
the consultation process according to the particular 
circumstances and sensitivity of the issue. 
The second section of the chapter has presented 
the formation of the maternity services policy in 
England, and the context in which it occurred. It has 
been shown how the changing combination of 
demographical, epidemiological, socio-economical, 
technological, medical, and clinical factors have led 
the policy to shift from universal home confinement to 
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universal hospital confinement. Changes in the policy 
have generally been made in a reactive as opposed to a 
pro-active fashion, meaning that the policy-makers 
dealt with policy changes only when action could no 
longer be avoided and when the intended new policy was 
already well on the way to being implemented. 
Probably the most striking feature of the current 
policy is that it is based on a widely shared belief 
that the GPMUs are unsafe and uneconomical with little 
reference to the evidence. As Summey and Hurst (1986) 
pointed out, 
"At the same time, as women lost control over 
the birthing process, childbirth became much 
safer for both women and infants. The 
relationship between the two changes is 
unclear, and its very uncertainty has played 
a larger role in the evolution of the 
professional ideology (obstetrics/gynecology) 
based as much on belief as on 
evidence"(p. 134) 
The absence of clear and unquestionable evidence either 
to support or to refute the national policy is likely 
to reflect in the process and outcome of 
implementation. 
For all its oversimplifications, including the 
tendency to present the formation of the policy as a 
linear sequential process, the product/service life 
cycle framework offers an interesting way of 
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summarising the development of the GPMUs. In the main, 
the GPMUs followed the following general pattern: 
(1) development in the first quarter of the century; 
(2) growth in the second quarter; 
(3) maturity and saturation in the third quarter; 
(4) decline since the mid 1970s. 
A representation of the GPMUs life cycle is given in 
Figure 5-9. 
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Figure 5-9 
Key Phases in the Life Cycle of the GPMUs 
1900 - 1990 
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In drawing the S-shaped life cycle curve a number 
of useful dividing lines come forth to break up the 
sequence. The over crowding of towns caused by the 
First World War emphasised the need for more maternity 
homes and led the Ministry of Health to promote, in the 
post-war years, the provision -of such facilities 
throughout the country. As Campbell & Macfarlane 
(1987) indicated: 
"The risk of maternal mortality did not loom 
large in the arguments for institutional 
birth after the First World War. Except for 
those women deemed to be complicated cases 
the undesirability for many women's housing 
conditions was seen as the major criterion. 
Indeed the focus -was on the risks of 
puerperal sepsis from which death rates were 
often higher in hospital"(p. 25) 
One of the major external events which influenced 
the formation of the policy was the introduction by a 
German company of an effective treatment for puerperal 
fever in England. This opened the doors of the 
obstetric wards to all women in any risk categories. 
The increasing competition from the obstetric wards 
combined with a decreasing birth rate inflected the 
growth of the GPMUs. 
The Second World War, the surging demand for 
health care which followed the inception of the NHS, 
and the unprecedented booming post-war birth rate, 
provided the context for a relatively peaceful 
coexistence between the obstetric wards and the GPMUs. 
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This reflected in the segmentation of the clientele 
according to a number of risk factors. As Campbell and 
Mcfarlane (1987) suggested, it is significant that the 
current policy of universal hospital confinement 
advocated in the Peel report - with "integrated" GPMUs 
being seen as an acceptable alternative, but little 
support for either the "isolated" GPMUs or for home 
confinements - came to pass at the end of a period when 
a substantial increase in the number of consultant 
obstetricians as well as in the number of maternity 
beds coincided with a declining birth rate. These 
circumstances were similar to those prevailing in the 
1930s when external pressure for better obstetric care 
and internal pressure to raise the status of the 
profession resulted in a move to close the ranks and to 
question the safety of the GPMUs. As Summey & Hurst 
(1986) pointed out: V 
"In both periods we watch the profession 
(obstetrician/gynecologist) blame others, 
become defensive, and then quietly close rank 
to become even more specialised and clinical 
than previously"(p. 112) 
Finally, the energy crisis of 1973-74 helped 
create inflation which resulted in a series of 
substantial reductions in public expenditure. The 
spending cuts in the NHS gave a new momentum to the 
rationalisation of all maternity services and to the 
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closure of the peripheral GPMUs in particular. As 
Mugford & Stilwell (1986) indicated: 
"There can be no doubt that small maternity 
hospitals are uneconomic from the health 
service point of view if they are run and 
staffed as independent hospitals, and this 
accounts for the speed with which units are 
now being closed" (p. 64) 
Hence, in summary, throughout these years central 
government policy for maternity services, and 
especially the policy for GPMUs, has been changing with 
its changing context. Political and socio-economical 
changes intermixed' with specific clinical changes 
creating a complex environmental situation to be 
interpreted by the national policy makers as well as by 
the local managers, the health care professionals, and 
the public. 
External factors add pressure, and influence the 
timing of the changes in the policy. While certain 
shocks, or sudden events, did at times take place, most 
of the changes were not radical but incremental. They 
developed slowly, gradually affecting the policy but 
generally not in a clear, straightforward manner. 
Although incremental, the process of change has not 
been continuous but interrupted, sometimes precipitated 
and sometimes slowed down by a number of major 
environmental disturbances. 
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The third and final section of this chapter has 
highlighted the gap between current policy and its 
implementation in some of the British health regions. 
Long-term trends and changing policies in the maternity 
sector have created a general pressure for the DHAs to 
change their maternity services and facilities 
strategy. Literature aimed specifically at studying the 
link between general environmental stimuli and 
strategic response is rare (Taylor, 1982; Whittington, 
1989). It is, however, thought to be a complex one, 
particularly if it concerns retrenchment in the public 
sector (Pettigrew and Ferlie, 1989). The important 
point is that the DHAs have a considerable degree of 
choice at their disposal with respect to the timing and 
strength of their response, especially as the issue has 
not resulted in specific constraints. Compared with 
other health districts in England, the Oxford districts 
have been late 'in closing down their peripheral 
maternity units. This suggests that the general 
pressure for closure did not affect all DHAs in the 
same way and that there was a configuration of features 
which was not consistent with a straightforward and 
speedy implementation of the policy in these Districts. 
This chapter has outlined the changing policy 
context. The following four chapters present the case- 
studies, analysing the evidence and highlighting the 
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key factors and features which can be associated with 
the success and failure of implementation. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Amersham GP Maternity Unit 
Chapters six to nine form the empirical core of 
this study. The chronological, descriptive 
reconstruction of the closures are presented with as 
much richness of detail as the available data permit. 
These chapters have a broadly similar structure. They 
are organised into four sections. The starting point 
is a description of the profile of the district and 
unit under study. This is followed by an overview of 
the process and outcome of the closure proposal. The 
next section considers the genesis, development, and 
conclusion of the closure process. Finally, the 
concluding section presents an analysis of the case and 
emphasises the key factors and features which 
influenced the pace and outcome of implementation. 
This chapter documents the progress of two 
successive proposals to close the GPMU at Amersham 
General Hospital (AGH) by Wycombe District Health 
Authority (WDHA). The first proposal concerns the 
closure of the whole General Practitioner Maternity 
Unit (GPMU). It was opposed by the Community Health 
Council (CHC) and rejected by the Secretary of State. 
The second proposal concerns the closure of the 
delivery service and the relocation of some post-natal 
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beds on the AGH site. The CHC decided not to oppose 
the second proposal and the closure was implemented. 
Staffing problems combined with financial pressure and 
the post-natal beds were not reopened. 
The Profile of the District and Unit Under Study 
The District covers a rather compact area in the 
South of Buckinghamshire. It has the second highest 
population density in the Oxford Region yet retains a 
predominantly rural character. The District includes 
High Wycombe as well as other less important centres of 
population such as Chesham, Amersham, Chalfont St 
Giles, and Chalfont St Peters. Amersham is the North 
terminal station of the metropolitan line of the London 
Underground. 
In 1983, the population of the District was over 
273,000. Wycombe's population had increased only 
marginally since the beginning of the 1970s and was 
expected to increase significantly less than any other 
district in the Region over the planning period 
1984-1994. The increase was estimated at about 1% 
against the Regional average of nearly 11%. This 
compared to an increase of 2.5% in the population of 
England as a whole over the same period. 
A study of the economic indicators of well-being 
reveals the District as outstandingly prosperous in 
relation to the Region and, indeed, to the country as a 
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whole. The overall standardised mortality ratios 
(SMRs) indicates that the population of the District is 
among the healthiest in the Region. The District has 
as much as 12% fewer deaths than would be expected from 
the age/sex structure. 
Wycombe has the second lowest ratio of acute in- 
patient beds in the Region. This was necessarily 
reflected in the service provided. By making a virtue 
of necessity it has the lowest average length of stay 
and the highest district performance in respect of day 
care services in the Region. The District sets the 
regional standard in treating twice as many acute 
admissions as day cases as a proportion for the Region 
as a whole. 
Normally such an area and population would look to 
one central hospital to provide its major health 
services. By an accident of history, the District has 
a single DGH, based on a split site Wycombe GH (362 
beds) and Amersham GH (250 beds) with three supporting 
peripheral GP Hospitals mainly providing care for the 
elderly. The two DGH sites are located roughly eight 
miles apart. 
"The context of that is quite important. In 
the 1960s there was an opportunity to have 
one big DGH in Ayslemere just half-way 
between Amersham and Wycombe. That chance 
was lost because each town wanted to develop 
its own hospital and this district has 
suffered ever since for having two DGHs 
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within quite short distance each wanting to 
be THE hospital". 
DMT Member 
The WGH site dominates the AGH one. 
"That is a central fact that one has to 
understand about the District. At the outset 
the idea was to have two hospitals. 
Gradually it became apparent, particularly 
with the lack of funding in the 1970s, that 
it was not going to be possible. Although we 
talk about having a split DGH - half of it 
being at Amersham and half at Wycombe - 
reality has been that the DGH has been in 
Wycombe and Amersham has been fighting an 
absolute battle the whole of that time to try 
to retain the services" 
Ex-Chairman DHA 
The previous public mobilisation around health care 
issues had left a network of people and groups 
competent and willing to effectively oppose the first 
closure proposal. This source of power was 
successfully mobilised by the opponents to the first 
closure proposal. 
The Wycombe GH site is, for practical purposes, 
saturated. Further expansion of the hospital is very 
much dependent upon land adjacent to the hospital being 
acquired, but the price of this land is estimated as 
being prohibitive. There is some limited potential for 
development on the Amersham site. However, up to June 
1987 when the enabling work for the redevelopment of 
the Amersham GH began, new services had to struggle 
against established ones to get some room and resources 
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on the sites. This constraining factor in developing 
services played a critical part in the genesis of both 
proposals to close the GPMU. 
"One key issue was the many claims for the 
limited space at Amersham" 
District Administrator 
The strategy of development of acute and priority 
services pursued by the District since 1965 can be 
divided into four main periods: 
(1) 1965 to 1969, a period of expansion of 
acute service based on the development 
of Wycombe General Hospital (WGH) site; 
(2) 1970 to 1976, a period of rapid 
rationalisation of acute services 
particularly on Amersham General 
Hospital (AGH) site; 
(3) 1977 to 1984, a period of progressive 
expansion in priority services 
throughout the District; 
(4) 1985 to 1990, a rapid change of pace 
towards self-sufficiency in the field of 
the Mentally Infirm (MI), the Mentally 
Handicapped (MH), and care of the 
elderly, with new purpose- built in- 
patient facilities provided on AGH site. 
The 1977 to 1984 period featured serious financial 
pressure: 
"There was terrible financial restriction. 
There was nothing we could develop. I mean a 
lot of plans were made but nothing much was 
done. We were strongly advised by the Region 
not to expect any growth in resources. Many 
much needed developments were possible only 
by withholding developments in other areas or 
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achieving greater efficiency in the existing 
provision of services" 
DMT Member 
The District is currently moving rapidly towards 
achieving self-sufficiency in Mentally Infirm (MI), 
Mentally Handicapped (MH), Elderly, and Elderly 
Mentally Infirm (EMI) services. However, the timetable 
provides for relatively little change in the provision 
of in-patient services before the end of the 1980s. 
Meanwhile the District is reorienting and building up 
its community services. These ingredients form the 
framework within which the proposal to close the GPMU 
was managed. 
The Management of the District 
From 1974 to 1982, the District had experienced 
virtually no change on the District Management Team 
(DMT). The only senior officer who left the DMT during 
that interval was the District Nursing Officer (DNO) 
who retired in 1980. 
The April 1982 reorganisation brought a very 
radical change in the DMT. This played a substantial 
part in the genesis of the first closure proposal. The 
District Administrator (DA) and the Treasurer retired 
to be replaced by two newcomers. Furthermore, the two 
practicing clinician representatives on the DMT were 
replaced. The hospital consultant who succeeded on the 
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DMT was the principal consultant obstetrician at WGH. 
This take-over played a critical part in the transfer 
of the Shrubberry Maternity Home to WGH and in the 
genesis of the first formal proposal to close Amersham 
GPMU. 
The District Community Physician (DCP) died at the 
outset of 1983. His successor joined the DMT to 
undertake the work on the District Operational 
Programme. Therefore, continuity at the DMT level was 
provided by the Nursing Officer alone. 
An interesting dimension to this, case-study is 
that it reports the genesis, development, and 
conclusion of two-consecutive closure proposals. The 
first one immediately preceding the Griffiths' report, 
the second one following soon after. The managerial 
style of the District following the implementation of 
Griffiths shows a striking difference in comparison to 
the managerial style which preceded it. The change of 
personalities and style altered the balance of power 
for and against the closure proposals (Pettigrew, 
1985). 
Before the implementation of general management, 
there was no formal leader of the District' Management 
Team (DMT). The chair of the DMT was rotated annually. 
At the time that the first closure proposal was issued, 
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it was held by the DA who had been the late Area Health 
Authority (AHA) Administrator. 
Commenting on the consultation document, the DA 
summed up his own managerial style as follows: 
"It was all there for people to read. If 
people like to read more into it, that is up 
to them. I am a natural bureaucrat. I like 
to see everything in print and writing". 
District Administrator 
The DA's distinctive bureaucratic skills granted 
him the status of an extremely meticulous administrator 
among his fellow DMT members. These skills were also 
acknowledged by the Secretary to the Community Health 
Council (CHC) as well as by the District Chairman: 
"The District Administrator was a man who 
abided by his regulations. He was a very 
meticulus man, very much an administrator, 
not much of a politician" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
The Chairman was a barrister. In the mid-1970s, 
he was a member of the AHA and, later, became a member 
of the Oxford Regional Health Authority (RHA). He was 
the first Chairman appointed since the elevation of the 
District to authority status in 1982. - 
The Chairman used to sit in on the DMT meeting. 
That particular involvement of the Chairman was far 
from unanimously welcomed by all the DMT members. He 
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was seen by some of the DMT members as an autocratic 
chief executive. 
As the publication of the first District 
Operational Plan illustrates, the communication between 
the Chairman and the DMT was muddled. 
"I was on holiday in China. When I came back 
I found that the whole district plan had been 
published for consultation. I was rather 
cross". 
ex-Chairman of the DHA 
The responsibilities of the DMT members were confused 
but the main criticism addressed to the DMT was its 
diffidence to disturb the equilibrium of the situation. 
The DMT's style was "laissez-faire". 
"The responsibilties of the various members 
of the DMT and the responsibility of the 
Chairman in particular were not clear ... No 
one had the strength to say to the Chairman 
that he should not come to the DMT meetings. 
Nobody wanted to rock the boat". 
DMT Member 
The District managerial style following the 
implementation of the Griffiths' report contrasts with 
the description above. The current DHA Chairman was 
nominated in 1986; he is an accountant. He has a 
strong industrial background which he sees as a 
strength in the present climate: 
"People do not like talking about treating 
their bodies in the same context as building 
a motor car but actually it is exactly the 
same ... You have got to remember this 
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business is no different from running any 
factory. It is relatively new to talk about 
the health service in terms of value for 
money, investment return, and good resource 
utilisation. It is no different at all ... " 
DHA Chairman 
The present Chairman's relationships with the 
trade unions and the consultants are particularly good 
and he has the commitment of all the members of the 
Senior Management Group (SMG). The SMG took over the 
DMT following the implementation of general management 
in 1985. 
"He works hard for us. He obviously enjoys 
it .... and that comes'- across and it is infectious" 
Unit General Manager 
He is regarded by most SMG members as a fine 
communicator and a skilled politician. 
"His style is much more "work behind the 
scenes" while the previous Chairman was much 
more "I will push it through myself" 
District Nursing Officer 
The District General Manager (DGM) came on the 
scene in 1982 as the Treasurer. His appointment as DGM 
was made in 1985 by the previous Chairman of the 
Authority. The Treasurer was selected despite strong 
pressure from both the Department and the Region to 
appoint someone from outside the District. The 
disagreement between the District, the Region, and the 
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Department was resolved by the intervention of the 
Minister. 
"Two consecutive selection committees were 
unanimously in favour of the appointment of 
the Treasurer as the DGM. However, the 
Department as well as the Chairman of the RHA 
were still very keen on having external 
candidates. As the Chairman of the 
Authority, I exercised my prerogative and I 
went to see the Minister who approved the 
appointment" 
ex-Chairman of the DHA 
The DGM favoured incrementalism in implementing 
change. 
"Unlike other districts in the Region, the 
DGM has set up his units on a geographical 
base as opposed to a service base. This is 
less threatening to this district. While it 
could be criticised for setting up an 
organisation which seems to be based on 
buildings rather than services, he has 
created a lot of much needed on-going 
stability. Gradually we are moving towards 
an acute and priority services type of 
management in the District" 
Unit General Manager 
He has a specific vision of the District's long 
term direction and favours decision made by committees 
involving the managers concerned. Because of his 
background as a Treasurer, he is particularly sensitive 
to the district's financial condition. 
"We are very conscious of money in the 
District. I do not mean that we are mean but 
there is not a lot of profligacy or 
overspending going on". 
Unit General Manager 
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The Profile of the Unit Under Study 
The birth and development of AGH is typical of 
most small hospitals in England. . First known as the 
Amersham Union Workhouse in 1838, it was renamed the 
Amersham Public Assistance Institute in 1930. An 
Emergency Hospital was built on its site during the 
Second World War. At the end of the war it assumed the 
title of Amersham General Hospital (Salmon, 1988). 
A brief review of the recent history of the 
Hospital provides an opportunity to sketch some of its 
prominent historical and cultural characteristics. 
These features make up the backcloth of the case-study. 
The AGH has had a long tradition of pioneering 
work in Paediatrics. In 1952, a system was introduced 
whereby mothers were allowed to stay with their 
children while in Hospital. The children who benefited 
from this scheme had a shorter recovery period. The 
idea caught on in children's wards across the country 
as well as abroad and in 1967, one of the pioneers, 
Sister Ivy Morris, was awarded an M. B. E. for her 
services to children. The tradition was important in 
hindering further proposals to close the Paediatric 
ward. 
"From time to time we did look at the 
possibility of centralising Paediatrics. 
That frequently came up not only as a cost 
saving measure but as something desirable 
from the service point of view. We never had 
the courage to tackle that. Atý the time 
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when the people remembered the main 
paediatrician and his colleagues it would 
have been very difficult indeed to close the 
Amersham Paediatric services" 
DMT Member 
The closure of the Amersham GPMU was initially 
planned to take place at the same time as the closure 
of the Paediatric ward. This created a particularly 
emotional situation in Amersham. Public opposition 
focused primarily on saving the Paediatric ward. 
In the early 1960s Amersham struggled to avoid the 
centralisation of health services on a half-way site 
between Amersham and High Wycombe. The fight against 
the centralisation of the health services was still 
very much in people's minds when the proposal to close 
the GPMU was initially mooted in 1983. The Town 
Council public assembly which discussed the first 
closure proposal was convened "to avoid the 
centralisation of the two hospitals". The myth that 
the future of the acute services at AGH were under 
threat was widely accepted in the local community. 
The hill between the two towns was seen as an 
important natural barrier, particularly by the local 
politicians and the CHC members. 
"There is no natural link between Wycombe and 
Amersham. They are very different places but 
apart from that it is the geographic barrier 
of the hill. They are two separate 
communities" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
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In the late 1960s, the AGH assumed the entire 
burden for acute care within the district, whilst the 
neighbouring High Wycombe War Memorial Hospital was 
demolished to be replaced by the new Wycombe General 
Hospital (WGH). The AGH won high praise within the 
local community for providing the health care services 
for the whole district. That contributed to 
consolidating the belief that Amersham should have been 
chosen as the single DGH site. 
In 1970, the oxford Regional Hospital Board (ORHB) 
indicated that the plan for the development of hospital 
services provided for the AGH to be developed as a 
general hospital complementary to the new WGH. Despite 
major capital investments and various upgrading work 
carried out at the AGH to keep the wards in effective 
use, the fabric was in a worsening condition. 
In 1973, the DHSS announced a substantial scheme 
to undertake a complete redevelopment of the hospital. 
It was proposed to develop the AGH to provide 400 beds 
incorporating facilities for acute care, care of 
children, the elderly and the Mentally Infirm. 
Unfortunately, the unfavourable economic climate of the 
mid-1970s led to the shelving of this scheme. The 
dominant district operational aims became building up 
the levels of provision, and encouraging the most 
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rational location of facilities. This setback upset 
the local community who, from this time onwards, feared 
for the future of its local hospital. Notwithstanding, 
a suite of brand new operating theatres was opened at 
the hospital at the end of 1983. 
In the mid 1970s, the 35 consultant obstetric beds 
were transferred from AGH to the new WGH obstetric and 
Gynaecology Department. 
"The history is important. When I came here 
in 1962 the main consultant ward was in 
Amersham Hospital. There was another small 
GP unit near Amersham, the Stone Maternity 
Home. There was no obstetric services in 
Wycome but the Shrubberry Maternity Home 
which was a GP unit with no resident doctor. 
That continued until the WGH unit was built 
in 1976. Then the role was reversed. WGH 
became the main consultant ward and Amersham 
became a peripheral unit" 
Consultant Obstetrician 
Because the AGH had been for many years the centre of 
obstetrics, a large proportion of the local population 
was born or had given birth at Amersham. The personal 
experience of these people did not match the claim made 
by the obstetricians at Wycombe DGH that the maternity 
unit at Amersham was unsafe. 
The 1970s also saw the closure of the AGH Casualty 
Service. This was fiercely opposed, particularly by 
the District Council and the local CHC. 
"There was a very strong move by the Health 
Authority to transfer all acute care from 
Amersham to Wycombe. The Authority would have 
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let Amersham Hospital run down into a 
geriatric hospital if land had been available 
for expansion on WGH site to concentrate all 
acute care there. The people of Amersham 
have a huge affection for that hospital and 
anything related to it. They would resist to 
the death any attempt to transfer further 
service to Wycombe" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
The two hospital site drama, the shelving of the 
redevelopment plan for the hospital coupled with low 
capital investment and with the progressive closure and 
transfer of acute services toward Wycombe -built up 
hostility from the local Councils and' antagonism from 
the CHC. 
"I inherited the feeling of antagonism from 
the Secretary of the Council. She was quite 
prepared to take an antagonistic role. 
Amersham has always felt under threat and the 
CHC always saw part of its role as defending 
Amersham" 
Ex-Chairman of the DHA 
The GPMU was the latest addition to the list of 
services provided at AGH. The services which were 
carried out at the Stone Maternity Home (SMH) in 
Chesham were transferred to the AGH on the 28th May 
1976. This marked the opening of the Amersham GPMU. 
The proposal to close the SMH was initially put 
forward, in March 1973, by the Regional Hospital Board 
(RHB). The building occupied by the SMH had to be 
demolished to make place for a new County Council road 
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development. In the circumstance,, the RHB f elt that 
the normal closure procedure f or closure involving a 
formal round of consultation was needless and 
purposeless. In January-19741 after months of 
discussions between the Board and the DHSSI the 
Secretary of State, Mr Wafer, - did -not accept the 
Board's arguments and requested the Board to undertake 
the normal consultation procedure. 
In April 1974, as a result of, the NHS 
reorganisation, the Area Health' Authority (AHA) took 
over the responsibility for closure and, following a 
recommendation from the Health Care Planning Team, 
undertook the consultation. Despite strong opposition, 
particularly from the GPs' Surgery which was providing 
general medical cover for the patients of the Maternity 
Home,, the newly established CHC did not object to the 
closure proposal provided that beds were made available 
at the nearby AGH. 
The provision of GPs beds at AGH was intended to 
placate the local community and authorities: 
"We had just transferred the obstetric 
service from Amersham to Wycombe. This 
disturbed the feeling of security at 
Amersham. The closure of the Stone Maternity 
Home was strongly opposed particularly by the 
GPs. In this context we produced a peace 
offering: we transferred the maternity 
services from the Stone Maternity Home to the 
general hospital in Amersham. We thought the 
new maternity unit at Amersham would benefit 
from the hospital's good reputation in 
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obstetrics and keep a high level of bed 
occupancy" 
'DMT member 
The Amersham GPMU had 10 beds and 1 labour ward. 
On average, 70% of the admissions were post-natal 
discharges from the DGH. The number of births over the 
period 1977-1982 rose from 207 to 234 and then fell to 
150 (Table 6-0). ý An important feature is that the 
Amersham GPMU's occupancy rate and turnover interval 
were among the best in the Oxford Region. 
CHAPTER SIX - AMERSHAM GPMU CASE-STUDY Page 219 
Table 6-0 
Obstetric and GP Maternity Vital Statistics 
Wycombe DHA, 1978 - 1982 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
-------------------------------- 
% beds occupied* 
WGH 83 84 85 84 76 
Shruberry 54 59 51 51 37 
Amersham 78 
----- 
83 
-------- 
81 
------ 
77 
------- 
61 
------ 
Discharges 
WGH 2672 2970 3035 2920 2988 
Shruberry 1073 1217 1121 1169 872, 
Amersham 656 
------ 
701 
------ 
700 
-------- 
646 
------ 
534 
------ 
Length-of Stay 
WGH 5.50 5.00 5.00 4.00 4.60 
Shruberry 3.90 3.80 3.50 3.30 3.20 
Amersham 4.60 
------ 
4.70 
------ 
4.50 
------- 
4.60 
-------- 
4.20 
----- 
Births 
WGH 2139 2422 2433 2402 2369 
Shruberry 481 533 460 478 372 
--Amersham 207 
------ 
206-, 
------- 
"'234 
------ 
- 169 
------- 
150 
------ 
* Number of beds: WGH: 49, Amersham: 10, Shruberry: 21. 
Source: Hospital Statistics 1978 - 1982, ORHA. 
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The District had another peripheral GPMU: the 
Shrubberry Maternity Home (SMH) in Wycombe. In 1983, 
the SMH was closed. The maternity home was integrated 
into the consultant obstetric unit at WGH and became 
the WGH Shrubberry Ward. The integration of the SMH to 
the WGH obstetric unit carried along a reduction in the 
number of beds, from 21 to 15. Nevertheless the CHC, 
and its Chairman in particular, supported it in 
principle. Some RHA Planning officers were of the view 
that any such, -move would require formal consultation. 
The Secretary to the CHC also felt that normal 
procedures should be followed and that formal 
consultation should take place.,, However the Area 
Administrator who in ' 1982 became the District 
Administrator, -disagreed. No consultation document was 
produced. As a result of this transfer, the Amersham 
GPMU was the last peripheral unit still in use in the 
District. 
This concludes the profile of the district and 
unit under study. The next section presents an 
overview of the process and outcome of the two 
proposals to close the Amersham GPMU. 
The Closure of Amersham GPMU: An Overview 
As Pettigrew (1985) points out, it is often 
difficult to establish precisely when change processes 
begin in large, complex, organisations. By the time the 
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closure proposal was formally put forward, in September 
1983, there was already a relatively long history of 
deliberation about its feasibility. 
The initial proposal concerned the closure-of the 
whole GPMU. and was contemplated concurrently with the 
closure of' -- the, Amersham' Paediatric ward. The 
announcement of these closures was made public through 
the 'formal consultation' over - the first District 
Operational Programme, produced under the new NHS 
planning system which required a , much greater degree of 
consultation at local level in the planning of the 
services. The DHSS had two sets of guidance on 
consultation; one on the strategic and operational 
plans and the other on the closure and change of use of 
health facilities. - 
The closure proposals came very much as a shock, 
particularly to the General Practitioners (GPs) who 
were using the facilities. Concern was immediately 
expressed by many local groups and an opposition 
committee known under the acronym CAWS - Campaign 
Against Ward Shutting - was set up by two residents. 
After considering the public uproar, ýthe Authority 
promptly withdrew the proposal to-close the Paediatric 
ward, pressing on with the remainder of the Operational 
Programme and in particular with the proposal to 
"transfer" the GPMU from Amersham to Wycombe. In-order 
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to allow for remedial work to be carried out to the 
fabric of the building, the GPMU was temporarily 
closed. 
The GPs,, in coordination with the CHCI the local 
Councils and the, public groups, carried on their 
campaign. The district was a Conservative strong hold. 
The Amersham MP, Sir Ian Gilmour - "the Tory left 
wing's most eloquent protagonist" (Holmes, 1985, P. 19) 
and the Lord Privy Seal in the - initial, -1979 
Conservative Government Cabinet - proffered his support 
to CAWS. The consultant obstetricians at WGH 
questioned the safety of keeping such -a unit open and 
supported the DHA proposal. 
'At the end of the consultation period on the 
Operational Programme, the greatest volume of comments 
received was on-the GPMU closure proposal. At the DHA 
meeting an 'amendment that any discussion on the 
proposal be deferred for twelve months was lost by 10 
votes to nine, the Chairman exercising his, casting vote 
against the amendment. This caused a further impetus 
in the opposition movement. 
The DHSS circular on the -closure of -health 
facilities specifies-that, under normal circumstances, 
a full consultation is required. Therefore, the 
Secretary to the CHC inquired about the District's 
intention to issue a consultation document on the 
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specific proposal to close the GPMU. The District 
Administrator, on behalf of the Chairman and the DMT, 
indicated-that the Authority had no intention of'doing 
SO. 
The main effort of the opponents went into 
publicising the Authority's failure to comply with the 
DHSS formal consultation procedure for closure on the 
one hand, and the relatively good safety record, high 
occupancy rate, and turnover interval of the Amersham 
GPMU on the other. I 
The DHA sought to correct its failure to comply 
with the DHSS circular on closure by holding a series 
of meetings with the persons and agencies concerned. 
After having rejected the CHC counter-proposal to 
relocate the unit elsewhere on the AGH site, the DHA 
referred the ýwhole matter to- the Regional Health 
Authority (RHA). 
The RHA agreed to support the DHA plans to close 
the Amersham GPMU despite the - District ýhaving 
contravened the normal closure procedure and forwarded 
the proposal-to the Secretary of State for aýdecision. 
Five months later, the decision that the Amersham 
GPMU should be re-opened was announced'by the Secretary 
of State, Mr John Patten. Approximately two years 
after its temporary closure and the initial proposal 
for permanent closure, the Amersham GPMU re-opened on 
CHAPTER SIX - AMERSHAM GPMU CASE-STUDY Page 224 
3rd June 1985. It was between the DHA and the RHA that 
the performance of the unit would be closely monitored. 
The second proposal to close the Amersham GPMU was 
mooted only seventeen months f rom its re-opening. It 
concerned the closure of the delivery service and the 
relocation of five post-natal beds in a redesigned, and 
refurbished ward on the AGH site. It was proposed to 
develop a new District Rheumatology/Rehabilitation Unit 
(RRU) in the old maternity building, providing 
alternative accomodation for the maternity services. 
The - proposal was made f Ollowing a detailed informal 
consultation with the CHCI the DHA advisory committee 
and staff representative, and an evaluation of the 
performance of the Amersham GPMU since it had re- 
opened. 
The f ormal announcement of the closure proposal 
was made in a consultation document titled "Development 
of Services at Amersham General Hospital". A large 
proportion of the consultation document was related to 
the development of the RRU. 
There was strong support for the provision of a 
RRU. The opposition to the closure of the delivery 
suite at Amersham was disunited. The GPs,, although 
sorry to see the facility disappear, did not actively 
object to the proposal, whilst the CHC supported the 
proposal as a total development. The National 
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Childbirth Trust (NCT) was the principal leading 
opponent to the"closure proposal. 
The Amersham GPMU delivery facilities 'closed on 
1st March 1987, less than four months after the 
inception of the formal consultation. In January 1988, 
the new out-patient facilities were ready for them to 
move into but unexpected staffing problems, combined 
with financial pressure, meant that the unit stayed 
temporarily closed. It has not yet been re-opened. 
Table 6-1 presents the diary of the main events leading 
to the conclusion of the closure processes. 
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Table 6-1 
Amersham GPMU Case-Study 
-Diary of the Principal Events 
First'Pröposal" - Transfer of the 'Whole GPMU 
1982 
November - District Review Meeting 
The District should examine 
ways and means of rational- 
ising its physical estate. 
Review of the District 
maternity services by WGH 
consultants. 
1983 
September - Announcement of the proposals 
to close the whole GPMU and 
the Paediatric ward through 
the formal consultation over 
the Draft Operational 
Programme 1984-1985. 
November - Withdrawing of the proposal 
to close the Paediatric Ward 
December - Approval of the District 
Operational Programme 
1984 
January - Refusal to issue a con- 
sultation document on the 
specific issue of closing the 
GPMU. Break with the formal 
DHS procedure for closure 
- The CHC resolved to oppose 
the proposal. 
February 
March - Attempt to remedy the initial 
lack of consultation over the 
closure proposal 
- Rejection of the CHC Counter- 
proposal 
June - RHA approval of DHA proposal, 
November - Secretary of State's decision 
to re-open the Amersham GPMU. 
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(Table 6-1 continued) 
Second Proposal Closure of the Delivery Services 
1985 
June - Re-opening , of the Amersham 
GPMU in part of its previous 
accommodation 
- Implementation of general 
management 
- Appointment of the new 
Chairman 
1986 
June - Reappraisal of the plan to 
establish a RRU at AGH 
- Review of Amersham GPMU 
level of activity 
September - Informal Consultation on the 
proposal to close the 
delivery services vs 
postponing the RRU proposal. 
November - Formal consultation document 
Strong support for the RRU 
and CHC decision not to 
oppose the closure of the 
delivery services 
1987, 
February - Approval of the scheme to 
establish a RRU in the 
former maternity building 
re-providing post-natal beds 
in "G" ward 
March - Closure of the Delivery 
services 
1988 
January - Shortage of staff: Opening 
of post-natal beds post- 
poned. 
February - Decision not to -staff the 
Unit in 1988 - 89. Need to 
re-open to be assessed in 
1989-1990. 
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The previous section has presented an overview of 
the process-and outcome of two successive proposals to 
close the GPMU- at AGH since 1983. The next section 
details the genesis, the development, and the 
conclusion of each proposal to close the Amersham GPMU. 
The First Proposal 
By the time the first closure proposal was mooted, 
there was already a relatively long history of informal 
discussion concerning its desirability. 
"As you will know it has been the policy of 
the RHA and before them of the RHB to have 
GPMUs as close as possible to the consultant 
specialist unit. This policy is also 
advocated by the DHSS and the RCOG. Quite 
understandably therefore there has always 
been some pressure on the DMT from the 
medical staff to carry out the transfer of- 
all isolated maternity services to Wycombe" 
ex-District Administrator 
The pressure from the national policy has not been 
reason enough- in the past to warrant the advance of 
such a proposal over and above other District concerns. 
The DMT always refused to take any tangible action: 
"You won't find it in the minutes' anywhere 
but it was discussed many times. For 
instance when we were talking about cost 
saving proposals in 1979 which was a very 
difficult year. In the context of those cuts 
we thought about closing the Amersham GPMU. 
We, did not go on with it for two reasons. 
Firstly we were aware of the political 
pressure. Secondly the closure would not 
produce the savings needed that year" 
DMT member 
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The DMT was not alone in reaching the conclusion 
that the Unit should carry on regardless of the 
national policy. The' last Buckinghamshire AHA also 
considered the closure of the Amersham GPMU but held 
fire on the proposal as well. 
"A number of alternatives for centralising 
obstetric services have been considered on 
the grounds that GP Units should, wherever 
possible, be situated in closer proximity to 
specialist services. This will be difficult 
to achieve in this district, and, taking all 
considerations into account, the present 
arrangement of maintaining a GP Unit in 
Amersham should be continued". 
(AHA Operational Plan 1983-84) 
The take over of the responsibility for the 
closure of health facilities by the new DHA-from the 
AHA and the radical change in the membership of the DMT 
brought about by the 1982 reorganisation set up a new 
organisational context for the closure to be 
reconsidered. However the most important factor which 
led the Authority to act towards closing the Amersham 
GPMU was the involvement on the DMT of one of the 
consultant obstetricians at WGH: 
"I have to say that I was on the DMT. I was 
very anxious to have all the obstetric beds 
here. I have put that proposal up and the DHA 
took it on board. It was important I mean I 
felt strongly about it. The Amersham unit was 
not purpose-built for doing midwifery in that 
way and I was keen to get it (the 
centralisation) through. The argument was 
there before but'we had not got the power to 
influence anything until then" 
Consultant Obstetrician and DMT Member 
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The other members of the DMT saw the closure of the 
Amersham GPMU as an opportunity: 
"The Consultant Obstetrician was the "flag 
carrier". However the DNO was the person who 
was pressing for it to happen quickly because 
it was putting pressure on his midwives and 
wasting money which was in his budget. The 
other members of the DMT could see some 
economic savings and were riding along the 
medical pressure" 
DMT Member 
At this early stage, the Chairman of the GP Committee 
who was a Member on the DMT took the view that his 
colleagues would reluctantly accept the proposal. 
The Genesis of the Amersham GPMU Closure Proposal - 
The first opportunity to reconsider the function 
of the Amersham GPMU came up at the November 1982 
District Review- Meeting. It was agreed that the 
District should examine ways and means of'rationalising 
its physical estate. As a result, a formal review was 
undertaken in February 1983 on a number of topics, 
including the obstetric services. 
The concentration of all in-patient services at 
WGH emerged as one of the proposals put forward by the 
consultant obstetricians who reviewed the District 
maternity services. Nevertheless very little service 
planning was undertaken in the District before the 
Summer of 1983 since the key planning posts in the 
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management arrangement, namely the District Planning 
Officer and the Specialist in Community Medicine, were 
not filled until- June. , Then it was decided to produce 
an Operational Programme notwithstanding the absence of 
strategic plans. 
"In view of the likely lack of growth in 
resources, the DMT considered it particularly 
important to produce a programme which would 
indicate the most urgently needed 
developments, and ways to release funds to 
finance them ... The Districts were 
encouraged to fund priority developments 
through generating savings elsewhere in their 
budget" 
District-Administrator 
A draft of the DHA Operational Programme was 
issued on 27th September 1983. Comments on the 
proposals were invited by 30 November 1983. The 
conclusions of the service review were then brought 
out. The relevant paragraph on the Amersham GPMU 
reads: 
"The review has shown a low level of 
occupancy, and more particularly a low number 
of deliveries. It is therefore proposed to 
concentrate all in-patient services at WGH. 
This will result in all GP maternity beds in 
the District being alongside the consultant 
unit" I 
Draft Operational Programme 1984-85 
The DHA officers insisted in the first place on 
referring to the scheme, not as a closure and change of 
use but as a transfer of services, but this was wrong 
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since the DHA did not propose adding to the number of 
beds at Wycombe. In contrast to the closure, the 
transfer and the temporary closure of services do not 
require a formal round of consultation. There was 
already an important history of relatively successful 
transfers of services in the District without complying 
to the letter with the DHSS guidance and without formal 
consultation being carried out: 
"The closure proposals were unusual in this 
District. I think they genuinely felt that it 
was a transfer not a closure. We started up 
in 1974 with the Stone Maternity Home being 
transferred. Then we had a terrible argument 
with the DHA over the so-called temporary 
closure of the Casualty services at Amersham 
and again a formal consultation paper was 
never ever put forward. Then they 
transferred the Shrubberry Maternity Home to 
the Wycombe General Hospital and again the 
consultation did not take place" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
The addition of the proposals to the first' Operational 
Programme produced by the DHA within the new NHS 
planning system was not meant to avoid the formal 
consultation on the closure. 
"Any proposal to close or rationalise a 
service has to start somewhere. A good place 
to start is in the plan where all services 
are considered. That is why it started 
there. It may have been a mistaken view but 
it was one genuinely held ... There were new 
rules on consultation (introduced with the 
implementation of the NHS planning system) 
which were followed out to the letter" 
District Medical Officer 
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The' closure of the GPMU was initially considered 
concurrently with the transfer of the services for 
children at WGH. 
"Again they were very reluctant to look upon 
the paediatric ward proposal as a closure. 
They wanted to call it a transfer of 
services. " 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
The relevant paragraph concerning the Amersham 
Paediatric ward read: 
"Currently facilities at both Wycombe and 
Amersham are under-used with comparatively 
low occupancy. There is dispersal and 
duplication of specialist skills particularly 
medical and nursing. The Authority therefore 
wished to consider a proposal that in-patient 
facilities be concentrated at WGH ... " 
Draft Operational Programme 1984-85 
The District's reasoning for advancing the 
transfer of the maternity beds out of the AGH was 
threefold: (1) lack of safety, (2) lack of facilities, 
and (3) lack of use. In issuing the plans, the 
District Administrator, in conjunction with the 
District Treasurer, emphasised that the proposals were 
not made primarily to save money but to achieve a 
better use of resources and safer obstetric care. 
Although saving money was not presented as a primary 
concern for closure, the District Treasurer welcomed 
the opportunity to make a transfer between 'heads of 
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expenditure so that community nursing levels could be 
increased. At 1982 price levels, the net recurring 
revenue savings resulting from the closure of the GPMU 
was estimated to be in the order of E90,000. This was 
largely undisputed though the opponents did not 
understand how the saving would have been achieved. All 
nursing and support staff were to transfer to WGH to 
fill vacancies in the establishment. 
The District Operational Programme contained both 
favourable as well as less favourable items and the DMT 
hoped that it would be agreed to as a whole. 
"The operational Programme was a package. 
Hopefully people would see the merit of the 
Operational Programme as a whole and they 
would accept, the need to close the units. It 
did not work but that was the logic behind 
District Nursing Officer 
The Development of Amersham GPMU Case 
As presumed by its Chairman and DMT member, the GP 
Advisory Committee, after consultation with the Medical 
Unit Management Team and the Maternity Liaison 
Committee, accepted on 29 November the rationale for 
closing the GPMU. However the Committee opposed the 
closure of the Paediatric ward. 
The GP Advisory Committee decision was strongly 
contested by the GPs affected by the closure of the 
GPMU. The opposition was led by two GPs who felt 
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strongly about their right to care for suitable mothers 
in labour., 
According to the GPs, the closure of the GPMU was 
ill-conceived due to ineffective consultation and the 
Advisory Committee's decision was illjudged because no 
GP directly concerned with the closure attended the 
Committee's meeting. Nevertheless, the Chairman of the 
GP Advisory Committee upheld the recommendation to the 
DMT. This led the District Administrator to assure the 
DHA meeting that the GPs were not actively objecting to 
the GPMU closure proposal. 
The midwives affected by the closure were 
disunited. Therefore, both the proponents and the 
opponents were claiming their support. However the 
Wycombe District Nurses and Midwives Advisory Committee 
supported the proposals. 
There was considerable press publicity on the 
proposal to close the services at Amersham. An 
opposition committee - CAWS - was set up by two 
Amersham residents. They were unknown in the local 
political circle. 
"The ýpublic opposition was not led by the 
conventional radical revolutionary left but 
by two decent housewives who had their babies 
there and who were not officially associated 
with any political party. Their opponents 
could not find anything to wrong foot them 
politically. The conservatives did not see 
it as a labour party move against them" 
Trade Unions representative 
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The public opposition campaign was supported by a 
broad range of individuals and local pressure groups. 
"We did try to keep politics out of it. It 
was an issue that everybody could agree on 
and it came outside ordinary party politics. 
That's what gave us the extra push" 
Secretary to the CAWS 
The Trade Unions did not officially campaign against 
the closure. 
"We thought that we would be able to stop the 
closure at Regional level because there were 
a number of members who are not normally 
sympathetic who were expressing a great deal 
of support in keeping it open. So it was 
felt that we didn't need to develop much more 
of a Trade Union campaign because it was 
considered that we had a majority on the RHA 
to sort it out. Funnily enough the fact that 
the Trade Unions were not as active may well 
have been what saved it more than anything 
else" 
Trade Union representative 
However some members of the staff affected by the 
closures as well as the Secretary to the JTUC joined 
CAWS. 
The GPs while keeping closely in touch with the 
public opposition group were leading their own campaign 
against the closure. 
The DHA Chairman dealt with many questions at a 
well attended public meeting held by the CHC on 7th 
November 1983. A petition containing 10,000 signatures 
protesting at the proposed closures was presented to 
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the DHA Chairman. The opposition startled the Chairman 
and the DMT Officers. 
"We did not expect such opposition and a lot 
of the--things we did made the opposition 
worse" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
On 16th November, considering the strength of the 
public outcry, the Authority decided not to proceed 
further with consideration of the proposal to transfer 
the Paediatric services to WGH but to undertake a 
comprehensive review, of all aspects of the services for 
children in the District. 
"We thought that if we fight on two"fronts, 
closing both the maternity services and the 
children's ward, we did not have a chance to 
succeed. We decided to fight on one front. 
We went for the one which was the most 
obvious case which fitted in very precisely 
with the national strategy" 
District Treasurer' 
Public opinion united primarily around saving the 
children's ward. However, withdrawing the proposal to 
close the paediatric ward did not appease the public 
opposition. 
"At the beginning the children's ward was the 
main issue. When the children's ward had 
been given back we were then narrowly 
channelled on the maternity unit. We got 
caught up in the dirty work over the 
maternity unit. We did not think about not 
doing it because it was such a strong point 
of principle and CAWS by then had become 
quite a social group" 
CAWS Secretary 
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All the original thesis for closing the Amersham 
GPMU was contained in a single paragraph of the DHA 
Operational Programme. 
"The review has shown a low level of 
occupancy, and more particularly a low number 
of deliveries. It is therefore proposed to 
concentrate all in-patient services at WGH. 
This will result in all GP maternity beds in 
the District being alongside the consultant 
unit" 
Draft Operational Programme 1984-1985 
Throughout the period of consultation, various 
documents were issued by the Authority to substantiate 
their proposals and to answer the questions raised by 
the protagonists. These documents were inconsistent on 
the number of maternity beds in the District and 
erroneous on the staffing levels in midwifery. That 
fuelled the controversy and supplied the opponents to 
the closure with a further argument against the DHA 
case. 
"Apart from the question of safety the prime 
reason that was put forward in those very 
early days was that they wanted to appoint 
more community psychiatric nurses with the 
savings. If the establishment figures were 
right as stated they were then we 
demonstrated that the Authority could do the 
transfer between heads of expenditure without 
closing Amersham Maternity Unit ... This made 
a good point when we met the Minister" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
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Some of the DHA members expressed embarrassment at 
having to support publicly the proposed changes without 
the benefit of clinical information. The Chairman 
requested the ýmembers of the Department of Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology at WGH to submit a report concerning 
the possible "transfer" of the GPMU from Amersham to 
Wycombe. In effect, the report was written by the 
consultant obstetrician who was on the DMT and 
recommended that on grounds of safety, lack of 
facilities, and lack of use, the Amersham GPMU should 
be transferred to the Wycombe GP/Consultant Unit. 
"It is an isolated 10 bed GP unit with no 
resident doctor available for emergencies ... 
We believe, therefore, from a sa fety point of 
view, that having a baby in an isolated GP 
unit is little better than haviný a baby at 
home" (Consultant Obstetricians Report, p. 7, 
emphasis is original) 
I 
The report was issued on 25th November. However,, it 
was received by most protagonists almost a week after 
the closure of the consultation- period over the 
Operational Programme. 
A further difficulty was that the safety record of 
the Unit was much better than the consultant 
obstetricians' report indicated. 
"The safety records of both the GP and the 
Consultant units in Wycombe were good. The 
professional views on the issue related 
partly to local knowledge and partly to a 
wider view of the role of isolated GPMUs 
RHA Planning Administrator 
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Therefore, closing the GPMU primarily on safety 
grounds proved difficult. The DMT emerged as not 
upholding a clearly focused cause: 
"The original reason given for the decision 
to close the maternity unit was that the 
three consultants at WGH had decided it was 
unsafe. The allegation was quite untenable 
and having been shown to be wrong on safety, 
the Health Authority shifted its ground to 
savings, even though they had clearly stated 
at the outset that the search for savings was 
not the primary reason for their wishing to 
close the ward" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
The consultant obstetrician's report increased the 
furore of the GPs who used the facilities: 
"The conclusions of the review of maternity 
services were not disclosed until the 
publication of the District Operational 
Programme. The GPs were upset because it 
looked like an attempt had been made not to 
alert them about what was going on. They got 
even more upset when the Obstetricians 
started turning on them as practicing unsafe 
obstetrics. It was not done sensitively at 
all" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
The DHA considered responses to the draft District 
Operational Programme on 14th December. The greatest 
volume of comments received'on the District Operational 
Plan was indeed on the proposal to transfer the GPMU 
from Amersham to Wycombe. Many of these comments 
stressed the need to keep at least some post-natal'beds 
at AGH. 
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After lengthy discussion, the Operational 
Programme was adopted. The Authority requested the DMT 
to investigate the possibility of keeping some post- 
natal beds at Amersham. An amendment that any 
discussion on the proposal to transfer the GPMU from 
Amersham to Wycombe be deferred for twelve months was 
lost by ten votes to nine. ' The Chairman exercised his 
casting vote against the amendment. 
"I felt that delaying things further would 
become counter productive. I had always 
spoken in favour of closing the unit. I felt 
that I had to support the DMT. I got it 
wrong. That was a silly mistake on my part. 
I did not realise what effect it would have" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
The Chairman'casting vote caused a further impetus 
in the opposition movement. 
"That was a little bit suspect in that a 
Chairman should use his casting vote to keep 
an issue going rather than closing the 
deliberation" 
Secretary to the-CAWS 
Opponents to- the closure were ready to do more than 
offer rational arguments for keeping the GPMU open. 
The Authority, at that time, was investigating the 
feasibility of developing a Rheumatology and 
Rehabilitation Unit (RRU) at the AGH. A rumour to this 
effect quickly spead. It was circulated particularly 
by some of the local Councillors. 
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"You are aware that my wife is a Rheumatology- 
Consultant at Amersham. When I exercised the 
casting vote there was absolutely no thought 
in my mind that anybody would begin to think 
that I was-trying to close the unit in order 
to favour the Rheumatology Unit. The 
publicity as result of it actually made 
things ten times worse" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
In fact,, the RRU proposal was still some way off. 
There was no way of telling whether this proposal would 
take place. At this stage there was another area under 
consideration - namely the 11G11 ward - for the 
localisation*of the RRU on the Amersham site and the 
financial support for such a unit was still uncertain. 
The RRU decision was pending and the DMT officers were 
hesitant about its feasibility. 
"We were operating in a very uncertain 
financial climate. We could not put a 
precise date on when and where we were likely 
to achieve that. We had to be very careful 
we did not make promises that we could not 
fulfill, 
District Treasurer/DGM 
The Officers' indecision over the RRU proposal provided 
further reasons to suspect evil: 
"There was probably an idea that the actual 
maternity building could be used as a RRU but 
it certainly did not come out ... If that was the original intention it should have come 
out but it was never put forward. The 
District Officers really avoided it" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
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However, the rumour of the RRU struck the local press 
and the public imagination. 
"The public saw it as very devious when the 
Chairman used his casting vote,, given that 
his wife was the one who stood to gain out of 
it. I do not think there was any truth in 
the rumour. I have great respect for him, but 
it was a very useful argument for us to bring 
to bear and it was very naive of them not to 
realise that it would have been used. It 
certainly swung the case without any doubt" 
CAWS Secretary 
The Secretary to the CHC inquired on 21st December 
about the intention of the Authority to issue a 
consultation document on the specific issue of closing 
the Amersham GPMU. On 6th January 1984, the District 
Administrator, on behalf of the Chairman and the DMT, 
indicated that the DHA had no intention of issuing such 
a document: 
"Certainly the DMT did not want to do that at 
all. We felt that everything we had to say 
was in the existing documents and there was 
not much point in saying it all again" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
The decision shocked and strengthened the 
opposition. The procedures adopted by the DHA were 
fulfilling the requirements for the consultation on the 
District Operational Programme but were not complying 
with the consultation procedures -on the closure of 
health facilities, particularly on the requirement that 
a period of informal consultation should precede the 
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formal consultation. 'Furthermore, the document did not 
meet the full requirements of a closure document 
particularly over alternative use of the maternity 
building. 
"In terms of the bureaucracy we got it wrong 
there is no doubt about that. We were trying 
to get the overall strategy agreed but then 
we were picked off because we haven't 
followed the formal procedure in producing a 
consultation document on that one bit of the 
service. Where we got it wrong was setting 
out the proposal to close the service in our 
short term programme rather than signalling 
the intention of producing a consultation 
document" 
District Treasurer/DGM 
Underlying that the DHA failed to use the proper 
consultation procedure, the CHC resolved directly to 
oppose the closure on 9th January 1984. 
The opponents stepped up their campaign. The CHC, 
the District Council, and the CAWS looked for legal 
advice, threatened to sue the Minister, held public 
meetings, wrote to DHA and RHA members, contacted the 
press and gained the support of a wide range of local 
and national associations such as the British Medical 
Association, Buckinghamshire Local Medical Committee, 
and the RCGP on the matter of principle involved. 
Meanwhile the representatives of the GPs lobbied 
the members of the GP Committee who, previously, 
accepted the rationale for closing the GPMU and secured 
their back-up in the fight against the District 
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proposals. Eventually, the lobby 'led the GP Medical 
Advisory Committee to revise its previous 
recommendation and call on the DHA to open a 
"functionally integrated" GPMU at Amersham. , 
In the meantime, Sir Ian Gilmour - the MP for 
Amersham - carried out the lobby, particularly to the 
Secretary of State, the DHSS officers, and the 
RGM/Medical Officer. 
Recognising that the District had not actually 
followed to the letter the proper consultative 
procedures and making no excuses for it, the DHA 
Chairman indicated to the RGM/ Medical Officer that the 
Authority did not wish to start the whole consultation 
process from Stage One. However, the Chairman 
consented to give full cooperation and sufficient time 
to the CHC and all the opponents to prepare a counter- 
proposal and to consider the implication of the 
closure. 
The DHSS advice on the matter was confusing. On 
the one hand, the DHSS officers were of the opinion 
that the circulars were for guidance and not mandatory. 
Furthermore the closure of the GPMU was in -line with 
the national policy and was openly welcomed by the DHSS 
officers. 
"We were following a policy, a strategy that 
was not just local but part of a national 
strategy. once the proposal had gone out of 
the local arena, the people who could be more 
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objective would see that we were doing the 
right thing. Some very senior DHSS officers 
were saying that it was a bit muddled because 
the procedure was not being followed 
precisely but that it was the right thing to 
do" 
District, Treasurer/DGM 
On the other hand, the DHSS officers were estimating 
that the Secretary of State would be unlikely to give 
his approval if he was doubtful of the adequacy of the 
consultation procedures followed. 
The line of action adopted by the DHA enabled the 
RHA Chairman to assure all the protagonists - and the 
local MP in particular - that the District was acting 
in the 11spirit"'of the procedure by allowing all sides 
time and opportunity, to present their case. One of the 
DHSS officers, on behalf of the Secretary of State,, 
issued a similar assurance to the Chiltern District 
Council. The Regional Officers were hoping that either 
a local agreement would be reached between the DHA and 
the CHC or the opportunity to , present their 'case 
against the closure would assuage the opponents - 'and 
particularly the CHC and the GPs - in their criticism 
of the manner in, which the DHA carried out the initial 
consultation. The first option - would avoid the 
embarassment of referring the matter to the Secretary 
of State, while the latter would increase the prospect 
of a favourable decision. 
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From January to March 1984, a number of meetings 
between the members and officers of the Authority and 
the GPs opposing the closure were held. In additionF 
the DHA Chairman held a series of special meetings with 
various - interested parties to give a further 
opportunity for local discussion. In particular, a 
General Assembly between the Chairman,, the DMT,, the 
consultant obstetricians, the GPs who had access to the 
maternity unit, the Chairman and the Secretary to the 
CHC was convened by the Chairman of the DHA and held on 
the 28th February. 
"After nearly two and a half hours there was 
some increased understanding of the problems 
but no changes in attitude or opinion. The 
argument for closure was then seen to be 
based not primarily on safety but on lack of 
use and cost" 
GP representative 
At the end of the consultation period over the 
closure of the Amersham GPMU,. the GP representative 
pointed out that the attempts made to remedy the lack 
of consultationý involved- a great deal of work for the 
Authority. It demonstrated a united opposition of the 
Community and the GPs as it would have done at the end 
of a formal consultation. The Chairman of the CHC 
indicated to the Regional General Manager that 
sufficient time and cooperation had been available to 
prepare her counter-proposals. 
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"In reality, the publicity given in the local 
press to the proposed closure between October 
1983 and March 1984 was such that no-one 
could have been unaware of the proposal. 
Even the strongest opponents of the closure 
agree that their views were amply made known 
to the Authority and to individual members 
before the decision was finally confirmed in 
March" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
Nevertheless, both the GPs and the CHC persisted in 
their complaints regarding the consultation procedures. 
"The DHA has sought to correct the procedure 
by a series of meetings. These could not be 
effective, especially as they were held in 
the face of a decision to close the unit 
which, it was repeatedly stated# could not be 
changed" 
Statement by GPs 
The GPs reasoning was twofold: (1) the Amersham 
GPMU was not a totally isolated unit and had enough 
facilities to support life until the baby could be 
transferred and (2) the number of confinements from 
local Doctors could be increased considerably. To 
strengthen their arguments, fifteen GPs signed a 
petition addressed directly to the Secretary of State 
indicating their desire to continue managing the 
intrapartum care of their patients at Amersham. 
The CHC issued its counter-proposal in February 
1984. Setting aside the unconventional consultation 
procedure, the CHC reasoning was threefold: (1) the 
unit was not totally isolated from all specialist 
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resources since it was on the DGH site; (2) it had, for 
a number of years, an excellent safety record; and 
(3) it was not under-used. 
"The DHA argued that the number of deliveries 
at Amersham was low and amounts to under- 
usage of the Unit. The number of births is 
only a partial indicator of, usage. The CHC 
pointed to the high occupancy rate and short 
turnover interval which were among the best 
in the Region for GPMUs. Amersham GPMU was 
not under-used in the sense that it did not 
frequently have a large number of unoccupied 
beds.. and it compared favourably with other 
such units in the Region" 
RHA Assistant Planning Officer 
Furthermore the CHC stressed that it was not realistic 
to expect the Amersham/Chesham GPs to travel so far out 
of their own area -7 to 12 miles, 20 minutes to one 
hour depending on the traffic congestion - to practice 
obstetrics. However, the CHC accepted that the 
maternity building was under utilised and suggested, in 
conjunction with the GPs, that the GPMU could be 
accommodated elsewhere on the Amersham site. The old 
theatre suite vacated by the opening of the new 
operating theatres was suggested as a possible site. 
"I walked round Amersham Hospital and in the 
end the only little corner that I could find 
that was not being used was the old operating 
theatres. So I got a Midwife to go with me 
and a GP you could just about manage to use 
the space. What in fact we were saying was: 
you maintain a maternity service we did not 
say that particular building" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
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The District had difficulty in maintaining a 
momentum for implementation. The DMT considered the 
response from the CHC in March 1984. 
"It was contemplated to call the closure off. 
We asked ourselves: would it make any 
substantial difference, if we start again and 
follow the procedure? Our view was that we 
have done it in any case and the Chairman 
felt there was no need" 
District Nursing Officer 
An assessment carried out ýby the DMO concluded that a 
space twice the size of the old theatre suite was 
needed to accomodate the GPMU. The DMT members felt 
that the relocation of the unit on the Amersham site 
was not altering in any way the initial reasons for 
bringing forward its closure namely its relative lack 
of safety, lack of facilities, and lack of use. 
Therefore it was recommended to reject the CHC counter- 
proposals. 
At the DHA meeting held on the 21st March, a 
proposal that the CHC counter-proposal be accepted was 
lost - 10 votes to 4 as well. The DHA referred the 
matter to the RHA as per normal consultation 
procedures. 
The unconventional consultation procedure followed 
by the DHA and the opponents' decision to persist in 
their protests placed the RHA officers in a difficult 
position. Furthermorer following the DHA meeting, the 
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GP Advisory Committee was complaining extensively that 
the DHA did not, specifically consider its resolution 
when the members decided to reject the CHC comments and 
counter-proposals. 
In such circumstances, the advice given by the 
DHSS Regional Principal was that the closure proposal 
should not go to the RHA until the disagreement over 
the consultation process had been resolved. It was 
decided not to put the proposal to the RHA till the 
June meeting, allowing an extra month to get the paper 
ready and to make further attempts to assuage the GPs. 
The RHA officers and the RGM and Medical Officer in 
particular sought unsuccessfully for some sort of 
acknowledgement from the GPs as well as from the CHC 
that the appropriate procedure had now been followed. 
In April,, the draft District Strategic Plan was 
issued for consultation. It described a scheme to use 
the maternity building for RRU purposes. 
In the meantime, an analysis prepared by one of 
the RHA assistant planning officers for the RTO did not 
show a clear-cut case either in favour or against the 
closure. 
"On balance the substantive arguments for and 
against closure come down on the side of 
closure - but it is an uneasy balance. The 
Amersham Unit has undoubtedly been providing 
a safe,, useful and valued service to local 
residents. Its existence is in line with 
current medical opinion on linking obstetrics 
with General Practice. The District as a 
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whole is slightly over-provided with 
maternity beds and the 10 beds at Amersham 
are the most obvious economies that need to 
be considered" 
ORHA Internal Memorandum to RTO 
Considering the uncertainty, it was suggested that the 
consultation issues were paramount and the RTO was 
recommended to oppose the closure of the GPMU. The 
Regional Planning Officer and the Planning 
Administrator were in broad agreement with the 
recommendation. - 
A month later, the matter was discussed at the 
Regional Team of Officers (RTO) meeting. The Regional 
General Manager and Medical Officer while agreeing with 
the analysis of the Planning Officers did not support 
their recommendation and she advised the RTO that,, 
subject to further consultation to clarify the nursing 
and the medical advices, the case for closure should be 
supported. 
"I felt that all parties have had sufficient 
time and information made available to them 
by the DHA, to consider the proposals fully. 
Notwithstanding the grumble on the 
consultation, the CHC made it clear verbally 
that all the substantive arguments against 
closure were adequately voiced. The Chairman 
of the CHC and the GPs representative were 
anxious that a decision should be taken 
swiftly and they advised me that -there would be nothing to gain by extending the 
consultation period further. I was in touch 
with officers of the DHSS who were aware of 
the situation and were satisfied with the 
steps taken" 
RGM/Medical Officer 
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The RGM/Medical Officer's additional consultation 
indicated that the number of transfers in labour from 
the Amersham GPMU to the WGH (13 cases out of 150 
deliveries in 1983) was not excessive and that the GPMU 
could be supported on safety grounds. Nevertheless it 
did not provide a more clear cut case. 
"We came down to the conclusion that we 
believed in the merit of the arguments any 
way. we could have made life extremely 
difficult for that process to be done 
successfully by making it starting all over 
again. We decided to take the issue as it 
stood. In these sort of circumstances we are 
less inclined to be heavy handed and more 
inclined to say that we are part of the body 
of the NHS and we have to weigh . up the 
proposals" 
RHA Planning Administrator 
The Regional officers took the view that the case 
in favour and against the closure would remain 
unaltered by a further period of consultation. 
Therefore the RGM and Medical Officer recommended that 
the RHA should accept responsibility for considering 
the issue. Her analysis indicated that the strongest 
part of the DHA case was that the demand could be met 
by the beds at WGH. Another powerful argument was the 
net revenue saving at a time when the Districts were 
encouraged to fund priority developments through 
generating saving elsewhere in their budget. On the 
other hand the difficult traffic conditions made an 
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association with WGH impractical for GPs, and therefore 
the closure would result in the loss of opportunity for 
the GP to practice obstetrics. She concluded that as 
f ar as the service was concerned it was a matter of 
preference between a-valued GPMU'and other unmet, needs 
in the District. I 
"Management then has a choice as to how it 
uses its resources and the need to realise 
resources wherever possible to fulfil the 
many urgent tasks facing the District become 
dominant. In this climate the Amersham GPMU 
could be seen as something of a luxury" 
RGM/Medical Officer 
Both sides, proponents and opponents, intensified 
their lobby of the RHA members and officers and the 
main arguments for and against were restated. The GPs 
went further and proposed a unit of 6 to 10 beds 
staffed by community midwives. 
"The GPs did not expect the Minister to turn 
the closure down. No doubt, part of their 
strategy was to try to make some sort of 
compromise. At that stage it would have been 
very difficult to compromise on the closure" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
The Chairman of the DHA as well as the Consultant 
Obstetricians emphasised particularly the development 
of services which were dependent, at least in part# on 
the availability of the building. 
At its meeting on the 1st June 1984, the RHA 
agreed,, by a vote of 9 to 4,, in f avour of supporting 
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the District plans to close the Amersham GPMU. The 
whole matter went to the Secretary of State, Mr Norman 
Fowler, for decision. 
The Conclusion of the Amersham GPMU Closure Proposal 
On 18th July 1984, as recommended by the RGM and 
Medical Officer at the RHA meeting, the Chairman of the 
DHA issued a public apology for not having followed the 
DHSS guidance in conducting consultation on the 
proposed closure. The fact that the Authority was 
allowed to reach such a position, was pointed out as a 
matter of concern to the DHA members. 
In September 1984 a new District Administrator was 
appointed. 
"I really attribute most of the things that 
went wrong to our initial failure to get the 
procedure right . .. I did not think it was 
really my place to examine what had been said 
from the point of view of compliance with the 
DHSS circular. That is the sort of things 
that the Administrator was supposed to do and 
he has always been good at doing that. He 
was held up as the Administrator who never 
made a mistake. Of all people who might get 
something wrong he was the last you would 
have expected" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
The Authorities were quite -confident of getting a 
favourable decision from the Secretary of State. While 
awaiting the decision, the District detailed in its 
Operational Plan 1985-1986 the proposals for the re-use 
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of the maternity building for a RRU and the RHA 
allocated money towards the cost of converting the 
building. A Project Team was set up to discuss the 
conversion. 
"In all the national trends that were taking 
place and considering that the temporary 
closure demonstrated clearly that we had the 
capacity to provide the service, we could not 
believe that it would take that long and that 
it would go against us" 
District Treasurer/DGM 
In contrast following their meeting with the Minister, 
the opponents were apprehensive about the decision. 
"Just before the Minister made his decision 
we got involved with a public relations firm 
in High Wycombe because we thought they were 
winning at that -point. The Minister was 
extremely well informed and that gave us some 
hope because we felt that the argument was so 
overwhelmingly weighted on our side. 
Nevertheless we 'were very apprehensive 
because we knew we were biased and he might 
be seeing it in a different light" 
Secretary to the CAWS 
The decision that the Amersham GPMU should be re-opened 
within a period of six months was officially announced 
by the Secretary of State, Mr John Patten,, on 16th 
November 1984. 
"Ministers saw the issues in this case as 
very finely balanced and were not, satisfied 
that a case had been made which demonstrated 
clearly and convincingly that the closure of 
the Amersham GPMU and the concentration of 
maternity service in Wycombe would be a real 
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advantage to patients and to the community as 
a whole" 
DHSS Regional Principal 
The Second Proposal: A Comparison 
The second proposal concerns the closure of the 
delivery service and the relocation of five post-natal 
beds in a redesigned ward on the AGH site. 
The Genesis of the Proposal to Close --the Delivery 
ýeiir; výý_ices at AGH 
The proposal to close the delivery services at AGH 
has its roots in the development and conclusion of the 
previous attempt to close the whole Amersham GPMU. The 
feasibility of providing only post-natal beds at AGH 
was mooted as a practical compromise -in December 
1983 as a res ult of the initial unfavourable public 
response to the Draft Operational Programme 1984-1985. 
However the idea was discarded in April 1984 on the 
basis of the RHA deliberation on the possible closure 
of the GPMU. It was rejected particularly on the 
grounds that it would occupy an important space already 
claimed by other priority services and that no capital 
development was available to rehouse the post-natal 
beds in facilities elsewhere in the Amersham premises. 
In March 1985, in the context of the re-opening of 
the GPMU ordered by the Secretary of State, a committee 
of all interested parties agreed that a complete 
maternity unit should be re-established. Given the 
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time constraint imposed, the consultant obstetricians 
concluded that it was impractical to re-provide the 
facilities of the unit in any other location than the 
previous one, despite the fact that the maternity 
building was too large to allow an economical unit to 
be provided. The GP representative feared that this 
location would lead to continued problems regarding the 
viability of the maternity unit but he admitted that it 
would allow time for an appraisal of the possible 
relocation to a more appropriately sized building. 
The Amersham GPMU re-opened on 3rd June 1985, with 
8 beds and a -delivery room in part of its previous 
accommodation. The re-opening of the GPMU was made 
without prejudice to the decision of its ultimate 
location or facilities to be provided in it. It was 
agreed with the RHA that the performance of the GPMU 
would be closely monitored. 
- The opportunity to reconsider the service provided 
by the Amersham GPMU came up from the June 1986 DHA 
meeting requesting the District Officers to undertake a 
reappraisal of the plan to establish a RRU at AGH. The 
decision ensued from the detailed- planning by a Joint 
RHA/DHA Project Team of the proposals to use the whole 
maternity building for strategic developments, 
rehousing the GPMU in an existing building used as an 
on-site staff residential-accommodation. 
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In 1984, when the DHA approved the Strategic Plan, 
it was thought that 26 R/R beds could be provided' in 
the maternity building. However, the detailed plans 
worked out-- in '1985 had shown that it was possible to 
provide only 17 beds. The consequences in terms of 
revenue were important and the running costs of the RRU 
could not be reduced. Furthermore, the capital 
expenditure for the conversion of the staff residential 
building into a complete GPMU was fully a District 
responsibility. Altogether it was thought that, it 
would not be' possible to establish -the RRU without 
detriment to other proposed strategic developments. 
The closure of the delivery services emerged as a 
proposal put forward by the District General Manager 
(DGM) in conjunction with the District medical Officer 
(DMO). The closure would reduce considerably the 
capital outlay of rehousing the GPMU. It would also 
save running costs which could be diverted towards 
strategic developments such as the RRU. 
The closure was contemplated against a rather 
different background from that pertaining at the time 
the Authority undertook the prior consultation. The 
implementation of general management,, the development 
of the'Planning and Review System, the end of consensus 
management, the change in management structure from DMT 
to SMG, and the appointment of a new set of UGMs came 
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together to-create a new context for the closure to be 
considered once again. It was also considered in a 
different climate of opinion. A massive - 27 million - 
redevelopment plan for the Amersham Hospital acute -and 
priority services facilities was submitted in January 
1986 by the RHA to the Chiltern District Council for 
approval. That soothed the local community f ear f or 
the future of their general hospital. 
Yet, considerable blocking power existed. Because 
of the recent decision of the Secretary of State, 
action to close the delivery facilities was neither 
simple nor popular. 
"None of the local people were in our favour 
at all. We knew as soon as the subject was 
raised, again that we were up against 
everybody, including at the time the CHC. 
The RHA said: you are on your own if the CHC 
opposes the closure, it will go to the 
Secretary of State and it will get overturned 
again" 
Unit General Manager 
By the time the second proposal was mooted, two of 
the key figures from the first- closure process had 
disappeared. Both the consultant obstetrician/DMT 
member and the DHA Chairman who championed the first 
closure proposal had been replaced. 
"It was very 
reappointed. 
case not able 
the time that 
with the mate 
found out that 
clear that I would not be 
As it happened I was in any 
to continue. I suspected at 
it might have something to do 
rnity unit but I subsequently 
it did not" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
CHAPTER SIX - AMERSHAM GPMU CASE-STUDY Page 261 
The appointment of a new DHA Chairman critically 
affected the balance of power for and against the 
closure of the GPMU and it contributed to setting up a 
more receptive context for reconsidering the future of 
the GPMU. 
"It would have been difficult for me to close 
the delivery-services. Having a new Chairman 
made a difference or, to put it negativelyi, 
not having me made a difference because the 
whole thing had been made personal the first 
time round" 
ex-Chairman DHA 
The leadership provided by the new Chairman of the 
Authority was another force for implementation. 
"The Chairman already flagged it up that it 
was one of his high priorities. It had to be 
done one year or another-and he decided that 
it would be done in his first year of office 
and he pressed on with it. That was a very 
brave decision considering that his 
predecessor had a pretty bad time as a result 
of the first closure proposal. He worked out 
a plan of action and made sure that the 
people involved knew exactly how and what we 
were doing and where we were going and he 
pulled us together as a team leader" 
Unit General Manager 
Understandably, there was a feeling, within the SMG 
that the Amersham GPMU should not have re-opened at 
all. The original target of the second proposal was 
also to close the whole GPMU. The learning from the 
failure of the first proposal meant that the new 
Chairman was, however, more cautious in change 
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initiation. Considering the sensitivity of the issue, 
the uncertainty of going back out into - public 
consultation only a year from the re-opening, and with 
the possibility of a National election, the initial 
target was readjusted. 
"We changed it because it was easier to argue 
that we were closing only the part of the 
service which was not used than to attempt to 
close the whole unit again" 
Unit General Manager 
The compromise came from discussion between the 
Chairman and the DGM on what, the public and the staf f 
would be willing to accept on the one hand, -and what 
would give the Authority the savings needed to pursue 
the implementation of the RRU on the other. 
"What emerged when I talked to members of the 
CHC was their main concern was the lying in 
period and the inconveniences to family in 
visiting after the baby had been born. The 
GPs concerned wanted to keep the delivery 
services. Very clearly it was the CHC who 
had the power. We were able to say if you 
agree with the closure of the delivery 
services we would re-provide the lying in 
facilities elsewhere in the hospital. That 
was a very agreeable compromise" 
District General Manager 
The District reasoning f or advancing the closure 
of the delivery facilities was essentially twofold: 
(1) savings, and (2) lack of use. In spite of a 
proportion of transfer in labour almost twice as high 
as when the f irst proposal was mooted, the safety of 
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the GPMU was not put forward as a primary argument for 
closure in order to avoid treading on the toes of the 
local GPs. 
"One of the things that has caused anger 
among the GPs was the reference to safety. 
We reached an agreement that we would not 
use the argument of safety and imply that 
they were providing- an unsafe service. The 
professional integrity was maintained" 
District General Manager 
However the primary reason stated f or the closure was 
the development of the RRU. 
"We really needed to develop a RRU. This was 
very important and we sold the RRU. That was 
what we went out to sell, not the closure of 
the maternity services" 
DRA Chairman 
The choice between the delivery services and the RRU 
provided a much more clearly focused cause than in the 
prior case and it contributed to split the opposition. 
"By that stage the RRU was much more of a 
proposition. When we went back to the CHC we 
could then offer a choice. We were able to 
make it absolutely clear that all they were 
loosing was the delivery service" 
District General Manager 
The Development of the Closure of the Delivery Services 
A discussion document, summarising the main 
issues, was produced by the DMO and sent to the CHC, 
the advisory bodies and staff representatives, seeking 
their comments. 
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"The technique we introduced was to talk to 
the people who could be difficult before 
issuing a formal consultation document. We 
drew their fire a little bit by doing that" 
DHA Chairman 
There is little doubt that the series of mistakes made 
by the Chairman and by the DMT members played a major 
part in the failure, to implement the first proposal. 
The new Chairman was determined that, this time,, no 
complaint would be expressed concerning the procedure 
adopted by the Authority in closing the facilities. 
"The Chairman was very astute and careful 
about the public consultation and he made 
sure that the public were given as many facts 
as possible about the use of the maternity 
unit and as much information as possible 
about what development we did want to do and 
were not able to do because we did not have 
enough resources" 
Unit General Manager 
Having stressed the disappointing level of activity in 
the GPMU since its re-opening - an average of 2.5 
deliveries per week, an over-all bed occupancy of 46% 
and a bed occupancy for delivery cases of 14% - the 
discussion paper concluded that unless there was a 
change in the policy concerning the provision of GPMU 
in-patient facilities, the Authority would have to 
consider delaying the investment into the RRU until the 
new building would be available in 1996. 
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A further discussion paper on the redevelopment of 
the AGH was sent by the DGM for consideration by the 
CHC Maternity and Child Health Working Group. The 
possibility of using "GII ward as a new location for 
maternity services, as well as the proposal to 
discontinue deliveries at Amersham, were put forward 
for informal sounding and discussion. 
The outcome of the informal consultation were 
reported in the f ormal consultation document entitled 
"Development of Services at AGH -- Proposed Change of 
Use of Buildings at AGHII issued and approved by the DHA 
in November 1986. 
Given the recent decision of the Secretary of 
State to re-open the unit, the opponents of the closure 
were in a good position to resist it. However, even 
the strongest opponents, namely the NCT and the Joint 
Trade union Committee, were cautious not to jeopardise 
the chance to develop a RRU at AGH. Most members of 
CAWS refrained from campaigning, deciding that they had 
already contributed enough to their cause. 
"We did not f eel we could go through it all 
again. There was nothing we could do about 
it without more time. You can not argue with 
declining f igures in a way. People were not 
using the unit as they should have been. 
Most of the members of CAWS felt that, 
although we felt very strongly on the issue 
we have done our bit and it was up to more 
recent users. The various people who were 
involved initially have moved on. The main GP 
representative indicated that he could not 
keep it going and that was someone elses 
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f ight. Without him the others just haven't 
come forward. " 
Secretary to CAWS 
Furthermore the proponents of the RRU proposal were not 
voiceless. 
"CAWS held only one public meeting on the 
issue. There was not a huge support. There 
were patients there in wheelchairs who wanted 
to see the Authority having a RRU and said 
what they felt about the service provided for 
them and what could be provided as a result 
of the change of use. It actually deflated a 
lot of the arguments" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
Moreover,, the Chairman and the District Officers used 
the local press and went along to a large number of 
public meetings to promote the DHA proposals. 
"First time round we felt under attack. Then 
the second time round it was much more a case 
of saying we have got a defensible case and 
we will take it to YOU. We went to CHC 
meetings, NCT meetings etc. arguing the case 
out rather then releasing something by a 
press statement and the two sides never 
actually met as it were" 
District General Manager 
The GP Advisory Committee opposed the proposals on 
the grounds that it would result in a loss Of 
opportunity for the GPS in the area to practice 
obstetrics. Notwithstanding, the GPs concerned while 
deploring the proposal were not obstructive in any way. 
That led the CHC reluctantly to decide not to oppose 
the proposal. 
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We always tried to be reasonable and when we 
looked at the usage f igures we could not see 
that we could possibly justify opposing the 
change of use. We did not think that we 
would be justified in going through all that 
again if the GPs were not to support it. I 
had a long talk with the main GP 
representative who was bitterly disappointed 
about it all. In my view it was up to the 
GPs. If they would have opposed it and 
offered to support and to refer people there 
then fine, we would have opposed the closure 
but without the support of the GPs and in the 
face of the figures we let it go" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
A number of Districts and Town Councillors, while 
expressing regrets at the closure of the delivery 
facilities spoke publicly in favour of the change. 
Opposition was primarily limited to the NCT and to 
the JTUC. The reasoning of the opponents was 
essentially twofold: (1) the GPMU did not have a fair 
trial since its re-opening, and (2) the improvement of 
facilities for R/R should not be at the expense of the 
maternity services at Amersham. The major complaint 
regarded the attempt to "manipulate" public opinion 
into a choice between the RRU and the maternity unit. 
"They initially made a lot of noise in the 
local press but at the end it came to 
nothing" 
ex-Secretary to the CHC 
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The Conclusion of the Closure of the Delivery Services 
In February 1987, the DHA approved the proposals 
to establish a RRU in the former maternity building and 
to reprovide five post-natal beds in the "G11 ward. 
The beds were due to re-open in January 1988. In 
December 1987,, following the visit of an Australian 
midwife who used to work in the district, fourteen 
midwives left to work in Australia creating a serious 
staffing problem. The re-opening wasp thereforep 
postponed until recruitment for the posts could be 
completed. In February 1988, because of the financial 
situation and after having considered the political and 
possible implications of not re-opening the Unitj, the 
SMG decided not to spend money to staf f the Unit in 
1988-1989. 
"The circumstance conspired really to get us 
into the position we wanted to be and we have 
never re-opened the post-natal beds" 
District General Manager 
Concluding Discussion 
This chapter amply described the progress of two 
successive proposals to close the GPMU at AmerSham. 
General Hospital by the Wycombe DHA. The first proposal 
failed dramatically whereas the second achieved a level 
of success unhoped-for. Why was the second proposal 
implemented so successfully when,, only a few years 
before, the first one failed entirely? 
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The First Proposal 
The first proposal to close the Amersham GPMU 
failed. Why was it so? 
Lack of Political Sensitivity of the Leaders and 
Tactical Mistakes 
The evidence suggests that the failure to 
implement the first proposal can be primarily 
attributed to the series of tactical mistakes made by 
the key people leading the implementation in handling 
the process and in presenting the proposal. Most 
notable of them were, perhaps, the Chairman's casting 
vote, the failure to enlist the cooperation and support 
from the medical staff directly concerned, the decision 
not to issue a specific consultation document on the 
closure of the GPMUj hence the lack of compliance with 
the statutory requirements for closure, and the 
publication of innacurate statistics. These actions 
and decisions seriously undermined the credibility of 
the DHA Officers and the legitimacy of the proposal. In 
this case, the district leaders' lack of political 
sensitivity and adroitness helped in setting up a 
context which increased rather than diminished the 
motivation to resist implementation. The case study 
shows the type of difficulties that can occur in 
implementing closure proposals when there is little 
thought and action devoted to legitimising the 
proposal. 
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The failure of the district officers to recognise 
the political nature of the issue and the emotional 
appeal of the hospital in Amersham can, however# be 
associated with a number of contextual factors. The 
discontinuity at DMT level generated by the 1982 
Reorganisation, and hence the loss of organisational 
memory, the pressure from national policy, the opinion 
of the Chairman supporting the closure and his 
autocratic leadership, and in particular the presence 
at senior level of an Obstetrician consultant acting as 
a "product champion" (Stocking, 1985), all played an 
important part in convincing the district officers that 
the closure of the GPMU was a logical and necessary 
change likely to succeed. 
Lack of Awareness and Understanding of the Local 
Context 
The philosophy and actions of the officers conform 
with the Rational Planning Perspective featuring 
implementation as a technicalf non-political activity 
proceeding in response to directives arising from the 
top (see Chapter two). The evidence from the case-study 
suggests that an awareness and understanding of the 
local context is of major importance in implementing 
such proposals. In the review of the literature in 
chapter two attention was drawn to the failure of the 
classical approach to deal with the contextual forces. 
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The case-study indicates that the classical approach is 
inadequate for guiding the action in closing 
facilities. 
The case-study also illustrates that the 
straightforward, top-down model of policy 
implementation does not describe accurately the 
dynamics of implementation of a closure proposal, The 
complexity of the rules and procedures of consultationj 
the absence of clear guidelines arising from the top, 
and the policy ambiguity were all reflected in the 
implementation process. The DHSS and RHA officers' 
ambivalence, as well as their abstention from 
interference with the DHA actions, featured also in the 
case-study. The evidence suggests that the centre's 
hold over the implementation of the policy was weaker 
than generally thought and that the periphery had more 
discretion than the conventional view of centre- 
periphery relations in the NHS assumes (Huntere 1983). 
The Will, Skills and Power of the Opposition 
The failure to implement the proposal must also be 
attributed to the action of the opponents to the 
closure of the GPMU. As Behn (1978) pointed out: 
"A public administrator may have the legal 
authority to close a facility# but others can 
raise the political costs of exercising that 
authority; and those whose sole concern is to 
keep the facility open can make those costs 
very high indeed" (p. 335). 
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The opponents vigorously resisted the closure. They 
successfully discredited the Authority's Officers, 
undermined their ability to inspire confidence and 
trust, and delegitimised the proposal. The dif fusion 
of rumours and the escalation of the problem were among 
the most notable "tactics of survival" (Behn, 1978) 
used by the opponents. They were able to build and 
capitalise on the lack of political sensitivity and 
tactical mistakes of the district officers and, 
ultimately, to convince the Secretary of State to 
reject the closure proposal and to order the re-opening 
of the GPMU. 
A number of contextual features help to explain 
the success of the opponents in resisting 
implementation. The single DGH on split sites and the 
historical rivalry between Amersham and Wycombe# the 
shelving of the Amersham hospital redevelopment scheme, 
the past history of transfer of services towards 
Wycombel the long tradition of maternity services in 
Amersham, the concurrent proposal to close the 
paediatric ward, are all important factors in 
understanding the negative public response to the 
closure proposals. These important inherited features 
were, however, overlooked by the DMT officers as a 
result of the loss of organisational memory following 
the reorganisation. Previous confrontations between 
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the two towns'had left a network of people and groups 
readily available and competent to oppose effectively 
the closure proposals. This existing network was 
critical of the success of the leaders of the campaign 
against the closures in building up a powerful 
coalition to resist implementation. The culture of the 
community and, in particular, the widely shared belief 
that the future of the hospital was under threat also 
built up an "invisible barrier" (Lorsch, 1986) 
inhibiting implementation. 
The Second Proposal 
The DHA's second proposal reached a level of 
success which surpassed the most optimistic expectancy. 
New People Providing Leadership 
The second proposal was handled very differently 
to the f irst one and its success can be attributed to 
the skills and actions of the key individuals leading 
its implementation. Ifere it is important to note the 
decisive role played by the new Chairman of the 
authority. The contribution of the leadership could 
not have been more different. The core of that 
difference has been in the way the implementability of 
the proposal was assessed. 
The departure of the District Administrator and 
the appointment of a now DIIA Chairman can be 
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interpreted as supporting one of the central arguments 
of the Symbolic Implementation Perspective stating that 
organisational leaders can be used as scapegoats in 
implementation failures. Obviously, these changes at 
top management level contributed to re-establishing the 
confidence and trust in the management of the district 
necessary to the success of the second proposal. 
According to Stewart (1989), the ability to inspire 
trust is a particularly important requirement to 
managing in the NHS. As Hardy, 1985 indicated, it is a 
prerequisite to a successful closure of services. 
"If management is deemed to act in good faith 
then its plans for closure are more likely to 
be accepted. Ifj on the other hando potential 
opposition groups do not trust managers, they 
are unlikely to accept their decisions" 
(P. 110) 
One of the key contentions of the contingency 
approach is that change in structural forms and 
organisational processes are important factors in 
implementation. Clearly, the 1982 reorganisation 
assisted in the issue of GPMU closures being moved up 
the district change agenda. The radical change in the 
DMT membership generated by the reorganisation and, in 
particular, the involvement on the DMT of one of the 
consultant obstetricians at Wycombe General Hospital# 
played a critical part in the genesis of the first 
proposal. 
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It is difficult to establish precisely to what 
extent the post-Griffiths' structure contributed to the 
success of the second proposal. Clearly, the 
managerial style following the implementation of the 
Griffiths' report shows striking differences in 
comparison with the style which preceded it. The case- 
study indicates that the second closure proposal was 
undertaken with a much more positive and proactive 
approach than the first one. The speed with which the 
issue was put back onto the district change agenda can 
be interpreted as a sign of the impact of general 
management,, since speedier decision-making was one of 
the main themes of the Report. The case-study points, 
however, to the influence not so much of the general 
management but of change of personalities and style at 
board level. The new Chairman and the DGM had 
complementary skills and formed a symbiotic team. They 
were able to frame a strongly based and well argued 
proposal for implementation which 'fitted' with the 
character of the locale and saved the relationship of 
the Authority with the clinicians. 
A New Approach to Implementation: Organisational 
The case-study also presents an interesting 
example of "organisational learning process" (Argyris 
and Schon, 1978). Clearly, those involved in promoting 
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the closure of the delivery services had gained some 
useful experience in the management of closure and 
evolved a number of important changes in their approach 
to closure. The new approach had several distinct 
aspects. In particularg, there was a clear political 
awareness of the issue and much emphasis placed on the 
formal closure procedures. From the outset, the 
proposal was conceived with the prerequisite approval 
of the CHC in mind and its of f icers were of fered a 
genuine opportunity to exert real influence rather than 
a token consultation. The case study illustrates that 
not only the objectives of the closure proposal, but 
also the approach to initiate change, has to be 
legitimised. 
The proposal itself, as opposed to the first one, 
was well sounded and strengthened by evidence provided 
by a negative evaluation of the service after a year of 
its re-opening. This demonstrates the importance of an 
analytic soundness in generating the data. Such an 
evaluation is one of the preliminary steps commonly 
recommended for closing a government facility (Ellis,, 
1983). This added to the credibility and legitimacy of 
the DHA proposal but, in addition, attention was also 
paid to the political requirements of implementation. 
Although the evidence from the evaluation could have 
been used to support the closure on safety grounds, no 
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reference was made to that issue so as to avoid 
treading on the toes of the local GPs. As Hardy (1985) 
pointed out, the justification of the closure on the 
basis of acceptable criteria is one of the key 
managerial strategies in reducing the possibility of 
resistance to closure. The GPs decision to support the 
second proposal was a key item in the SMG decision- 
making process to go ahead with the proposal. It also 
played a fundamental role in the decision of both the 
CHC and the public campaign group not to oppose the 
closure of the delivery services. 
Combining Retrenchment and Development 
Another key f actor in the success of the second 
proposal was the combination of the closure of the 
delivery services with the development of an RRU at 
Amersham. Indeed, the provision of an RRU acted as a 
major incentive for the closure of the delivery 
services, drawing -the CHC into participation in the 
process. The case study illustrates the role of 
incentives in putting together a coalition for change. 
It also shows that management can counteract the effect 
of contextual influences by acting adroitly and with 
sensitivity (Hardy,, 1985,, 1986; Hardy and Pettigrew, 
1985). Not only was there a readily apparent 
performance gap to build in to justify the closure, but 
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the officers were able to put together a -legitimate 
solution to meet an already legitimate problem. The 
case study also supports Korman and Glennerster's 
(1990) argument that public managers and bureaucracies 
can learn from their own mistakes. 
A New Context for Closure and The Role of Chance 
The significance of the learning process and the 
impact of the change in personalities and style at 
board level should, however, not be singled out from 
the critical change in the local context of the 
hospital. The success of the second proposal must also 
be attributed to the change in the attitude of the 
local community resulting from the approval of the 
Amersham hospital redevelopment plan. This major change 
significantly altered the culture of the locale; it 
eradicated the fear for the future of the hospital in 
the community and quietened down the opposition. 
Although the previous Secretary of State's decision was 
strengthening the position of the opponents, they were 
unable, in the new context, to legitimise their 
position and to build up a powerful coalition to fight 
and ultimately to win the issue. This clearly supports 
one of the key contentions of the CCSC research on 
change in the NHS stating that managerial and 
professional action as well as environment or policy 
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changes at higher tiers can encourage 
non-receptive to receptive context 
(Pettigrew et al,, 1990). The achievemen, 
closuref when only the closure of the 
thought possible, nicely illustrates 
chance, alongside . foresight and 
implementation process. 
movement f rom 
for change 
of the total 
delivery was 
the role of 
intent, in 
Summary and Conclusions 
To summarise, the evidence from the Amersham case- 
study shows particularly well that it is not enough to 
take obsolete central policy off the shelf; the action 
taken by the key decision makers as well as the 
personality, skillr and style of the leaders can be 
critical factors in implementation. The tendency of 
those who were trying to implement the first proposal 
to move quickly and with authority, and for action to 
dominate over legitimacy were clear features of the the 
first proposal. As Pettigrew et al (1990) pointed outj 
"The issue may be one of balancer timing, and 
sequencing. But there are dangers in moving 
too quickly, skipping the selling of the new 
idea ai! the unselling of the old. " 
The second Chairman had the sense of strategy and 
tactics, the personal resourcesp and the political 
skill which were lacking in his predecessor. 
"Political skill means the ability to use the 
bases of power effectively - to convince 
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those to whom one has access - to use one's 
resources, information, and technical skills 
to their fullest in bargaining, to exercise 
formal power with a sensitivity to the 
feelings of others, to know where to 
concentrate one's energies, to sense what is 
possible, to organise the necessary 
alliances. Related to political skill is a 
set of intrinsic leadership characteristics - 
charm, physical strength, attractiveness, 
what Kipnis calls "personal resources. " 
(Mintzberg, 1983, p. 26) 
The analysis also demonstrates clearly that the 
implementation process was pervasively influenced by 
the context in which it was set. The case-study 
illustrates the effect of history and local 
characteristics on the reaction to the proposals. In 
particular it shows the effect of the history of 
competition between two major towns sharing the DGH 
services and the role of local politics in complicating 
the closure decisions. The evidence indicates that 
local context sensitivity was of primary importance in 
implementing the proposals. A further important point 
illustrated in the case-study is that contexts are 
changing and that relatively fast contextual changes 
can critically contribute to removing some of the major 
blocks on implementation. 
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CEMTER SEVEN 
Abingdon GP Maternity Unit 
The second case-study documents the progress of 
the Oxfordshire DHA's proposals to close the GP 
maternity beds in Abingdon. The first proposal put 
forward in April 1986 by the current District Executive 
Board formed part of a comprehensive set of savings 
intended to bring the District's income and expenditure 
into balance. 
The whole set of proposals were vigorously 
opposed. The proposal to close the maternity beds at 
Abingdon was decried particularly by the local GPs. In 
June 1986, the Government's decision to defer part of 
the pay awards until July eased the District's 
financial situation. With the exception of the 
proposal on closing some of the Nuffield Orthopaedic 
beds, all the closure proposals contained in the 
package of savings were put into abeyance. 
The proposal to close the Abingdon GPMU was re- 
launched two years later. The closure of the GPMU was 
the corner stone of a complex series of changes 
intended to consolidate the GP medical beds and to 
develop an EMI servic4 at Abingdon Hospital. The GPs 
and the Midwifery staff reluctantly accepted the 
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Authority's proposal and the CHC supported the closure. 
The Unit closed on 31st December 1989. 
The Profile of the District and Unit Under Study 
Oxfordshire is the biggest district in the Region, 
both in geographical and in financial terms. It covers 
an area of over 237 000 hectares, which is the whole of 
Oxfordshire County, spends over 25% of the Oxford 
Region's budget, and is also a prominent teaching 
district. 
In such a big District, the closure of relatively 
small peripheral GPMUs has not been seen by the senior 
Officers as a strategic priority. 
"We have talked about the closure of the 
GPMUs f or quite a long time. In fact-it has 
been on the cards right since the inception 
of the District in 1974. However, it has 
always been seen as a relatively small 
problem. . Do remember: 
Oxfordshire is the 
f ifth in the order of size in the Country. 
This District is large enough to have f irst 
class senior officers. There is a lot of 
clinical development and a lot of stimuli. 
There is always something going on. Nothing 
is very slow streaming in this health 
Authority unless it is trivial. The GPMUs 
are the little bits of the service. it is 
such a tiny issue compared with some of the 
other ones that we are grappling with" 
District Medical-Officer 
Oxfordshire has one of the lowest population 
densities in the Region and is essentially a rural 
county. There are concentrations of population in 
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Oxford, Banbury and Abingdon. All the other market 
towns are fairly small. 
In 1984, the population of the district was over 
half a million. It was projected to increase by nearly 
10% during the planning period- 1984-1994. The age 
structure of the District's population was well below 
national average in numbers of elderly. However,, one 
of the major problems facing the District was the 
substantial increase in the population of people over 
75 years old. The problem was generally the same as 
commonly found throughout the Region: the need to 
substantially increase the provision for Geriatrics and 
Psychogeriatric patients. 
The "centre of excellence" function of Oxford 
means that the District attracts an inflow of patients 
from each District in the Region as well as a sizeable 
inflow from populations beyond the Region's boundaries. 
The size of the inflow in obstetrics, the standards of 
maternity care, and the flexibility needed to meet 
future demands were among the disagreements between the 
District and the Region. The Region was concerned that 
the District was providing a higher level and quality 
of maternity services to its patients. To bring the 
District's maternity services into line with the 
Regional Plan would require a reduction of 49 in the 
number of maternity beds. The Regional Strategic Plan 
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suggested that the majority of surplus capacity was at 
the John Radcliffe Hospital. The conversion of these 
beds for gynaecology purposes by 1994 was considered. 
The economic indicators of well-being reveals the 
District as rather prosperous and healthy. It has one 
of the lowest SMR in the Region. People living in the 
North of Oxf ord are highly educated and particularly 
influential in developing local health policies. 
"Setting aside the University, which is the 
single most influential group, health 
policies in Oxfordshire are influenced by 
what is called the North Oxford Factor. This 
suggests that the academic families living in 
the North of Oxford form a very vocal 
community. we have wives of academics who 
can steer the public opinion quite -well, 
quite easily, and quite effectively. The 
local maternity policies have been 
considerably influenced by this factor" 
District Medical Officer 
The District has thirty'- hospitals scattered over 
its territory. The hospital services are distributed 
through two fundamentally independent - centres - at 
Banbury and Oxford. 
Oxford has a DGH spread over three major sites: 
the Radcliffe Infirmary (277 beds), the Churchill 
Hospital (371 beds) , and the main teaching hospital, 
the John Radcliffe Hospital (620 beds). The District 
wishes to concentrate these facilities but does not 
have the necessary capital-to do so. . 
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"Because it is a teaching centre, Oxford has 
problems which are different from those 
experienced elsewhere in the Region, such as 
the need to associate closely certain 
disciplines, and the desirability of 
operating on a very f ew sites because of the 
complexities of organising teaching. A major 
problem in Oxford is the contrast between 
that and the multiplicity of sites on which 
care is delivered. It is very uneconomical 
and very dif f icult in practical terms to run 
a DGH acute service on three different sites 
in a town as congested as Oxford. The 
ultimate aspiration of the Authority is to 
close the Radcliffe Infirmary and to 
concentrate the services on two sites but the 
financial implication of a two-site strategy 
for Oxford is prohibitive" 
Director of Planning & Performance 
Oxfordshire also has another DGH in Banbury (252 
beds) . It is a more typical DGH without a significant 
teaching responsibility. The staffing ratios in 
Oxfordshire were below the Regional average in 
maternity services. Many beds were neither properly 
staffed nor available. The Horton DGH has 25 staffed 
consultant beds which is the minimum number for 
recognition by the RCOG of junior medical staff 
training. The hospital also has an integrated GPMU of 
10 beds but only 5 of them are actually staffed. There 
is also an integrated GPMU of 12 beds at John Radcliffe 
Hospital. 
One of Oxfordshire's distinguishing features is 
its large proportion of beds in peripheral units. 
"There was a tendency in the NHS to 
centralise all DGH services. The old concept 
of the market town having its own facilities 
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was altered as the financial restrictions 
came to be more pressing. Whilst most 
districts have virtually closed all their 
town's hospital, Oxfordshire has not closed 
one as such. It was a philosophy, and the 
local communities have given tremendous 
support to their local hospitals. 
Ironically, the costs in these units are much 
lower than in a DGH" 
Unit General Manager 
Setting aside the DGHs, acute in-patient beds are 
further provided in a dozen of f airly small peripheral 
community hospitals. In 1984, five of them were 
providing a total of 24 GP maternity beds (Table 7-0). 
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Table 7-0 
Complement of In-patient GP Maternity Beds 
Oxfordshire DHA 
1974 - 1984 
Hospital GP Births per 
beds available bed 
1974 1 984 1974 1984 
John Radcliffe 1 8 12 n/a n/a 
Horton General 10 10 n/a n/a 
Abingdon 12 3 11.6 5.9 
Bicester 10 c losed* 12.4 closed* 
Brackley 4 4 41.2 20.76 
Chipping Norton 12 10 14.2 7.4 
Wallingford 16 4 13.9 21.6 
Wantage 4 3 16.0 14.6 
---- ---- ----- - ---- 
TOTAL 76 46 x 18.2 14.0 
Bicester GPMU closed in 1980 
Regional Average: 1974: x= 17.2, 1984: x 10.3. 
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The decreasing number of peripheral GP maternity 
beds since 1974 resulted mainly from the 
rationalisation of services over, the years. 
"For historical reasonst there were- GP 
maternity beds in the Cottage Hospitals but 
the demand declining their number was 
reduced. However, in spite of the national 
policy, it proved difficult to phase them out 
completely" 
AHA Administrator 
All the other hospitals in Oxfordshire are not 
providing acute and maternity services. 
"To understand why we have not closed our 
peripheral GP maternity beds you have to 
understand something about the -district's 
commitment to the development of local 
services. We are one of the districts which 
have pioneered the development of the 
community hospitals. In the, early 1970s the 
Oxford Hospital Board and the DHSS-initiated 
research on the role of the community 
hospital. We became a pilot district. The 
first-real community hospital was built here 
in Wallingford. We illustrated how the 
traditional cottage hospital could be evolved 
and changed to' be more intensive in their 
support to the local communities. The 
maternity unit was part and parcel of that. " 
Community Unit General Manager 
The trend in obstetric workload indicated that 
whilst births, as well as in-patient cases, in DGHs 
increased, showing a general upward trend, the workload 
of the peripheral GPMUs was generally declining. The 
decrease at Abingdon and Wantage 'were particularly 
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striking. The bed occupancy in the peripheral units 
also dropped significantly. 
Because most maternity units are staffed by 
Community Midwives, the closure of the peripheral 
GPMUs would result in only minimal revenue savings. 
"Our peripheral GPMUs run a Domino scheme. 
They are not-staffed by Hospital Midwives but 
by Community Midwives. Only Wallingford has 
its separated staff. Midwifery staffing 
levels are low. In South Oxfordshire, 
Abingdon and Wantage hospitals do not provide 
24 hours midwifery cover. This is not 
recommended by the English National Board. 
The Nursing staff provide support care but 
the mothers are the responsibility of the 
midwife or the midwife on call. This system 
has been operating in Wantage for 25 years. 
It works at Wantage but it has not worked as 
successfully at Abingdon. We demonstrated 
that if you close the GPMUs you would need 
more, r not less,, community midwives spending 
more, not less, money. - The GPMUs are a more 
cost effective option for providing maternity 
services than to run a community - domicilary 
midwifery service with all its overheads of 
staff on call. it is the more cost-efficient 
way of providing the next best to a home 
confinement" 
Community Unit General Manager 
The safety of the GPMUs has never provided a reason for 
closing, the GPMUs. - 
"In the- past fifteen years the only- thing 
which has really forced the DMT or the 
Executive Board to take radical decisions has 
been financial difficulties. There was 
financially - very little gain in closing a 
GPMU and it did not seem to be any gain in 
terms of healthier mothers and babies. 
There has been very little argument about 
safety locally. It just has not been a 
feature of the debate. The safety argument 
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is a carry over from the Pell report's day. 
In Oxfordshire it would be very hard to push 
that argument forward as the principal reason 
for closing a GPMU. It is a difficult 
argument to substantiate. We still run a 
flying squad. It is hardly - worth it but we 
do" 
District Medical Officer 
The relatively good safety record of the District's 
GPMUs is attributed to the quality of local GPs. 
"One of the reasons the closures were- not 
pushed in the f irst place is the quality of 
our GPs. The consultants know the calibre of 
our GPs. We have good GPs and good primary 
health care teams. The District has 
committed GPs who have defended their wish to 
practice GP obstetrics. - There is very little 
evidence of bad selection of patients. There 
is some evidence to support the hypothesis 
that the proximity of the 11centre of 
excellence" is influencing the standard of 
our GPs. For instance,, the analysis of the 
drugs bill of family doctors supports the 
assumption that it is influencing the speed 
in which new treatments are used" 
District Medical Officer 
The local strategy has been to keep the GPMUs open 
where they have GPs committed to maintain the service 
and to press the local, GPs to consent to closing the 
maternity beds when the facilities could be better used 
for more urgent local needs. ' The District's philosophy 
has been that planning initiatives, involving a 
reduction of services, ought to come out from the unit 
level. 
"Prior to the 1979 election, we used to 
receive a quarterly telephone call from the 
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DHSS asking for progress on the reduction in 
the number of GPMUs because of the national 
policy to phase these beds out. Oxfordshire 
was one of the AHA's regarded as very tardy 
in this respect by the Department. We were 
not prepared for economy or -for safety to 
push ahead dramatically with the closure of 
the GPMUs. The overall-policy, which started 
with the AHA and was carried on by the DHA, 
has been to wait until the GPs themselves and 
the public had made up their minds. It is 
much better if these decisions either 
originate with the GPs or are made to appear 
to originate with them. It does make the 
removal of the maternity beds considerably 
easier if they are seen to be fulfilling as 
great if not greater needs. As far as 
Oxfordshire was concerned we looked to 
discontinue the use of peripheral maternity 
beds as coming up either spontaneously or 
engineered from the local GPs. We seized any 
opportunity available whenever it presented 
itself and we tried to create opportunities 
by suggesting proposals, testing the 
feasibility of moving forward, where there was 
a greater consensus, and setting up working 
parties" 
Oxfordshire AHA Planning Officer 
The closure of the Bicester GPMU is unanimously 
considered as a perfect example of the Oxfordshire's 
closure philosophy put into practice. 
The Bicester Cottage Hospital had a total, of 14 
beds. In November 1976, since the bed utilisation for 
confinement was falling, eight beds were converted to 
medical and surgical use. The change was advocated by 
the local GPs themselves. 
In June 1979, since the maternity bed occupancy 
was falling again, the GPs decided, byýa majority vote, 
to cease confinements in Bicester from 30th December 
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1979, and to turn all the beds over to 'a mix of 
convalescent, post-operative, and geriatric patients. 
They issued a press statement giving details of the 
proposed change of use and explaining its motives. 
The news took everyone by surprise. The ARA 
General Administrator set up a meeting between members 
of the Planning Team and the GPs to discuss the 
proposal and to assess the implications of the change. 
The CHC reacted immediately and put out a consultative 
document outlining the facts. 
"In this case, the GPs acted quite 
arbitrarily in withdrawing their services 
from the maternity beds, without care for the 
other members of the staff. They made up 
their minds and put it in f ront of everybody 
as a "fait accompli". The press statement 
was a very disgraceful way of announcing such 
a proposal" 
Secretary to the CHC 
At the end of the consultation period, the CHC 
decided that it had no fundamental grounds for opposing 
the plans. The proposal was implemented on 31st January 
1980. 
The closure of the Brackley Hospital maternity 
beds is also a good example of the closure philosophy 
being put into practice. The Brackley Cottage Hospital 
had no more than 8 GP medical beds and 4 GP maternity 
beds. Closure in Brackley has always been a very 
sensitive political issue. 
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In October 1984, the impending retirement of the 
Senior Nurse raised doubts about the ability to 
maintain the maternity services. She was a very 
dedicated person who was covering up for the 
deficiences in staff cover by working extra hours, 
largely on an unpaid basis. 
At the request of the DMT,, the UMG prepared an 
analysis of the options concerning the future of the 
Brackley Cottage Hospital. The four options were: 
(1) the continuation of all services, (2) the closure 
of the maternity unit as well as the casualty service, 
(3) the closure of all services, without ý additional 
clinical provision else where, and, finally, - (4) the 
change of use of maternity beds to accommodate 
geriatric patients. The estimates ýof -revenue 
consequences and the effect on clinical services, 
together with an assessment of the political 
acceptability of each option to the local community was 
considered. 
The Chairman of both CHCs concerned, the Chairman 
of the Friends of Brackley Hospital, and the members of 
the Brackley Town Council were approached before 
issuing the consultation paper. In view of the likely 
opposition to the proposals, the factual accuracy of 
all quoted data was carefully checked. 
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The consultation paper presented all the options 
considered. The change of use of the GPMU was presented 
as a development of services. 
"The change of use was not sold as a revenue 
saving but as a development of service. We 
insisted on the fact that in exchange for 
very lightly used obstetric beds, four much 
more needed general beds would be provided. 
You could take the public along with you only 
if you could tell them that they are going to 
get something out of it? " 
Community Unit Manager 
Despite the District's care in reducing opposition 
to the proposalsr the closure of the GPMU was strongly 
decried by the GPs, the Town Council, and the public. 
"Over the years there have been repeated 
alarms about the possible closure of Brackley 
Cottage Hospital and, understandably, a large 
body of opinion was already mobilised to 
oppose this. This issue and the GPMU 
proposals became linked in many peoples' 
minds. The main fear was that the Authority 
would close the hospital completely. Saying 
"yes" to the closure of the GPMU was saying 
"yes" to Phase I of the closure of the 
hospital" 
Secretary to the CHC 
Two well-attended public meetings were held. However, 
on 21st November 1984, the CHC finally supported the 
DHA's change of use proposal. 
"This is the only occasion where our members 
went totally against the wishes of the public 
living in the area. There was overwhelming 
support for retaining the- maternity unit. 
However, at the public meetings there were 
more people interested in maternity services 
than elderly people. Elderly people do not 
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go out to public meetings while young mothers 
do. A different audience would have produced 
a different swing of opinion. we received a 
number of letters supporting the change of 
use. That was the rational decision to make" 
Secretary to the CHC 
The Senior Nurse retired on the 31th March 1986 and the 
Maternity Unit closed the same day. The Unit was 
modified and since July 1986 now accomodates geriatric 
patients. 
The District's maternity service strategy stressed 
its resoluteness to maintain both the integrated as 
well as the peripheral GPMUs. The overall strategy of 
development of acute and priority services pursued 
since the inception of the District in 1974 could be 
divided into three main periods: 
1974 to 1979, a period 'of development of 
General Acute Provision and Regional 
Specialities based on the opening of John 
Radcliffe Hospital Phase II. Closure of 
Cowley Road Geriatric Hospital. Re-use of 
beds in the Radcliffe Infirmary and Churchill 
Hospital for geriatric care. Development of 
the Community Hospitals; 
(2) 1980 to 1986#, integration of acute geriatric 
and medical specialist services at John 
Radcliffe Hospital in Oxford and Horton 
General Hospital in Banbury. Closure of 
Bradwell Grove Hospital and joint development 
with the Local Authorities of -a new mental 
handicap service based on a series of 
community units for severe mental handicap; 
(3) 1987 to 1990, improvement of elderly and EMI 
services. Minor developments to increase and 
improve the acute facilities., 
CHAPTER SEVEN - ABINGDON GPMU CASE-STUDY Page 296 
The District change agenda has spared little place 
for the closure of the small peripheral GPMUs. 
"In the last few years a great deal of our 
effort went into opening the new acute 
hospital and closing a geriatric hospital as 
well as a mentally-, handicapped hospital. 
Opening and closing health facilities is a 
highly time consuming business. These major 
changes took up our management time. Our 
efforts were diverted from the smaller things, 
into the big challenges. The financial 
interest of closing the GPMUs- 'was fairly 
small. The motivation was just not there" 
District Medical Officer 
The procedure for closure and the power of ýthe local 
CHC also acted as deterrents. 
"You must also remember the formal steps that 
you have to go through f or closing health 
facilities. In Oxfordshire we have a big and 
and rather powerful CHC. Until 1985 our 
working relationship with them was rather 
conflictual. We -were always the faceless 
bureaucrats. In a place like Oxford it is 
easy to get the Authority bad publicity. The 
Secretary of the Council has always been able 
to convince people that the ordinary services 
were suffering because of the glory of the 
teaching hospitals. The Authority has shied 
away except for big things where the gains 
were considerable" 
District Medical Officer 
Because of the size of the DMT and the influence 
of the medical representatives, achieving consensus for 
the closure among the DMT members was also very 
dif f icult. 
"In Oxford again we were different. Most 
DMTs had two medical representatives. We had 
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two consultants, one university professor, 
and two GPs. Getting a consensus on any 
closure of service was not an easy task" 
District Medical Officer 
The Management of the District 
From 1974 to 1982 the District had experienced no 
change of senior Officers. The reorganisation brought 
a radical change in the DMT. Continuity was provided 
by the District Medical Officer alone. 
The implementation of general management also 
brought notable changes -in the management of the 
District. 
"The difference between consensus management 
and the current arrangement is quite marked. 
Before- the implementation of General 
Management we had a large consensus team. It 
got bogged down in details. A lot of talking 
took place and decisions were slow to come 
through. Implementation did not necessarily 
follow the decision. Members tended to get 
on very well together, it was a cosy 
management arrangement. The Chairman did not 
attend the meetings, the DMT ran the show. 
Today, every part of the service has a 
General Manager accountable to the District 
General Manager. We have a large management 
group and the Chairman frequently attends. 
It is-always chaired by the Chief Executive. 
Leadership is a lot stronger. It has a much 
more executive style than it had before. The 
new Griffiths' management structure makes it 
more likely for decisions to be implemented. 
There is now a stronger will to implement 
changes" 
District Medical Officer 
Part of the new DGM's power has been decentralised down 
to the unit level management. 
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"There is much greater authority at this 
level. Providing that I have the money,, I 
could get on with it. Obviously, this stems 
from the philosophy of the Chairman and the 
DGM. I am sure districts vary considerably 
on this. Certainly, the view of our Chairman 
and definitively the view of our DGM is that 
the UGM were appointed to get on with their 
money. What they do is their own business 
and if it goes wrong they will answer for it" 
Unit General Manager 
The effects of the implementation of general management 
in Oxfordshire have also been felt by the CHC. 
"The Implementation of General Management has 
been a very good thing in Oxfordshire. When 
a conflict occurs we are now fighting at a 
more rational level than we would have been 
before. The Authority,, even if it does not 
do what we ask it to do, is now responsive to 
what we want. It is a hard f ought battle 
with respect and a great deal of friendship 
on either side. Perhaps we have been lucky 
in the two DGMs we had" 
Secretary to the CHC 
The first DGM was a consultant radiotherapist 
whose main strength was his ability to deal with the 
consultants in the medical school. The second DGM had 
been the Assistant DGM (Planning and Performance) and 
he took over the DGM job in July 1987. The District 
officers did not interpret the change as having 
dramatically altered the district style of management. 
"The styles have to be different because one 
is a consultant and the other is a layman in 
medical terms. However, they worked very 
closely together and they made a very good 
duo. Both are direct, prefer informal 
communication, and above all are good 
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politicians in the medical sense and in the 
sense of the local community. They are both 
able to negotiate and certainly to 
compromise. However, the first DGH had more 
"charm" and, to some extent, was more able 
to deal with the senior consultants. Apart 
from his obvious managerial ability, the 
current DGMIs strength derives from his local 
government background. He makes extensive 
use of committee to achieve his ends which is 
a good thing in a District like Oxfordshire. 
He has some good allies among the more 
powerful senior consultants in the medical 
school" 
District Officer 
Managing in Oxford is generally seen as different 
and more innovative than in the other Districts. 
"What is different in Oxfordshire is that 
there is a lot of pressure. It, is a veryý 
complex district. It is even more difficult 
in Oxf ord, there is no doubt about it. In 
terms of experimenting with new innovative 
ideas there is no other district with the 
comprehensive record that we have. The level 
of financial resource is-low and imposes more 
pressure for innovative management. " 
Unit General Manager 
For some respondents, the level of innovation has its 
down side. 
"These people at the University are pushing 
back the frontiers of knowledge and in so 
doing they raise new ethical and priority 
questions all the time. The sad aspect is 
that it is more difficult to get management 
achievements. We have medical as well as 
quality of service achievement. However,, our 
organisational priorities are diverged by the 
magnet effect of the teaching, hospitals. We 
feel we lack a strategic framework in which 
innovation can take place. At the moment we 
do not have a very clear idea on the long 
term direction to follow as an organisation" 
Director-Planning'and-Performance 
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The Profile of the Unit Under Study 
The Abingdon Hospital-. 'was built - 
in 1901 and was 
originally an isolation hospital. When it was no 
longer necessary to provide facilities for those 
conditions, the hospital came under the responsibility 
of the Nuffield Orthopaedic Centre providing 
orthopaedic and physiotherapy services to the local 
population. From 1970s onwards, the hospital was being 
developed as a community hospital. In 1985,, it had a 
total of 69 beds. 
Up to 1968, local maternity services were provided 
by the GPMU at Warren Hospital in Abingdon. In 1968, 
because of work required at the building, the maternity 
services were transferred from the Warren to the 
Abingdon Hospital. This marked the opening of the 
Abingdon GPMU with 16 beds. 
"We did not oppose the closure of the Warren 
maternity unit. The Warren Hospital was a 
geriatric hospital with a maternity unit. 
The closure was negotiated. we got quite 
good facilities at Abingdon ýHospital as a 
result of the closure. We ended up with a 
Day Hospital, more beds for the elderly 
there, and the maternity unit as well. It was 
all agreed" 
GP representative 
In'1985,: the Abingdon GPMU had only 3 beds. It was 
essentially used solely by one group practice of GPs. 
The maternity unit undertook 14 deliveries and, on 
average, 0.4 occupied beds (Table 7.1). 
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Table 7.1 
Abingdon GPMU Vital Statistics 
Oxfordshire DRA, 1976-1986 
beds occuDied 
Obstetrics* 
District GP Average 
Abingdon GPMU** 
Discharges' 
Obstetrics 
District GP Total 
Abingdon GPMU 
Lenath of Sta 
Obstetrics 
District GP Average 
Abingdon GPMU 
Birth 
Obstetrics 
District GP Total 
Abingdon GPMU 
1976 1978 1982 1984 1986 
73 70 67 64 60 
51 42 45 36 41 
53 31 40 30 13 
6343 6845 7238 7313 7412 
2374 2032 1722 1747 1605 
254 140 137 97 47 
8.0 6.7 5.8 5.4 4.8 
5.0 4.4 4.4 3.5 3.6 
5.0 3.4 3ý2 3.0 3.1 
5552 5942 6499 6640 6727 
645 460 314 301 212 
74 26 26 -16 8 
Obstetric beds: 1976=183; 1978=180; 1982-1984=170; 
1986=168 
Number of beds: 1976=6; 1978=4; 1982-1986=3 
Source: Hospital Statistics 1976 - 1986,, ORRA. 
This concludes the profile of the district and 
unit under study. The next section presents an 
overview of the process and outcome of the two 
proposals to close the Abingdon GPMU. 
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The Closure of Abingdon GPMU: An Overview 
From 1974 to 1985.. the closure of the Abingdon 
GPMU was considered on various occasions. The GPs had 
always strongly opposed such a proposal and the closure 
was withdrawn time after time., 
In April 1986, faced ý with continuing financial 
problems and the likelihood of overspending its revenue 
budget by half a million pounds, the Authority adopted 
a package of savings proposals, which included the 
closure of beds in geriatrics, obstetrics, 
orthopaedics, and in community care. It, was also 
proposed to move the Pain Relief Unit (PRU) from 
Abingdon to Oxford and to close the ward at Abingdon 
Hospital. The PRU was sharing a ward with 8 GP medical 
beds. Since the GPMU was under-utilised, it was 
suggested to close it in order to accommodate some of 
the medical beds affected by the reloca tion of the PRU. 
The closure of obstetric beds concerned 20 beds in 
the main teaching hospital. The Chairman of the 
Division of Obstetrics and Gynaecology indicated that 
he would not approve the closure of beds without ways 
of reducing the number of ante-natal admissions. He 
proposed opening an Out-patient Ante-natal Day 
Assessment Unit in the area vacated by the proposed bed 
closure. 
CHAPTER SEVEN - ABINGDON GPMU CASE-STUDY 
_ 
Page 303 
The proposal to close the Maternity service and-to 
transfer the PRU from Abingdon to oxford were-strongly 
opposed by both the GPs and the local community. The 
Clinical Medical Board of the University of Oxford did 
not comment either on the closure of beds at Abingdon 
Hospital or at the John Radcliffe Hospital. However, 
the Medical Board strongly opposed the closure of 
geriatric beds. 
In June 1986, the Government's decision to defer 
part of the pay awards enabled the DHA to review the 
proposals. 
"Cash limits meant that costs that rose more 
than the limits would have to be met from the 
ongoing allocation. The pay increases 
announced in May did exceed the cash limits 
although the extent to which they did was 
moderated by the device of deferring a part 
of the agreed increase until July 1. Nurses' 
pay was to rise by an average of 7.8% but 
because that award was deferred until July 1 
(as opposed to the start of the financial 
year in April) the real value of the year's 
increase was 5.9%. Doctors and dentists were 
to get an average of 7.6% but, because of the 
deferment, effectively got 5.7%. " (Small, 
1989, p. 75) 
As a result, the DHA decided not to proceed 
immediately with the package of closures and 
particularly with the closure of the Abingdon GPMU. 
However, it was agreed with the CHC to continue 
reviewing maternity provision in the District. A pilot 
study was undertaken to test the feasibility of the 
Ante-Natal Day Care Unit proposal. 
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In 1988, an outside influence revived the project 
to close the Abingdon GPMU. The Imperial Cancer 
Research Fund built a new unit -, at, the Churchill 
Hospital for cancer treatment services and offered to 
include facilities in'the n&ý_building'-for the Abingdon 
PRU. That raised, once again, the issue of its 
relocation. 
The closure of the GPMU was linked to a complex 
series of moves intended to develop an EMI service on 
the ward vacated by the PRU. A consultation paper was 
issued in October 1988. Virtually no objection was 
raised to the closure of , the GPMU. , The CHC did not 
hold a public meeting on the issue and decided to 
support the proposals. The Abingdon GPMU closed on 
31st December 1989. Table 7-2 presents a diary of the 
main events leading to the conclusion of the closure 
process. 
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Table 7-2 
Abingdon GPMU Case-Study 
Diary of Principal Events 
1985 
April The Authority adopted a 
package of savings proposals 
which included the relocation 
of the PRU and the-closure of 
the Abingdon GPMU; 
Strong opposition from the 
local GPs and the local 
community; 
July 
As a result of the 
Government Is decision of part 
funding the pay awards the 
proposal to close the Abingdon 
GPMU was put into abeyance; 
1988 
October The proposals were re-launched 
--The closure of the GPMU was 
the corner stone of a complex 
series of changes intended to 
consolidate the GP medical 
beds and to develop an EMI 
service at Abingdon Hospital; 
No objection was raised to the 
closure of the GPMU either by 
the GPs or by thelocal 
community; 
1989 1 
March The CHC supported the 
proposals; 
December Closure of the Abingdon GPMU. 
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The Proposal 
The previous section presented an overview of the 
process and outcome of the proposal to close the 
Abingdon GPMU. The next section details the genesis, 
the development, and the conclusion of the proposal. 
The Genesis of the Abingdon GPMU Closure Proposal 
- The Abingdon GPMU opened its 16 beds in 1968. 
With demand decliningi f our beds were closed in 1972 
and a further six beds closed in 1975 to ý accommodate 
some surgical post-operative patients. No objection 
was raised either by theý staff or by the local 
community against these bed reductions. 
In 1976-1977, a number of working parties were set 
up by the AHA to review maternity services throughout 
the area and to consider the future of the peripheral 
maternity units, particularly in Brackley,, Chipping 
Norton, and in Abingdon. The dominant issue regarding 
the District's maternity services was the closure of 
obstetric beds and the addition of beds for gynaecology 
in the main teaching unit in Oxford. 
The various working parties were not unanimous 
regarding the closure of the peripheral GPMUs. 
Generally, the working parties set up to consider the 
closure of peripheral units recommended that the GPMUs 
should remain on the basis that considerable ý value was 
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attached to their retention in the local hospital 
particularly by the GPs and the Nurses while the 
potential net savings were negligible. The other 
working parties, set up to consider - the maternity 
services and closure of obstetric beds in central 
Oxford, supported the closure of the peripheral units 
particularly in Abingdon. 
In 1978, the closure of a geriatric hospital and 
the need to accommodate the elderly patients into the 
existing beds led the Authority to reconsider the 
closure of the Abingdon GPMU. The first formal 
proposal to close it completely was then made. 
Following a consultation period, the proposal was 
withdrawn in response to strong pressure from the local 
community and GPs. A further two beds were then closed 
and the GPMU moved into a general medical ward. 
"There was a large public outcry, strong 
support from the mothers in Abingdon, and 
from one GP practice in particular. The 
opposition was such that we finally agreed to 
move four maternity beds and a delivery suite 
f rom ward three to ward six. At -the -same 
time we stopped providing a complete 24 hour 
midwifery cover. That was a compromise which 
made the authority's peace, particularly with 
the GPs in Abingdon". 
Community Service Unit General Manager 
In 1981, the services provided by the Abingdon 
Maternity Unit were reviewed against the backcloth of 
the financial constraints and in the light of the 
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National policy of centralisation of the peripheral 
GPMUs. A new closure proposal was mooted. The 
proposal was abandoned in response to requests from the 
public and GPs to be allowed to demonstrate the 
viability of the maternity unit. A number of 
campaigners formed the Abingdon Maternity Support Group 
to continue safegarding and promoting the - local 
maternity unit. Births subsequently increased to a 
maximum of 27 in 1982 and declined annually after that. 
"They justified the proposal by saying that 
it was the policy to close peripheral 
maternity units and to encourage the use of 
GPMUs attached to a consultant unit. We 
actually managed to show them that there was 
not any cost involved because it was staf fed 
by community midwives. We pushed them hard 
on the statistics to prove that the hospital 
delivery was better than peripheral delivery 
and they were not able to present us with 
any. " 
GP representative 
The proposal for closure was raised again, in April 
1986 by the District Executive Board (DEB). The 
District Treasurer was anticipating a def icit of over 
half a million pounds and the DEB recommended a set of 
saving proposals which included closure of beds in 
geriatrics, orthopaedics, and in obstetrics as well as 
the relocation of the Pain Relief Unit from Abingdon to 
Oxford. 
"The second proposal - to close' the Abingdon 
GPMU stood,, not from a review of maternity 
services but from the need for saving in 
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order to stay within the revenue budget-., Once 
proposals have been ý raised, they do not tend 
to go away and they keep being raised in 
different contexts by the same people. We 
cast our minds around to find things that 
could contribute to savings, and the 
possibility of reducing maternity beds and 
closing the Abingdon GPMU came up again. It 
was only after the paper went out for 
consultation that we realised that the 
closure of Abingdon GPMU would hardly 
generate any saving at all" 
Director of Planning and Performance 
The proposal was primarily made in order to 
accommodate most of the 8 GP medical beds threatened 
with closure as a result of the relocation of the PRU 
in central Oxford. 
The DHA 'used the opportunity offered by the 
statutory consultation over the - package of savings -to 
press its case for increasing its revenue allocation. 
"The public consultation document and-all the 
statements that were publicly made at that 
time were an attempt to keep the people fully 
informed of the situation and its cause. We 
felt that the difficulties weý-were facing 
were not the effect of bad management but the 
result of under-funding. One of the running 
sores in Oxfordshire was that when the phase 
II of the main teaching hospital opened in 
1979, we did not get enough revenue to run 
it. The publications attempted to make that 
clear and to put political pressure upon the 
NHS Management Board and the Region to try to 
remedy to that situation" 
Director of Planning and Performance 
The package of savings was strongly opposed by the 
public, the medical-and nursing staff,, and the CHC. 
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"There was a general feeling in public 
opinion that it should have been the Cabinet 
and the RRA not the DHA which should have 
been in the dock. The problem was 
attributable to national priorities and 
funding policies. We were particularly 
concerned about the effects on the services 
caused by the method by which the RRA 
allocated revenue and capital to the eight 
DHA. A large reserve was held back by the 
RHA against the funding needed for Milton 
Keynes new development. We were certain that 
the District would not have been facing a 
serious financial problem if it had been 
given its proper share of the Region's 
resources. " 
Secretary to the CHC 
The Clinical Medical Board of the University of 
Oxford did not comment on the closure of maternity beds 
either in the main teaching hospital or in the Abingdon 
Community Hospital. However, the closure of obstetric 
beds in Oxford was strongly opposed by the Chairman of 
the Division of Obstetrics and Gynaecology as well as 
by the consultant obstetricians in the main teaching 
unit on the basis that, given the referral patterns, it 
would result in a bed shortage during peak admission 
periods. An imaginative counter-proposal was developed 
by the opponents. 
"The proposal to convert the space vacated, by 
the closure of the obstetric beds into an 
Ante-natal Day care Unit came from the 
consultant obstetricians of the teaching 
unit. It was quite an innovative idea and a 
clinical development which aimed to reduce 
the number of ante-natal admissions without 
detriment to the clinical services and at no 
additional revenue cost. In turn, this 
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allowed a reduction of obstetric beds and a 
more efficient and effective use of the 
resources" 
Director of Planning and Performance 
The Medical Board of the University, as well as 
Oxfordshire County Council and Oxford City Council, 
expressed their strong opposition to the proposal of 
some geriatric beds in central Oxford. 
The proposals to transfer the PRU from Abingdon to 
Oxford and to close the Abingdon GPMU were opposed by 
the Abington Maternity Support Group and the local 
community. The CHC opposed all'the proposals included 
in the District's package of savings and suggested that 
the DHA should join the CHC in discussions with the RHA 
on the allocation of revenue and capital to 
Oxfordshire. 
The DHA considered the responses atits meeting on 
22nd July 1986. The, financial position of the 
Authority was then eased by the Government decision on 
part funding the pay awards. The DHA decidedý not to 
proceed immediately with the set of proposals. 
"We could have persisted with the whole 
package of proposals in which case, because 
of the opposition of the CHC, it would have 
gone to the Secretary of State for 
arbitration. The closure of the GPMU would 
probably have been accepted by the RHA but it 
was part and parcel of the whole package of 
savings. Seen against the total likely 
shortfall in the district's budget, the 
closure of the Abingdon maternity beds was 
really neither here nor there. The RHA 
officers were not prepared to support our 
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saving package as a whole. They indicated 
that they could not support us against the 
CHC. Besides.. the members of the Executive 
Board and the District General Manager in 
particular were concerned about improving our 
relationship with the CHC. The last thing we 
wanted to do was to upset them. The local 
people and one GP practice, through the CHC, 
objected very strongly to the closure of the 
GPMU. The agreement was reached that we 
should carry out a further review of the 
maternity services which would include the. 
Abingdon Unit". 
Director of Planning and Performance 
During the second half of 1986 and-the first half 
of 1987, a series of meetings were held between"the DHA 
and the RHA officers to revise the strategy for 
maternity services in the District. The District and 
the Region agreed to close a -further 16 obstetric beds 
in the main teaching hospital and to set up an Ante- 
Natal Day Care Unit in the area made available by the 
closure. Further reductions in the number of GP 
maternity beds in peripheral units -and, the closure --of 
Abingdon GPMU were considered possible, thought not in 
the short term. Then an outside influence affected the 
momentum of the closure process. 
The District was presented with an opportunity to 
reconsider the closure of the Abingdon GPMU in 
September 1988. The Imperial Cancer Research Fund was 
building a new unit in central Oxford for oncology 
services and offered to include facilities in the new 
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building for the PRU. The capital costs were being met 
entirely by the research fund. 
The relocation of the PRU was threatening the 
future of eight GP medical beds. Because there was no 
funding to increase the number of GP medical beds to a 
viable level, it was considered either to close the 
remaining medical beds or to close the GPMU re- 
providing the medical beds in the space vacated. In any 
case, the whole ward freed by the relocation of the PRU 
would be made available to the Mental Health Unit for 
development of services for EMI. The latter proposal 
was championed by the Community UGM. 
Setting aside the benefit of relocating the PRU in 
Oxford, the District's reasoning for advancing the 
closure of the GPMU was threefold: (1) lack of use, 
(2) needs in the Abingdon community for more not less 
GP medical beds, and (3) relative lack of safety of the 
very small maternity units. The proposals were 
introduced as a global development in terms of services 
to the local population. 
"The closure of the GPMU was not presented as 
a revenue savings issue. We worked out the 
proposal as a trade-off between maternity 
services and services f or elderly people in 
the local community. We kept an element of 
choice in our consultation paper whilst 
emphasising the reasons behind our own 
conclusion" 
Community UGM 
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The Development and Conclusion of the Abingdon GPMU 
There was virtually no opposition to the proposal 
to close the GPMU. The GP practice using the unit 
refrained from objecting to the proposal on the basis 
that local demand for delivery did not justify keeping 
the unit open. 
"We opposed the 1978 and the - 1982 proposals 
because we felt that there was then a 
sufficient number of mothers who wanted to 
have their babies locally. We preferred to 
have them in a small unit than at home and we 
believed that the number of home confinements 
would go up unacceptably if the unit was 
closed. In 1986, we opposed the closure 
simply because there was no alternative use 
for the beds. The District did not have the 
money to develop anything and a whole ward 
would have been left completely empty. We 
agreed that if the Authority could f ind the 
money to use the beds for some other purposes 
then we would accept the closure. Now, the 
number of local deliveries is so small that 
we could cope with them as home deliveries 
without difficulty. It would have been 
illogical to oppose the proposal" 
GP representative 
The midwifery staff also reluctantly accepted the 
closure proposal. 
"The midwives were very sad. We would have 
liked to keep the unit open but unless it was 
supported by the local mothers, it was simply 
not viable. When the proposal was made in 
1986, the booking for delivery stopped 
completely and it became very difficult to 
regenerate the work. For almost a whole year 
following the proposal, it was used solely by 
a handful of mothers for post-natal care. We 
now have occasional deliveries but, we could 
not possibly justify keeping it open" 
Midwif e 
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No campaign group was set up in the local community to 
oppose the closure of the GPMU. 
"When the threat of closure came again, the 
members of our initial opposition group were 
all heavily involved in doing other things. 
Such a campaign is very hard work. The GPs 
who helped us enormously in opposing the 
previous closure proposals seem to have 
reconciled with the fact that the unit could 
not keep going. They were not as interested 
in backing a campaign as they had been. The 
principal GP in charge of, the unit at the 
time of the previous proposals was then 
seriously ill. Quite honestly, we wereý 
actually orchestrated a lot by the GPs and 
the midwives. Our group had a parish clerk 
who knew the local political scene very well 
and we got the support of all parish councils 
in the area. He also was heavily involved in 
doing other things when it blew up again. It 
was luck as much as anything else if the 
group initially came together to oppose the 
previous proposals. Basically, this time 
there was no leader or group to give the 
initial push to the opposition campaign. I 
certainly sat back and waited to see if 
somebody would step up and do what we did the 
previous times. Nobody did". 
ex-Chairman of the Abingdon 
Maternity Support Group 
In December 1988, the Assistant Secretary to the 
CHC wrote to all individuals and groups who opposed the 
previous closure proposals informing them of the new 
Authority's proposals and requesting their comments 
about it. At the end of the formal consultation 
period, no comment was received by the CHC from any of 
the people consulted on the closure of the GPMU. 
"There are all sorts of geographical and 
sociological reasons to why people do not 
appear to be fighting the closure of the GPMU 
CHAPTER SEVEN - ABINGDON GPMU CASE-STUDY Page 316 
anymore. The whole area is changing 
dramatically. Abingdon is a market town with 
a rapidly expanding population. Much of the 
expansion is due to young families moving to 
the area. The outskirts of Abingdon are 
unrecognisable. Besides, the GPMU was 
primarily used by one well established GP 
practice. They were not taking many new 
patients. The "mothers -to-be 11 were sent to 
other practices who were not using the GPMUII 
Assistant Secretary to the CHC 
There were thirteen other papers out for 
consultation and because no objection was raised 
against the closure of the GPMU, the CHC decided to 
support the proposal without holding a public meeting 
on the issue. The DHA approved the closure proposal in 
March 1989. The Abingdon GPMU closed on 31st December 
1989. 
Concluding Discussion 
ý This chapter has described the process and 
outcome of a series of proposals made by the 
Oxfordshire DHA to close - some - of its GPMUs and -the 
Abingdon GPMU in particular. The closure of the 
Abingdon GPMU eventually went ahead successfully. The 
pertinent question to ask is why was the last proposal 
to close the Abingdon GPMU successfully implemented 
when, for more then ten years, all the proposals were 
either withdrawn or put into abeyance? 
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The Organisational Culture 
Unlike the failure to implement the first closure 
proposal in Amersham, the unsuccessful outcome of the 
previous proposals to close the Abingdon GPMU cannot be 
imputed primarily to managerial mistakes. The case- 
study has provided sufficient evidence to show that the 
district officers truly believed in the virtue of the 
prerequisite clinical approval in implementing such a 
change. This is perhaps, not, surprising in a leading 
teaching district such as Oxfordshire where the power 
of the medical staff is prominent. Although a number 
of opportunities to close the Abingdon GPMU arose, -the 
officers were reluctant to act towards -the closure of 
the maternity unit without the sanction of the-medical 
staff involved. It was only when the GPs' approval was 
ultimately secured that the closure proposal was 
finally implemented. The outcome of the various 
closure proposals, failure as well as success, can be 
primarily attributed to this important feature of the 
district organisational culture. 
New Structural Forms and Organisational Processes 
The prescriptive implementation literature 
emphasises the -role of structure and organisational 
processes in bringing about change. There is no 
evidence that the 1982 reorganisation had had any 
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signif icant effect on the management of the issue in 
Oxfordshire. It is difficult to assess*precisely what 
effect the change in structural form and 
organisationnal, process resulting from the 
implementation of the Griffiths' Report had on the 
success of the f inal proposal. The proposal which 
arose af ew months after the implementation of general 
management was put* into -- abeyance. The process - and 
outcome of that proposal-can be clearly associated with 
the national -political climate (see Chapter f ive) and 
with the controversy between ýthe Conservative 
government and the Labour party about the funding of 
the NHS in particular. The District Executive Board 
(DEB) deliberate action, in using' the consultation to 
press its case for increasing the district revenue 
allocation and to discredit expenditure cuts, can be 
interpreted from a Symbolic Decision Perspective of 
implementation (see Chapter two) as a "bleeding stump 
tactic" (Holmes, 1985). 
"As in -the case of rational public service 
strike, which aims to do maximum harm to the 
public in order to force government to yield, 
bureaucracies and politicians seeking to re- 
sist cuts may choose to concentrate those, 
cuts in the places where they will most hurt 
the outside public, be- most easily noticed, 
and thus court the maximum political 
unpopularity for the government. Such actors 
may actively help to orchestrate the chorus 
of protest against inhuman cuts ... This is the sore thumbs and bleeding stumps tactic" 
(p. 208) 
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However,, the extensiveness and austerity of the whole 
DEB's package of savings, which included the closure 
of the Abingdon GPMU, can be' seen as a sign of the 
impact of - general management in the * district. 
Considering the DMT structural -complexity and the 
concensus, management arrangement, it is unlikely - that 
the DMT would have reached an agreement on such a 
controversial package of savings. The CHC handling and 
support for the final proposal can also be associated 
with the implementation of the Griffiths's- Report, 
since improving the, district relationship with the CHC 
has been one of the DGMIs means of speeding up'-change 
in the district. Finally, the presence of a UGM 
championing the development of an EMI unit clearly 
contributed, to the success of the last proposal. This 
can also be seen as an outcome of the implementation of 
generalýmanagement. 
Combining Retrenchment and Redevelopment 
The content of the proposal also appears toý have 
been influential on the outcome of the proposals. The 
f inal proposal concerned a redevelopment of resources 
for local priority services whereas the previous 
proposals were introduced as savings, resulting in, a 
net closure of beds available in the district. This 
suggests that the economy rationale might not be 
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particularly effective 
facility (Behn,, 1978). 
that the overall problem 
persuading the various 
particular to support 
spending-some time and pi 
closure. 
for closing a- government 
The evidence also indicates 
definition, can, be important in 
stakeholders and the GPs in 
the proposal 'or to choose 
ersonal energy to challenge the 
Managerial Perception, Choice and Strategy 
The question of closing the peripheral GPMUs and 
the closure of the'remaining three GP maternity beds in 
Abingdon, in particular, was not regarded by the 
district officers as a desirable change per se. It was 
seen as a tiny issue compared to others. Furthermore, 
the officers thought that the local GPsl wish to keep 
their maternity units . fitted with the nature . of the 
district environment, as well as with its distinctive 
strategy of pioneering the- development of , the 
peripheral cottage and -community hospitals. This 
indicates 'that managerial perception and" choice can 
influence the pace of implementation of -national 
policy. The data illustrates clearly that 'strategic 
priority made by the f ield agencies can substantially 
deflect the implementation of conflicting non-strategic 
national policy. As Hunter (1983) indicated: 
"If the promotion of innovation is desired, 
the power of the periphery to make policy 
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and, on occasion, to distort, delay or ditch 
national policy aims needs to be recognised" 
(p. 144) 
In any case, there was little managerial energy to 
spend on a possible controversy with the medical staff 
on the issue. Although a number of working parties 
recommended the closure of GPMUs, _the District Officers 
were too busy implementing what they already had -on 
board to take on further controversial - change at that 
time. A number, of contextual factors added up to the 
lack of pressure for change and contributed to keeping 
the issue off the active change agenda. These were: the 
size and complexity of the district, -the soundness of 
the policy, the formal procedures for closure; the 
bottom-up philosophy -of implementation and the 
extensive use of committees --and working parties; the 
tradition of pioneering and innovation; the 
performance of the units; the power of the-CHC; and the 
sensitivity of the ýlocal community. As Ferlie and 
Pettigrew (1989) indicated the issues do not 
automatically give rise to agendas but require 
legitimation, need to be seen as feasible, and depend 
on a critical mass of powerful, supportý Clearly, these 
conditions were not entirely fulfilled at the time- of 
the previous proposals. 
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The Implementation Approach 
The philosophy of actions of the district officers 
conform to the Bureaucratic Process Perspective of 
implementation (see Chapter two) which suggests that 
hierarchical controls to alter the behaviour of 
relatively autonomous professionals generally fail and 
which recommends a bottom-upj, as opposed to a top-down, 
process of implementation. In this case-study, the 
officers performed a supportive, enabling role as 
opposed to a controlling, managerial one in dealing 
with the issue. According to Hunter (1983), such 
managerial style would best fit with the pluralistic 
nature of the health care system and with the 
conditions for effective implementation in hospitals. 
The evidence from the case-study suggests that the 
Bureaucratic Process Perspective is a useful guide for 
implementation at micro-implementation level, as long 
as no strong contextual pressure or severe crisis 
conditions urge quick, decisive, and tightly integrated 
action. The package of proposals put forward in 1986 
by the DEB illustrates that when powerful pressure 
exists, the managerial behaviour and style can change, 
at least temporarily. As Mintzberg (1983) pointed out: 
"In such cases - we can call them state-of 
seige organisations - the CEO can get away 
with behaviours, such as squashing 
dissidents, that might be unacceptable in 
calmer times. There is nothing like trauma to 
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fuse all disparate influencers into one 
cohesive easily led body. " (p. 365) 
To a certain extent the action of the officers 
challenges the basic precept of the Strategy-Manager 
Perspective of implementation (see Chapter two) which 
suggests that managers lack the flexibility to adopt a 
range of managerial behaviour and styles. 
Patience and Perseverance of the Promotors of Change 
Although the district had not completely closed 
the Abingdon GPMU officers used the opportuniti es, as 
they presented themselves, to reduce the service levels 
according to the decreasing demand. These small 
interventions also helped in setting up the right 
conditions for the successful implementation of the 
proposal in 1989. 
number of features of context combined to 
prevent the district officers from acting against the 
will of the GPs involved. The evidence indicates that 
the pressure from national policy, the tightness of the 
local resources, and the district financial constraints 
in particular did not impose the closure of the 
district GPMUs. In the absence of sufficient pressure 
for closure, the proposal was difficult to legitimise 
and it tended to incur resistance particularly from the 
local GPs involved. The case study illustrates that in 
such circumstances signalling intention and opportunity 
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costs can be a useful tactic to test a possible closure 
without making full commitment to it because of 
uncertainty of the will of critical staff members. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, the evidence suggests that there was 
neither sufficient pressure in the district nor a 
definite political will for the closure of the GPMUs. 
These features had a prime influence on the fate of the 
proposals. The organisational culture of the district, 
as well as the managerial percept ions and choices, were 
also important contributory f actors in the process and 
outcome of the various proposals to close the GPMUs. 
The implication that-change may be seen as a long 
courtship between content, context, and process 
requiring repetition and opportunism, as -well as 
commitment, patience, and perseverance of its promotors 
(Pettigrew, 1985), is clearly supported in this case- 
study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Westbury Maternity Home and 
Bletchley GP Maternity Unit 
The third case-study -documents the closure ý of 
Westbury Maternity Home in Newport Pagnell- by-, the 
Milton Keynes DHA. It also describes the progress of 
the proposal to change the use of the Bletchley GPMU. 
The two proposals were put forward in 1982 by the 
Milton Keynes DRA against the backcloth of the opening 
of the new DGH hospital. The CHC objected to both 
proposals. They were, however, approved by the 
Secretary of State and implemented in 1984. 
The Profile of the District 
Milton Keynes became a District in its own right 
in 1982. It is the newest and the smallest district in 
the Region covering an area of just over 31,000 
hectares in the North of Buckinghamshire. it 
encompasses the designated area of the new town of 
Milton Keynes which incorporates a total of 13 small 
villages as well as a number of former traditional 
small towns such as Bletchley in the South, Wolverton 
and Stoney Stratford in the North. 
"The growth of Milton Keynes as a new town 
took away Bletchley's identity but gave it 
lots of resources. By the time the closure 
of the GPMU was mooted in 1982, the town had 
already grown considerably; Bletchley was no 
longer a small community and did not have a 
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Parish Council anymore. That was an 
indication of the declining strength of the 
local community" 
Chairman CHC 
The market town of Newport Pagnell and other small 
villages in the north east of Milton Keynes are located 
outside the designated area of the new town but within 
the area of the health district. 
"Newport Pagnell is a small town with an 
identity of its own outside the designated 
development corporation area. There is a 
quite articulate population ý in Newport 
Pagnell composed particularly of people who 
work for the Open University in Milton 
Keynes. There was a relatively long history 
of resisting the centralisation of public 
services. For instance the closure of the 
police station in favour of the opening of 
the station in the new town centre was 
strongly opposed by the people of Newport 
Pagnell. The closure of Westbury was seen as 
yet another case of Newport Pagnell missing 
out and Milton Keynes gaining" 
District Administrator 
The new town designed for 250,000 people is the 
largest entirely planned new urban development in 
British town planning history. The site was officially 
designated in 1967. Milton Keynes Development 
Corporation (MKDC) was then formed to plan and 
supervise the new town development and to coordinate 
the activity of the private sector and public 
authorities such as the Borough Council, the County 
Council, the Health Authorities and other statutory 
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agencies. mKDc has been a key lobbyist and a 
facilitator in social and health care policy (Ferlie & 
Pettigrew, 1988). 
Milton Keynes has one of the highest population 
densities in the Oxford Region. Since the early 1970s 
the district has had the fastest population growth of 
any health district in the UK. In 1982, the population 
of the new town was over three times its initial 
population of 40,000. The increase, over the planning 
period 1984-1994, was estimated at over 40% against the 
national average of 2.5%. 
Historically, the new town had developed through 
emigration from London in search of new council 
housing. Until 1983, the unemployment rate as well as 
the SMRs were above the national- - average. The 
population presented typical new town problems of high 
demand for health care. However, owner occupation and 
white collar employment has been expanding since the 
beginning of the 1980s. Meanwhile, the rate of 
unemployment has fallen dramatically and, since 1987,, 
compares with the unemployment rate of the prosperous 
Southeast. Although the SMRs were high by regional 
standards in the early eighties, they have been falling 
and compare with the national average. 
The population of the new town is much younger 
than the nation as a whole. The district has the 
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highest rate of childbirth in the country. Therefore 
both maternity services and paediatrics are strategic 
considerations. 
Milton Keynes Community Hospital opened in 1979 on 
the future DGH site providing,, f or the f irst time, 
acute local hospital facilities. There were 17 GP 
medical beds in the Community Hospitalý, Phase I of the 
DGH opened in 1984. 
"There was a long delay in providing the DGH. 
There was a lot of public pressure to have a 
DGH in Milton Keynes but the RHA was unable 
to get the capital from the DHSS to build it. 
In 1979 the Prime Minister,, - Mrs Thatcher,, 
came to Milton Keynes to open the new 
shopping centre. Within a few weeks from her, 
visit, the decision was taken that the 
project should proceed. There was a very 
rapid design period and the hospital started 
being built in 198111 
District Administrator 
The new DGH made the district self -suf f icient in 
maternity and paediatrics. The district is dependent 
upon Northampton and Aylesbury Vale Districts in all 
other acute and priority services. 
Since 1967, the strategy of development of 
services pursued by the various authorities concerned 
has been dominated by the building up of new acute 
service facilities in the District. It can be divided 
into three periods: 
(1) 1967 to 1979, a period of dependency over 
neighbouring districts for all acute and 
priority services; 
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(2) 1979 to 1984, opening of the MK Community 
Hospital and rapid development of acute 
services,, based on the opening of the DGH 
Phase I; 
(3) 1985 to 1990, a period of development of 
acute services, based on the opening of the 
DGH Phase II, - and development of elderly 
services through new facilities and 
development of community care. 
The District has an ongoing extensive programme of 
major capital development. In particularr Milton Keynes 
is moving towards self-sufficiency in acute services by 
the opening of Phase II in 1990. The commissioning 
process of new facilities has been shown as complex, 
lengthy,, and difficult for local management (McKee & 
Pettigrew, 1988). The success of the commissioning 
process of the Milton Keynes DGH Phase I has been 
questioned (Ferlie & Pettigrew, 1988). 
"Different respondents used a variety of 
success indicators in their-evaluation ofthe. 
commissioning process. A number of the front 
line respondents however identified important 
flaws in the commissioning of Phase I 
relating to: inadequate resourcing and lead- 
in time, lack of clinical input; over- 
controlling regional tier (district view); 
over-controlling district tier (unit view); 
poor internal team dynamics; failure to plan 
for people and especially junior staff; a 
lack of clear brief or framework; the failure 
to de-brief properly. There were also fears 
that some of these mistakes would be repeated 
in Phase IVI (P. 63) 
At the outset, a strategy f or centralisation of 
all in-patient maternity beds on the DGH site was 
mooted by the Authorities responsible for the planning 
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of the new DGH. However, it was thought that 
centralisation could not be achieved until Phase III 
had been built in the 1990s. 
Management of the District 
Between 1974 and 1982, health services in Milton 
Keynes were run at district level by the Aylesbury 
Vales District Management Team (DMT). The formation of 
the Milton Keynes District as a separate identity in 
April 1982 brought a very radical change in its 
management. A distinct DMT was f ormed to run the new 
District. 
None of the District Senior officers appointed on 
the new DMT were f rom Aylesbury Vale DMT. Continuity 
was assumed by the District Community Physician alone. 
He had been a member of the new DGH Commissioning Team 
since its inception in December 1980. He became the 
first Milton Keynes District Medical Officer (DMO). 
"The DMO had strong opinions about the 
closures and could not understand why some 
people were not seeing the logic and the 
benefits of the proposals. He was convinced 
that the AHA should have closed it in 1977. 
He championed the proposals. He adopted a 
rather provocative style which did not work 
well with the opponents to the proposals" 
DistriCt Administrator 
The GP representative was practicing in Bletchley 
for some years while the consultant representative,, a 
consultant physician,, was new to the district. The 
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District Administrator had been the Oxfordshire AHA 
Planning Officer and on the issue of closing the GPMUs 
he acted as the press officer and principal spokesman 
for the DMT. 
"The District Administrator was,. -a very 
prudent person who did not particularly enjoy 
standing on the front line and, being put 
under the spotlight. Playing the game by the 
book was much more his style. " 
District Treasurer 
The District Treasurer was particularly anxious to 
be seen as ef f icient. He grasped the opportunity of 
closing Bletchley GPMU to rationalise further the 
maternity services in the District. 
"The idea of closing Bletchley initially 
started with the Commissionning Team. We 
were not too sure about it. We thought it 
would be politically difficult to achieve. 
The financial situation was reasonably 
satisfactory at that stage. Nevertheless the 
Treasurer pointed out that Westbury was very 
uneconomical and put forward the proposal to 
close Westbury as well as Bletchley 
redeploying the money for other purposes" 
District Administrator 
The first District Nursing Officer joined the DMT 
from a London District. She did not have particularly 
strong views about nursing and midwifery and saw the 
rationalisation as an opportunity to improve the 
midwifery services in the District. , 
"The Community Midwifery Service was not as 
large as we wished it to be and this was 
basically due to under-funding. 
CHAPTER EIGHT - BLETCHLEY/WESTBURY GPMUs 
_ 
Page 332 
Rationalisation of the midwifery services on 
one site meant we were able to provide more 
community midwives undertaking more home 
deliveries and discharging, earlier into the 
community, those who do go into hospital" 
District Nursing Officer 
The chair of the DMT was rotated, every six months 
among the DMT members. At the time the proposals were 
issued it was held by the District Administrator. 
The new DMT members were all quite anxious to 
demonstrate their capability to manage the services. 
"We were all newly appointed. Everybody was 
trying to establish his position in the 
hierarchy. To a certain extent, there was a 
fair degree of competition between the DMT 
members as well as a certain level of 
confusion about who was doing what. There 
was also a desire to go and show to our more 
established colleagues, particularly at 
Region, that we were there to do the job" 
District Treasurer 
The Chairman of the DHA was a local businessman 
and the deputy council leader in the Milton Keynes 
Borough Council. He controlled the direction of the 
District from behind the scenes and did not champion 
the District's proposals. 
"At the two meetings held on the issue the 
Chairman of the DHA attended and brought with 
him all senior members of his management 
team. On both occasions he did not deal with 
the questions from the floor himself but let 
his officers and particularly the Medical 
Officer deal with them. Throughout the 
consultation he constantly avoided commenting- 
on the issues assuring the public that the 
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question would be given the most careful 
consideration by the Authority. " 
CHC member 
The formation of the new District resulted in, the 
setting up of a new Community Health Council (CHC). 
"Before 1982 there was a joint, CHC which- was 
based in Aylesbury with a fairly quiet branch 
in Milton Keynes. Most planning happened 
without much awareness of what was going on" 
CHC Chairman 
The new CHC, and particularly its Chairman, was equally 
anxious to establish its status. 
"It was literally within weeks of, the CHC 
being set up as a completely new body that 
the proposal to close Bletchley and Westbury 
was made. There was'a new DHA determined to 
move forward in certain directions, 
enthusiastic about getting on with things 
quickly and keen to be seen as efficient. 
Equally, the brand new CHC was concerned to 
establish certain ways from which it wanted 
to work. A particularly, important influence 
was the Chairman of the CHC. He has been on 
the right wing of the conservative group of 
the district council for quite a long time. 
The DHA officers were regarding us as a bunch 
of amateurs who represented nobody. At the 
personal level, our Chairman did not have, 
strong views about the closure of the 
maternity units. However, he was veryý' 
concerned to establish the CHC as a 
representative body which needed to be 
respected. " 
ex-Chairman of the CHC 
Maternity and Child Care Group 
The closure of Westbury Maternity Home and the 
change of use of Bletchley GPMU had been achieved f or 
some time when the Griffiths I Report recommendations 
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were implemented throughout the NHS in 1985. As Ferlie 
& Pettigrew (1988) indicated, the management style 
which appeared to be developing in the District, 
particularly since the implementation of general 
management, displays the following features: (1) an 
emphasis on service innovation, (2) flexibility, multi- 
disciplinarity, and willingness to take risks, 
(3) political judgement, and -(4) preference for 
informality in communication. The emergence of some of 
these features could be seen through the genesis, 
development, and conclusion of the closure proposals. 
The Profile of the Unit Under Study 
The Westbury Maternity Home w as located in an old 
Victorian mansion house, built around 1870 by a locally 
well-known and rather inf luencial chemist and f arming 
family: the Tayler family. Its name had its origin in 
mediaeval times. It referred to its location on the 
West side of the burgh field, a common land belonging 
to the burgesses when the town was first established in 
the llth century. It was dubbed the "bury" field by 
the local population. During the War the building was 
requisitioned by the Government. At the inception of 
the NHS in 1948, it started being used as a maternity 
home. 
The physical condition of the building at 
Bletchley was very much better than at Newport Pagnell. 
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The Bletchley GPMU was - purpose-built in 1962 by the 
Oxford Hospital Board as a means of increasing hospital 
confinements (see Chapter five). ''Other health 
facilities, particularly for the care of the elderly, 
were also built on the same site. 
In 1981, Bletchley GPMU had 20 in-patient beds and 
two delivery rooms. The maternity unit undertook 492 
deliveries. The GPMU also received 467 post-natal 
transfers, mainly from Barratt Maternity Home in 
Northampton. There were on average 10.6 occupied beds 
and 2.5 discharges per day. The average length of stay 
was 4.4 days. The Westbury Maternity Home' had 16 beds 
and two delivery rooms. It undertook 220 deliveries 
and received 259 post-natal transfers. There were on 
average 5.7 occupied beds and 1.4 discharges per day. 
The average length of stay was 3.9 days (Table 8-0). 
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Table 8-0 
GPMUS Vital Statistics 
Milton Keynes DRA, 1978-1982 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
%beds occupied* 
Bletchley 58 50 55 53 45 
Westbury 35 38 35 32 36 
Discharges 
Bletchley 1035 875 874 873 724 
Westbury 474 523 -501 479 517 
Length of Stay 
Bletchley 4.1 4.1- 4.3 --4.4ý 4.5 
Westbury 4.3 4.2 4.1 3.9 4.0 
Births 
Bletchley 492 434 420 406 325 
Westbury 276 317 266 220 220 
Number of beds: 
Bletchley GPMU: 20, Westbury Maternity Home: 16. 
Source: ORHA, Hospital Statistics, 1978 1982. 
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Milton Keynes DGH had the opportunity to develop 
its services from a relatively low level of provision. 
There was concern for rationalising inherited estate 
almost only in services for the elderly. 
The District had no tradition in obstetrics. 
Setting apart the GP maternity beds at Bletchley and 
Westbury, maternity services were provided in the form 
of consultant units in the Aylesbury Vale and 
Northampton Districts. Roughly one third of the 
consultants' deliveries were handled by Aylesbury 
consultants and two thirds by Northampton consultants. 
The opening of the Milton Keynes DGH in May 1984 
triggered off the closure of Claydon Ward at the Royal 
Buckinghamshire Hospital in Aylesbury Vale as well as 
the closure of Windsor ward and Eleanor Hague Ward at 
the Barratt Maternity Home in Northampton District. 
The Royal Buckinghamshire Hospital was a 
physically isolated maternity hospital comprising 44 
consultant obstetrician's beds and 18 GP's beds which 
provided all maternity services for the Aylesbury Vale 
District. The ward had 11 consultant post-natal beds 
located in a temporary building. It opened in 1981 to 
relieve the pressure on beds due to the increasing 
population, particularly in the Milton Keynes District. 
The District had the lowest maternity nurse/birth ratio 
in the Region and welcomed the opportunity to improve 
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the staffing levels. The GPs,, the consultant 
obstetricians, the midwives, and the Aylesbury Vale CHC 
raised no objection to the closure of the Claydon Ward 
and the proposal was implemented in December 1985. - 
Barratt Maternity Home had 102 GP's and consultant 
obstetrician's beds integrated to Northampton DGH. 
Windsor Ward had 6 beds and Eleanor Hague Ward had 16 
beds. The closure of these wards was opposed by some 
members of the medical and nursing staff as well as by 
the CHC. It was argued that the projected increase in 
the District population necessitated keeping the 
facilities open. The Windsor Ward was "permanently 
closed in January 1986 while the Eleanor Hague Ward was 
mothballed. 
This concludes the profileý of the district and 
unit under study. The next section presents an 
overview of the process and outcome of the proposal to 
close Westbury Maternity Home and to change the use of 
Bletchley GPMU. 
The Closure of Westbury Maternity Rome and the Change 
of Use of Bletchley GPMU: An Overview 
The proposal to close the Westbury Maternity Home 
in Newport Pagnell was put forward by-the new'Milton 
Keynes DMT within a few weeks of its inception. It 
followed a recommendation made by a working party set 
up to consider the future of maternity services in the 
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District. The announcement of the proposal was made 
public in a consultation document issued in November 
1982. The document also contained a proposal to change 
the use of Bletchley GPMU from obstetric to GP medical 
beds. The latter proposal was the prime 11raison 
dletre" for the review of maternity services in the 
District. 
The change of use of Bletchley GPMU was the 
cornerstone of a solution developed by the District 
Commissioning Team to the complex problem of creating 
sensible shared facilities between the specialities 
that needed to be housed at the opening of Phase I of 
the new DGH in 1984. To achieve this aim it was 
proposed to combine the Bletchley GP maternity beds 
with the consultant obstetric beds in the new DGH. 
Then it was intended to bring to Bletchley the GP 
medical beds in Ward 1 of the Community Hospital on the 
DGH site. Finally,, Ward I would be converted into a 
consultant managed medical ward. 
The closure of Westbury Maternity Home was an 
adhoc proposal aimed essentially at releasing resources 
for more effective use. Taken altogether, these 
changes were centralising all in-patient maternity beds 
on the DGH site. 
"The whole project began not as a way of 
unifying maternity services but of making 
more effective use of all the beds that were 
to be available. It was only afterwards that 
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we saw the benef it of centralising maternity 
services and its clinical advantages" 
District Administrator 
The proposal to change the use of Bletchley GPMU 
proved to be less controversial locally than the 
proposal to close the maternity home in Newport 
Pagnell. The nursing staff,, as well as the medical 
staff, generally welcomed the proposal to combine the 
GPMU beds from Bletchley with the consultant obstetric 
beds in the Milton Keynes DGH. However,, the GPs were 
concerned at the removal of GP medical beds from the 
DGH site to the Bletchley maternity unit. Ultimately, 
this was reluctantly agreed as a temporary measure. 
An opposition committee, known as the Bletchley 
Action Group,, was set up by some members of the local 
branch of the NCT. However, their campaign lacked 
impetus and the opposition group eventually merged with 
the Westbury Action Group. 
The Westbury Action Group petitioned the DHA,, 
organised a series of press events and lobbied the CHC 
to contest the closure. After a period of hesitation, 
the CHC, alongside the Action Groups and other local 
councils, finally decided to oppose both closures. The 
main effort of the opponents went into demonstrating 
that the Authority's birth rate projections were wrong 
and that the reduced number of beds provided for in the 
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DHA proposals would, therefore, be insufficient to, meet 
the demand. 
Neither the local MP nor the GPs strongly rose to 
the unit Is def ence. The JTUC,, as well as the RCM,, 
supported both proposals. The Milton Keynes Development 
Corporation made no formal observation on the 
proposals. Milton Keynes Borough Council opposed the 
closure but the Conservative majority on the Council 
abstained on the issue. 
Despite the CHC's entreaty to extend - the 
consultation period over the issues, the DHA -ýapproved 
the proposals in March 1983. The decision went toýthe 
RHA. In the electoral climate of Summer 1983 and on 
the backcloth of the renewed commitment of the 
Conservative party on the NHS (see Chapter five) the 
Regional Team of Officers (RTO) insisted on the 
District giving more time for consultation. 
At the end of the extended period of consultation, 
the CHC restated its opposition to the proposals and 
the DHA reaffirmed its-previous decision. 
The RTO reviewed the main arguments and supported 
the request for permission to close both units. 
However, they required the DHA to proceed towards 
closure more slowly allowing for an overlap period of 
at least a year between the opening of the new DGH and 
the closure of the GPMUs. Although supporting the 
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closure of Bletchley GPMU, the Regional Medical Officer 
vetoed the key proposal to transfer the GP medical beds 
from the Community hospital to Bletchley. 
The Secretary of State, Mr Kenneth Clarke, 
approved the closure proposals. He suggested an 
overlap period of 3 to 4 months between the opening of 
the DGH and the closure of the GPMUs to assess the new 
DGH services. 
After having tried to find some way of modifying 
the acute bed allocation in order to retain the GP 
medical beds on the DGH site, and with the backcloth of 
the approval to close both units, the RMO finally 
agreed to the transfer of the GP medical beds from the 
Community Hospital to Bletchley. 
The Milton Keynes DGH obstetric ward opened in May 
1984. The Bletchley GPMU closed in June and the 
Community Hospital Ward 1 moved in. The Westbury 
Maternity Home closed in July 1984 and its building was 
demolished in June 1987. 
Table 8-1 presents the diary of the main events in 
this case-study. 
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Table 8-1 
Bletchley and Westbury GPMUs CaseStudy 
Diary of Principal Events 
1982 
August DMT meeting to consider the 
Commissioning Team's proposal 
to swap beds between Bletchley 
and Milton Keynes. The DT 
stressed the need to consider 
the future of Westbury as 
well; 
September Working Party on the future of 
GP maternity services in 
Milton Keynes; 
November The Working Party's 
recommendation that both 
Bletchley and Westbury be 
transferred into the new DGH. 
Consultation paper on the 
proposals. WAG was launched. 
First public meeting; 
1983 
January Second public meeting. CHC 
Maternity and Child Care Group 
recommendation to close 
Westbury keeping Bletchley 
open. CHC decision to oppose 
both closures. 
March The CHC asked for a further 
period to make additional 
comments. The DHA adopted the 
proposals. The RHA asked the 
DHA to extend the consultation 
period; 
April CHC Special General Meeting 
restating its opposition to 
the proposals. 
May The , DHA , reaffirmed its 
previous decision; 
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Table 8-1-(Continuation) 
June RTO recommended supporting 
the DHA's decision to close 
Bletchley andý Westbury but 
rejected the proposal to swap 
beds between Bletchley and 
Milton Keynes. The RT 
recommended to keep both units 
running in parallel with the 
new DGHýobstetric ward for at 
least a year; 
July The RHA approved the RTO's 
recommendation; 
1984 
, January The Secretary of State 
approved the closure of both 
Units; 
February The RTO withdrew its objection 
to the transfer of GP beds to 
Bletchley; 
8th May opening of Milton Keynes DGH 
obstetric ward; 
l1th June Closure of Bletchley GPMU; 
lst July Closure of Westbury Maternity 
Home; 
1987 
June Demolition of the Westbury 
Maternity Home building; 
The Proposal 
The previous section presented an overview of the 
process and outcome of the proposal to change the use 
of Bletchley GPMU and to close Westbury Maternity Home. 
The next section details the genesis, the development, 
and the conclusion of these proposals. - 
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The Genesis of the Closure of Westbury Maternity Home 
and of Bletchley GPMU 
Until 1977 the services provided by the Westbury 
Maternity Home were managed by Northampton Health 
District, which was part of the former Northamptonshire 
AHA. The responsibility for managing the maternity 
home was then transferred to Aylesbury Vale District, 
which was part of Buckinghamshire AHA. The GPMU in 
Bletchley was also managed by Aylesbury Vale District. 
For many years, Westbury Maternity Home has had 
the lowest average occupancy levels in the Oxford 
Region. In contrast, Bletchley GPMU has had one of the 
best occupancy levels in the Region since its opening 
in the late 1960s. Setting apart the current proposal 
to change its use, Bl etchley GPMU has never been 
formally considered for closure. A proposal was mooted 
in 1978 but it never reached the staff ears. 
A proposal to close the Westbury Maternity Home 
was put forward by the Buckinghamshire AHA within weeks 
of its take-over f rom Northamptonshire. The proposal 
was strongly opposed by the local community and did not 
have the support of the Milton Keynes Development 
Corporation. The opponents argued that the increase in 
population would justify keeping the maternity home 
open in order to cope with the demand. Since the DGH 
was still some way off,, and considering the 
difficulties in accurately forecasting the population 
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changes, the AHA finally withdrew its proposal. The 
maternity home was then kept open entirely. 
At the time of the Regional Strategic Plan review 
in 1980, r a strategy for centralisation of obstetric 
beds on the DGH site was mooted but no firm decision on 
the future of both units was taken. It followed a 
feasibility study on the closing of both GPMUs in view 
of the opening of the DGH. The principle of an 
integrated service at the DGH was agreed. The sketchy 
outline presented at the regional review suggested that 
provision for additional accommodation could be 
incorporated into Phase II so that a GMPU could then be 
centrally located with the consultant obstetric unit on 
the DGH site. Provisional thoughts envisaged a unit 
for the mentally handicapped at Westbury and a unit for 
the younger disabled at Bletchley. No objection to the 
principle was raised by the RHA. 
The opportunity to reconsider the future of the 
district GPMUs came from two different directions: 
(1) up-grading work required at Westbury Maternity Home 
and (2) the problem over siting of beds in the new DGH. 
In April 1982,, when the Milton Keynes DHA took 
over responsibility from Aylesbury Vale Health 
Authority, the Regional Work Officer indicated to the 
new DHA that capital work needed to be undertaken at 
Westbury Maternity Home. For safety reasons, this work 
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was considered to be a high priority. The Acting 
District Work Officer took the view that the disruption 
to patient care, resulting f rom the work, would be 
considerable and therefore plans were necessary to 
close the Home f or that work to be carried out. The 
total cost of the work to bring the fabric and 
condition of the existing buildings up to an acceptable 
standard would be in the region of E60,000. It would be 
financed from the Regional Estates Funds, provided that 
the maternity home remained open to provide health care 
services for at least another ten years. 
The new DRA questioned the low occupancy of the 
maternity home and stressed the need to develop a 
maternity policy on the opening of the DGH. The DMT 
considered the maternity home as a capital resource and 
recommended that the required works should proceed. 
However, because of other priorities in the change 
agenda no further action was undertaken immediately. 
Six months later, the DMT examined a solution 
developed by the District Commissioning Team to the 
problem of creating sensible shared facilities between 
specialities and sexes which needed to be accommodated 
in wards which would be* available at the DGH. The 
problem arose as a result of trying to accommodate an 
additional speciality into Phase I of the DGH. 
"In the original planning of the hospital it 
was not considered necessary to open an ENT 
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department in its Phase I. It was also 
assumed that 16 out of the 69 maternity beds 
provided in Phase I could be temporarily used 
for gynaecological patients. Discussion with 
various bodies suggested that we needed to 
have an ENT department. It was also 
discovered that because of the nature of 
maternity care, neither Gynaecology or any 
other speciality for this matter could share 
facilities with obstetrics. The closures of 
the GPMUs arose as a result of trying to 
accommodate yet another speciality while 
relocating Gynaecology in what was already an 
overstretched facility. This was a local 
problem which had nothing to do with any sort 
of government directive or regional strategy 
to centralise the peripheral GPMUs" 
DMT member 
After grappling with the problem for some time, 
the DMT concluded that the only solution was to 
transfer the GPMU into the new accommodation in the DGH 
and to transfer into the accommodation vacated at 
Bletchley the existing GP medical beds already on the 
DGH site. The latter beds would thus be vacated and 
ready to take one of the eight specialities which 
needed to be fitted into the new hospital 
accommodation. 
The District Treasurer drew the DMT's attention to 
the need also to reconsider the question of the future 
of Westbury Maternity Home. Because of the capital 
works which needed to be undertaken, the high running 
cost of the maternity services and the low level of 
occupancy of the maternity home, the District Treasurer 
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suggested transferring the GP maternity beds initially 
from Westbury to Bletchley and eventually into the DGH. 
In any case, a Working Party on the future of GP 
maternity services was set up in September 1982 to 
consider the proposals in greater detail. In addition 
to the appointed DHA members, party meetings were 
attended by DMT members only. No members of the 
medical staff concerned by the changes were directly 
involved in the discussion. 
"The DMO ran the closures by himself. He did 
not take professional - views from the 
consultant obstetricians simply because they 
were not appointed yet. At that stage the 
DMT f elt that there was no need to involve 
the GPs in the process since there was still 
no proposal to submit to their attention" 
District Administrator 
It soon became apparent to the Working Party's 
members that the District Treasurer's proposal would be 
untenable and politically difficult to implement before 
the opening of the DGH. 
"The transfer of Westbury to Bletchley has 
never been considered as a viable proposal 
and was definitively discarded after the 
first meeting of the working party. Not only 
would that have stretched Bletchley to the 
limit but we did not have a chance to succeed 
in selling that to the people living in the 
northern extremity of the District. However, 
it turned out to be the forerunner- of the 
proposal to centralise all the GPMUs at the 
opening of the DGH" 
District Treasurer 
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Further -thought led the DMT to support, the 
centralisation of all in-patient beds on the DGH site. 
The idea of centralising all GP maternity beds had been 
around long before the problems facing the Authority in 
opening the new DGH, but the problems arising from 
commissioning the -new buildings were giving a new 
legitimacy to the closure proposal. 
"Once we introduced the idea of centralising 
all the maternity beds in the DGH we got 
enthusiastic about it. We were convinced 
that it was the right thing to do. All 
maternity beds in the new DGH were to be used 
for their original purpose. It meant that 
there was not any shared facility at all. 
That was enabling the maternity beds to be 
approved for training purposes. GPs were 
having immediate access to specialist 
facilities. Post-natal transfers were 
eliminated. Savings were made. The 
centralisation was a wholly encompassing 
solution to a series of problems facing the 
Authority" 
District Administrator 
The emphasis in submitting the proposals for 
consultation was placed on the most ef f icient, use of 
resources rather than the need for economy. 
"Although we always insisted that the closure 
of Westbury was not 'a financial- question it 
was in fact driven by financial consideration 
more than anything else. We tried to argue 
on the ground of clinical practice rather 
than cost. We were very careful to say that 
the whole proposal was not about saving money- 
because we felt that this would be a 
counterproductive argument" 
District Administrator 
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The district's reasoning for advancing those 
changes was twofold: (1) early achievement of the 
District's long term intention to centralise all 
inpatient maternity beds and (2) effective use of 
resources. 
The consultative document insisted that it was the 
District's intention eventually to bring together all 
in-patient maternity services on the DGH site. 
"The policy was already published in the 
Regional Strategic Plan and other Districts 
had already closed their isolated GPMUs. It 
was not a perverse Milton Keynes I idea. We 
were the baby in the whole region and setting 
standards was important. We could not afford 
to lie behind the other districts. We were 
merely achieving the inevitable changes 
sooner than expected" 
District Administrator 
It was also stressed that centralising maternity 
services was making a more- efficient use of midwifery 
staff. The savings resulting from the closure of 
Westbury was enabling expansion in -the level of 
community midwifery care. 
The Development of the Closure of Westbury Maternity 
Home and of Bletchley GPMU 
The proposal to change the use of Bletchley GPMU 
did not meet opposition from the GPs or from the staff 
involved. HoweverF some GPs were concerned about the 
level of facilities available in Bletchley to back up a 
Community Hospital. 
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"Most GPs were quite interested to have the 
community hospital here in Bletchley. To be 
honest, there was some apprehension 
concerning the availability of supporting 
staff, Physio, O. TIs, as well as regarding 
the access to the diagnostic services. 
Although it was generally accepted that for 
100% safety the GP unit should be at the DGH, 
a handful of local GPs felt that with 
immediate help only a few miles away the unit 
should not be closed. However, the closure 
of the GPMU was combined with an increase of 
three GP medical beds. This was most 
welcomed" 
Bletchley GP 
The midwives supported the proposals but pressed 
the Authority's officers to increase the number of GP 
maternity beds provided in the new DGH. 
"Several midwives wanted to-go, to the new DGH 
and supported the proposal to close the GPMU 
in Bletchley. There were many emergencies 
which we f aced which could have been better 
dealt with if immediate consultant aid would 
have been at hand. However, we contested the 
length of stay of 4.5 days used by the DHA 
officers to work out the capacity of 
maternity beds. We thought it was 
unrealistically short considering the social 
conditions in the District and the number of 
beds provided would not be adequate" 
Bletchley Sister-- 
The midwives' view on the number of GP beds was 
supported by one ex-member of the District Working 
Party set up to consider the future of GPMUs- 
"The planners took 16 because it was the 
number of beds which was available in the new 
building. There were 69 beds in the new 
wards and 53 were already allocated to 
obstetrics. The Commissioning Team took the 
view that no change could be made to the 
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number of obstetric beds particularly because 
of the requirements of the RCOG f or proper 
training f acilities. This left 16 beds for 
some other speciality. There was-no thinking 
out from scratch to find out the number of GP 
beds which were actually needed" 
Bletchley GP 
The Newport Pagnell GPs-and the midwives did not 
rise to the defence of the Maternity Home. 
"A considerable number of Newport Pagnell GPs 
felt that the Westbury Maternity Home offered 
them no more facilities than attending a home 
birth. There were very few back-up 
facilities and they were getting worried 
about taking on caring in those cases. The 
building was substandard. They were also 
being offered a brand new GP unit down at the 
DGH" 
Newport Pagnell GP 
However,, one GP practice joined the public campaign 
against the Authority's proposal. They were dependent 
on the maternity home for their patients ante-natal 
care. They argued that the closure would stretch 
considerably their Health Centre while there was no 
money to extend it. They also pointed out that the new 
GP beds would be , too f ar away f or them to continue 
practicing obstetrics, limiting the choice for Newport 
Pagnell mothers. 
Two Action Groups were set up by local members of 
the NCTj one for each unit. The Bletchley Action Group 
met some difficulties in enlarging its membership base 
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and eventually merged with the , Westbury, Action, Group 
(WAG). The latter had a much wider support base. 
"WAG started with a double, force: people who 
felt very strongly about the issue of 
maternity care and people-,, who were opposing 
the closure purely for reasons of local 
loyalty; Bletchley was not like Newport 
Pagnell for it has always accepted Milton 
Keynes 'as the dominant centre. There were 
also people who simply felt that the DHA 
needed to be sent back to do its homework 
because the information provided in the 
consultation document was so inaccurate. At 
the time we did not work to get the support 
from the professionals involved We 'already 
had a GP on our committee and we thought they 
would fight for themselves. No individual 
midwife was prepared to come forward and be 
seen on our side. We believed they were 
instructed from the top not to show public 
support for the campaign" 
Founder member WAG 
WAG had a remarkably high quality and resourceful 
membership. 
"They had many bright and energetic people on 
their side, some of them lecturing at the 
Open University. They had access to all sorts 
of resources and they were , assisted by 
specialists in communication and by a 
professional statistician. They devised a 
computer programme showing what would happen 
if our planning assumptions were wrong. 
Locally we did not have such expertise and we 
were in real difficulty with some of their 
statistical arguments" 
DistrictýTreasurer 
WAG's reasoning to oppose the District's proposals 
was twofold: (1) the number of beds in the DGH would 
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not fit the future demand,, and ' (2) ý the - units were 
local,, friendly, low tech, and had a good reputation. 
The-expertise available had a significant impact 
on the campaign strategy adopted by the opponents to 
the closure'. Their-main effort went into demonstrating 
that the District's birth projections were erroneous. 
The Action Groups also led a very 'intensive public 
relations campaign. They organised a series of press 
events such as finding the first- baby born at the 
Westbury to support the fight to keep it open. They 
also gathered over 6000 petition signatures. They also 
lobbied the local councillorsl the Authorities, and the 
CHC. 
Both the District and the CHC had their own ideas 
about the issues at sake. The CHC was inclined to 
compromise and hesitated for some time before making up 
its mind. 
"Our response evolved over time., We did not 
know we were going toý oppose both closures 
until the night of the second public meeting. 
Having discussed the District's proposals in 
our sub-group, we then went back to the full 
CHC meeting. We put forward a proposal 
advocated by the NCT representative on the 
CHC who suggested that we should accept the 
closure of the Westbury Maternity Home but 
oppose the change of use of Bletchley GPMU. 
It was a compromise which fitted the mood of 
the committee. On one hand, the members of 
the committee felt that the new CHC ought-to 
flex its muscles and they did not want to go 
along with all the district's proposals. on 
the other hand they did not want to the rock 
the boat unnecessarily. " 
CHC Chairman 
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The, CHC members were broadly in agreement with the 
compromise proposal. Nevertheless, they finally decided 
to oppose both closures. 
"At the very last minute an amendment to the 
effect that the Council would oppose the 
closure of both units was mooted and passed 
with a very narrow majority. The same person 
who advocated the compromise motion seconded 
its amendment. That suggests the ambivalence 
which was around. There was a bit of the CHC 
having to decide to test its power or to sit 
back and be a rabbit organisation" 
IýI Founder member WAG 
Having decided to oppose the proposals,, the CHC then 
had to justify its position and to adopt a strategy. 
"The amendment covers a lot of points. We 
then really had to start doing our homework. 
There were a whole series of reasons for 
opposing the proposals. They reflected -the 
coalition of different interests that was put 
together to oppose the closure. There was no 
clear majority on anyone of those arguments 
to oppose the closure. The arguments were 
falling into three categories: 
(1) statistics, (2) local -politics . -and 
(3) quality of maternity care. The latter 
was much harder to argue. It was absolutely 
vital to be seen to be doing this properly 
and to be respected for what we were doing. 
WAG was a very professional operation. We 
hitched on them. We f elt that we had the 
expertise via WAG to concentrate on the 
statistical level. We did try to beat the 
Authority at its own game. " 
CHC Chairman 
The CHC proposed retaining both GP units andý reducing 
the number of maternity beds in the DGH to 53. The 
Council declined to make any recommendations onýthe use 
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of the remaining beds. They also proposed selling bits 
of land- surrounding the Westbury building in order to 
meet financial pressures. 
The Regional Planning - Team (RPT) considered the 
proposal in January 1983 iný order, -to- appraise the 
District of their views before the closure- of the 
consultation. The, Regional Planning Officers expressed 
concern about the District's birth projections. They 
also questioned the associated move -of transferring GP 
medical beds from the Community Hospital to Bletchley. 
Nevertheless, in principle they supported the 
proposals. 
The maternity working group met on two occasions 
following the closure of the consultation period to re- 
examine the proposals in the light of comments received 
from objectors, as well as fresh statistical 
information provided by the RHA's statistician and 
planning team. The working party accepted that the 
number of GP beds might be inadequate to meet the 
demand. However they felt that the'total of 69 beds 
would be sufficient and that 12 shared-use beds between 
consultant obstetricians and GPs would allow for 
increasing the size of the GP unit according to need. 
A new document supporting the proposals was then made. 
The summary of responses to the proposals showed 
that along with the CHC and the Action Groups, Milton 
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Keynes Borough Council and the local medical committee 
were against the closures. The JTUC and the Royal 
College of Midwives were in favour of the proposals. 
At its meeting on lst March 1983, the DHA resolved 
to reject the CHC counter-proposal and to support the 
closure of both GPMUs, despite the CHC Chairman's 
request for an opportunity to put the new-document to 
the CHC., 
"The paper tabled at the DHA meeting varied 
considerably from the initial consultation 
document. It was presented in. the form of 
two separate proposalsi, the bed allocation 
was adjusted, it was supported by a financial 
paper, the statistical evidence was revised, 
and the new paper was supported by a 
submission from the Regional Statistician. 
Our Chairman received this wad of paper late 
in the evening of the day before the meeting. 
He asked for an extra month to consider it 
but this request was refused and the decision 
was carried forward. To be honest, the 
important thing for us was not so much the 
comments we had to make on the proposals as 
to establish what our relationship with the 
DHA should be and the way they should treat 
us. Not only must they receive what we have 
to say but they must be prepared to tell us 
what they think about our response. It must 
be a two way process. " 
ex-Chairman of the CHC Maternity 
and Child Care Group 
Having decided to accept the proposals, the DHA 
referred the proposals to the RHA as per normal 
consultation procedures. 
The CHC and the Action Groups criticised the 
Authority f or denying them more time to revise the 
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"new" document. They urged the RHA to direct the DHA to 
consult further. 
, The Regional Manager took the view that in view of 
the forthcoming National election, Ministers, would want 
to be absolutely sure that local consultations had been 
appropriate and effective. Since this was more likely 
to be challenged, it would be better to allow an 
additional period to the CHC to make further comments. 
In April 1983, the DHA agreed-to allocate further time 
to conclude consultation with the CHC. 
According to the CHC, the major problem arose out 
of the design of the new DGH. Therefore, the CHC Is 
strategy called for the Phase I DGH building to be 
physically modified to separate off the 16 beds into a 
distinct ward for use by gynaecological patients only. 
"The key mistake was the decision to build-in 
provision for 69 beds on the assumption that 
16 of these could somehow be temporarily used 
for gynaecological patients. Together with 
another policy decision not to risk impairing 
completion of the DGH contract by varying its 
specifications in any way before handover,, 
this reversal of an assumption made at a 
relatively early stage of the decision 
process has led the DHA to formulate its- 
proposals" 
CHC Chairman 
Ultimately,, the CHC reasserted its, previous counter- 
proposal. 
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On the 3rd May 1983, the DHA resolved by a 
majority of 13 to 1 that it should reaffirm its 
previous decision. 
_ 
"We said the right thing to do is to use the 
new facility. It is mad to have an expensive 
new asset partly closed and to continue to 
use an uneconomical and less satisfactory 
facility. ' Having fought that many years to 
get a DGH in Milton Keynes and having 
invested that much money in the new hospital, 
we should use it. We did not accept that 
counter-proposal. " 
District Administrator 
The Conclusion of the Bletchley and Westbury Proposals 
The RTO analysed the DHA's proposals in June 1983. 
After having reviewed the main arguments used by the 
opponents as well as the DHA's replies,, the, Regional 
Officers concluded that the , statistical and safety 
arguments were fairly marginal whilst the full 
financial savings were not achievable in a very near 
future any way. Therefore the RTO directed its 
attention to the strategy to introduce a specialist 
maternity service into Milton Keynes. 
The RTO supported the closure of Westbury 
Maternity Home. Although supporting the closure of the 
Bletchley GPMU, the RMO vetoed the proposal to move the 
GPIs medical beds from the Community Hospital on the 
DGH site to Bletchley. 
"The RMO felt strongly that Milton Keynes DGH 
would be different from a traditional 
hospital in that it would be much more GP 
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oriented. Region has always been- committed 
to the concept of community hospital and the 
removal of all GP medical patients' was seen 
as entailing destruction of the principle 
upon which the hospital was 'built. The RMO 
took the view that means of increasing rather 
than diminishing the GPIs DGH presence were 
to be found. " 
Regional Planning Administrator 
The RTO also requested the DHA , to proceed towards 
closure much more slowly. The strategy proposed 
involved . running the two GPMUS in parallel to the new 
GP unit, integrated with the DGH specialist, for at 
least an overlap period of a year so that ý, GPs and 
midwives could compare experience. 
The RHA approved the RTO's recommendations on 
July 14 and sought the Secretary of State's approval to 
close Bletchley and Westbury for maternity purposes. 
Since no objection was raised by any Regional 
Off icer during the consultation period, the District 
Officers were shocked by the regional proposal to keep 
the GP medical beds on the DGH site. 
"Region did not know, what they were doing at 
that time. They were very f ragmented. This 
is where a lot of the Commissioning Team 
problems came from. Whilst the proposal 
might be considered a reasonable option in 
theory, in reality it was impractical. Not 
only the allocation ý of 'beds between 
specialities in the DGH was still an 
unresolved problem but the strategy involved 
staffing three GP units,, two of them for an 
interim period only. The recruiting policy, 
allowed staff to ask to be considered for 
transfer to the new hospital. All the'staff 
at both Bletchley and Westbury, with one 
exception, were requesting transfer. An 
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additional problem related to the maintenance 
of the Westbury building. - Another problem 
was the increased running cost etc. " 
Director of Maternity Nursing Service and 
Commissioning Team Member 
The opponents to the closures celebrated the RHA 
decision as a victory. 
"we saw it as a victory. We knew we could 
not really fight the closure, any more but we 
welcomed the RHA's idea of having a 
monitoring period during which time some 
research would have been done into the use of 
the units and maternity services in general. 
That would also have provided some time to 
strengthen our campaign and to prove that the 
units really were popular. The RHA decision 
involved the complete closure of Bletchley as 
opposed to its change of use. That was one 
step further than the District's proposal. 
We have never been consulted on the total 
closure of Bletchley. There was an argument 
there to be made. However, there was not the 
energy to start all over again. We felt-, we 
presented our case and it was up to the 
Minister to decide. " 
Coordinator WAG 
The District officers met the RMO and her 
colleagues to try to f ind some way of modifying the 
acute bed allocation in order to retain at least af ew 
GP medical beds 
possibilities were 
October 1983, none 
in the long term. 
was suggested that 
retained in the sb 
in Phase I of the DGH. Many 
investigated but, at the end of 
of them was considered satisfactory 
At the District Review Meeting it 
the GP unit at. Westbury should be 
ort term in parallel to the DGH. A 
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feasibility study was undertaken by the- Chief Nursing 
Of f icer. 
A meeting between a delegation of opponents to the 
proposals and the Minister was mooted by the -local MP,, 
Mr Bill Benyon. At the meeting held on 15th December 
1983, the delegates insisted that several years were 
needed to let the new hospital become established and 
to have a reasonable monitoring period. 
The Secretary of State, Mr Kenneth Clarke, 
approved the closures in January 1984. He requested 
that the units should be closed within 3-4 months 
following the opening of the new DGH facilities. 
The RMO reluctantly agreed to withdraw her 
objection to the transfer of GP beds to Bletchley as a 
temporary measure. She insisted on the need to restore 
the Community Hospital to a GP function following the 
opening of Phase II of the DGH. 
The DHA opened the first 28 DGH mate rni ty beds on 
8th May 1984. In the first two months the workload 
built up more rapidly than expected. The CHC agreed to 
advance the closures. __1 1 
"Once the decision was taken to close the 
GPMUs,, the CHC supported the proposals and 
made them work. They were very good all 
along. " 
District Administrator 
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Bletchley GPMU closed on Ilth June 1984 and Westbury 
Maternity Home on 1st July 1984. 
"The outcome has been a- lot better respect 
and working relationship between our two 
bodies. I do not think the community could 
have run a better campaign. As f ar as the 
CHC is concerned, yes, we could say that it 
has been quite successful. " 
CHC Chairman 
The CHC's Survey of Maternity Services assessing 
the satisfaction of mothers who used the services 
offered by the DGH during its first year concluded that 
most mothers were basically satisfied with the service 
being provided. The evaluation carried out by the DGH 
also stressed the success of the unit in its first year 
pointing out that good relationships had been built up 
between the staff of the unit and the various voluntary 
bodies who opposed the proposals. 
"The new Unit is quite well regarded as far 
as delivery goes; but there have been,, and 
will continue to be, problems of having 
enough beds and, staff to provide - quality 
post-natal care in both the hospital and the 
community. " 
Founder member of WAG 
Concluding Discussion 
The implementation of the Milton Keynes DHA's 
proposal to close the Westbury Maternity Home featured 
strong local resistance while the concurrent proposal 
to change the use of the Bletchley GPMU was virtually 
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unopposed by the local community. Ultimately, the 
closure of both facilities was regarded as successful, 
although the proposals were formally objected to by the 
CHC. Why, was it so, and why was the previous proposal 
to close the Westbury Maternity Home unsuccessful? 
The Pressure for Closure 
This case-study illustrates empirically how, local 
strategy can be developed in response to a number of 
relatively independent frontline problems (Barrett and 
Hill, 1984; Ferlie and Pettigrew, 1990). The combined 
effect of the commissioning of the new DGH, the need to 
accommodate an additional speciality. into it,, --the 
deteriorating condition of the Westbury Maternity Home 
and its need for up-grading work, triggered off a 
series of decisions and actions which, progressively, 
led to the centralisation of'all maternity beds. 
The evidence indicates that national policy and 
regional strategy were used once, the decisions had 
already been made by the district officers in order to 
enhance legitimacy for the proposals. On the backcloth 
of the District Review System, the new DMT members and 
the District Treasurer in particular ýwere anxious to 
demonstrate their capability to manage the local 
services. Their concern to be seen by'the Region as 
doing the right things in "the proper way was an 
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important factor in speeding up the centralisation of 
maternity services in the district. The data rejects 
the conventional assumption that the-central policy is 
the starting point for implementation (Fudge and 
Barrett, 1984) and,, therefore, challenges the 
traditional top-down view of implementation. The case 
study suggests that policy can be generated at local 
level and that local circumstances and strategies can 
trigger implementation. 
A New Context for Closure 
The Westbury Maternity -Home had had a relatively 
low level of occupancy and few deliveries. A number of 
contextual , influences, however acted "as forces of 
inertia and, secured its continuance. Until 1982 the 
facility was located outside the limit of the district 
responsible for running the local health care services. 
This structural feature made it difficult for the 
district concerned to uphold the closure proposal in 
the face of local public opposition. 
Because of the rapid growth of population and the 
high child birth rate in the district of Milton Keynes 
as a whole, the possibility of a future increase in, the 
statistics was a- rational and logically admissible 
scenario; as Hunter (1983) pointed out, "rationality is 
a legitimising characteristic" (p. 58). This convincing 
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argument was played with full vigour by the opponents 
to the various proposals. 
There were only a few local health care services 
available and the Milton Keynes community was already 
thoroughly pursuing claims for more local health care 
services. The Westbury Maternity Home became a symbol 
in the community. This granted powerful support to the 
maternity home not only from the residents in Newport 
Pagnell but from other important influencers living 
within the limits of the future, District., 
The Westbury -data illustrates that- change in 
context can critically alter the base of power of the 
potential inf luencers and provide, -, in this case, the 
conditions to legitimate the closure; The inception,, of 
the Milton Keynes DHA helped create the political will 
for implementation, and the decision to build a new DGH 
in Milton Keynes confined the-opposition to the people 
of Newport Pagnell. 
The case-study suggests that the contrast in the 
response to the, proposals between Bletchley and Newport 
Pagnell can also be attributed to the nature of--the 
district. Milton-Keynes incorporated Bletchley but not 
Newport Pagnell which remained geographically separated 
from the new city. Milton Keynes has undergone major 
social and demographic changes. This can'be associated 
with the lack of opposition in Bletchley. ý In the same 
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way as in the Amersham case-study, the rivalry between 
the traditional market town of Newport Pagnell and 
Milton Keynes played an important part in setting up a 
powerful coalition to oppose the closure of, the 
maternity home. 
Combining Closure and Redevelopment I 
The proposals themselves played a critical part, in 
the contrasting local response between Bletchley and 
Newport Pagnell. The evidence shows that a closure 
proposal can be more difficult to implement than a 
change of use of local facilities. Compared with the 
Newport Pagnell community, the community in Bletchley 
felt that it was not -losing but, gaining by the 
implementation of the proposal. *" Clearly, the provision 
of a community hospital in Bletchley contributed 
convincingly to those with blocking power and the'local 
GPs, in particular, in not, -resisting the proposal. ý The 
case study illustrates ý once more the role of * incentive 
in putting together a coalition- f or change, in this 
case an alliance between the District Officer,, the GP 
in Bletchley, and the staff who prevailed over 
relatively powerless ' local NCT - representatives. As 
Kogan and Simon (1978) indicated:, 
"By being able to demonstrate that closure is-- 
part of a process of working towards 
redevelopment of resources to provide a 
service which is better aligned to recognised 
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needs, the community may feel that it is not 
losing but gaining. " (p. 174) 
The Approach to Implementation 
The managerial actions were no different in 
Bletchley than in Newport Pagnell. The actions of the 
officers conform with the decision-making perspective 
(see Chapter two),, which points to ýa 
rational /analytical decision-making process as the key 
element to successful implementation. The officers did 
not attempt to reduce the likelihood of local 
opposition from the community, nor did they take any 
special steps to secure either the CHC or the GPs 
support for the proposals. - In Hardy's (1985), - terms 
"since no threat was perceived, managers felt no, need 
to develop unobtrusive measures" (p. 104). The opening 
of the new DGH was perceived by the - officers as a 
legitimate reason for the withdrawal of services and 
the Minister's approval was expected. In this casej it 
is clear that the context of the opening of the new DGH 
played a significant ýpart in the -implementation 
process. 
The Will, Skills and Power of the Opposition 
The CHC Chairman's concern for establishing the 
status of its Council was the most important factor in 
the CHC decision to oppose -the proposals. , The 
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consultation was regarded by the CHC as an important 
test-case with significant implications for its future 
relationship with the DHA and for the public perception 
of its function. Had. the- CHC already been well 
established, it is conceivable that no formal objection 
would have been raised to the closure of the maternity 
home as initially recommended by its Maternity Advisory 
Committee. 
Unlike the CHC in Wycombe,, the CHC in Milton 
Keynes was, however, reluctant to offer more than 
rational arguments to keep the GPMUs open. The case- 
study points to the personality and style of the CHC 
chairman as a key factor in understanding the action of 
the CHC. It also suggests that institutional-pressures 
and societal norms of rationality0-1 in particular, can 
lead both the DRA and the CHC to adopt actions and 
languages that are viewed *as rational in order, to be 
perceived as responsible and legitimate in- promoting 
and in resisting implementation (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Langley, 1989). This supports the view that visibility 
in decision-making can force the use, of more acceptable 
and legitimate criteria to justify the decisions and 
actions (Pfeffer,, 1981). 
Finally, the evidence relating to the RHA's 
decision not to support the DHA proposal to change the 
use of the Bletchley GPMU, as well as its counter- 
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proposal to run concurrently the three district 
maternity services, tends to confirm the findings of 
Kogan et al (1978) and Butts et al (1981) that DHSS and 
RHAs' decision criteria oftenýdiffer to those of the 
districts which are more concerned with the'operational 
problems of implementing change. I 1ý 
Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, the case7study questions, the 
conventional view of implementation as a simple 
transmission of policy into action. In this case, the 
DHSS policy was re-discovered after the process of 
implementation had begun and used by the -authority to 
add legitimacy to the closure proposal. The dominant 
feature of the case is that the closures were part of a 
whole series of actions related to the commissionning 
of the new DGH. The evidence shows clearly the 
influence of the local context and particularly of the 
history and geographical characteristics, the 
competition between localities, and the local politics 
on the reaction to the closure proposals. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Isebrook GP Maternity Unit and Children's Ward 
The fourth case-study-documents the closure, of the 
whole GPMU at Isebrook Hospital (IH) in Wellingborough 
by Kettering DHA. The proposal to close the maternity 
unit was one of the main items included in a-package of 
cuts in services which also contained a proposal to 
close the paediatric ward. The CHC did not, object to 
the closure of the maternity-unit and the proposal was 
implemented. The closure of the paediatric ward was 
much more controversial. Ultimately a Joint, working 
group between the Authority and the Community Health 
Council (CHC) agreed to transfer the paediatric, service 
from Isebrook Hospital to the Kettering District 
General Hospital (DGH). 
The Profile of the District and Unit Under Study 
Kettering DHA is located in the North and East of 
Northamptonshire. It is situated within the East 
Midlands compared with the rest of the Oxford RHA which 
lies within the prosperous South East. Therefore the 
socio-economic structure of the District is closer to 
the profile of the industrial Midlands than to the rest 
of Oxford RHA. There is a greater proportion of 
skilled and semi-skilled manual workers compared with 
other Oxford Districts. The population of 
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Wellingborough was less educated, not as organised nor 
as vociferous as in Amersham. The district comprises 
three main centres of population based in the North on 
Corby, in the centre on Kettering, and in the South on 
Wellingborough. Although unemployment has fallen 
considerably in the last few yearsF particularly in 
Corby, the District still has the highest unemployment 
rate in the Region. 
Kettering and Wellingborough were traditionally 
centres of the British footwear industry. However the 
importation of footwear from abroad eroded their 
importance. Wellingborough has been granted enterprise 
zone status. Kettering is a market town which is the 
focus of the surrounding rural area. ' The -acute 
services were almost entirely concentrated on one site 
at Kettering DGH (533 beds), largely in new buildings. 
All other hospitals were predominantly, used for the 
care of the elderly. In terms of acute health care 
services, the centrality of Kettering was generally 
accepted and the people living in Wellingborough were 
accustomed to traveling there for most of their health 
needs. It was also recognised in the 1962 Hospital 
Plan. 
"Kettering was second only, to Northampton on 
the list of the important centres of 
population in Northamptonshire. At the time 
the hospital plan was prepared it was 
projected that by the mid-1970s the 
Wellingborough population would merely 
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compare with the population already in 
Kettering in the early 1960s. Major growth 
was expected in the North of the District 
rather than in Wellingborough. However, 
there had been speculation within the County 
that the population growth would be in the 
corridor between Northampton and 
Wellingborough. Therefore there were 
exploratory discussions to provide a new DGH 
in Wellingborough. The anticipated population 
growth did not happen and the bed requirement 
has been reduced significantly. The case for 
a second DGH in the South of the District has 
completely disappeared. This fact is now 
accepted by the local population in terms of 
acute services but not totally accepted in 
terms of the care for the elderly. " 
Administration and Planning Manager 
Kettering Health District had a population which, 
in 1984, stood at about 255,000. The population was 
projected to rise to 270,000 in 1994. The increase was 
estimated at about 7% against a Regional average of 
nearly 11% and a national'average of 2.5% over the same 
period. 
The Standard Mortality Ratios (SMRs) indicate that 
the population of the District is slightly healthier 
than the population of England & Wales. Nevertheless 
the District is among the less healthy in the Region. 
It has only 2.5% fewer deaths than would be expected 
from the age/sex structure. For several years, the 
District has had the highest Perinatal Mortality Ratio 
(PMR) in the Region and the PMR of the Isebrook GPMU 
was the worst in the Region. This had a significant 
impact on the district strategy for maternity services 
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which traditionally suggested retaining all maternity 
beds in Kettering as well as in Wellingborough, 
contrary to RHA guidance,. 
"There was a general view within the District 
that we should provide services on a 
distributed base where it was possible. We 
always valued accessibility of services very 
highly. The strategy for maternity services& 
was made with that in mind. Beside the KGH 
maternity unit would not have been able to 
cope with an increased workload without any 
risktof increasing further the PMR. We were 
not providing a backup community service so 
to operate a more intensive use of the- 
maternity beds in Kettering" 
Administration and Planning Manager 
However the Regional Strategic Plan 1984-1994 restated 
the need to address the reduction and distribution of 
maternity beds in the District. 
The strategy of development of acute and priority 
services pursued by the District since the early 1960s 
could be divided into four periods: 
(1) 1962 to 1977, a period of expansion of acute 
services based on the development of 
Kettering DGH site phases I and II and the 
opening of out-patient -and day care 
facilities; 
(2) 1977 to 1985,, a period of rationalisation on 
the DGH site and development of geriatric as 
well EMI and psychogeriatric services and on 
various peripheral sites using some of the 
existing buildings freed by the opening of 
the DGH Phase II; 
(3) 1985 to 1987, v a period of serious financial difficulties; 
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(4) 1987 to 1990, a period of consolidation of 
acute services and rapid development of 
community based MI and MH services. 
The major impact of the District, Strategy 1984- 
1994 was to ensure that the population ceases to rely 
upon services in Northampton for Mentally Infirms, 
Mentally Handicapped, and Elderly Mentally Infirms. 
The Management of the District 
From 1974 to -1982 the District had experienced 
virtually no change on the DMT. The only senior 
officer who left the DMT was the District Nursing 
Officer (DNO) who retired in 1981 to be replaced by the 
current Chief Nursing Officer. , 
The 1982 re-organisation brought some senior 
officer changes to the DMT with the departure of both 
the District Medical Officer (DMO) and the District 
Treasurer (DT). The vacancies were filled by 
experienced officers from ý Oxfordshire and from 
Berkshire AHAs respectively. There was,, however, no 
lack of continuity at top-management level and the 
proposals were carried on- in the light of the past 
history of the issue. 
In 1985, the introduction of general management 
brought about some changes in the Kettering DHA. 
However it did not bring many new faces to the 
District. The District Administrator was appointed 
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District General Manager (DGM) .- He retained with 'him 
the DMO and the Chief Nursing Officer (CNO). All three 
new Unit General Managers '(UGM) brought by'. the 
implementation of the Griffiths' report had lengthy 
service in the District as members of the medical staff 
and district officers. The District Treasurer was the 
only outside candidate to join the new District 
Management Board (DMB) which took over the District 
Management Team (DMT) as the key management structure 
following the implementation of the Griffiths' report. 
The district senior officers did not interpret general 
management as having radically, changed the style and 
process of management in the district. 
Before being appointed District Administrator in 
1974, the current DGM was already involved in the 
management of the local health services. He was the 
Deputy Group Secretary to the Northampton Hospital 
Management Committee. He has been leading the District 
ever since. 
The key f actors in this case resolved around a 
politically aware DGM. He was anxious to spread any 
reductions in services as widely as possible throughout 
the District and across the range of services provided 
by the Authority but he was also anxious to see the 
strategic developments achieved. The DGM was ready to 
consider all alternative proposals yet prepared to take 
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an unpopular decision if no agreeable compromise could 
be found. The favoured managerial style in the 
District was one of approaching the problems in stages 
with an element of opportunism. 
"There is a limit to the number of measures 
that can be implemented at once. When one 
stage has been completed you have got a more 
precise measure of what needs doing further 
... In the short term what can be done' under the particular set of circumstances might not 
always match precisely with the plans. For 
instance, in the case of the closure of the 
children's ward the path was ýdrawn only in 
the light of sign posts that appeared 
fortuitously. There was no sense in which 
the final outcome was the perceived objective 
when the whole exercise started. Standing 
back, from the Authority point of view it 
could still be seen as -a compromise.. 
Nevertheless the service now provided is 
clearly improved. " 
District General Manager 
The Chairman of the DHA played a rather less 
conspicuous part in directing the closure proposals 
than his counterpart in Wycombe DHA did in closing the 
Amersham GPMU. The Chairman was a local businessman 
who retired in March 1989. His appointment was the 
latest of a long series of involvement in the 
administration of the local health care services which 
started in the mid-1960s. The Chairman was particularly 
concerned by the public relations and by the promotion 
of the Authority. He was seen as being involved in the 
running of the Authority while keeping a largely non- 
executive stance. 
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"The Chairman had af air degree of 
involvment. He certainly ensured that he 
kept out of the day to day management of the 
District. He wanted the District to run as 
smoothly as possible. Making rough water was 
not usually his style" 
DMG Member 
The Profile of the Unit Under Study 
The older buildings on the site of the hospital 
were built in 1835 and formed part of the 
Wellingborough Union Workhouse. The hospital did not, 
however, have the same sort of emotional appeal in the 
local community as the Amersham General Hospital in 
Wycombe. In 1948, at the inception of the NHS, the 
institution was renamed the Wellingborough Park 
Hospital after the city park which is located nearby. 
As it had done prior to 1948, the hospital provided 
residential accommodation for -the elderly, together 
with a small maternity service. 
Throughout, the 1950s and the 1960s the hospital 
was a Joint User Establishment -managed between the 
District Hospital Management Committee and the County 
Council. In the 1960s the residential accommodation 
was gradually phased out as new homes for the elderly 
were built by the County Council. By the late 1960s 
all the hospital residential accommodation had been 
closed and the old Workhouse buildings vacated. They 
are still unoccupied. 
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In the early 1970s major developments took place. 
New buildings were constructed and new geriatric 
services and facilities were- added to the hospital. 
Furthermore an out-patient department was opened. The 
Hospital, was renamed Isebrook Hospital after the River 
Ise which runs through the town. The change was 
intended to stress the new developments which were 
taking place at the hospital. It was also an attempt 
to break with the old hospice image associated with 
Park Hospital,, particularly in the mind of the local 
elderly population. The new name of the hospital 
negated many of its historical associations, which in 
any case were concerned with the care of the elderly as 
opposed to the obstetric and maternity services. 
In 1972 the closure of a small local acute 
hospital resulted in the paediatric service being 
transferred to Isebrook Hospital. 
"The transfer of the paediatric ward to Park 
Hospital (Isebrook) was made for two reasons. 
Firstly, paediatric had traditionally been 
seen in this district as a local service. 
Secondly, various wards were being vacated on 
the Park Hospital "(Isebrook) site. This 
allowed paediatrics to be retained in 
Wellingborough without any substantial 
capital investment. The opening of the 
paediatric ward at Isebrook was the result of 
opportunism as much as anything. " 
Administration and Planning Manager 
In 1984,, Isebrook GPMU had 14 in-patient beds and 
three delivery rooms. The maternity unit undertook 
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177 deliveries out of a District total of 3107. The 
GPMU also received 514 post-natal transfers from 
Kettering DGH. There were on average 5.7 occupied beds 
and 2.5 discharges per day. The average length of stay 
was three days (Table 9-0). 
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Table 9-0 
Obstetric and GP Maternity Vital-Statistics 
Kettering DRA, 1981-1984 
%beds occupied* 
Kettering DGH 
Isebrook GPMU 
Discharges 
Kettering DGH 
Isebrook GPMU 
Length of Stay 
Kettering DGH 
Isebrook GPMU 
Births 
1981 1982- 1983' -1984 
66 70 70 63 
39 -32 -'39 41 
3270 3342 3162 3293 
917 851 757 691 
4.4 4.5 4.2 4.0 
3.1 2.8 2.8 3.0 
Kettering DGH 2741 2837 2715 2696 
Isebrook GPMU 307- 261 222 177-- 
Number of beds: 
KGH: 1981 = 60,1982 = 59,1983 = 52,1984 = 58 
Isebrook GPMU: 1981 - 82 = 20,1983 = 15,1984 = 14 
Source: ORHAI Hospital Statistics, 1981-1984. - - 
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Kettering has a long tradition in-obstetrics. Up 
to the opening of the DGH Phase II in 1976 the main 
District obstetric service was provided by St Mary's 
Hospital in Kettering. The closure of' the-St Mary's 
Hospital allowed the opening of the DGH. 
The District used to have-another GPMU, of 20 beds 
and 4 delivery rooms which formed part -of the 
Diagnostic Centre in Corby. Like the closure of 
Isebrook GPMU, the proposal to close the Corby GPMU was 
mooted as a "temporary" measure undertaken to deal with 
financial difficulties. The Authority wished to bring 
the unit back into use but, as the District 
Administrator indicated, not necessarily for maternity 
purposes. 
There was considerable opposition to the closure 
of the Corby GPMU particularly from a large number of 
GPs in the locality and from the midwives and nursing 
staff of the unit. Initially the CHC, and particularly 
its Hospital Committee,, agreed with the change of use 
of the GPMU but further public pressure led the CHC to 
alter its original decision and to propose, in 
conjunction with the staff and the GPs,, retaining a 
small maternity suite utilising the remaining beds for 
other general medical purposes. 
The CHC counter-proposal was rejected and the 
proposal approved by the RHA. The RHA referred the 
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proposal to the Secretary of State who,, in October 
1977, approved the closure of the Corby GPMU. In 
February 1978, the maternity services were transferred 
to the new maternity ward in the DGH in Kettering. 
This concludes the profile of' the district and 
unit under study. The next section presents an 
overview of the process and outcome-of the proposal to 
close both the children's ward and the maternity unit 
at Isebrook Hospital. 
The Closure of Isebrook GPMU: An Overview 
Kettering DHA was facing a different problem than 
the other DHAs described in the previous chapters: 
bringing its income and expenditure quickly into 
balance. The proposal to close Isebrook GPMU was one 
of the main items included in a single package of cuts 
in services put forward by the District General Manager 
in July 1985. The package also contained a proposal to 
close the paediatric ward. 
As a result of the implementation of a number of 
planned developments, combined with the replacement and 
the addition of new consultants, the general level of 
activities in the District was running ahead of the 
predicted level. Therefore, the costs of providing the 
services were exceeding the District revenues. The 
original proposal concerns the temporary closure of 
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both services. They were later changed, into permanent 
closure proposals. 
The proposal to close the GPMU did not come as 
much of a shock to the medical staff as the closure of 
the Paediatric ward did. The latter caused the 
resignation of the medical representative,, - one of the 
consultant paediatricians at IH, from the DHA Board. 
The news came upon the midwives and nurses of the 
maternity unit as a shock,. ' However,, staff resistance 
and the Trade Unions opposition to the closure faded 
out rapidly. 
A "Save Isebrook Campaign" (SIC) was launched by 
two mothers of mentally handicapped, children who 
regularly used the Paediatric ward. The public 
opposition campaign welcomed the supplementary pressure 
put on the District package of cuts in services by the 
opponents to the closure of the GPMU. However, the 
maternity unit, was seen as a'side issue. 
The District was a marginal constituency held by 
the Government. The closures swiftly became a 
political issue dominated by the problems of funding 
the NHS (see Chapter five). The, Chair of SIC was taken 
over by a Labour prospective parliamentary candidate 
and the campaign was supported by the local paper, The 
Evening Telegraph. Soon a meeting between the Minister 
of Health, Mr Kenneth Clarke, and a delegation of 
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people against the closure of either one or the other 
wards was instigated by the local conservative MP, Mr 
Peter Fry. 
The Minister intervened. The opponents to the 
closure of the Paediatric ward used this political 
support to uphold their appeal to save the children's 
ward-but the opponents to the closure of the GPMU were 
unable to establish enough legitimacy for their cause 
locally and did not benefit from it. 
The District pressed on with the temporary closure 
of the GPMU and then moved f orward to the permanent 
closure with minimum opposition. At-the outset the CHC 
opposed the District package of reductions of services. 
However both the Chairman of the CHC and its Secretary 
were broadly subscribing to the closure of the GPMU and 
to the rationalisation of the paediatric ward. 
Ultimately a new proposal mooted by a Joint 
DHA/CHC working group was put forward which transferred 
the nucleus of the paediatric services to the DGH. 
The latter proposal was suggested by the CHC as well as 
by the paediatricians. 
"Our original intention was to close the 
whole paediatric ward. It is only f air to 
acknowledge that the closure of the 
Paediatric ward was an, example of the 
consultation process serving a very useful 
purpose and not being just a formality" 
DHA Chairman 
Table 9-1 presents the diary of the principal events. 
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Table 9-1 
Wellingborough Isebrook GPMU Case-Study 
Diary of Principal Events 
Closure of (A) the GPMU and (B) the Paediatric Ward 
1985 
July A. B. Announcement of the temporary 
closures through ý the DHA approval 
of the DGM's package of measures to 
retain the level of expenditure; 
B. Resignation of the consultant 
paediatrician f rom the DHA Board. 
The Medical Advisory Committee and 
the consultant -paediatricians 
refused all collaboration; 
A. B. The local MP opposed the closures; 
A. B. The CHC opposed the scheme; 
B. SIC was 'launched and held two 
public meetings; 
A. B. meeting between a delegation of 
opponents and the Minister 'of 
Health; 
August A. B. The Minister requested from the DHA 
a clear statement about ý (1) the 
alternative facilities before 
either closure goes ahead and 
(2) whether the closures are to be 
temporary or permanent; 
B. Consultation of parents on the 
alternative facilities to the IH 
children's ward; 
1985 
September A. Temporary closure of the GPMU; 
A. B. The Minister pressed the DRA to 
decide as quickly as possible the 
long-term future of both wards; - 
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(Table 9-1-continued) 
October B. Details of offers made to the 
parents sent to the minister; 
Consultant paediatricians informed 
the Minister that the alternatives 
were not suitable but recommended a 
reduction of 4 to 6 beds; 
B. The CHC asked for full consultation 
to be implemented; 
November B. The Chairman recommended the 
permanent closure of the paediatric 
ward. As a result, there was then 
no decision for the Minister to 
take on the original proposal; 
1986 
January B. Consultation paper on permanent 
closure of the paediatric ward; 
February A. Consultation paper on making 
permanent the GPMU temporary 
closure; 
May B. The CHC opposed the closure of the 
paediatric ward but a Joint CHC/DHA 
Working Party (JWP) was set up; 
July B. JWP recommended the transfer of 6 
paediatric beds to KGH; 
B. The CHC withdrew its opposition to 
the paediatric ward closure; 
September A. CHC decision not to oppose the 
closure of the GPMU. 
The Proposal 
The previous section presented an overview of the 
process and the outcome of the proposal to close the 
GPMU and the Paediatric ward at Isebrook Hospital. The 
next section details the genesis', the development, and 
the conclusion of these proposals. 
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The Genesis of the Isebrook GPMU Closure Proposal 
The Isebrook GPMU had been a candidate for closure 
on several occasions before a formal proposal was 
finally put forward. In 1976, in view of the opening 
of Phase II of the DGH, the DMT considered the closure 
of the 26 maternity beds in Wellingborough in order to 
bring more of the new maternity beds into use at the 
Kettering DGH. Ultimately, the closure of the 20 
maternity beds in Corby was considered more appropriate 
by the AHA officers. However 6 maternity beds were 
closed at IH. 
In 1982, the closure of the Isebrook GPMU was the 
first item on a list of some 28 possible cuts in 
services sent by the DMT to the CHCF the advisory 
committees, and all other interested bodies for 
consultation. The district officers were keen to 
secure the maximum degree of cooperation from all 
interested parties. Details of the District financial 
position were attached to the list of cutbacks. One of 
the subsidiary objectives of that consultation was to 
ensure that the seriousness of the financial situation 
was brought home to all staff and the public. Two 
stages were suggested to reduce expenditure: 
(1) bring the income and expenditure into balance; and 
then, if necessary (2) initiate further savings to 
reduce the accumulated overspending. 
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The size of the accumulated over-spending was one 
of the main disagreements between the District and the 
Region. 
"Before 1982, - Northampton -and Kettering were 
two districts under the umbrella of the 
Northamptonshire AHA. When the restructuring 
took place we expected that the AHA over- 
expenditure would be ironed out. We spent 
many years arguing our case with the RHA. We 
have got to reduce an over-spend which was 
not of our own making in the f irst instance. 
We should not have inherited an over-spent 
budget when we became independent" 
District Nursing Officer 
The revenue allocation was also an important 
controversy between the District and the Region. Up to 
1985, the District Officers were working under the 
assumption that they had a legitimate claim for 
additional monies from the Region and they deferred the 
implementation of the closures. There was no time 
pressure and no sense of urgency in cutting back the 
services. The Authority was cautious, not to jeopardise 
its campaign for additional monies from Region in 
implementing change. 
"When we, took 'over from the AHA we 
anticipated that we would get our correct 
proportion of the budget. However we did not 
get our f air share of the cake as it were. 
We informed the Region extensively about 
this. The general feeling in the District 
was that we did not really need to close beds 
since the Regional figures would eventually 
come out and show that the District was well 
under-funded and we would get additional 
money. we planned a series of developments 
assuming that this would happen. We still 
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suspect that if they were ever to produce 
good quality RAWP targets we really ought to 
be shown to be below any reasonable level. " 
District Deputy Treasurer 
The candidates for closure and the possible 
closure of the GPMU in particular were#, however,, well 
flagged up. On the list of possible cuts in services 
issued in 1982 for consultation, the closure of the 
GPMU stood side by side with proposals which proved to 
be much more controversial. For instance the closure 
of the whole Corby Community Hospital, as well as a 
major part of Rushden Hospital, was considered. The 
closure of a generalý surgical ward and an operating 
theatre at KGH as well as the closure of the paediatric 
ward at IH were also among the proposals considered. 
Ultimately, Isebrook GPMU was maintained though 
not completely. As an alternative option arising out 
of the consultation, it was decided to rationalise 
further the maternity services closing 6 out of the 
remaining 20 maternity beds at IH and reducing the 
staff levels at KGH maternity unit. 
"The medical and nursing staff felt strongly 
that it was necessary to keep the unit open. 
Isebrook was used as a "safety valve" when 
the pressure was intolerable at Kettering 
Maternity Unit. It was feared that a larger 
workload at Kettering might increase the PMR. 
The occupancy of the GPMU was low but with 
the commitment of the consultants and GPs to 
use Isebrook it was thought that there was 
enough grounds for retaining a local base 
service. Last, but not least, the savings 
resulting from the rationalisation were 
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estimated approximately half of those which 
would be realised by closing completely the 
GPMU. We were presented with an opportunity 
to get the savings without closing the 
services. That was a quite workable 
compromise. " 
District Medical Officer 
These changes were implemented in 1983. According 
to the District Strategic Plan issued in July 1984, the 
changes brought the District maternity services into 
balance. Contrary to Regional Guidelines, the plan did 
not take into account any further closure of maternity 
beds during the period 1984-1994. 
"It is thought that this balance is about 
right, and will not be altered until adequate 
experience is gained, over several years. The 
District therefore intends to retain one of 
the GP units separate from the consultant 
unit, contrary to RHA guidance. In any case 
the beds presently available could not 
accommodate the number of births which take 
place in Isebrook Hospital, Wellingborough. 
With good selection, a ge6graphically 
separate GP unit has a useful part to play 
and satisfies both midwives and mothers' 
expectations. " 
District Strategy 1984-1994 
In fact, the District Strategy was in disagreement with 
the Regional Guidelines on all but the acute services 
bed targets. 
The opportunity to reconsider the future of the 
maternity services at Isebrook Hospital came up at a 
DHA special meeting held in June 1985 to consider the 
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financial situation. The District was providing 
services at a much more rapid rate than was planned. 
"All the evidence showed that we were an 
efficient district with a high level of 
patient activity and no sign that we were 
extravagant or wasteful. However, we were 
doing more work than we could afford. We 
were doing a good job effectively but cannot 
meet the cost of all our activity. " 
District General Manager 
The overall financial position was becoming more 
dif f icult. 
"There were pressures to take on new staff 
and to do extra work without seeing the book 
balance. We replaced a number of consultants 
who had their old but cost effective way to 
work. The new consultants who came along 
were much more enthusiastic, more active, and 
more energetic but less cost effective. They 
were able to have a greater work throughput. 
We also implemented a number of desirable 
developments such as the hip replacement 
service which had a much higher volume than 
expected. Altogether we did not have the 
money to support that workload. " 
District Deputy Treasurer 
The budget report was forecasting a potential 
accumulated over-spending of over a million pounds by 
March 1986. 
"We inherited an over-spend of E200,000 on 
the break out of the AHA and we came out of 
our first year with an over-spending of 
L300j, 000. The next year it went up to 
E560,000 and it was threatening to reach over 
a million pounds. It was that creeping up 
process that triggered the closures. " 
Administration and Planning Officer 
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When the district's assumption that more money from the 
Region would be available was finally being proved 
wrong the Officers considered closing some of the 
services. 
"When it became obvious that we were moving 
into a different climate, since there was no 
additional money to come, we decided that it- 
was better to cut our services. The 
children's ward at Isebrook used to have very 
few children in there and the maternity unit 
was under-used. Had the closure of the 
children's ward been put forward in 1982 
there would have been less opposition. The- 
occupancy and the staffing level were very 
low and the sister was retiring. It was used- 
essentially to provide relief care for 
handicapped children. The new sister 
developed the treatment of children with 
difficult behaviour providing a new 
legitimacy to the ward. We missed the 
opportunity. We always have been fairly 
optimistic that there would be more money 
forthcoming. Although common sense told us 
to look carefully at these services with a 
view to closing them, we were not in a 
financial crisis and we let them continue. " 
District Nursing Officer 
The timing of the paediatric ward closure was not 
conducive to a peaceful development. It was later 
questioned by the CHC working group set up to consider 
the permanent closure of the children's ward. 
"The working group did not subscribe to the 
Authority's view that the ward was under-used 
but stressed that, for years, the number of 
beds was higher than was necessary. It was 
suggested that the reduction of beds should 
have been implemented earlier thus making 
saving over a longer period of time. " 
Secretary to the CHC 
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The closure of the maternity unit at Isebrook 
emerged as one of the major elements contained in the 
package of immediate cuts in services proposed by the 
DGM. Setting aside the closure of the GPMU, the 
package included a proposal to close the paediatric 
ward at Isebrook Hospital as well-as a reduction in the 
community service budget and in the nursing 
establishment at Kettering DGH. The sequence of events 
leading to the closure of the GPMU was influenced by 
other elements contained in the financial package and 
in particular by the proposal to close the paediatric 
ward. 
"We had less opposition to the closure of the 
maternity unit because the closure of the 
children's ward focused everybody's attention 
on that. We did not plan it deliberately. 
The size of the financial problem meant that 
we had to close something else as well. If it 
had been dealt with in isolation, the closure 
of the maternity unit would have been more 
difficult but the result would not have been 
any different. " 
District General Manager 
Given the importance of speed, ", the initial 
proposals concerned the temporary as opposed to the 
permanent closure of both services. 
"We were under very heavy pressure to curb 
our expenditure rapidly. The temporary 
closure was genuine. It was not a devious 
way of achieving a permanent closure. We 
were worried about moving in the unknown -by 
not having this maternity unit available. 
There were a lot of unanswered questions when. 
we closed. The prospect of reopening the 
CHAPTER NINE - ISEBROOK GPMU CASE-STUDY Page 396 
units and certainly the GPMU was not to be 
ruled out. We entered into the process with 
quite a short horizon. " 
District Nursing Officer 
However, the DGM pointed out to all the people 
concerned that, even with the temporary closure, the 
permanent closure of these services was still a 
possibility. 
"It is recognised that temporary closures are 
often seen as the forerunners of permanent 
closures. Clearly the Authority has to avoid 
the continued over-spending and in due course 
it will have to decide if any of the measures 
are to be permanent. It would be wrong not 
to recognise this possibility for either of 
these wards. It is stressed that such a 
recommendation has not been made and would 
require full formal consultation. " 
DGM's letter on the temporary closures 
The district's reasoning for advancing the 
temporary closure of the GPMU was twofold: (1) savings, 
(2) existing alternative facilities within the 
District. I 
The savings in a full year of the closure of the 
GPMU was estimated in the region of E50,000. This was 
largely undisputed. The savings, were to be realised 
from voluntary as well as compulsory staff 
redundancies. 
The key element of the District approach to 
closure was to highlight the -alternative proposals 
should the closure of the GPMU proves unsuccessful. 
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I 
"Basically we were saying that if we cannot 
close the maternity unit something else would 
have to go. There was a distinct possibility 
of having to close an acute ward as well as a 
long stay ward. For those there was no 
alternative provided in the District. The 
maternity unit was comparatively under-used. 
We took on trust the working party's 
conclusion that Isebrook GPMUIs workload 
could be handled in the Kettering main 
maternity unit though not without creating 
some difficulties. " 
District General Manager 
Setting aside the search for savings, the District 
reasoning for closing the paediatric ward was twofold: 
(1) the relatively low usage of the beds, and (2) the 
health profile of the children who were using the 
facility. 
The net revenue saving resulting from the closure 
of the paediatric ward was estimated at E150,000. On 
average 50% of the staffed beds and 30% of the 
available beds were occupied. The advice given by the 
DMO to the DMG was that the unit was supporting a 
client base that, according to modern ideas, did not 
need health care. 
"One of our principal arguments was that the 
unit was addressing some of the social as 
opposed to health care problems. The unit was 
self perpetuating itself by bringing in 
children with behavioural problems or 
emotional disorder who really did not need 
hospital care per se. It was also largely 
used for many years to provide relief care 
for handicapped children who could have gone 
elsewhere. Indeed there was also a certain 
percentage of beds used for children with 
more identifiable but non-acute medical 
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conditions as well as for the early transfer 
of children from the main District hospital. 
However there were enough resources at 
Kettering General to care for these 
children. " 
District Medical Officer 
The 12 paediatric beds at Isebrook Hospital were 
operated as one unit with the 16 beds in the Timpson 
ward at the DGH. They were shared by three consultant 
paediatricians who worked in both hospitals. There were 
also 13 beds for permanent and intermittent relief care 
of mentally handicapped children in Colton Ward at 
Rushden Hospital. 
Up to the arrival of the Sister in charge of the 
ward in 1983 much of the ward was used to provide 
relief care for handicapped children. Since then, the 
ward was pioneering in the field of the prevention and 
the treatment of families with abused children and with 
children suffering from behavioural problems. 
The Development of Isebrook GPMU and Paediatric Ward 
ClosurW-- 
At the July DHA Board meeting, there was a long 
debate between the members about whether or not the 
Authority should close both wards. During the dispute 
the consultant representative, one of the consultant 
paediatricians, underlined that the medical staff were 
in no mood to discuss or co-operate with cuts in 
patients services. Following extensive discussion of 
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the issuest it was finally resolved to adopt the steps 
proposed by the DGM and to go ahead with the temporary 
closure proposals. This resulted in the resignation of 
the consultant representative from the DHA Board. He 
took on the lead in the fight against the Authority's 
proposal to close the paediatric ward. 
"The consultant paediatrician was a strong 
socialist. He was very much involved in 
Wellingborough particularly in the community 
relations care and he felt that we were 
letting him and the people down. " 
District Medical Officer 
The reasoning of the consultant paediatricians to 
oppose the closure was essentially twofold. Firstly as 
a result of the closure, 50% of the paediatric beds in 
the District would be lost, restricting admission 
particularly for children suffering from social 
deprivation and emotional disorder or for abused and 
handicapped children. Secondly emergency admission 
would be difficult and children might have to be 
admitted to adult wards. 
Unlike the closure of the paediatric unit, the 
closure of the GPMU had not come as a shock to the 
medical staff concerned. There was virtually no 
support for the unit. 
"A very important point was that the 
obstetricians and the local GPs were not interested in keeping it open. Because of 
alteration at the DGH maternity building 
there was enough capacity to expand- the 
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number of obstetric beds to meet the demand 
to about 1990. The consultant obstetricians 
saw the closure of Isebrook as an opportunity 
to centralise all the beds at the DGH. One 
of the main arguments which saved the 
Isebrook unit in 1983 was that the commitment 
of the professionals could be regained to 
support their local unit. In 1984, we went 
out to speak to the GPs inquiring why they 
were not using the Unit as much as they used 
to. The principal remark which then came out 
was that the local GPs'surgeries had a 
substantial number of newcomers who were not 
particularly interested in practicing 
midwifery. The word closure was written on 
the wall for everybody to read. " 
Director of Midwifery Services 
The previous rationalisations of the GPMU and the 
deferred implementation of its closure paved the way 
for an uncontested implementation of the proposal. By 
the time the DRA faced a critical resource crisis the 
potential opposition groups were well aware of the 
District financial problem. It was widely recognised 
that cutbacks would have to be made, and that closure 
was a probability. The GPs were already resigned to 
seeing the facility disappear. 
"They reduced the number of beds in the 
maternity unit twice. The closure began to 
happen a few years beforehand. By 1985 the 
opinion of the professionals had already 
changed and we were then ready to let it go. 
In any case we f elt that nothing could be 
done to save it from the axe. The 
inevitability came into it. " 
GP Representative 
At the same time, the interest of the local GPS in 
Practicing obstetrics was also diminishing. The 
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nursing and midwifery staff, however, were not ready to 
accept the closure without contesting it. 
"The actual unit staff itself was very 
disappointed. They were quite vociferous 
initially but it was not maintained. Side by 
side with the opponents to the closure of the 
paediatric ward, they lobbied the public by 
having a campaign in the town centre 
collecting signatures against the closures. 
They lobbied the health authority members,, 
the council, the MP, but at the end of the 
day all the support went to save the 
children's ward and they did not have the CHC 
backing. They were resentful. " 
Director of Midwifery Services 
With the exception of the closure- of the Corby 
GPMU in 1978, there was no history of confrontation 
between the DHA and the CHC. Initially CHC opposed all 
the proposals included in the DHA package of cutbacks. 
The CHC reasons f or opposing the District proposals 
were twofold: (1) the origin of the District financial 
difficulties, and (2) the relative contribution of 
Isebrook Hospital to the accumulated overspending of 
the District. 
According to the CHC members, the District 
financial problem was not solely the result of a lack 
of financial control by the District Senior Officers. 
It was mainly due to a lack of funding from the RHA to 
provide for the increasing demands upon the Services. 
Therefore rather than closing services the District 
ought to press the RHA for more financial resources. 
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Besides, the package of cuts in services was 
essentially striking Isebrook Hospital. However it was 
at the DGH that the over-spending was really taking 
place. 
In spite of the Council decision to oppose the 
whole District financial package, the Chairman of the 
CHC, as well as her Secretary, were in broad agreement 
with the proposal to close the GPMU. 
"We tried to look at the proposals logically. 
The case of the maternity unit was much 
easier to deal with than the case of the 
childrens' ward because we had the expertise 
readily available. Our Chairman is a 
midwife. my wife is a midwife as well. My 
own experience as an hospital administrator 
was most helpful in this particular issue 
since I have run a maternity unit. The case 
f or closing the GPMU was quite a strong one. 
We knew that no one could alter the fact that 
the unit was under-used. It was so 
uneconomical. We had no solid base on which 
to mount an objective opposition. We had 
only one representation from the GPs but 
after discussion they agreed that their 
interest was too late. The main opposition 
came from the staff who were fighting to keep 
their jobs. " 
Secretary to the CHC 
There was virtually no opposition to the closure of the 
GPMU. The only exception was the nursing and the 
midwifery staff who were threatened with redundancy. 
They were unable to convince the public, and the CHC in 
particular, that their motivation was legitimate. 
Ultimately the CHC acute and midwifery service 
committee recommended to the Council not to oppose the 
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closure of the maternity unit. The professional 
background of the CHC Chairman in midwifery, made her 
arguments all the more convincing and played a critical 
part in the response to the proposal. 
"The CHC acute service committee felt that 
home confinement as opposed to the GPMU was 
the alternative to the consultant obstetric 
ward. The CHC Chairman who was a midwife had 
strong views about it. The other lay members 
of the CHC had limited knowledge regarding 
maternity services and it was difficult to 
override the influence that the Chairman had. 
The fact that the Chairman of the CHC 
declared her position fairly. soon did not 
help our cause at all. We did not get the 
County Council support either. One of the 
most vocal councillors was also a DHA member. 
He was quoted in the local press stating that 
the unit should be closed. By the time the 
proposal went back to the Council for 
decision it was already obvious that the 
maternity unit had gone leaving only the 
children's ward to fight for. " 
Midwifery-Staff Representative 
The - Chairman and the Secretary to the CHC were 
also aware that the children Is ward was used by some 
children who did not necessarily need hospital care. 
"We knew, unofficially, that because the 
paediatricians needed to keep the occupancy 
figures up, the children's ward was being 
used by some parents of handicapped children 
almost like a baby sitting circle. There was 
no reason to fight to keep this going. 
However there was a small group of children 
f or whom a facility ought to be kept open. 
The problem as we saw it became to find a way 
to retain that particular part of the service 
for these children. " 
Secretary to the CHC 
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In fact, the figures concerning the children 
looked after on the ward showed children admitted for 
medical reasons representing 45% of the bed days used 
while handicapped children represented 25% of them. 
The remaining 30% was used by abused children or 
children with difficult behaviour. The latter group 
was at the core of the controversy. 
There was considerable publicity in the media and 
public reaction. Letters from parents of children 
cared for in the paediatric ward as well as from users 
of the maternity unit began to be received by the 
Authority. The prevailing attitude was concern about 
the services in Wellingborough, concern about the 
future of Isebrook Hospital, and concern about what was 
happening to the NHS in general, rather than the 
particular advantages and disadvantages of the closure 
of the maternity unit. 
A "Save Isebrook Campaign" was launched by two 
mothers of handicapped children who regularly used the 
paediatric ward. The control of the campaign committee 
was,, however,, taken over by the local branch of the 
Labour Party. 
"We got a bit worried at one stage because it 
was getting too political. We very much felt 
that we were being used by the people from 
the Labour Party who turned our campaign into 
a political issue. The actual issue of the 
children's ward was overshadowed by the 
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political arguments such as the under-funding 
of the NHS and the like. It got out of hand 
in that sense. " 
Joint Secretary Save Isebrook Campaign 
The Trade Unions officially registered their 
opposition to the closures urging the Authority to 
clarify the position of the staff if the plans were to 
go ahead. However they failed to mobilise their 
membership and to undertake any collective action 
against the District proposals. As an alternative, the 
individual Unions officers joined and supported the 
Save Isebrook Campaign. 
"The history of Trade Union militancy in 
Kettering is minimal. We tend to have 
something of a "shy mentality". It is 
extremely difficult to get the Trade Unions 
to work together. We used the district 
grievance procedure to try to register an 
objection particularly to the closure of the 
children's ward but it appeared 
inappropriate. The Trade Unions had more 
input in the fight, against the District's 
proposals via the individual unit officers 
taking membership with SIC. " 
JTUC Secretary 
The local Conservative MP" Mr Peter Fry, 
proffered his support to opponents of the closures. 
The District was a marginal constituency held by the 
Government. The MP had already put his efforts into 
other saving campaigns in the constituency such as the 
closure of British Leylands Foundry and the closure of 
General Motors Factory. He instigated a meeting 
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between the Minister of Health, Mr Kenneth Clarke, and 
a delegation of 3 parents and 3 members of the staf f 
concerned by either one or the other closures. The 
meeting was held on 30 July 1985. 
A protest march was led through the town by the 
local MP, the Deputy Mayor, and the Chairman of the 
Save Campaign. A petition was signed by approximately 
30,000 people. The possibility of legal action was 
considered by the SIC and by the Borough Council. The 
protestors suggested that the Authority took the 
decision to close the GPMU and the Children's Ward 
based on out-dated figures and new figures showing 
increasing level of activity were sent to the Minister 
of Health. 
Within two weeks of its meeting with the 
delegation, the Minister of Health requested the DHA to 
issue a clear statement about the alternative 
facilities before closing any services. He also 
requested the Authority to specify clearly whether the 
closures were to be permanent or temporary. 
"Some of our planning was not as good as it 
should have been. When the proposal was 
first mooted the medical advice we were given 
was that the unit was used by children who 
did not need hospital care. This advice was 
not entirely well founded. There were in 
fact a small number of children for whom the 
unit was some sort of a life line. The 
opponents were able to show to the Minister 
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that we were unable to be very precise about 
whether the alternative facilities were 
satisfactory or not. " 
District General Manager 
The lack of detailed up-to-date knowledge of the 
services provided to the individual child by the 
paediatric ward justified the veto of the Minister on 
the closure. As a result, the initiative was given to 
the opponents to the closures. 
"It become apparent that we would not get the 
Minister's agreement to a closure. The most 
influential opponents were the consultants 
and the CHC. Until the anxiety being 
expressed by those two powerful groups could 
be resolved the likelihood of getting the 
Minister's agreement for the closure of the 
children's ward was very slim. That did not 
apply to the same extent to the GPMU because 
the alternative provision was clearly 
accounted for. " 
District General Manager 
The CHC Chairman and her Secretary of f ered a reluctant 
acceptance of a solution to address the District 
financial problems and refused to antagonise further 
the controversy over the children's ward. 
"We knew we had them over a barrel. However 
we did not want to keep the whole children's 
ward open f or the sake of it. The District- 
needed savings and they were seriously 
threatening to close either a surgical or a 
geriatric ward. We had hostility from the 
Save Campaign group because we were not 
opposing the closure of the GPMU and because 
we did not want an unconditional withdrawal 
of the paediatrics' closure proposal. We 
wanted to save the service not the ward 
itself. That was extremely important. We 
had to fight to get the people to understand 
CHAPTER NINE - ISEBROOK GPMU CASE-STUDY Page 408 
that. The parents understood but the 
politicians did not. The operational details 
such as where and how many beds were all 
negotiable. We managed to get in between the 
Authority, the Save Campaign, and the 
parents. We acted as a mediator. " 
Secretary to the CHC 
At the request of the DGM, a list of names of 
children using the ward was produced by the Sister and 
an inventory of the alternative facilities was made. A 
community nurse visited the parents to find out what 
they needed and to see whether the alternative 
facilities would be acceptable. The opposition group 
and the paediatricians were unwilling to accept the 
study of alternative facilities and they undertook 
their own assessment of alternatives. The 
paediatricians condemned the alternative facilities 
offered on the grounds that none of the people involved 
in consulting the parents or in developing the 
alternative were professionally qualified. 
"You may well have been strongly advised by 
medical and nursing representatives,, on the 
Management Team,, about what is best for the 
treatment of children. None of these are 
paediatricians or paediatric nurses and their 
advice runs counter to that of specialists in 
child health and illness ... Children's 
services within the District are being cut 
and they are being managed by people with no 
knowledge at all of the needs of children. " 
Letter from the Consultant Paediatricians 
Meanwhile the DGM pressed on with the remainder of 
the financial package and with the temporary closure of 
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the GPMU in particular. The temporary closure of the 
GPMU was effected on 30 September 1985. Three midwives 
and one auxilliary nurse were transferred from Isebrook 
to the DGH. Eight midwives were made redundant. 
The Chairman of the Authority informed the 
Minister of the temporary closure of the GPMU pointing 
out that arrangements were made for all mothers to be 
cared for in the main maternity unit at the DGH. In his 
reply, the Minister pressed the District to decide as 
soon as possible the long term future of both wards. 
Further discussion between the Chairman and the DGM 
concluded that the Authority was then ready to consider 
the permanent closure of the maternity unit. However 
the DGM recommended that the Authority should wait 
until alternative arrangements had been made with the 
parents to consider the permanent closure of the 
paediatric ward. 
A paper prepared by the District Treasurer and 
showing the financial outlook for the District was 
circulated widely to the staff, the advisory groups, 
and the consultative committees. The aim was to 
stimulate discussion about what had to be done to put 
the situation right. At best the outlook predicted an 
over-spending of : E463,000 while the worst prediction 
suggested an over-spending of E968,000. 
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On 8th October,, the Chairman of the Authority 
wrote to the Minister giving him details on the offers 
which had been made to the parents. Most of them were 
reported to be happy to use the alternative resources 
offered. However one of the mothers of a handicapped 
child whose name was on the list among the parents 
happy to use alternative resources stated publicly that 
she had not been offered officially any alternative for 
her child. The fact was reported to the Minister by 
the MP as undermining the credibility of the list. 
The consultant paediatricians indicated to the 
Minister that the proposals were not suitable to meet 
the needs of their patients. However they put forward 
their own counter-proposal recommending a further 
reduction of 4 to 6 beds in the children's ward. 
"The paediatricians realised that they would 
lose the service altogether unless they did 
re-think what they were talking about. They 
started talking about reducing the number of 
beds. That was the first step toward a 
possible compromise. " 
Secretary to the CHC 
The CHC pointed out that a full consultation 
procedure should be implemented. 
The Conclusion of the Isebrook's Closure Proposals 
At its public meeting held on 26th November 1985, 
the'Authority accepted the Chairman's recommendation to 
begin the statutory consultation on the permanent 
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closure of the children's ward. The Chairman's 
reasoning for changing his approach was twofold. 
Firstly, the delay in implementing the temporary 
closures jeopardized any significant saving in the 
f inancial year. Secondly, the Authority had then a 
clearer financial picture which showed significant 
over-spending for another two years. 
A consultative document was issued on January 9, 
1986. The District's reasoning for advancing the 
permanent closure of the paediatric ward was twofold: 
(1) savings,, and (2) opportunity to create an 
integrated Children's department at the DGH. 
"The Authority is taking this step not only 
because it feels this is one way of reducing 
its expenditure, but because it thinks that 
there are advantages in developing paediatric 
care on one site at KGH ... The Authority's 
Strategic plan set out the overall philosophy 
that children should be nursed together by 
trained paediatric nurses not in separate 
specialty wards ... The Authority therefore 
proposes to consolidate the care for children 
in the District and by making changes that 
fit into previously declared national, 
regional, and local policies, set the 
foundations for a greatly improved and co- 
ordinated service for future years. " 
Consultation Document 
A public meeting to be held on February 25,1986 
was called by the Save Isebrook Campaign. The Chairman 
of the Authority declined the invitation to 
participate. The strength of the parents' opposition 
to the closure was diminishing. 
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"At that stage basically everybody was 
satisfied with the alternative proposals. It 
boiled down to the two of us. We were told 
that our handicapped children did not need 
hospital care. The meetings were attended by 
only a handful of people. " 
Joint Secretary Save Isebrook Campaign 
On February 14,1986, the DHA published a 
consultation document on its proposal to make permanent 
the temporary closure of the GPMU. The District's 
reasoning was twofold: (1) there was enough capacity at 
Kettering DGH to meet the demand, and (2) the closure 
would allow the building to be re-used for geriatric 
patients who were currently cared for in old victorian 
accommodation. 
Whilst not deliberate,, the permanent closure of 
the GPMU was more readily acceptable when finally 
proposed because of the temporary closure. At the end 
of the consultation period on closure of the Isebrook 
GPMU a total of 15 replies were received. Of them only 
two opposed the permanent closure: the Kettering 
Borough Council and the Save Isebrook Campaign. In 
short, the Councillors maintained plainly their former 
position. The SIC published a nine page document 
criticising the Authority's proposal on many grounds. 
Primarily the Campaign committee blamed the Authority 
for "putting cash before caring", for "having little 
thought spared for the future", and for "increasing 
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workload and stress on staf f as well as on pregnant 
mothers". Doubts were expressed on statistics, 
savings, and performance figures. 
All the advisory committees supported the closure. 
On September 25,1986, a motion not to oppose the 
permanent closure of the Isebrook GPMU was passed by 
the CHC. 
Meanwhile, in April, the CHC set up a working 
group to draft a recommendation on the closure of the 
children's ward. A meeting between members and 
representatives of the Authority and the CHC's working 
party was held on May 8,1986. At the meeting the 
transfer of six beds from Isebrook to the DGH was 
suggested by one of the CHC members. 
"One of our ENT consultants left the 
District. We were concentrating the ENT 
function into the Nightingale ward. This 
left enough room for the transfer of the six 
beds creating a self-contained unit for the 
treatment of children with special problems. " 
Administration and Planning Officer 
A joint DHA/CHC working group approach was proposed by 
the DGM. Nevertheless because an agreement could not 
be reached before the end of the formal consultation 
period, the CHC working group recommended that the CHC 
should oppose the closure. The recommendation was 
adopted by the CHC on May 22,1986. 
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Meanwhile the Authority was investigating the 
possibility of transferring the beds from Isebrook to 
the DGH. Following a second meeting with the CHC and 
after having gained the support of the consultant 
paediatricians for the proposal, the DGM recommended 
that 6 children's beds should be transferred from 
Isebrook to Kettering DGH. 
"The Authority's decision was mainly based on 
the fact that it was cheaper to run the 
children's beds at the DGH. We estimated the 
saving at approximately f. 65,000 in a full 
year. The beds would be used more 
effectively as part of an integrated 
paediatric department in the DGH rather than 
kept in isolation in Wellingborough. We also 
felt that the solution was creating a base 
f or the future development of the paediatric 
service in the District. Finally the 
compromise was acceptable by the CHC as well 
as by the consultant paediatricians. 11 
District General Manager 
On July 24.. the CHC withdrew its opposition to- the 
children's ward closure. The beds were transferred 
from Isebrook Hospital to KetteringýDGH in April, -1987. 
"Despite all the trauma we went through, the 
closure of the children's ward has been very 
successful. In the face of the opposition we 
worked out an alternative which was 
acceptable to the objectors because they were 
involved in working it out. Perhaps you need 
to leave yourself some space to work out a 
proposal. Allowing the opposition to voice 
their anxieties and then bringing them in is 
perhaps more constructive. We did not do it 
deliberately but it worked that way. The 
original proposal was modified by the process 
of consultation. " 
District General Manager 
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Concluding Discussion 
The Kettering DHA proposal to close the Isebrook 
GPMU was presented concurrently with a similar proposal 
to close the hospital, paediatric ward. From the point 
of view of the DHA,, the closure of the GPMU proved 
highly successful whereas the paediatric ward resulted 
in a compromise solution. Why was the proposal to 
close the GPMU implemented so successfully- when the 
previous proposals were not, and when, the DHA's 
concurrent intention to close the peadiatric ward was 
frustrated? 
4 
Continuity of Key People Providing Leadership ' 
The evidence indicates that. the key f actors in 
these closures revolved primarily around a politically 
aware DGM who began establishing the, legitimacy of the 
proposals a number of years before they became - formal 
issues. There is little evidence that the 
implementation of general management-in Kettering had a 
significant influence, 'on the process and outcome of the 
proposals., The case-study points to the influence of 
the continuance at top management level and to the 
managerial skills of the DGM in connecting up logically 
admissible solutions to legitimate problems. The 
failure to close the paediatric ward illustrates the 
crucial part of timing in this process. As Stewart 
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(1989) pointed out: 
"Some times are better than others for 
getting changes accepted because people are 
more open to accepting the need for change. 
Part of the art of managing change is 
recognising when something has happened that 
makes people more willing to accept change" 
(p. 22) - 
The Approach to Implementation 
The managerial thinking and action conform to the 
Organisational Development Perspective of 
implementation which emphasizes consultation and 
participation in the decision-making process as a key 
factor to secure successful implementation-(see Chapter 
two). The DGM demonstrated a definite will and a 
strong lead for some sort of action to be undertaken to 
correct the district financial situation. There was, 
however, a genuine opportunity -for those being 
consulted to produce alternative solutions to the 
financial problem. The type of leadership which 
emerged was not unlike the principle of "tight and 
loose management" whichp according to Korman and 
Glennerster (1990), was used by the South East RHA to 
speed up the closure of the Darneth Park Hospital in 
the 1980s (see Chapter Three)., Such,, a style of 
leadership was consistent with the tradition of the 
district. 
Since its inception in 1982, the DHA had sought to 
explain exactly its precarious financial position, 
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particularly to the CHC, and to justify its proposals 
while deferring closures and, exchanging views with the 
potential influencers about what had to be done 'to 
rectify the situation. As Hardy (1985) pointed out: ' 
explanation of the reasons , behind a 
closure is an important element in the 
management of meaning. A decision which is 
justified on the basis of acceptable criteria 
is itself acceptable ... Reasons confer legitimacy, not because they are, in any 
objective sense, right, but because they are 
deemed legitimate by the groups in question. " 
P. 111) . 
By floating an extensive list of potential proposals 
for closure, as well as details about the District 
financial difficulties, the District Officers 
contributed to creating some of the favourable local 
conditions for implementation. In this case, the 
actions of the officers reduced the motivation to 
resist implementation. By the time the DHA f aced a 
critical resource crisis, the potential opposition 
groups and the CHC, in particular, were already 
convinced that cutbacks would have to be made and that 
closures were a probability. The Chairman and the 
Secretary to the CHC were persuaded that keeping the 
GPMU and the whole paediatric ward in Isebrook would 
have negative consequences particularly on the priority 
group services. 
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The Will, Skills and Power of the Opposition 
The local context afforded the officers some 
advantages , which coml: )lemented their actions. For 
instance, one of the key f actors in the successful 
implementation of the proposal was the lack of clinical 
support for the GPMU. The Officers were fortunate that 
the consultants' support for a locally based service at 
Isebrook hospital vanished , completely as a result of 
the alteration made to the DGH building. The CHC's 
awareness of the need for savings, combined with the 
lack of clinical support for the retention of the 
Isebrook GPMUj were particularly important 'factors 
which eased the implementation of the closure proposal. 
Other favourable features of the local-context include: 
the lack of emotional appeal of the hospital in-the 
community, the central location of the alternative 
facility, and the history of relatively good relations 
between the CHC and the DHA., 
The implementation- of the proposal to close the 
paediatric ward revealed much more controversy than the 
closure of the-GPMUj primarily because medical opinion 
was against it. The evidence suggests that the 
presence of a paediatrician with the will and the 
political skill to champion the - opposition was a key 
factor in the failure of the district to close the 
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paediatric ward entirely. As Hardy (1986) pointed out, 
"Medical opinion is obviously influential in 
decisions in health service, particularly 
when services are being curtailed: the use of 
profit and loss criteria are not usually 
perceived as legitimate reasons for the 
withdrawal of services; medical opposition 
can easily override any financial arguments 
in the eyes of the public, employees and 
unions, the AHA, and often the government" 
(p. 20) 
Clearly the national political context enabled the 
opponents ýto resist implementation (see Chapter five). 
The District wasIn a marginal constituency and,, at the 
time, increased national attention was being paid to 
the issue of child abuse. These factors raised the 
political profile of the proposals, and attracted the 
local MP and the Minister's interest comparatively 
early in the proceedings. Because the District's 
proposal was based on an inaccurate premiseý the 
opponents were able to de-legitimise the closure-and to 
secure the Minister's support for their cause. This 
tends to substantiate the Rational Planning Perspective 
of implementation (see Chapter' two) stressing the 
soundness of the planning premises as a key factor in 
implementation. 
The opponents to the closure of the paediatric 
ward used the Minister's support to prevent the 
temporary closure and to force a formal consultation 
over the closure proposal. Their power, however, was 
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limited because they did not have the absolute support 
from CHC staff in critical posts, who believed that the 
district was really facing a serious resource crisis. 
In this case the mediation of the CHC was an important 
aid to implementation. The CHC counter-proposal 
offered a fortuitous opportunity to reach a, - local 
agreement which the DGM did not fail to use involving 
further the CHC in working itýout. The transfer of the 
paediatric ward to Kettering DGH resulted from the same 
sort of opportunism which brought it to Isebrook 
Hospital in the first place. ý- 
Summary and Conclusions- 
In summary,, this case study shows how managerial 
action can shape context and events. The fluid and 
emergent nature of strategy is well illustrated by the 
case study. The strategy of the DHA can best be 
described as ad hoc and emergent. Although the District 
Officers did not have a predetermined, detailed 
strategy for closure, the decisions and actions led 
towards the closure of the Units. 
The DHA officers had already set some of the 
conditions for implementation by reducing the number of 
beds in the maternity unit and by flagging up the 
closure proposal well in advance. They also made sure 
that the public and the staf f were well aware of the 
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seriousness of the situation by widely circulating 
details of the District financial outlook, in order to 
stimulate discussion about what had to be done to put 
the situation right. The implication that one of the 
major roles of managerial action in. implementing change 
is to alter context (Pettigrew et al. 1989) is clearly 
supported in this case-study. , 
The evidence features 
the DGM managerial skill in creating an, overall climate 
for change to occur as a, key factor in the successful 
implementation. 
A further important substantive f inding is that 
consultation can serve a very useful purpose, thereby 
improving the proposal being implemented. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Implementinq The Proposals 
In presenting an analysis of the implementation 
process described in the last four chapters, this 
chapter begins with -an investigation of the districts, 
responses to central government policy over the period 
from 1970 to 1989. The second section then examines the 
key features of implementing the closure proposals 
among the districts investigated to see if there are 
any patterns in those processes. Later in the chapter, 
the theoretical approaches to implementation posited in 
chapter two are reviewed in the light of the empirical 
evidence of the researchý Finally, the chapter 
presents a summary and conclusion of this dissertation. 
National Policy and Local Strateqies 
This research provided an opportunity to examine 
the implementation of change in the provision of 
inpatient maternity beds in four health districts since 
the current central policy was formulated in 1970 (see 
Chapter five). The districts had much in common. All 
four were neighbouring health districts belonging to 
the same RHA, they were operating during the same 
period, sharing a broadly similar outer environment, 
facing the same changing policy context, and all were 
under similar pressure from higher tiers to review the 
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structure of services provided, especially to close 
their peripheral GPMUs. On these grounds, and in the 
light of the classical approach that still dominates 
both the literature and practice of implementation, one 
could expect the districts to adopt very similar 
maternity bed provision strategies in response to the 
central government policy. 
Following the approach taken by Pettigrew (1977, 
1985), Mintzberg (1978) and Mintzberg and Waters 
(1985), strategies can be viewed as "a pattern in the 
stream of decisions" (Mintzberg, 1978, p. 24). The key 
local health authorities, decision streams relating to 
inpatient maternity facilities can be grouped into 
three categories: (1) services offered, including 
opening, transfer, temporary closure, and permanent 
closure of obstetric wards and maternity units; 
(2) resources and, particularlyt increase and reduction 
in the number of beds; and (3) the management of 
closure, including the formal consultation on permanent 
closure of facilities in the district. 
Figure 10-0 presents a summary of the decision 
streams from 1970 to 1989 with respect to maternity bed 
provision in the four health districts investigated. 
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Figure 10-0 
Diary of Change in GP Maternity Bed Provision 
in Wycombe, Oxfordshire, Milton Keynes, and 
Kettering health districts 
1970 - 1989 
DISTRICT Year 
GPMUs 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80,81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
WYCOMBE ...... 
Amersham 
_or 
*t or t ...... 
Stone * 
-+ Shruberry 0 
>Shruberry Ward DGH 0- 
OXFORDSHIRE DGH 
>Churchill + 
>John Radcliffe-or 
>Horton 
Moreton x- 
Bicester r+ 
Brackley + 
Abingdon 
Chipping r 
Wantage r- 
Wallingford 0-rr 
St George + 
MILTON KEYNES_ 
- 
DGH 
Bletchley 
_A 
+ 
Westbury 
-+- >General 0 
KETTERING DGH, 
Corby * 
-+ 7- ... Isebrook r *r t. **+ 
Key Lo Symbols per Category of Decisions 
(1) Services Offered (2) The Management of Closure. 
o: Unit Opening : First Formal Closure Proposal 
+: Unit Closure ...... .: Second Formal Closure Proposal 
t: Temporary closure ...... .: Third Formal Closure Proposal 
x: Out/Boundary change Forth Formal Closure Proposal 
DGH: Opening of DGH wards 
1 
(3) Resources: Opening of beds, r: Closure of beds 
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The Policy Implementation Processes 
An analysi s of Figure 10-0 reveals a number of 
patterns or periods in the decisions relating to the 
provision of inpatient maternity beds of each district 
investigated. 
Figure 10-0 shows three periods in t he policy 
implementation process of Wycombe health district. The 
first of these periods came to an end in 1976 when the 
new Wycombe DGH opened its obstetric ward. Although a 
formal proposal to close one of the GPMU was issued 
during the first period, the level of resources did not 
change. The second period began in 1976 with the 
transfer of all consultant obstetrician beds to the new 
Wycombe DGH obstetric ward. This period is 
characterised by the opening, in breach of the national 
policy, of two peripheral GPMUs in the facilities 
vacated by the consultant obstetricians. The final 
period began in 1983 with the opening of an integrated 
GPMU in the Wycombe DGH bringing about the 
centralisation of all GP maternity beds in 1987 
following the "temporary" closure of the Amersham GPMU. 
Table 10-0 summarises the pace and rate of change in 
Wycombe. 
An examination of the decisions and actions in the 
Oxfordshire health district also reveals two major 
periods, the first ending in 1979. During this period 
the district spared none of its peripheral GPMUs from 
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rationalisation,, but retained all of them. The second 
period began in 1980 when the pattern of decision 
streams changed. In contrast with the preceding period, 
there was no emphasis on bed reduction during that 
period and permanent closures of facilities were 
achieved. These periods are illustrated in Table 10-l. -- 
One of the difficulties in trying to identify the 
patterns in the decisions and actions in Milton Keynes 
health district is that before 1982 the services were 
administered by two neighbouring districts. Three 
periods, however, seem to emerge from Figure 10-0. 
Services remained unchanged during the first 
period after a number of beds were added in Bletchley 
in 1972. During the second, short, period between 1982 
and 1984, the district maternity bed provision was 
radically transformed and the centralisation of all GP 
maternity beds in the district was achieved. During the 
third period, no further changes were implemented. 
Table 10-2 summarises the rate and pace of change in 
Milton Keynes. 
Figure 10-0 shows three periods in the Kettering 
health district's maternity decisions. Untilý 1976 the 
services remained unchanged. One of the district GPMUs 
was then closed and the number of GP maternity beds 
available was reduced further on two occasions: first 
in 1976 and again in 1983. In the meantime, the number 
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of obstetric beds available in the DGH was 
progressively increased. The third period began in 1985 
with the temporary closure of the Isebrook GPMU and 
resulted ultimately in its permanent closure in 1986. 
From then onwards there was 'only one element of 
maternity bed provision in the district: consultant 
obstetric wards in Kettering DGH (see Table 10-3). 
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Table 10-0 
The Rate and Pace of Change in the 
Provision of Inpatient MaternityýBeds 
Wycombe Health District 
1970 - 1989 
Year 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
First Period-. 
_ 
Second Period Third Period 
Continuity Revolutionary Change. Evolutionary 
and Then Change 
Continuity 
Centralisation of . Capacity Reduction 
All Consultant . Through Closure 
Obstetric Beds . of All Peripheral 
And Increase In . GPMUs 
Peripheral GPMUs . 
Capacity Through . 
Change of Use of . 
The Old Consultant 
Obstetric Wards 
Table 10-1 
The Rate and Pace of Change in the 
Provision of Inpatient Maternity Beds 
Oxfordshire Health District 
1970 - 1989 
Year 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
First Period Second Period 
Evolutionary Change Evolutionary Change 
Excess Capacity Voluntary 
Reduction Closure and Conversion 
Initiatives of GP Maternity Beds 
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Table 10-2 
The Rate and Pace of Change in the 
PrOVi3ion of Inpatient Maternity Beft 
Milton Keynes Health District , 
1970 - 1989 
Year 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
First Second: Third 
Period Period. Period 
Continuity Revolutionary Continuity 
Change. 
CenýralisaLon 
" of 
All Peripheral 
" Units. 
Table 10-3 
The Pace and Rate of Change in 
inpatient Maternity Bed Provision 
Kettering Health District 
1970 - 1989 
Year 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 
First Period Second Period Third Period 
Continuity Evolutionary Change Continuity 
Increasing 
Consultant Obstetric 
Capacity 
And Then 
Reducing 
GP Maternity 
Provision 
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The Districts' Responses to the Central Policy 
The first point to be made concerns the 
variability of local strategies. Again, caution must 
be taken in drawing general conclusions from the small 
sample of 
-districts 
which may not be typical. The 
evidence clearly indicates that compliance with the 
national policy has not been homogeneous nor 
automatically secured across districts. This suggests 
that the local health authorities hav e had significant 
potential influence and discretion for autonomous 
action over the character, volume, or distribution of 
the local services they have chosen to provide. The 
best example lending weight to this point is, perhaps, 
provided by the Oxfordshire health authority where the 
officers, in collusion with the local GPs and the 
Regional Medical Officer, have decided to develop the 
district small community hospitals and, as a result,, 
preserve their GPMUs. 
The discretion of the local health authorities in 
implementing policy change has now been established 
from a whole series of research studies and writing on 
the relation between the centre and the periphery in 
the NHS (Mackenzie, 1979; Hunter, 1979,, 1980,1983; 
Haywood and Alaszewski, 1980; Ham, 1981; Gray and 
Hunter, 1983; Allen, 1985; Tomlinson, - 1988; Gunn, 
1989). The clear message of these studies is that in 
areas of agreement both the DHSS and the health 
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authorities move quickly together whilst in areas of 
disagreement, and particularly on the issue relating to 
medical priorities, the power of the local authorities 
will generally prevail. Having reviewed the literature 
on the relationship - between the DHSS , and the health 
authorities, Allen (1985) concluded: 
11 it seems that health authorities are 
anything but the mere creatures of the 
Secretary of State. They have considerable 
independence and vitality which is due not 
only to the members and officers of the 
authorities,, but also to the power of the 
medical profession ... In terms of finance, 
the centre is most effective. The DHSS 
through setting resource allocation and wage - 
and price levels centrally does have 
considerable power. In terms of setting 
medical policy, the centre is less effective. 
It 'is here there is greatest 'conflict. The 
centre can lead health authorities where they 
want to go. If the periphery does not want to 
go, then it will prevaricatell(p. 60). 
The evidence reported in the present research 
indicates that' although the DHSS policy was more than 
merely symbolic, little direct attempt was made by 
central government to -induce compliance and impose its 
will on the district investigated. DHSS policy was 
permissive rather than mandatory. In Hunter's (1979,, 
1980) wordsl the DHSS policy was primarily 
"contextuating rather than prescriptive" (p. 45):, 
"Outside the field of major capital 
expenditures, central influence is largely 
geared to dealing with classes of local 
issues rather than with specific local 
issues. In short, most central control is 
contextuating rather than prescriptive - the 
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centre is primarily concerned with setting 
contexts for local operations through 
formulating generic policy positions" 
(Hunter, 1979, p. 45). 
Even at the district level, the closure of 
peripheral GPMUs had a relatively low visibility. This 
was particularly true in Oxfordshire where the officers 
were too busy implementing major change in acute and 
priority services to raise the issue of GPMUs and spend 
managerial time and energy on a potential controversy 
with the medical staff involved. Perhaps the influence 
and discretion for autonomous action over the local 
services is not so evident in larger, more central 
change, such as the implementation of "Working for 
Patients". Theoretically what this means is that local 
discretion might vary according to change content 
investigated. However, much of the analysis of 
organisational relations in policy implementation in 
the NHS as well as in other public services have been , 
so far, "policy-free" (Fudge and Barrett, 1981, p. 271) 
in the sense of disregarding the specific subject 
matter and intention of policy as a factor affecting 
the process and outcome of implementation. 
The preceding discussion has not sought to argue 
that environmental forces and top-down pressures - for 
change were totally ineffective in securing change at 
local level. Further analysis of the diary of, change in 
maternity bed provision (Figure 10-0) across the 
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districts reveals two periods when, although change was 
not always --successfully implemented,, the issue was 
concurrently on the active change agenda of - all 
districts investigated : 1976 to 1978 and 1982 to 1986. 
In reviewing the evidence it is clear, therefore, that 
from the DHSS point of view - these periods can be 
sensibly labelled as "periods of high levels of change 
activity" (Pettigrew, 1985, p. 446). 
Recalling the evidence of Chapter five, each of 
these periods-can be associated with changes in the UK 
economic fortunes and their effects upon public 
spending in Britain. Both periods were preceded by oil 
shocks followed by rapidly increasing inflation (Smith, 
1984) and both periods took place against backgrounds 
of recovery from recessions (Whittington, 1989). More 
significant, perhaps, is the fact that both periods 
featured substantial cuts in public expenditure so that 
pressure for closure became more tangible (Bramley and 
Stewart, 1981; Small, 1989). Finally the pattern of 
change between low and high level of innovation 
activity matches the ideological shifts in emphasis 
between permissive local discretion at one extreme and 
firm central control at the other in the evolution of 
DHSS relations with the local health authorities during 
the period covered by the present research (Hunter, 
1983; Allen, 1985). 
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Thus, the overall momentum for implementation 
seems to have been influenced by environmental forces 
and top-down policy pressure. Butr the trigger effect 
of those broad forces and pressures were, in 
themselves, insufficient to create the will for 
implementation at district level. The evidence shows 
that, in addition, specific local disturbances were 
also required (Table 10-4). The districts that closed 
their GPMUs over the period investigated did so 
primarily in order to deal with specific local problems 
and to seize local opportunities. 
The closure of the peripheral GPMUs investigated 
was essentially reactive as opposed to proactive, 
meaning that the district officers attempted to deal 
with the issue after a local occurence requiring action 
or a response which could not be avoided. Of all the 
proposals issued for formal consultation over the 
period of the research only one was essentially 
proactive: the unsuccessful proposal to close the 
Amersham GPMU in Wycombe. The overall pattern was for 
implementation to be precipitated by local events 
bringing a renewed consciousness of the national policy 
which then was mobilised by the officers to enhance 
legitimacy for the closure. This was particularly true 
in the case of the closure of the Bletchley GPMU and 
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Westbury Maternity Home by the Milton Keynes DHA (see 
Chapter eight)'. 
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Table 10-4 
The Specific Triggers for Consultation 
on Closure Proposals in the 
Districts Investigated 
Year Trigger Type, 
DISTRICT 
GPMUs 
WYCOMBE 
Stone 1974 Council road work opportunity 
Shruberry 1983, Opening of DGH wards Opportunity 
Amersham 1983 DHA Operational Plan Opportunity 
1986 Space for Developing Problem 
a Readaptation Unit 
OXFORDSHIRE 
GPs' decision to 
Bicester 1980 stop providing the Opportunity 
services 
Brackley 1983 Retirement of Senior Opportunity 
Nurse 
Abingdon 1978 Review of services Problem 
1981 Review of services Problem 
1986 Financial Crisis Problem 
1988 Capital Opportunity Opportunity 
Relocation PRU 
MILTON KEYNES 
Bletchley 1982 Commissionning DGH Problem 
Westbury 1978 Boundary changes Opportunity 
1982 Up-grading work Problem 
KETTERING 
Corby 1976 
Isebrook 1986 
Opening DGH wards 
Financial Crisis 
Opportunity 
Problem 
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Thusy it is by no means clear that the maternity 
bed provision strategies of the districts investigated 
were primarily guided by the shining star of the 
current national policy. The conventional wisdom that 
implementation is an automatic follow-on from policy 
decisions is ýchallenged by the evidence, reported. 
Rather, the present research supports the view that the 
local health authorities have considerable power of 
discretion in implementing DHSS policy. 
Policy and Strategies: Concluding Summary 
The first section of this chapter has investigated 
the districts' responses to central -government- policy 
over the period from 1970 to 1989. The main themes of 
the preceding discussion can be summarised as a set of 
simple statements: 
Compliance with national policy has been 
neither homogeneous nor automatic. This 
has been attributed to the power of 
discretion of the districts in 
implementing policy change, as well as 
to the 11contextuating rather than 
prescriptive" (Hunter, 1979) status of 
the policy itself. 
Two periods of "high level of change 
activity" (Pettigrew,, 1985) in the 
districts' provision of in-patient 
maternity beds have been found: (1) 1976 
to 1978; and (2) 1982 to 1986. These 
periods were linked to UK economic 
downturns and with their associated 
effects on public expenditure, as well 
as on the centre -periphery relations in 
-the NHS. 
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Environmental forces and top-down policy 
pressure for change were, however, 
insufficient to create the will for 
implementation at local district level. 
A mixture of such broad forces, and 
pressures, and specific local problems 
and opportunities was necessary to 
trigger off the implementation process. 
The overall pattern was for 
implementation to be precipitated by 
local problems and opportunities 
followed by a renewed consciouness of 
the national policy which was then 
mobilised to enhance the legitimacy of 
the closure proposals. 
The depth, rate and pace of implementation clearly 
differ across the distric:. -ý investigated., The next 
section starts by reviewing the elements of the 
literature on rate and pace of change before revealing 
the common patterns in the closure processes. 
The Rate and Pace of Change Across Districts 
The f irst point to be made, as stated earlier in 
this chapter, concerns the variability of local 
strategies. Following on from this, the second 
important point to be made concerns the variability in 
the processes of implementation across the districts 
investigated. The analysis indicates that apparently 
similar districts can adopt quite different service 
strategies, rate and pace of change at micro- 
implementation level: Wycombe increased significantly 
its maternity bed provision in peripheral GPMUs before 
undertaking to close them all following the 1982 
CHAPTER TEN - IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS Page 439 
Reorganisation. Oxfordshire held onto virtually all 
its peripheral maternity units concentrating on excess 
capacity reduction initiatives, staffing innovation, 
and conversion. Milton Keynes radically transformed 
its maternity bed provision by centralising all 
peripheral beds at the opening of its DGH in 1984. 
Kettering adopted a more piecemeal and gradual approach 
alternatively increasing its consultant obstetric beds 
and then phasing out its peripheral maternity beds. 
Clearly, the rate and pace of change, if not the final 
policy goal, varied across apparently similar 
districts. 
This theme of variability in depth, rate and pace 
of policy implementation across districts was also 
found in the CCSCIs research at the Warwick Business 
School. According to Pettigrew et al (forthcoming) 
there is neither a strong social science tradition nor 
a great welter of empirical studies seeking to describe 
and explain differences in the rate, pace, and depth of 
change. They present Kanter (1983) and the works 
carried on at the CCSC (Pettigrew and Henry, 1991; 
Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991)-as important contributors to 
the debate on depth, pace, and rate of change in 
varying localities. 
Kanter (1983) argued that some features of 
structure and culture are broadly facilitative or 
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inhibitative to the processes of creating innovative 
change in organisation. She distinguished between, on 
the one hand, integrative structures and cultures which 
are supportive of change processes and, on the other 
hand,, segmentalist structures and -cultures which 
encourage an antichange style of thinking and problem- 
solving. The latter feature compartmentalised 
problems, control and ownership of ideas, secrecyt 
bureaucratic hierarchy and rules as well as -finely 
divided structure with clear levels, status, and 
functions. In contrast, the integrative structures and 
cultures feature holistic problem solving, ý team work,, 
mechanisms for idea generation and circulation, clear 
sense of direction, and a drive for' leverage and 
experimentation., The stability of key actors 
championing change and the processes of bargaining and 
negotiation which can raise support and increase the 
legitimacy for change are found to be the complementary 
conditions for the delivery of innovation.,, '' 
Kanter's (1983) distinction between integrative 
and segmentalist structures and culture is, even in her 
own words, directly akin to Burns and Stalker (1961) 
dichotomy of organic and mechanistic organisations. In 
the present research, the contrast in pace and fate of 
implementation, particularly' between the roughly 
integrative structure and culture in Kettering# and the 
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initial segmentalist structure and culture in Wycombe# 
tends to support Kanter's (1983) thesis. The contrast 
between the failure of the first proposal and the 
success of the second proposal - to - close the Amersham 
GPMU in Wycombe health district can also, be interpreted 
in terms of move from a segmentalist to an integrative 
structure and culture, continuity of key actors, and 
skills of the champions for change- ideas in managing 
the processes so as to 'raise support and increase the 
legitimacy for change. 
Pettigrew and Hendry (1991) investigated the 
motors and barriers to training and, human , resource 
change in organisations. The overall- pattern, -is for 
pressure in the outer context of the - firms, and for 
competitive pressures in particular, to increase 
leading to business strategy changes which in * turn 
highlight human resource deficiencies and the 
consequent human resource change. However, the single 
effect of business strategy changes in itself was found 
to be insufficient to secure sustained training -and 
human resource change. Three other complementary 
factors were also found necessary: (1) the 
external/internal labour market; , (2) an , internal 
champion for human resources as , well as the 
availability of the appropriate systems, philosophies, 
and management organisations; and (3) external human 
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resource stimuli and support, including 
'funding. 
Pettigrew and Hendry (1991) found that although 
training can have an impact on broader, more strategic 
activity, for most firms it is often looked upon as 
simple routine decision-making: "training represented a 
tap which could too readily be turned on and off" 
(p. 33). This theme of managerial perception and 
choice is another point which is echoed in the'present 
research particularly in the light of the Oxfordshire 
health authority case-study (see Chapter seven). 
Pettigrew and Hendry (1991) indicated that addressing a 
broader range of human resource issues such'as career 
development, OD, and culture change processes -is, 
perhaps, the most effective way to cement attention to 
training in organisations.,, ý 
Another analysis as to why rate and pace of change 
differ in contrasting contexts is given -by Pettigrew 
and Whipp (1991). They found an observable- difference 
in the way higher performing firms managed strategic 
change from their counterparts over time. In the higher 
performing firms, change is the result of uncertain, 
emergent, and iterative process. There are no grand 
blueprints for long term success or quick fixes for 
immediate salvation. The process- -relies on the- 
development and use of less immediately visible 
capabilities called "intangible assets" (p. 26). 
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"Intangible assets - include knowledge about 
markets and technologies and how to exploit 
them, as well' as brands and reputation for 
quality of products, services and human 
resources. However,, the most fundamental 
intangible assets, and those most linkable to 
competitive performance-are organisational 
capabilities to learn and change" (p. 1) 
Firms 'that can develop such capabilities will' be able 
to' 'grasp'' opportunities quickly. -The' building process 
itself is, ' 'however, measured in 'years' 'rather than 
months. II" 
The ability of firms to learn - and'adapt' over time 
relates to a set, of f ive interrelated factors which 
provide high energy , around 'change which in turn 
contribute to corporate performance: - (1) environment 
assessment; (2) leading change; , (3) 'linking strategic 
and operational' change; (4) human resources as assets 
and liabilities; and (5) coherence. According to 
Pettigrew et al (forthcoming) the process and factors 
evident in higher performing commercial firms hold good 
in the DHAs processing high change, agendaý. --, 
"All 'five of the factors are echoed -In our higher change districts, and there are clear 
parallels between the private sector 
observations of the change process as 
uncertain, emergent,, and iterative and what 
we have observed in the NHS'I (P. 12) 
Pettigrew et al (forthcoming 1991) ý indicated that 
although the 1980s were marked by sustained top-down 
pressure to change, many central policies in the NHS,, 
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including priority services, were being ý, only 
"falteringly implemented" (p. 1), at DHA level. The 
CCSC study - shows - that districts -f acing similar 
environmental and policy . pressures , 
behave dif f erently 
at times in achieving outcomes. Pettigrew et al 
(forthcoming- 1991) suggest -that the different 
experiences of DHAs, reinforce one of the fundamental 
arguments that 'context may be, a, critical shaper of 
process. They, argue that the differences in the rate 
and pace of change across DHAs reflect the differential 
receptivity of the local context, for change. Pettigrew 
et al (forthcoming 1991) conclude that: 
"the management of change is likely- to be 
contextually very sensitive; that there is no 
quick fix or simple recipe; and that there, is 
no one way in such a pluralist organisation 
- forthcoming,, as the NHSII (Pettigrew et all 
p. 2) 
The features of context which, according to 
Pettigrew et al (forthcoming 1991), seem to be 
favourably associated with forward movement include: 
(1) the quality and coherence of policy; (2) the 
simplicity and clarity of goals and priorities; (3) the 
availability of key people leading change; (4)- a 
supportive organisational culture; and (5) the f it 
between the district's change agenda and its locale; 
(6) the managerial clinical relations; (7) the 
cooperative 
- 
interorganisational networks; (8) the 
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intensity and ý, scale ý of -long term environmental 
pressure. Although acknowledging that there, may be a 
link between, the criteria of receptivity and the 
content of the change issue or agenda,: Pettigrew et al 
(forthcoming 1991) do not, however,, contribute further 
to this debate, leaving it-to further work to test the 
robustness of their findings. -, .1 
The first five -factors mentioned above are echoed 
in the present research., Clearly,, the- quality and 
coherence - of the -proposal generated, at , local level. 
appear to have been %influential. Probably the best 
example that it is not enough to ýtake a dated central 
policy "off the shelf " to , secure implementation at 
local level is the f ailure of the Wycombe DHAI s-f irst 
proposal to close the Amersham GPMU. , The second 
factor, the simplicity and clarity of goals and 
priority, is also confirmed. , The ability, of -the 
officers to reduce the problem and-to-uphold a clearly 
focused cause is-- well illustrated, -particularly by the 
closure of the Abingdon GPMUýin Oxfordshire, as well as 
by the closure of the Isebrook -GPMU in Kettering. The 
third factor,,. - the availability of key people leading 
change, is best illustrated by the closure of the, 
Amersham GPMU in Wycombe. The leaders lacked-the 
bureaucratic, as well as the political, ýskills to 
implement the first proposal whilst, the new Chairman 
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and the DGM provided the necessary complementary skills 
to succeed the second time. The fourth factor, a 
supportive organisational culture ''for 
change, is 
evident in the Oxfordshire case-study where_ the 
openness to innovation and the district officers' 
belief in the virtue of the, clinical approval dominated 
the, implementation process. The, f ifth f actor, the f it 
between the district's change agenda and its locale, is 
also confirmed particularly in Wycombe as well as in 
Milton Keynes case-studies where competing population 
centres struggle for the health services. 
The remaining three 'factorst the managerial 
clinical relations, the cooperative interorganisational 
networks, and the' irýtensity and scale of long term 
environmental pressure, seem less "important in th Ie 
present research than in Pettigrew et al (forthcoming 
1991) study. - These differences can be ýattributed to 
the types of service change investigated, by each 
research. The CCSC study addressed the "implementation 
of a number of current major strategic changes whilst 
the present research investigated the'implementation of 
change falling within the , categ'o' ry, 
ýof "middle 'range 
decision-making" (Hunter,, 1980,, p. 6). The former are 
likely to be more sensitive to environmental change 
and, therefore, to be triggered by intense and large 
scale environmental pressure (Pettigrew,, 1985; Tushman 
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and Romanelli, - 1985) than the latter*', ' This suggests 
that the criteria of context receptivity 'are closely 
related to the content of the change issue 
investigated. 'The 'manageri'al clinical- interface is 
likely to be more critical in implementing change in 
acute services than, for instance, in priority groups 
sector,, whereas a cooperative interorganisational 
network is, perhaps, more important in implementing 
changes in priority group sectors than in maternity 
services. 
Closing the "Implementation Gap": A Common Pattern 
The GPMUs that have been described in the 
preceding f our chapters were all, as far as the DHAs 
are concerned, successfully closed by 1991. The 
conceptual starting point of our analysis is that the 
achievement of change objectives could be explained by 
the interplay between the content of changet the 
context of change, and the process of change 
(Pettigrew, 1985). Keeping that in mind, the next 
section of this chapter analyses the narrative accounts 
presented in detail in the preceding chapters and 
highlights the factors and features which contributed 
to the districts' success in closing their 
"implementation gap". 
A set of three interacting factors, derived 
inductively from the research,, seem to have a 
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meaningful effect on the "implementability" of the 
proposals: (1) the nature of the DHA; (2) leading 
implementation; (3) the quality of the local proposal. 
These factors are detailed in Figure 10-1. 
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rigure 10-1 
Some Important Features and Factors 
in Implementing the GPMU 
Closure Proposals 
Nature 
of the 
Locale 
Leading 
implementation 
Quaiity of 
Local Proposal 
I THE NATURE OF THE LOCALE 
Objective: 
a Geography 
b Competing Centres 
C Major Hospital Sites 
d Population Changes 
e Strength of the CHC 
f Networkof Local Groups 
g Socio-economic Structure 
h Marginal Constituency 
Subjective: 
i- Local Opinion 
j- Timing 
k-- Past Mobilisation 
1- Culture and Beliefs 
m- Public Attitude 
11 LEADING IMPLEMENTATION 
a- Diversity of Leadership 
b- Sharing the Leadership 
c- Leader/ Champion 
d- Team Support 
e Strategies 
and Tactics 
Enforcing 
" Arbitration 
" Temporary Closure 
Legitimating 
" Setting Climate 
" Reducing Services 
Negotiating 
" Expectations 
" Opportunity Costs 
" Combinings 
Development and 
Retrenchment 
III QUALITY OF THE LOCAL PROPOSAL 
a- Soundness of the National Policy 
b- Facts and Arguments at Local Level 
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(I) The Nature of the District 
The nature of the district was "found to have an 
impact on the implementability of the closure proposals 
investigated. The main features of the locale are 
twofold: (1) objective, and (2) subjective., Of the 
former, the most important elements are: the geography 
of the district,, the number of competing centres of 
populations and the major hospital sites in the 
districty the pace and rate of change in the structure 
of the local population, the strength of the local CHC 
and its access to wider support- from the local network 
of interest groups, and the socio-economic structure of 
the district. 
The difficulty of implementing the proposals also 
depended on the way the local population perceived 
their situation. The more subjective elements include: 
local opinion concerning health services, the timing of 
the proposal versus the national climate of opinion on 
the management of the NHS, the history of mobilisation 
around health care as well as other local issues, the 
culture of the locality, the attitude of the local 
population towards their local hospitals, and the local 
MP's political security in his constituency. 
The impact of the locale on the implementation 
processes and outcomes has also been reported by Korman 
and Simons (1978), Hardy (1985), and Pettigrew et al 
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(forthcoming 1991). Korman and Simons (1978) 
highlighted the, ef f ect of the local culture on the 
difficulty to implement closure in a community 
geographically separated from other health services: -, 
"Although consultation 
bodies revealed doubts 
which the local area 
services,,, - the local 
thought it was, and thi 
opposition" (p. 173) 
with other statutory 
about the degree to 
was receiving poor 
community certainly 
s was the basis of its 
They also stressed the influence of the local MP and 
the political nature of closure: 
"The local MPs constituted another external 
force. Right from the outset they were 
formative in initiating and continuing a 
dialogue with the RHB, over proposals and- 
decisions concerning Poplar. The fact that a 
Labour government was returned in February 
1974 facilitated the influence they had, for 
it allowed three Labour MPs from traditional 
Labour areas to plead a special case with a 
Labour Secretary of State. This point. 
emphasises the highly political nature of the 
question of Poplar closure" (p. 175) 
According to Hardy (1985), environmental factors are 
important in implementing closure, particularly because 
they contribute to the power resources of the different 
interest groups involved. This was particularly 
evident in Wycombe health district as well as in Milton 
Keynes where previous confrontation between the 
population centres involved, provided the opponents to 
the closure of the GPMU with a larger support base than 
it would have had otherwise. Pettigrew et al 
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(forthcoming 1991) argues that, although many of those 
factors may appear beyond management control, the 
awareness of their influence could nevertheless be 
important in anticipation of potential- obstacles to 
change. 
_(II) 
Leading implementation, 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, leadership was also an 
important factor in implementing the closure proposals. 
The best examples are provided by the successful 
proposal raised -by the Wycombe DHA to 'close the 
delivery services in Amersham, and ý-by the successful 
closure of the Isebrook GPMU and children's ward in 
Kettering health district. There can- be little doubt 
from the evidence of the present, research,, as well as 
from other studies on the issue (Behn, 1978; Hardyj, 
1985), that closures are generally uncertain, often 
threatening for those affected by them, and, therefore, 
difficult to implement. II 
"During the process of change conflicting 
interests will come to the fore. It is 
sometimes difficult to summon up and maintain 
the willpower to face up to conflict and have 
the tenacity to implement -decisions. The 
process can, at best, be extremely demanding 
and often apparently unrewarding" (Dennis, 
1980, p. 12) 
In such circumstances leadership is vital to raise the 
necessary enthusiasm to achieve implementation. ý As 
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Stewart (1989) indicated, 
"Leadership is most needed'in changing times, 
when the way ahead is not clear. A good 
leader should both show the way and make 
others feel enthusiastic about following it. 
Change can - then, depending on its nature, 
become positive, exciting and challenging 
rather than discouraging and threatening" 
(p. 3). 
The most striking f eature of leadership across 
the district investigated is that although the 
maternity units were ultimately all successfully 
closed, the ways key people at district level made the 
change happen differ substantially from one, district to 
another. The diversity of leadership was also apparent 
in Pettigrew et al (forthcoming 1991) research on 
change in the NHS. Leadership, they, suggest, is acutely 
context sensitive. The findings of -this, research seem 
to support that claim. 
The central f inding of the present research in 
relation to the leadership process in implementation is 
twofold. First the . leadership behaviour I 
in 
implementation appears to be less -dramatic than often 
pictured in the literature. 'Second, the leadership task 
was generally shared by different individuals within 
the district as opposed . to a single individual 
throughout the process. 
This view that leadership behaviour in managing 
organisational change , has much to do with routine 
processes as opposed to extraordinary episodes of 
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imagination, persistence or skill has also been 
reported by March (1981) as well as by Pettigrew et al 
(forthcoming 1991). As March (1981) indicatedr 
"Simply to describe leadership as, 
conventional and constrained by 
organisational realities, however, is to risk 
misunderstanding its importance. Neither 
success nor change requires dramatic action. 
The conventional, routine activities that 
produce most organisational change require 
ordinary people to do ordinary things in a 
competent way" (p. 575). 
According to Pettigrew et al (forthcoming 1991), the 
tasks of leadership in managing change are about the 
resolution of patterns of interwoven problems and 
require a combination of planning, opportunism and the 
adroit timing of interventions. The-leadership task in 
managing change also involves, according to Stewart 
(1989), developing a strategy,, particularly on how to 
enlist the necessary support for change. 
The idea of sharing the leadership in implementing 
change has also been reported by Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991). They suggest using the term "leading change" 
(p. 27) rather than leadership to contrast the 
collective and multifaced aspect of the process with 
its image of individualism and heroism. 
"The critical leadership tasks in managing 
change appear to be much more fragmentary and 
incremental than the popular images of 
business heroism allow. Leading change 
involves action by people at every level of 
the business" (Pettigrew and Whipp, 
forthcoming 1991, p. 10) 
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In the narrower f ield of leadership in the NHS,, the 
Templeton Series on DGM (1987) and Stewart (1989) 
pointed out that sharing'the leadership can be found 
not only in the relationship between the chairman and 
the general manager but also in groups and sometimes in 
other relationships, particularly with doctors and 
subordinates. 
"The overall lesson for any manager - but 
. particularly a senior one - 
is that there are 
different aspects of leadership and that 
those often will - and should be shared" 
(p. 70) 
The evidence of the present research indicates 
that the proposals to close the 
, 
GPMU were clearly 
decisions by management and suggests that two aspects 
of leadership were more easily shared in implementing 
the closure proposals: championing the proposal and 
leading the closure process. These tasks were 
fulfilled by people of various hierarchical levels 
(Table 10-5). 
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Table 10-5 
Leaders and Champions of Implementation 
DISTRICT 
Proposal 
Wycombe 
Amersham I 
Amersham II 
Oxfordshire 
Abingdon III 
Abingdon IV 
Milton Keynes 
Westbury 
Bletchley 
Kettering 
Isebrook 
Leader 
Chairman 
Chairman 
Planning Adm. 
Planning Adm. 
District Adm. 
District Adm. 
DGM DGM 
As Pettigrew et al (forthcoming 1991) suggest, it 
is often personalities and personal resources rather 
than formal status and rank within the organisation 
that are important. In such a division of work the 
champion provides the vision and points the way forward 
whilst the leader responsibility is to mobilise enough 
support and commitment to action from other members. 
Korman and Glennerster's (1990) analysis of the closure 
of the Darenth Park illustrates that the availability 
of a "champion" is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for successful implementation. 
"It is still unusual in the NHS to find an 
officer willing to step out of standard 
operating procedures and openly take a 
leadership role on a controversial issue. - 
Champion 
Obstetrician 
DGM and DMO 
Community Unit GM,,, 
DT and DMO 
Commissioning Team 
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Without the regional nursing officer who did 
this, the Darenth Park Project would not have 
succeeded ... That was not enough however. More officers needed to meet- regularly to 
chase the progress of multiple parts of the 
project and find solutions to practical 
problems as they arose ... One-of the way in 
which this situation was overcome was to 
bring together a group of people who were 
committed to the Darenth Park Project" (p. 61) 
Pettigrew et al (forthcoming 1991) also found a similar 
pattern in their receptive contexts and stressed the 
leader's task of building a team of officers providing 
complementary assets and skills. 
"It was a critical mass of enthusiasts with 
shared values that was important, rather than 
one individual champion of change. Partly 
this network formed organically, partly it 
was being orchestrated by the Chairman and 
was aided by stability in management, 
tempered by judicious appointments" (p. 21) 
Confronted with conflicting interests and the 
likelihood' of resistance, the key people leading 
implementation ought to take conscious steps to secure 
implementation (Bardach, 1976; Behn, 1978; Ellis, 1983; 
Hardy, 1985; Pettigrew, 1985; Stewart,, 1989; Pettigrew 
et al,, - forthcoming 1991). The analysis -ýof the case- 
studies indicates seven managerial tactics falling into 
three categories or strategies which, although 
considered separately for analytical purposes, were 
often combined by the key people leading 
implementation: (1) the legitimating strategy; (2) the 
enforcing strategy and (3) bargaining/negotiation 
strategy (Table 10-6). The first strategy concerns the 
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use of- "unobtrusive power" (Hardy,, - 1985, p. 17) to 
secure acceptance and quieting possible opposition. 
"Unobtrusive power incorporates the conscious 
use of symbolic power to legitimise desired 
outcomes to the extent that conflict is 
prevented" (p. 20)- 
The two last strategies are concerned with "overt 
power" (Hardyl 1985,, p. 16) being exercised in the face 
of opposition to defeat conflict and achieved results. 
"Overt power refers to the mobilisation of 
resource interdependencies to defeat. 
conflict" (P. 20) 
Table 10-6 
Strategies and Tactics for Closure 
Emerging from the Case-studies 
STRATEGY TACTIC 
-------- ------ 
I 
Legitimating (a) Climate Setting; 
Strategy (b) Reducing Services; 
Enforcing (c) Arbitration; 
Strategy (d) Temporary Closure; 
Bargaining/ (e) Reducing 
Negotiation Expectations;, 
Strategy (f) Opportunity Costs; 
(g) Combining 
Development and 
Retrenchement 
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The three strategies and the seven major tactics 
developed by the health districts investigated are 
concisely described below. 
The Legitimating Strategy 
The legitimating strategy consists of various 
managerial actions primarily intended not to defeat 
opposition but, instead, to mobilise support and to 
prevent resistance from arising in the first place 
(Pfeffer, 1981; Pettigrew, 1985; Hardy, 1985). As 
Pfeffer (1981) pointed out, 
"Power is most effectively used when it is 
employed as unobtrusively as possible. The 
exercise of power and influence is 
facilitated by the -legitimation of the 
decision process, decision outcomes,, and the 
power and influence itself. Most strategies. 
for the exercise of power involve attempts to 
make the use of power less obstrusive, an 
attempt to legitimate and rationalise the 
decision that is to be made as a result of' 
the exercise of the social power of an actor 
in an organisation" (p. 137). 
According to Hardy (1985), implementation is achieved 
by influencing the way, people feel about the physical 
outcomes of closure such that it is deemed legitimate, 
inevitable or acceptable. , Features of intra- 
organisational context and socio-e conomic context can 
be mobilised in order to achieve legitimacy (Pettigrew, 
1985). 
Three specific tactics for mobilising support and 
quieting opposition are particularly well illustrated 
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in the case studies: (1) climate setting; 
(2) opportunity costs; (3) and reducing service levels. 
Climate Setting 
As Pettigrew and Whipp (forthcoming 1991) 
indicate, moving directly to bold actions can be 
costly. 
"Instead,, the prior need is to build a 
climate f or change while at the same time 
raising energy levels and setting out new 
direction to be followed before precise 
action is taken" (p. 10) 
Building within the district a climate conducive 
to change, prior to focusing on the specific issue of 
closure, is probably the most complex- and time 
consuming tactic illustrated in the case-studies. 
According to Hardy (1985) such a'strategy requires,, at 
least, two basic conditions: (1) creating credibility 
for management; and (2) genuine consultation. Here, the 
consultation process is primarily used as a "review 
system" (Korman and Simons, 1978, p. 177) in which both 
proponents and opponents are able to contribute to the 
closure decision-making process: 
"Those who are consulted may go over the same 
reasoning process to ensure that sufficient 
weight has been given to factors important to 
them" (p. 177) 
CHAPTER TEN - IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS Page 461 
A third condition for creating a receptive climate for 
change is to provide legitimate reasons f or closure 
when the proposal is ultimately mooted. 
The closure of the Isebrook GPMU and the transfer 
of the children's ward from Isebrook to-the DGH by the 
Kettering DHA illustrate this tactic and show that it 
can be rewarding. The need for action to be undertaken 
was unchallenged even by the CHC. Although doubts were 
cast on the origin of the district's financial crisis, 
it provided enough legitimacy for both the closure of 
the GPMU and the transfer of the children's ward. The 
need for savings did not provide sufficient legitimacy 
for closing fully the children's ward, particularly 
because of the lack of attention to "the politics of 
timing" (Brewer, 1978) and because medical opinion was 
against it. As Hardy (1985) indicated, 
"Reasons conf er legitimacy, not because they 
are, I in any objective sense, right, butý 
because they are deemed legitimate by the 
group in question. Whereas finance may be an 
appropriate argument in the industrial 
sector, things become much more complex in 
the health sector ... There is, then, no 
absolute right or wrong with many medical 
arguments, and what may be perceived as right 
may simply be those actions which receive the 
largest amount of public approval by doctors 
and consultants. The task of management is in 
selecting appropriate criteria and securing 
visible support" (p. 111) 
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Opportunity Costs 
The concept of opportunity cost rarely enters into 
a public policy debate. As Behn (1978)'indicated, 
"The cost of initiating a new policy, for 
example, is expressed in mere dollars - not 
in terms of opportunities forgone. This is 
even more true when the policy choice 
concerns the closing of a government 
facility. Certainly a more significant 
benefit than mere money ought to be required 
to justify ending a service that, when it was 
institutedj, was considered important and 
essential" (p. 333). 
The second tactic of the legitimating strategy is 
illustrated by the Oxfordshire DHA closure of the 
Abingdon-GPMU. It consists of regularly stressing the 
opportunity cost of keeping the facility open - until 
either an acceptable alternative is found or opposition 
to closure simply disappears, therefore opening an 
opportunity for action. Consultation is then used 
essentially to keep the dialogue going, to assess the 
strength of resistance, and to test the feasibility of 
change. 
Reducing Service Levels 
The third tactic of the legitimising strategy 
consists of using every opportunityj, * as it arises, to 
reduce service levels in advance of the total, closure. 
Such a tactic has also been reported by Ellis (1983): 
"In addition to timing termination efforts 
with favourable conditions, administrators 
are also cautioned to take other preliminary 
steps prior to the actual termination. Some 
CHAPTER TEN - IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS Page 463 
of the most important are: precede the 
termination with negative evaluations of the 
programme; gain the support of superiors and 
warn them of the public outcry that might 
follow the termination and; cushion the blow 
of the termination by reducing the 
programme's service levels well in advance" 
(p. 355). 
Failure to achieve total closure following 
consultation, working parties' reports, and formal 
evaluation of services provide such opportunities. The 
consultation helps in deciding which new level of 
services will be accepted without substantial 
opposition. Both Oxfordshire and Kettering districts 
illustrate the strategy. The latter shows that the 
strategy contributes by creating a sense of 
inevitability and powerlessness among the interest 
groups concerned. Here, the case-studies illustrate 
that the shrinking and de-escalation of the change 
content can contribute in bringing movement into 
previously contentious and deadlocked processes. 
The Enforcing Strategy 
The enforcing strategy consists of-using power and 
legal authority to defeat opposition. Basically,, the 
strategy aims at imposing the closure and can be both 
demanding and of considerable importance. As Pfeffer 
(1981) pointed out, 
"Enforcing one's way over others requires the 
expenditure of resources, the making of 
commitments, and a level of effort which can 
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be undertaken only when the issues at hand 
are relatively important" (p. 4) 
Two specific tactics for enforcing implementation 
are illustrated in the case studies: (1) arbitration; 
and (2) temporary closure. 
Arbitration 
This tactic simply consists of pushing directly 
forward and 'referring the proposal for Ministerial 
Decision regardless of the strength of local 
opposition. The main purpose of local'consultation is 
then either primarily symbolic or,, at best, to-inform 
the various groups involved of the decision already 
taken by the authority. ' Such a strategy proved 
unsuccessful in Wycombe,, particularly because of lack 
of attention to the bureaucratic process of closure, 
the high degree of political mobilisation around health 
care issue in' the district, and the mishandling of the 
closure. It was, however, successful in Milton Keynes, 
where the problems associated with commissioning the 
new DGH provided sufficient legitimacy for the proposal 
to gain the approval of the Secretary of State, despite 
a solid case against closure by skilled opposition. 
Temporary Closure 
The second tactic,, 'temporary closure, also uses 
legal authority to defeat opposition. As stated in the 
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King's Fund (1980) handbook on the administrative 
processes on closures, 
"When there is no time for formal 
consultation on a substantial temporary 
closure or change of use, an authority should 
undertake full consultation immediately after 
the temporary closure has been made if there 
is a possibility that the authority might 
eventually wish.. or be forced, to make the 
closure permanent" (p. 181 emphasis added) 
This tactic consists of closing the facility to assess 
and demonstrate the capacity of the interim 
arrangements to cope with the volume of services. 
Consultation -is then used to inform the various 
interest groups of the thinking of the authority, both 
of immediate action and long term plans. ý Although the 
officers appear to have recourse to the tactic in an 
emergent as opposed to a deliberated way, the temporary 
closure of the , Isebrook GPMU in Kettering DHA 
illustrates this tactic. 
The Bargaining/Negotiation Strategy 
The third strategy is bargaining and- negotiation. 
The central objective is neither to defeate opposition 
nor to prevent resistance arising but to 'get something 
done, albeit at the expense of some of the original 
intentions. As Barrett and Fudge (1981) indicated: 
"Without total control over resourcest 
agencies and the whole implementation 
environment, those wanting to do something 
may be forced to compromise their original 
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intentions in order to get any action at all" 
(p. 21). 
Both proponents and opponents used the consultation 
process in order to reach a mutually satisfactory 
compromise. The transfer of the Isebrook children's 
ward by the Kettering DHA illustrates this particular 
strategy. 
Reducing Expectation 
The first tactic of the bargaining and negotiation 
strategy is to reduce change expectations to known 
acceptable levels before consultation is undertaken in 
order to secure approval. Consultation is then 
basically used to promote managerial good will and to 
create 
_, 
credibility for managers. The closure of the 
delivery services at the Amersham General Hospital when 
the original intent was to close the GPMU altogether 
illustrates the tactic. 
Combining Retrenchment With Development 
Probably one of the most popular tactics combines 
retrenchment with development. Consultation is used to 
promote the new development allowed by the 
retrenchement, thus splitting potential opposition. The 
redevelopment contributes to minimising the impact of 
closure. As Behn (1978) pointed out, 
"Any effort to minimise the impact will 
further reduce the short-run savings from the 
closing, but it can also help reduce the 
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political resistance. Those who receive 
direct benefits will be mollif ied,, and 
political leaders who believe the closing is 
inevitable may, if they have a real 
opportunity to influence the transition, 
devote their energies to planning for the 
future rather than resisting the closing" (p. 
336) 
Examples of this strategy are the provision of 
additional community beds in Abingdon as well as the 
provision of a RRU in the space vacated by the GP 
maternity beds in Amersham. 
Table 10-7 indicates the primary tactic adopted by 
each of the four districts investigated. 
Table 10-7 
Primary Tactic Adopted by the District' '-- 
DISTRICT 
. Proposal 
WYCOMBE-DHA 
. Amersham I 
. Amersham II 
OXFORDSHIRE DRA 
. Abingdon 
MILTON KEYNES DHA 
. Bletchley 
. Westbury 
KETTERING DRA 
. Isebrook GPMU 
. Children's ward 
TACTIC OUTCOME 
Arbitration Failure 
Reducing Expectation Success 
Opportunity Costs Success 
Development Success 
Arbitration Success 
Climate Setting Success 
Negotiation Success 
The central f inding in relation to the closure 
strategies is that there are no simple universal rules. 
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Although the strategies and tactics vary across 
districts,, all of them, ultimately,, were closed. The 
detailed analysis of -the case-studies made earlier in 
this chapter indicates that the general approach to the 
implementation adopted by each district also varies. 
That suggests that the choice of a particular approach, 
as well as the efficiency of a particular strategy or 
mixture or group of strategies, is highly context 
sensitive. 
The question then becomes: in which contexts do 
the strategies seem to be appropriate? Again, the main 
limitation of-this research relates to its small sample 
size, drawn from a single and not typical health 
region: the Oxford RHA has been a' "laggard" (Rogers, 
1983, p. 249) in closing its GPMUs. Caution is 
therefore required in addressing this question. 
Nevertheless, evidence indicates that bargaining and 
negotiation can be a suitable strategy where both the 
objective and the subjective features of the locale 
are, on the whole, not conducive to the closure of the 
facility. This, perhapslýis best illustrated in Wycombe 
health district where the attempt to enforce total 
closure failed but the trade up of the- delivery 
services for a rheumatology and readaptation unit 
succeeded. 
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In contrast,, the enforcing strategy and tactics 
may be appropriate when both the objective and the 
subjective contexts are generally conducive to closure, 
yet resistance is manifested by some individuals. The 
best evidence is provided by Milton Keynes. There was 
certainly a great deal of activity designed to prevent 
the closure in the small market town of Newport Pagnell 
where the objective and the subjective features of the 
locale were not favourable to closure of the Westbury 
Maternity Home. 'The conditions in the district as a 
whole were, however, clearly more conducive to 
implementation and the opponents failed to take the 
issue out of the small local arena. 
The aim of the legitimating strategy is to set a 
more conducive context in anticipation of the closure. 
The evidence, particularly in Kettering, indicates that 
the strategy is appropriate when at least some of the 
major objective and subjective features of the locale 
are already conducive to closure andt therefore, can be 
mobilised by the people leading implementation. In 
addition, strong leadership seems essential and 
continuity of leadership desirable because knowledge of 
locale is, perhaps, then at its best. 
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Ellis (1983) corroborated this finding: 
"Each termination effort was initiated by 
administrators who sincerely believed that 
they had made the best decision given the 
scope of their responsibility and the 
limitation of their resources. What they 
failed to realise,, of-course, was that all- 
aspects of an issue cannot be reduced to 
'dollars and cents'. As a result of their 
lack of attention to the more intangible 
aspects of the mounted patrol,, the 
administration was not sufficiently sensitive 
to the wants and needs of Miami taxpayers. 
Had there been greater continuity of the 
administration during this period, the 
officials would have undoubtedly realised 
that they were 'beating a dead horse', so to 
speak, that this was not an issue they should 
have addressed. Instead,, they aggravated a 
no-win situation. " 
These conditions were also reported by Hardy (1985) in 
two of her case-studies where similar legetimating 
strategies were used: Camerons, a chemical factory, and 
Midville, a small cottage hospital. In the 'f ormer 
case-study the factory was situated in a built-up area 
next to a hospital and it was considered wrong, even-by 
the employees themselves, to make chemicals with so 
many people around, in case of an accident. 
"The key factors in this case study are the 
appointment of Oppen and his management of 
the closure, including the initial culture 
change which set a firm foundation for a 
consultative approach to the closure ... 
Management was undoubtedly helped by the 
steward's perception of powerlessness, and 
the abdication of the union officials which 
left the stewards in a weakened position. 
Both of these groups found the decision to 
close Montside works acceptable,, mainly for 
environmental reasons. Management was also 
helped by the existence of a non-militant 
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long-serving workforce which was loathe to 
take action against the closure. " (Hardy, 
1985, p. 49) 
The closure of the small cottage hospital also supports 
the findings, particularly with, respect to the place of 
leadership in legitimating strategy. 
"midville was a rapidly expanding market town 
in the Midlands ... It had grown from a rural background and was not associated with high 
incidence of industrial ' activity or labour 
militancy ... The key factors here resolved 
around the existence of a powerful chairman, 
who had the support of management at both the 
area and the district level. He had initiated 
a climate setting exercise, similar to that 
undertaken at Camerons,, several years, beforeý 
the closure, so that a constructive 
atmosphere existed before the closure became 
an issue. once the closure was underway, 
management relied on consultation, 
communication and explanation, again, in much 
the same way as Camerons" (p. 72) 
Further research is clearly needed to establish more 
precisely which features of context are particularly 
influential in closing facilities and when the 
strategies and tactics are especially appropriate. 
The analysis broadly supports the view expressed 
in recent studies (Pettigrew, 1985; -Baier et al, 1986; 
Korman and Glennerster,, 1990; Pettigrew et al, 
forthcoming 1991) that clear indication and strong 
commitment to action coupled with a broad vision as 
opposed to a detail blueprint, at least at pre- 
consultation phase, can contribute by easing some of 
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the implementation difficulties. As Pettigrew et al, 
(forthcoming 1991) indicated: 
"Such broad visions were found to have 
significant process and implementation 
benefits in terms of commitment building and 
allowing interests groups to buy into the 
change process, and allowing top down 
pressure to be married with bottom up concern 
as the f ield gets scripted in rather than 
scripted out"(p. 17). 
(III) Quality and Coherence of the Proposal- 
Together with the nature of the locale and leading 
implementation, the quality of the proposal itself was 
also found important, particularly as the power of the 
district to close the facility is limited. As Brewer 
(1978) indicated, 
"Generally,, it can be said that termination 
demands prior guarantees that changes - to 
programs, institutions,, and affected publics: 
- will leave the aggregate or net situation 
better off. However, the burden of the proof 
for this guarantee resides with those who 
wish to end something, and their evidence, if 
not their relative or situational power, must 
be nearly overwhelming (p. 339). 
The need to develop a solid case f or closure based on 
sound facts and well-reasoned argument is clearly 
supported in the research. Although this point might 
appear a truism, the evidence of the research indicates 
that the data and the rationales for closure were often 
lacking. 
Providing sound f acts - and clear arguments is,, 
however, not an easy task, particularly as the 
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soundness of the policy itself is controversial. As 
Barrett and Hill (1983) and Baier at al (1986) 
indicated, unresolved problems,, and compromise to get 
sufficient support for the policy at macro- 
implementation level are likely to spring back again 
and add further complications at micro -implementat ion 
level. The argument on the safety of the peripheral 
GPMUs is a good example of such an unresolved issue. 
The importance of the quality and coherence of the 
proposal has also been reported in Pettigrew et al 
(forthcoming 1991). They suggest that analytic 
considerations represent, perhaps, necessary conditions 
while sufficient conditions relate to attention being 
paid to processes of negotiation and change. 
The quality of the data substantiating the local 
closure proposals would, perhaps, be less necessary if 
the district officers could implement them themselves 
without having to convince anybody. But the decision- 
making power to close local health facilities is shared 
with a number of conflicting interest groups, 
particularly with the CHC. The situation at local level 
is one of 11behavi oural -interdependency" (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1982): 
"In the case of behaviour interdependence, 
the activities are themselves dependent on 
the actions of another social actor. 
Organising a poker game is an example of 
behavioural interdependence. In order for one 
person to play poker, it is necessary that he 
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or she convince others to participate in the 
game, which involves-having them at a certain 
place at a certain specified time. If the 
others do not cooperate, then the person 
cannot engage in the activity of playing 
poker"(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978f p. 41) 
In order for a DHA to close local facilities, it is 
necessary that the officers-convince the CHC and other 
local groups to close them. 
sharply with the context 
The situation contrasts 
reported by Peters and 
Waterman (1982) in arguing for less "paralysis-induced- 
by-analysis" (p. 49) and more bias for action in 
organisation. 
"Even though these (excellent, - - innovative) 
companies may be analytical in their approach 
to decision making, they are not paralysed by 
that fact (as so many others seem to be). In 
many of these companies the standard 
operating procedure is do it, fix it, try it. 
Says a DEC senior executive,, for example,, 
when we've got a big problem here, we grab 
ten senior guys and stick them in a room for 
a week. They come up with an answer and 
implement it" (p. 13, emphasis is original) 
The point that is being made is important: the role of 
analysis is inextricably linked to the social 
interactive context and processes surrounding it 
(Langley,, 1989). 
"The more decision making power is shared 
between people who do not quite trust one 
another,, the more formal analysis tends to 
become important. Formal analysis - is often 
done to obtain information (as the normative 
literature suggests), but people also use it 
for communication, direction and control, and 
for its symbolic value in conveying messages 
of rationality, concern and willingness to 
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act. Analysis may help to determine the 
content of decisions, but it also acts as 
glue - binding the decisions of different 
individuals together to create an 
organisational decision. To understand the 
role of formal analysis in organisations, we 
must understand how it is related to the 
social interactive context" (P. 342) 
I:, 
The Common Pattern: Concluding Summary 
The second section of this final chapter has 
examined the key features of implementing the closure 
proposals and drawn the common pattern emerging f rom 
the data. As in the first section of this chapter, the 
main themes of the preceding discussion can be 
summarised as a set of simple statements:, 
Three sets of f actors had an ef f ect on the 
implementability of the proposals: the nature 
of the district, leading implementation, and 
the quality of the local proposals. 
The f irst set, the nature of the locale,, 
includes two types of factors: objective and 
subjective. These factors are important 
because they contributed to the power 
resources of the groups involved (Hardy, 
1985). 
The second set of factors ', leading implementation, is also important. The 
central findings in relation to the 
leadership process is twofold: leadership is 
less dramatic than often pictured in the 
literature, it is generally shared by 
different individuals. 
Three strategies and seven tactics used by 
the key people leading implementation were 
identified and concisely described. Further 
research is clearly needed to establish more 
precisely in which context the strategies and 
tactics are appropriate. 
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The bargaining strategy was successfully used 
when both objective and subjective local 
conditions were not conducive to 
implementation. 
In contrast, the enforcing strategy was 
successfully used when both sets of 
conditions were conducive to closure. 
The legitimating strategy seems appropriate 
when at least some of the objective and 
subjective conditions are conducive and can 
be mobilised by the people leading the 
closure. In addition a strong leadership 
appears necessary and continuity of 
leadership desirable. 
Together with the nature of the locale and 
leading implementation the quality of the 
proposal itself was also found important 
because the decision making power of closure 
is shared, particularly with the CHC. The 
role of analysis is linked to the context and 
process surrounding it (Langley, 1989). 
Chapters five to nine add further empirical 
evidence to the existing literature on implementation. 
The next section of this final chapter examines 
empirically the validity and power of each distinctive 
approach as a "single analytical lens" (Van de Ven,, 
1986, p. 597) to investigate implementation phenomena. 
The Theoretical Approaches to - Implementation: An 
Assessment 
In Chapter two, attention was drawn to the growing 
theoretical pluralism in the implementation literature 
reflecting partly the multiple processes concurrently 
at work, partly the variety of contexts and content 
areas investigated, and partly the various theoretical 
frames of reference adopted by the researchers. Care 
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has been taken throughout this dissertation to avoid 
what Pettigrew (1985) calls "premature theoretical 
ethnocentrism" (p. 41),, i. e. to pursue and refine from 
the outset a singular perspective or a particular 
approach dictating relevances in dataF concepts,, and 
hypotheses beforehand. 
"I issued a warning to the reader and myself 
- beware of'the singular theory of choice and 
change. Behind this warning was the obvious 
desire to avoid premature theoretical 
ethnocentrism, especially as I have shown the 
analyst of process does actually have a 
choice of perspective, if not theories, 
available" (p. 41) 
The type of logic is recognisably akin to Glaser and 
Strauss' (1967) "Grounded Theory" suggesting that 
theoretically sound and useful research findings are 
those which are substantially inductive.. out of the 
examination of the data. 
After the empirical investigation made in chapters 
five to nine, the examination of the district responses 
to the national policy, and the search for a common 
pattern in the features of implementing the proposals, 
the time has now come to return to the theoretical 
approaches. 
Without rehearsing comprehensively the arguments 
of Chapter two, it is important in setting the scene 
for assessing the descriptive validity and the power of 
the theoretical approaches to call to mind their key 
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assumptions. Table 10-8 outlines a' metatheoretical 
scheme for classifying the approaches. Two key 
dimensions are evident in the analytical matrix: 
(1) the nature of organisation and, (2) the nature of 
man's behaviour. 
Table 10-8 
metatheoretical Scheme For classifying The 
Approaches and Perspectives to Implementation 
Perspectives: Perspectives: 
Rational planning, Structural Contingency, 
tools, decision-making, nfit" 
ideal conditions, 
operational research 
. Technically 
. Constrained CLASSICAL APPROACH CONTINGENCY APPROACH 
. System 
NATURE 
or 
ORGANISATION 
. Social POLITICAL APPROACH BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH 
. Construct 
Perspectives: Perspectives: 
Bureaucratic, resource Individual characteristics 
dependency, symbolic, strategy-manager, culture, 
inter-organisational, innovation, organisational 
bargaining/negotiation development 
Voluntaristic Deterministic 
NATURE OF MAN 
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The first dimension distinguishes between the 
organisation as a technically -constrained system and 
the organisation as a social construct. The f ormer 
contends that organisational behaviour, is cohesive and 
rationally contrived towards the instrumental 
attainment of goals. The view of organisation as a 
social construct suggests that the system is an 
aggregated outcome of subjectively meaningful 
individual acts (Astley and Van de Ven, 1983). 
The second dimension relates to the models of man 
underlying the theoretical approaches. It uses the 
traditional duality between voluntaristic and 
deterministic views of behaviour. The voluntaristic 
view suggests that individuals are autonomous, 
proactive, self-directing agents capable of adjusting 
the various conditions to meet their ends. The 
deterministic view assumes that people's behaviour is 
determined by exogenous forces and constraints (Van de 
Ven and Astley, 1981, Pettigrew, 1985). 
Table 10-0 shows that both the classical approach 
and the contingency approach assume that organisations 
are technically constrained systems. However, the 
former views human behaviour as voluntaristic whereas 
the latter views it as deterministic. The political and 
the behavioural approaches assert that organisations 
are social constructs. Although there is considerable 
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diversity and . debate between the classical and the 
political approaches, they share a common voluntaristic 
view of human behaviour whereas the contingency and the 
behavioural approaches take up a deterministic view on 
that issue. 
The Classical Approach 
The various perspectives of the classical approach 
adopt the rational-analytical view of intentional 
process and outcome. In the main the approach rests on 
the assumptions that formulation and implementation are 
two discrete entities with implementation the means of 
putting well-thought-through intentions into effect. 
The proposal is selected among a number of alternatives 
which are formally assessed through rational debates. 
Once formulated the proposal is expected to be 
automatically implemented through methodical and 
sequential action undertaken by a small group of top 
managers who have the capacity to change the 
organisation, the authority to make the decision, and 
enough influence to obtain compliance. 
Recalling the evidence of Chapter five, there can 
be no doubt that the formulation of the policy and its 
implementation were two discrete entities. On averager 
sixteen years separated the closure of the local GPMUs 
investigated from the national pronouncement. There was 
also a division between formulation and implementation 
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at local level-. Here, the split between formulation and 
implementation can clearly be linked to the statutory 
requirement to produce a consultative document before 
closing the health facility. 
Evidence that the outcome of the implementation 
process does not always match the original formulated 
intentions can, however, be found in all four districts 
investigated. -It is particularly true in Wycombe 
where, at the time of the first proposal, the re- 
opening of the Amersham GPMU was obviously not the aim 
pursued by the district officers, neither was the 
closure of the whole GPMU the expected outcome of the 
second proposal. Another example is the series of 
proposals to close the Abingdon GPMU in Oxforshire. 
Ironically, it was during a period when the closure of 
the maternity unit was considered undesirable by the 
district officers that it was- finally ''achieved. 
Similarly, the proposal to close the Isebrook GPMU was 
implemented in spite of the district stated intention 
in its Strategic Plan to retain it. 
There is evidence that the process also does not 
always work as intended. The RHA decision not to 
support the change of use of the Bletchley GPMU in 
Milton Keynes,, as well as the delay prescribed by the 
Secretary of State in achieving the centralisation of 
all maternity services in the new DGH, also illustrate 
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that the implementation process is often not working 
entirely as intended. 
The evidence suggests,, however, that the initial 
intentions were not as carefully analysed and well- 
thought-through as the classical approach suggests they 
should. Again, the classic case is provided by the 
Wycombe DHA. The first proposal to close the Amersham 
GPMU is perhaps the most ý obvious example giving 
evidence to this point: the national policy was simply 
taken off the shelf by the consultant obstetricians who 
championed the closure regardless of the performance-of 
the maternity unit and local circumstances. Although 
the intention of the 'second proposal was more 
thoroughly investigated, At is clear, in retrospect, 
that the officers were over-cautious in their proposal 
to close only the delivery services. In any- case the 
second proposal was clearly not the outcome of a formal 
assessment of numerous alternatives through rational 
debates but the result of various political 
compromises. The closure of the Isebrook children's 
ward provides another example of a proposal based on a 
faulty analysis. The officers appear to have made a 
mistake, even in their own words, in assuming that the 
children using the facilities did not need hospital 
care. 
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The relatively large number , of unsuccessful 
closure proposals in all four districts investigated 
illustrates clearly that intentions are not 
automatically implemented. Although the district 
officers had the authority to make -the proposal,, the 
evidence indicates that 'they do not' necessarily have 
either the capacity or sufficient influence to obtain 
compliance and to secure implementation. 
In conclusion, the analysis supports the claim 
already made by Allison (1971), Pettigrew (1973,1985), 
Elmore (1978), and Hardy (1985,1986), among others,, 
that the classical approach is not an adequate 
explanation of behaviour and events. The-processes and 
outcomes of implementation were not entirely 
intentional, neither were the intentions carefully 
analysed; alternatives were rarely considered and, 
therefore, hardly assessed through rational debates; 
officers had the authority to make the decision but 
they did not necessarily have the power -and the 
capacity to implement change. Implementation was not 
automatically secured but often resisted, 
The Contingency Approach 
The perspectives of the Contingency Approach also 
adopt the rational-analytical views of intentional 
process and outcome. The basic premise of the 
contingency approach is that the top decision-makers 
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have a variety of 'structural f orms and organisational 
processes f rom which to choose in implementing change. 
The key to successful implementation is to rationally 
design an organisational structure together with a set 
of consistent organisational mechanisms which fit, both 
the characteristics of the environment of the 
organisation and the requirements of its strategy., 
The contingency approach does not -*inform the 
present study of implementation f or two main reasons. 
First, the analysis requires a processual theory whilst 
the structuralist perspectives on organisations are 
essentially determinist. They assume that the strategy 
is an optimal solution falling into line with various 
demands dictated by the environment which only permit 
certain ordained outcomes. Strict and instant obediance 
is automatically secured through economic constraints 
and market selection mechanisms. 
Second.. although the closure of a GPMU involves 
more strategic levels of choice than is the case with 
simple routine decision-making,, it does not have the 
magnitude to call for change in the districts' 
organisational structure nor in their organisational 
mechanisms. Therefore, the case-studies do not provide 
the necessary evidence to assess the descriptive 
validity and analytical power of the contingency 
approach. 
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Indirect evidence, howeverl is provided which 
informs the debate between strategy and structure. 
Earlier in this chapter the periods of high level of 
change activity have been associated with the shifting 
emphasis towards firm central control in the evolution 
of the DHSS relations - with the ' local health 
authorities. These periods featured major change in 
structure and/or in organisational mechanisms at 
national level which, in turn,, have been followed by 
change in local service strategies. 
The Behavioural Approach 
The Behavioural Approach assumes that resistance 
needs to be overcome in implementing change. The way 
change is communicated to people, the participation of 
the people concerned in the decision-making process as 
well as the role and skill of the leaders are all 
critical factors in overcoming resistance to 
implementation. The careful selection of top managers, 
attitude changesl and the rethinking of the 
organisational culture are also advocated as important. 
The empirical evidence reported in the present 
research clearly supports the view that overcoming 
resistance is an important aspect of implementation. 
All the case-studies, including the relatively easy 
closure of the Isebrook GPMU,, feature some sort of 
resistance. However, the most obvious example is, 
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perhaps, the closure of the Amersham GPMU by the 
Wycombe DHA where the f irst proposal was opposed by a 
wide range of interest groups including GPsj the local 
councils, the CHC, and a number of national bodies. The 
case-study clearly demonstrates that resistance can 
increase as a result of managerial mistakes in handling 
the process of implementation. 
A number of case-studies illustrate that the way 
change is communicated to people is important. The 
closure of the Amersham as - well as the closure of the 
Isebrook paediatric ward show the importance of 
analytical soundness in generating the data and framing 
the issue to convince the people likely to resist 
implementation in the district. Pettigrew -et al 
(forthcoming) also provide evidence that# analytically, 
the quality of the data played an important part in 
substantiating a solid case, especially in relation to 
convincing the members of the medical staff. Closure 
that comes as a complete shock may evoke hostile 
reaction and increase the likelihood of resistance 
(Hardy,, 1985). 
Of the four DHAs investigated in the present 
research, Kettering DHA provides, perhaps, the best 
example of "integrative structure and, culturell (Kanter, 
1983; Pettigrew, 1985) and cooperative mode of, problem- 
solving. The closure of the Isebrook GPMU and 
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children's ward illustrates clearly that participation 
of the people concerned in the decision-making process 
had an important part to play in building up the 
commitment from the CHC and allowing other groups to 
buy into the change process. 
All the cases indicate the importance of 
leadership skill in implementation. The best example 
is, perhaps, provided by the contrast between the 
leadership of the first proposal to close the Amersham 
GPMU and that of the second proposal. There is also 
sufficient evidence to support the view that culture 
can play a key part in implementation. This is 
especially evident in Oxfordshire where a strong 
positive self image of being different, an openness to 
innovation, and the officers' belief in the virtue of 
the prerequisite clinical approval clearly dominated 
the process of implementation in the district. 
The behavioural approach appears capable of 
providing a convincing account for some elements of the 
processes investigated in the present research. 
Clearly, there is considerable support for the need to 
overcome resistance. Attention to the analytical 
soundness in generating the data and framing the issue, 
participation of the people concerned in the decision- 
making process, leadership skills have been found 
important factors in doing so. 
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The Political Approach 
The Political Approach adopts a pluralist view 
(Cyert and March, 1963) which not only acknowledges the 
existence of conflictr as the result of different 
interest groups competing from scarce resources, it 
also provides an analysis of why and how it arises. 
Political action is only possible if the 
participants have access to power. The access to power 
is, however, an insufficient condition for success; 
political actors must-also be aware of their power as 
well as to control and use it tactically (Pettigrew, 
1973). They must have the willingness and the ability 
to translate their awareness into effective action to 
make and prevent changes from happening. 
Power can be utilised in two ways: (1) to defeat 
opposition,, and (2) to prevent resistance from arising 
(Pfeffer, 1981; Hardy, 1985). In the former, the 
actors rely largely on resource dependency 
considerations and attempt to impose their decisions 
whereas, in the latter, the actors use symbolism, 
language, belief, and myth to create legitimacy for 
their demands and to delegitimise the demands of their 
potential opponents. 
It is clear from the evidence provided that the 
division of labour tends to create conflict and release 
political energy, particularly in closing health 
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facilities. The most obvious example of confliting 
interest is, perhaps, the split between the DHA and 
the CHC laid down by the NHS regulations. Although the 
DHA has the authority to'close the facility, the CHC 
has considerable power because of its statutory 
obligation to be consulted. Clearlyt the decision of 
the Secretary of State to re-open the Amersham GPMU in 
1985 illustrates it. The Milton Keynes case-study 
demonstrates that both the DHA and the CHC can use 
their power*sources to promote their own interests; the 
DHA was keen to be seen as efficient, particularly by 
the RHA, whilst the CHC was concerned to establish its 
reputation, especially in'public. 
But the DHA and CHC are not the only conf licting 
groups in implementing closure of health facilities. 
The Isebrook children's ward illustrates the power of 
the medical staff in resisting closure promoted by the 
district officers to achieve financial saving. The 
conflict is not limited to the managerial clinical 
relations but also within the medical staff itself. 
Clearly, the frames of reference of obstetricians ýin 
Wycombe and GPs in Amersham differ as to both the 
nature and the safety of delivery process. These 
differences also lead to conflicts. 
The case-studies provide evidence of a number of 
other conflicting groups: the Bletchley GPMU 
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illustrates the conflicting interests, as well as the 
differing time orientations, between the new DRA 
attempting to open its District General Hospital and 
the RHA long term plan for community hospitals; the 
Isebrook GPMU shows the conflicting interests between 
the staff threatened with losing their jobs and the DHA 
in search for savings; the Amersham as well as the 
Westbury give examples of the conflict between 
community groups and local councils and the DHAs. , 
The view that the awareness of power is an 
important condition for success is clearly illustrated 
in the case-studies, particularly in the first attempt 
to close the Amersham GPMU. The most eloquent example 
is, perhaps, the refusal of the local GPs and the CHC 
to agree formally that the consultation over the 
closure of the GPMU had been satisfactory despite the 
RGM's endeavour to get such a statement before 
referring the closure proposal forward to the Secretary 
of State for decision. Although they admitted that the 
outcome of the consultation would not have been any 
different, they refused to give up their power and 
insisted that the formal consultation process had not 
been properly followed, threatening to take action 
against the Secretary of State if the closure was 
approved. 
CHAPTER TEN - IMPLEMENTING THE PROPOSALS Page 491 
Evidence indicated , that, in contrast to Milton 
Keynes,, the opponents in Wycombe were willing to use 
all their power and to offer more than rational 
arguments to keep the maternity unit open. It is clear 
that they had the necessary skills to escalate the 
problem and to mobilise fear for the future of the 
local hospital in the locality to save the GPMU. 
Although the opponents to the closure of the Westbury 
Maternity Home in Milton Keynes also had the skills and 
particularly the power of expertise in the field of 
statistics and population projectionsj, they did have 
the will to use all their power resources to win the 
issue. For instance, they did not search to get 
medical support for their campaign and played down the 
"emotional" reasons for keeping the facility in Newport 
Pagnell. 
The idea that power can not only be used to make 
change but also to prevent it from surfacing is echoed 
in the case-studies. This is particularly clear in 
Oxfordshire where the medical staff controlled -the 
agenda. In this case, staffing innovations were 
introduced and change of use of maternity beds were 
made in order to prevent closure proposals-based on 
savings from arising as decision issues. 
The use of power both to defeat opposition and to 
prevent conflict arising has been discussed in the 
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previous section. The Milton Keynes case-study 
illustrates that legal authority can be used to impose 
closure. In this case, the proposal was simply referred 
to the Secretary of State for approval. The closure of 
the Isebrook GPMU, in contrast, illustrates the use of 
power to reduce the likelihood of opposition. In this 
example the district officers took a number of steps 
over the years to explain the financial position of the 
district, particularly to the staff and the CHC. They 
widely consulted on the selection of actions which 
should be undertaken. Great pains were taken to ensure 
that all the people involved were fully aware of the 
pressures which necessitated the closures. Furthermore 
the officers made sure that the DroDosals were 
justified on the basis of acceptable criteria. The 
explanation for the reasons behind a closure is an 
important element in the management of meaning (Hardy, 
1985). Although the district financial crisis 
resulted,, at least partly from the senior officers' 
lack of financial control, the closure was justified 
primarily due to lack of funding from the RHA and the 
DHSS. At the time the proposals to close the maternity 
unit and the children's ward were mooted, the question 
of funding the NHS was at the top of the national 
political agenda (see Chapter f ive) . The underfunding 
of the health services was a running theme in the 
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national media and, therefore, was deemed legitimate by 
the local population. 
The Approaches to Implementation: A Concluding Summary 
So, which of the theoretical approaches to 
implementation of f ers the greatest value in describing 
and explaining the processes and outcomes investigated 
in the present research. Perhaps, not surprisingly, the 
analysis above indicates that a mixture of political 
and behavioural approaches offers the best potential 
value. There are three main reasons for the findings. 
The first relates to the content of change 
investigated: given the disruptive and threatening 
nature of closure, its prospect is bound to release 
political energy. As Hardy (1985) indicated: 
"There seems little doubt that power and 
politics are likely to play a particularly 
important role in the discussion of closure. 
Political behaviour often features in 
situations in which the existing pattern of 
resource sharing is threatened. One such 
example is major innovation when 
opportunities to seize new resources are 
opened up (Pettigrew, 1973, Mumford and 
Pettigrew, 1975, Mintzberg, 1983). Another 
example is that where resources decrease, 
positions are threatened, and political 
behaviour may become necessary in order to 
safeguard interests" (p. 13) 
The second reason relates to the context of change: 
considering the politicised context in the NHS and the 
requirement for consultation bringing in a number of 
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groups with conflicting goals,, politics is a likely 
result. As Korman and Simons (1978) pointed out, 
"The parochial views of those being consulted 
may give different weightings to particular 
f actors than would management and thus lead 
to different decisions. Participation may 
temper rationality, depending on 
circumstances and strength of opposition. 
Professional groups may,, through local 
practitioner views of acceptable standards or 
through their national , bodies, create 
constraits on management, limiting 
alternatives available. CHCs, because their 
opposition forces the decision on closure to 
the Secretary of State, are able to insist 
that the rationality of a decision be 
scrutinised by those who up to that time have 
not been party to the decision" (p. 182). 
Finally,, the third reason relates to the process of 
closure. -There is a clear need to build up commitment 
and ownership in change. Evidence that overcoming 
resistance is a critical aspect of implementation can 
be found in all case-studies analysed in this research. 
Therefore, the behavioural approach, combined with the 
political approach, offers the greatest value in 
explaining the process and outcome of implementation of 
closure. 
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Summary of the Findings and Conclusion of the 
Dissertation 
This dissertation aimed to study the 
"implementation gap". It reported evidence on progress 
in implementing closure of health services at micro- 
implementation level. Specifically, the research 
developed an historically bound, processuall and 
contextual account of the development and fate of 
permanent closures of General Practitioner Maternity 
Units (GPMU) in four neighbouring Oxford DHAs. 
The major objectives of this study were: (1) to 
illustrate and analyse the process by which the 
"implementation gap" is closed in practice at, micro- 
implementation level and (2) to identify some of the 
potentially important factors which might help explain 
the pace and rate of change differential across health 
districts. 
The key questions guiding the study included: was 
there evidence of variability in the rate and pace of 
implementation in districts facing broadly similar 
policy pressure? what affects the pace of 
implementation? why is it that central ly-f ormulated 
policy is not implemented ipso facto as prescribed? 
why do districts fail or succeed in implementing change 
desirable by the DHSS in the provision of local health 
care services? what affects the "implementability" 
(Quick, 1980) of the GPMU closure proposals? 
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This research has made two main types of 
contribution: (1) theoretical,, and (2) empirical,, as 
summarised below. 
The Theoretical Contribution 
The research has successfully built a bridge 
between organisational theory and public policy 
literature on implementation. A comprehensive review 
of the literature, of interest to both policy 
scientists and organisational theorists, was 
undertaken. Seventeen differing theoretical 
perspectives for studying implementation were 
identified. Simplifying the question as far as 
possible, an original framework for classifying the 
various perspectives was developed and the alternative 
perspectives were clustered into four categories 
inductively derived from the review: the classical 
approacht the contingency approach, the behavioural 
approach, and the political approach. A metatheoretical 
scheme for classifying the approaches and perspectives 
to implementation was further elaborated using two 
fundamental dimensions: the nature of organisation and 
the nature of man's behaviour. 
The four theoretical approaches and their 
perspectives were summarised and their respective 
strengths and weakenesses highlighted and discussed. 
The analytical power and descriptive validity of those 
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approaches were further tested on the basis of the 
evidence of the research. Although it was found that, 
analytically, data played an important part in 
implementing the proposal,, the classical approach was 
dismissed. The rationality of the- closure proposal 
itself does not secure its implementation; it is the 
symbolic value of the process of formulation and its 
outcome which, in conveying messages of rationality# 
concern, and willingness to act, is important in 
enabling intentions to become actions. It was found 
that, because of the distruptive and threatening nature 
of closure, the politicised context and requirement for 
consultation, and the need to reduce resistance and-to 
build up commitment and ownership in change, a mixture 
of behavioural and political approaches offers the best 
potential value in describing and explaining the 
processes and outcomes of implementation investigated. 
A number of important conclusions were made. The 
traditional claim that too little attention has been 
paid to the question of implementation was dissmissed 
as was the evolutionary explanation that the different 
models of implementation represent a shift away from 
the classical approach and a trend towards increasing 
sophistication in thinking about implementation. The 
volume of literature on implementation is now enormous. 
An alternative, and more satisfactory, explanation for 
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the diversity of perspectives was , provided. It was 
argued that, the number of perspectives is partly 
accounted for by the diversity of processes 
concurrently at work in implementing change, as well as 
by the skills and variety of conceptual frames of 
reference of the social scientists who have 
investigated the phenomenon, and by the variety of 
contexts and contents which have been studied by the 
various scholars. 
The research on the implementation of closure in 
the NHS was reviewed to draw 'out what it has to say 
about either the content, the - context,, or the process 
of implementation itself. A critical analysis of the 
research - was then carried out: each study was 
individually summarised,, its contribution emphasised, 
and its major shortcomings clearly pointed out. It was 
found that, although important progress has been made 
since the first study on closure in the NHS was carried 
out only thirteen years ago by Korman and Simons 
(1978), the critical focus has generally been on 
structure rather than action, on RHAs rather than DHAs, 
and on psychiatric rather than on acute and maternity 
services. The present research has focussed on the 
action of the DHAs in implementing closure proposals in 
maternity services. 
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To make further progress towards an, understanding 
of implementation, the present research adopted a new, 
eclectic, and integrative approach: the Contextualist 
approach. one major theme underlying most of the 
results and ideas presented in this dissertation is 
that the outcome of, implementation can be explained by 
the interplay between the content, of the proposal, the 
context of implementation, and the process of 
implementation itself. 
The first and most influential contextualist 
research was Andrew Pettigrew's (1985) study of ICI,, - 
The Awakening Giant. Although other members of the 
CCSC, University of Warwick, have investigated various 
aspects of the management of change, including that in 
the NHS,, the present research is the first to have 
examined it empirically and systematically using the 
concept and language of implementation in the area of 
closure of health,, services. 
The Empirical Contribution 
The research also probed the notion of 
implementation in an empirical sense. The unique 
contribution of the research has been to develop an 
historically bound, processuall and contextual account 
of the development and fate of four permanent closures 
of GPMUs in England during the 1980s. 
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The research provides a contextualist treatment of 
the development of central government policy in the 
maternity services area since the beginning of the 
century. Although other studies,, such as Korman and 
Glennerster (1990) and the CCSC series on the 
management of change in the NHS, have touched on health 
service policy, the present research is, the only 
research of its kind offering -such an extensive 
treatment of the changing policy context under 
investigation. 
Although the aim of the policy has remainded the 
same since the beginning of the century, the policy 
itself has changed entirely from universal home 
confinement to universal hospital confinement and 
centralisation of all in-patient maternity beds in the 
DGH. Change in the policy was found to be generated by 
a mixture of political and socio-economical factors at 
national level combined with specific clinical changes. 
Here, two important findings were made. First, most 
changes in the policy were not radical but incremental, 
although not continuous. Second, policy changes were 
generally reactive as oppose to proactive. One of the 
key features of the current policy is that it , is 
largely based on controversial beliefs that integrated 
GPMUs are safer and more economic than - peripheral 
units. 
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It was further found that the policy has been 
implemented relatively rapidly throughout the country. 
The trend towards closure was precipitated further by 
economic recession. One of the key f indings is that 
the pace of implementation of the policy has not been 
unif orm, throughout the country. Building on the work 
of Rogers (1983), the analysis indicated four groups of 
health regions: the early adopters, the continuous 
adopters, the non-adopters, and the late-adopters which 
includes the Oxf ord health region investigated in the 
present research. 
The study has collected extensive, and in-depth 
information on the implementation of GPMU closure 
proposals in four DHAs. Such detailed and 
comprehensive empirical studies of how local health 
authorities struggled to close the "implementation 
gap", are still rare. It is rarer still for questions 
of rate and pace to be posed in a context of research 
where the content and the outer-context f raming the 
implementation process are similar. The present 
research is one of the few addressing these questions 
and the only research on the implementation of GPMU 
closure proposals in neighbouring and apparently 
similar districts. It adds-, to the data base of a 
limited number of studies which, in the last six years, 
have developed the contextualist approach. In 
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particular, this study also adds further empirical 
case-studies to the CCSC data base on the management of 
change in the NHS (Pettigrew et al,, forthcoming 1991) 
and on the management of closure in particular (Hardy, 
1985; Korman and Glennerster, " 1990). ' It is the first 
to investigate, partial as opposed to total closure of 
hospitals within the context of the NHS. 
The evidence clearly indicated that apparently 
similar districts, although located within the 
boundaries -of the same health Region, can adopt 
different *service strategies and rate and pace of 
change. Compliance with national policy has not been 
homogeneous nor automatically secured across districts. 
This variability indicates that there was substantial 
discretion for autonomous action at local level: the 
conduct of the local authorities was not entirely 
determined by the policy but was found to result from 
processes of local choice. Policy might not always be 
a purely mandatory and prescriptive statement, as much 
of the public administration literature generally 
assumes. 
The analysis of the diary of change across these 
districts indicated two periods of high level of change 
activity: 1976 to 1978 and 1982 to 1986. These periods 
were linked to UK economic downturns and with their 
associated effects on public expenditurej as well as on 
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the centre-periphery relations in the NHS. It was 
found that environmental forces and top-down policy 
pressure for change were, however, insufficient to 
create the will for implementation at local district 
level. No matter what the' strengthýof those forces and 
pressures, they were only efficient in triggering the 
implementation process if the people were willing to 
act. A mixture of such broad forces, and pressures, 
and specific local problems and opportunities was found 
to be necessary to trigger off the implementation 
process. The overall pattern was for implementation to 
be precipitated by local problems and opportunities, 
followed by a renewed consciouness-of national policy 
which was then mobilised to enhance the legitimacy of 
the closure proposals. 
A set of three interacting groups of factors was 
found to affect implementablity and rate and pace of 
change at micro-implementation level. The f irst was 
the nature of the locale. Objective factors, such as 
the geography of the district, the number of major 
competing centres of populations, and the pace of 
Population change, were found to be significant. 
Subjective factors, such as the timing# the culture, 
and the attitude of the local population, also appeared 
to be important. This research supports Hardy's (1985) 
findings that those objective and subjective factors 
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were important because they contributed to the power 
resources of both the proponents and opponents to 
implementation. 
Leadership was also found to be crucial. The 
central finding in relation to leading implementation 
supports the contention that "leadership is acutely 
context sensitive" (Pettigrew and- Whipp, forthcoming 
1991). The tasks in leading implementation were found 
to be less dramatic, more incremental, as well as more 
fragmented than generally thought; evidence of 
leadership sharing as described by Stewart (1989) was 
reported in all case-studies. 
Eight specific tacticsý empirically sound and used 
by the people leading implementation, were found, 
described, and illustrated using the evidence of the 
research: arbitration, climate setting, opportunity 
costsf reducing level of services, reducing 
expectation,,, temporary closuref- incentives, and 
negotiation. These tactics were classified into three 
categories or strategies: enforcing strategyj 
bargaining and negotiation strategy, and the 
legitimating strategy. In the same way that the 
leadership is highly context sensitive, so is the 
effeciency of a particular strategy. Although an 
attempt has been made to specify in which contexts the 
strategies seem to be most appropriate, the research 
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has not, however, been able to assess clearly the 
specific conditions required for the strategies to be 
successful. Further research is therefore required. 
Finally# the quality of the proposals was also 
found to be important. Failure to develop an 
analytically sound proposal and to justify the 
decision, risks increasing the power of the opposition 
and may lead to failure. In the past, the descriptive 
literature emphasising political processes in 
organisation generally has tended to dismiss the 
quality of the decision itselft together with the 
classical rational actor approach. The findings of the 
present research call for the soundness of the proposal 
to be re-introduced in the political analysis of 
implementation. 
This research will not conclude with the 
traditional call for more research. Rather it ends 
where it alL started: with the words from Pressman and 
Wildavsky (1979) which first prompted my interest in 
studying implementation. 
"Implementation is worth studying precisely 
because it is a struggle over the realisation 
of ideas. It is the analytical equivalent of 
original sin; there is no escape from 
implementation and its attendant 
responsibilities. What has policy wrought? 
Having tasted of the f ruit of the tree of 
knowledge, the implementer can only answert 
and with conviction, it depends ... 11 
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APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW FORMAT 
While there was not a specific set of questions 
asked in each of the research interviewsp there was a 
general format for the interviews. The archive 
material phase of the research provided a useful basis 
for asking some specific questions regarding the 
development of the sequence of events. Interviews 
lasted, on average, for about one hour. 
Each interview was initiated with a description of 
the research topic and an indication that other DHA/CHC 
were also participating in the research. 
A The INNER context of iM21ementation 
History Considerations 
What was the history of the district/unit and what 
traditions have built it up? 
Needs Considerations 
What were the particular needs of the district? 
What were the main financial pressures? 
Was there any imbalance in services? 
What was the population that the maternity unit 
served? 
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Was this the same as the catchment population 
designated by the Region for maternity services in 
this district? 
What was the workload? 
Were staffing levels and performance substantially 
the same as that in other districts? 
what changes have occurred? 
Was the-unit used solely for maternity services? 
What was the condition of the buildings? 
Were the resources available for necessary 
improvements? 
Organisational, inter-Relationships 
What relationships did the district have with the 
CHCI the trade unions and any local pressure 
groups? Please provide details of: 
Formal and informal relations between the CHC 
and the District; 
Mechanisms for maintaining these relation- 
ships; 
Perceptions of CHC Chairman and Secretary# 
--their style and degree of competence; 
CHC reactions to recent closure proposals; 
Role of the CHC; 
Climate of industrial relations and level of 
union activity and professional association; 
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Climate of relations with the medical staffi 
Quality of relations with District, parish 
and city councils in the area; 
Who were the key individuals participating in the 
closure of the unit? 
Which members (if any) of the following groups 
were most-significantly involved? 
DHA members 
Consultant Obstetricians 
Local GPs 
Midwives/Nurses 
Trade Unions 
-Local Authorities 
Committees 
*t "Save Campaign" 
Local MPs 
Regional Officers 
How did they form a coalition? 
Which tactics did they use to strengthen their 
position? 
Leadership and "product champion" 
Was there a coherent district leadership style 
(participative# consultativel autocratic)? 
What was your perception of the Chairman/DGM (or 
DMT) style and competence in handling the closure? 
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Who took the lead in focusing attention against 
the closure? Why? 
How would you describe his/her/their style and 
competence in handling the opposition to the 
closure? 
Planning and Evaluation Considerations 
were there any major differences between Regional 
and District strategies? 
What were the main outcomes of the District review 
meeting-which preceded the closure? 
Geographical Considerations 
Were the neighbouring Districts self-sufficient in 
maternity services? 
Which political party was in control locally? 
What was the socio-economic profile of the 
district? 
B The PROCESS (HOW) of Im2lementation 
Antecedent Conditions 
What was the history of closure and change of use 
of health facilities/of maternity services in the 
District? Was the District familiar with the 
closure procedure? 
APPENDIX A- INTERVIEW FORMAT Pago 510 
Were there any unforeseen precipitating (eg crisis 
conditions, financial difficulties) factors for 
closure? 
Was the closure of the maternity unit or of the 
unit ever considered before? 
Were there any rumours of closure or change of use 
at the time of the announcement? 
was any opposition to the proposal expected? Why? 
Were there any favourable conditions for closure? 
The Decision Making Process 
* Identification 
Where did the idea come from? 
Who first brought the situation to general 
attention? 
What was the triggering point (ie the point at 
which so many indicators have accumulated that the 
problem can no longer be ignored)? 
* Development 
How was the situation handled? 
Who was involved? 
Was there much dissent regarding the proposal? 
Who were the dissenters? 
Were a range of alternative options explored? 
How carefully? 
Why was closure chosen? 
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Management of meaning process 
a) the action (labelling, sense-making, 
consensus-building) 
How was the closure presented to the 
public? 
Were there any unthinkable (eg savings, 
need for space, etc) or ready-made - (eg 
end of lease, closure of the whole 
hospital, opening of new facilities, 
etc) justification for the closure? 
How carefully have the reasons for 
closure been worked out? 
Were all the arguments (eg saving,, 
staffing levelst etc) checked out before 
issuing the consultative document? Why? 
Was there any concomitant problem (other 
than maternity) that the closure helped 
to solve? What was the relationship 
between these problems? 
Which labels were used to describe the 
closure (eg closure, transfer, change of 
uset rationalisation, development 
programme, etc) and by whom were they 
usedt and why? 
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Has anything been done in order to make 
the closure more attractive and to make 
the decision acceptable? How did you 
develop support and commitment for the 
decision? 
What was the general feeling about the 
consultation procedure? 
Was the speed of implementation 
important? Why? 
What aids for closure (eg new modern 
additional facilities, new jobs, 
transitional assistance, etc) were 
available to ease the implementation 
process? 
Tactics for Closure 
Time closure to coincide with change in 
political/professional support. 
Precede closure with negative evaluations. 
Promise to provide a superior alternative. 
Gain support of Region and DHSS in advance 
Cushion the blow by reducing (or temporarily 
closing) service levels in advance. 
Coincide with period of fiscal stringency. 
Close the unit quickly. 
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Explain the rationale and emphasise 
opportunity costs. 
Close the unit after a shift in public 
attitudes about it. 
b) the reaction 
Who, formed the nucleus of the opposition? 
What were the main issues at stake and base 
of power available? 
Was there any tradition of conflict and 
militancy in the district? 
At which step have you been involved in the 
process? 
Was it anything in particular which was 
raising the appeal of the unit? 
What were the major arguments against the 
closure of the unit? 
Did you get any backing from the 
professionals involved? 
How did you lobby for support? 
Tactics of Survival 
What did you do (1) to secure support of 
superiors (DHSSj RHA) and other persons of 
prestige, and (2) to secure public support? 
Was a compromise acceptable? Why? 
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C) the transaction 
Was there any formal or informal assessment of the 
negative impacts of confrontation with the CHC/the 
GPs/other groups? 
What were the key negotiation channels and control 
mechanisms? 
What was the general f eeling about going to the 
Secretary of State for a decision on the matter? 
C The CONTENT (WHAT) Implementation 
What are the main characteristics of maternity 
care which could help defining it as a health care 
issue - for example: 
Happy event and successful output; 
Patient's discretion on use of service; 
The correct format for maternity services 
could be important and could dif fer between 
districts; 
Rather common, standard, predictable and 
relatively simple; 
Universal and almost eXCluSively NHS; 
Involved an emergency episode most of the 
time; 
It has a rather high emotional appeal and it 
has 'good press'. 
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Is maternity sidestep part of the problematic 
characteristic of health care analysis? Which? 
What was the particular place of the maternity 
unit closure in the realisation of the District 
strategic and operational plans at the Regionalp 
District and Unit levels? 
What are the various interpretations of the 
guidelines and directives concerning - 
'isolated' vs 'integrated' GP maternity 
Units; 
closure and change of use of health 
facilities 
Was the local commitment to close clear? 
What was the main rationale for closing? 
- Economisers: advocate closing non-essential, 
marginally useful, or obsolete facilities; , 
- Reformers: advocate the establishment of a 
better policy. 
D The OUTER CONTEXT (WHY) of Closure 
What was the impact of the following elements on 
the implementation of the proposals? 
the economic climate and the ideological 
outlook of the government in power; 
the historical development of 
maternity/obstetric services; 
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shifts in attitudesp beliefs or ideology 
about GP maternity service (changes in the 
ideological and attitudinal dimensions); 
national public opinion. 
Bureaucratic Features (interpretation) 
DHSS/Region policy concerning maternity and 
obstetrics; 
The Closures and Changes of Use of Health 
Facilities (Circular HSC (IS) 127); 
The OPCS projections and the norm f or 
provision of maternity beds; 
National and Regional priorities; 
RAWP and Regional distribution policy; 
Policy content and the macro aspect of 
implementation (influence on local delivery 
organisations to close 'isolated' GPMU); 
Development of the planning system and the 
review process. 
Professional Features 
The RCOG and RCGP positions vs GPMUj 
National shortage of nurses and midwives and 
recruiting problemst impact on the District; 
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E The OUTCOME of Implementation 
How successful did the closure proposal turn out 
to be? 
Did it achieve its original objectives without any 
variation or did the original intentions change? 
Were there any unforeseen side-effects to the 
closure? 
Was the speed at which the District moved towards 
implementation satisfactory? 
Would the same decision and implementation 
procedure be carried out again, given the 
information now known? 
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